DO CHINESE UNIONS HAVE “REAL” EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION?

In this article, we use enterprise population‐level data to investigate the effectiveness of Chinese unions in improving employee wage and nonwage compensation. We show that the effectiveness of Chinese unions stems from a “collective voice” face rather than from a “monopoly” face. The empirical findings on the effectiveness of unions are remarkable: unions in the workplace significantly improve employee wage and nonwage compensation, along with employee training. Moreover, the presence of unions within the same region and industry generates positive spillovers for employee compensation. The unions in China do have “real” effects. (JEL J30, J50, J51, K31)     

Two Tales on the Returns to Education: The Impact of Trade on Wages

This paper uses micro data from the Current Population Survey combined with data from the US International Trade Commission and Bureau of Economic Analysis to evaluate the impacts of international trade (import penetration and export intensiveness) on wages with a special focus on the returns to education. Consistent with the literature, our empirical analysis provides evidence that the wage rates of similarly skilled workers differ across net‐exporting, net‐importing, and nontradable industries. Our results add to the literature by showing that the wage gap usually found across importing and exporting industries vanishes for highly skilled workers (workers with college degree and beyond) when we control for the cross‐effect between international trade and education, but the wage gap due to international trade still persists for low‐skilled workers. This finding supports the view that education serves as an equalizer and counterbalances the adverse impact from import penetration on wages of highly skilled workers.     

Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

The responsiveness of industry wages to low‐frequency shocks in Canada

Abstract The first objective of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between low‐frequency shocks to labour demand and average wages on an industrial basis using a Canadian longitudinal data set. We estimate a fixed‐effects model that controls for workers’ unobservable attributes. The second major objective is to extend the existing industry‐based literature by estimating a specification allowing for a comparison between the degree of wage responsiveness of within‐firm stayers and between‐firm movers. The findings indicate that average wages by industry tend to respond positively to low frequency changes in employment, and that there is some degree of wage flexibility within firm‐worker matches.     

Imposing Capital Controls on Credit Unions: An Analysis of Regulatory Intervention in Australia

Abstract ** ** Résumé en fin d’article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resumen al fin del artículo.
: What impacts would minimum capital requirements have on mutual institutions lacking the ability to raise equity capital? Can the response of credit unions to capital controls be explained by internal member bonding? The imposition of capital controls on credit unions by the Australian Financial Institutions Commission is studied as a Box‐Tiao time series quasi‐experiment. Time series intervention and trend analyses are performed on a sample of 150 credit unions over the period 1987 to 1997, together with cross‐sectional regressions of the estimated responses. The results demonstrate that the capital controls had a significant impact on credit union behavior. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the response of individual credit unions is found to be a function of initial capital levels and internal member bonding.     

Unions without rents: the curious economics of faculty unions

Abstract. We show that Canadian faculty unions have had no effect on university revenues, only a small positive effect on earnings, a negative effect on research output, and lead to earnings redistributions across disciplines and ranks. We argue that faculty unions have a negligible positive (and often negative) effect on average faculty wages, because a union that promotes the median faculty member's welfare negotiates wage redistributions and more onerous teaching conditions, despite the negative impact these changes have on research output. Average wages may rise, but only because non‐unionized universities trade off wages against the non‐pecuniary benefits from research and teaching. JEL classification: I20, J51, J54     

UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

Unions and wage inequality: The roles of gender,skill and public sector employment

We examine the changing relationship between unionization and wage inequality in Canada and the United States. Our study is motivated by profound recent changes in the composition of the unionized workforce. Historically, union jobs were concentrated among low-skilled men in private sector industries. With the steady decline in private sector unionization and rising influence in the public sector, half of unionized workers are now in the public sector. Accompanying these changes was a remarkable rise in the share of women among unionized workers. Currently, approximately half of unionized employees in North America are women. While early studies of unions and inequality focused on males, recent studies find that unions reduce wage inequality among men but not among women. In both countries, we find striking differences between the private and public sectors in the effects of unionization on wage inequality. At present, unions reduce economy-wide wage inequality by less than 10%. However, union impacts on wage inequality are much larger in the public sector. Once we disaggregate by sector, the effects of unions on male and female wage inequality no longer differ. The key differences in union impacts are between the public and private sectors—not between males and females.     

MINIMUM WAGES AND HEALTHY DIET

A healthy diet is often unaffordable for low‐income individuals, so income‐lifting policies may play an important role in not only alleviating poverty but also in improving nutrition. We investigate if higher minimum wages can contribute to an improved diet by increasing consumption of fruits and vegetables. Exploiting recent minimum wage increases in the United States and using individual‐level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System we identify the causal effect of minimum wage changes on fruit and vegetable intake among low‐wage individuals in a triple‐differences framework. The estimated minimum wage elasticity of fruit and vegetable consumption equals 0.12. (JEL I12, I18, J38)     

Trade and unions: Does size matter?

Our empirical analysis builds upon the hypothesis that unions are detrimental to a firm's efficiency. Using a rich survey of German manufacturers, we investigate firm-level determinants on the probability of collective wage bargaining with particular focus on the impact of a firm's engagement in foreign markets. An interesting and very robust finding is that exporters are less likely to engage in union wage bargaining. This finding is in line with a pessimistic perception of unions. The negative effect of collective bargaining can be offset by efficiency gains for larger exporters, who can benefit from operation cost saving effects. Size does matter as larger firms export and may find bargaining with a single entity representing the workforce more convenient than bargaining with each worker individually. We are using firm level information on IT investment as instrument for the export dummy and successfully test for the validity of this instrument.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Do workers perceive high wage settlements of craft unions as fair?

In recent years, Germany has experienced an increasing impact of craft unions that negotiate high wage increases for the occupations they represent. This article analyses under which conditions workers perceive such over-proportional wage increases for occupational groups represented by craft unions as (rather) fair. We use a vignette approach, asking respondents for their fairness perceptions of several hypothetical scenarios. The results show that perceptions depend on the burdens of the occupational group, the size of the wage increase, information policies and potential consequences for other groups. These findings are in line with social and organizational justice theories about equity and informational justice.     

WHEN IS A GOOD TIME TO RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE?

I analyze changes in the target efficiency of the federal minimum wage over the past 25 years. Using static simulation methods I find that minimum wage target efficiency is currently close to its 25‐year peak—of the total monetary benefits generated by a 12% increase in the federal minimum wage, 16.8% would flow to workers in poverty. This exceeds the least target efficient year over this period by 4.7 percentage points and is only 0.6 percentage points below the peak. Furthermore, I find a very strong positive relationship between minimum wage target efficiency and the real federal minimum wage. The implication is that, from an efficiency standpoint, a good time to raise the minimum wage is when it is already high. This discovery raises the possibility that the minimum wage increases the employment of low‐skilled poor individuals relative to the employment of low‐skilled non‐poor individuals. Moreover, this discovery may bolster the rationale for an indexed minimum wage whereby it is prevented from falling to less efficient levels. (JEL J21, J31, J38)     

Why Unions Reduce Wage Inequality: A Theory of Domino Effects*

Numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences. I demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy, maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages. Unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages, and still not sacrifice higher wages much, if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency-enhancing wage differences. If these “domino effects” are strong enough, then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage.     

IMMIGRANT RELATIVE WAGES AT THE GREAT RECESSION: EVIDENCE WITH MATCHED EMPLOYER‐EMPLOYEE DATA FOR SPAIN

The article examines relative wages of immigrants in Spain, with a particular focus on the impact of the Great Recession. The empirical analysis is restricted to men and is based on matched employer‐employee microdata and the decomposition techniques of Juhn et al. (1991, 1993) and Fortin et al. (2011). Our results show that the significant native‐immigrant wage gap that exists both in terms of average wages and of differentials along the wage distribution is essentially explained by differences in the endowments of observed characteristics so that, in general, immigrants tend to receive a similar wage treatment than Spaniards with analogous observed attributes. On the other hand, the Great Recession has had a noticeable impact on the relative wages of immigrants, given that the significant increase of the native‐immigrant wage gap observed during the previous expansionary period was mitigated during the economic downturn due to composition effects arising from the severe employment destruction pattern.     

HIGH-INVOLVEMENT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, TRADE UNION REPRESENTATION AND WORKPLACE PERFORMANCE IN BRITAIN

Debates about Britain's productivity performance have often drawn attention to the roles played by working practices and employment relations. In the 1980s and 1990s, trade unions were a prime focus; more recently, attention has turned to high‐involvement management (HIM) practices (also referred to as ‘high‐performance work systems’). We combine the two to investigate the relationships between work organisation, trade union representation and workplace performance. We find that HIM has a positive impact on labour productivity. However, this effect is restricted to unionised workplaces, and seems more readily explained by concessionary wage bargaining than ‘mutual gains’, given the absence of any association with financial performance. These findings raise questions about the universal applicability of HIM as a route to improved workplace performance.     

Strategic Delegation of Multiple Tasks

This paper studies both the owner–manager relationship and the union–firm relationship in a model of unionised duopoly to analyse whether a firm's owner delegates the task of wage bargaining to a manager along with the task of output determination. We also analyse the profit and welfare effects of multiple‐task delegation. It has been shown in the literature that, when there is only one delegation task – output determination – delegation of output decisions to managers leads to lower profits for owners than non‐delegation as pure profit‐maximisation. However, when there are two delegation tasks as in our model – output determination and wage bargaining – we show that owners are better off delegating both tasks than delegating only the output decision or not delegating at all. This result provides a rationale and managerial insight for strategically delegating multiple tasks to managers. Moreover, we show that union utility, consumer surplus and social welfare are all higher when owners do not delegate the task of wage bargaining than when they do. This result suggests that governments implement union contracts that require owners, rather than managers, to negotiate wages with unions in order to benefit unions and consumers and to improve social welfare as well.     

Do Long‐Term Unemployed Workers Benefit from Targeted Wage Subsidies?

We evaluate a wage subsidy program that is targeted at long‐term unemployed workers in Germany. We use an alternative identification procedure compared to empirical studies conducted so far. Exploiting the particular program regulations and large administrative data we estimate the impact of program availability using a regression discontinuity framework. Our results suggest no significant impact of the availability of the subsidy on labor market outcomes of the target group. Even though our analysis lacks some statistical power, our findings do not support the substantial positive effects obtained from matching studies. As our approach does not require observability of all drivers of selection, previous empirical studies justifying government expenditures on wage subsidies based on matching methods should be reconsidered.     

Multinationals,cross‐border acquisitions and wage dispersion

Abstract We examine the impact of cross‐border acquisitions on intra‐firm wage dispersion using a detailed Swedish linked employer‐employee data set including data on all firms and about 50% of the Swedish labour force with information on job‐tasks and education. Foreign acquisitions of domestic multinationals and local firms increase wage dispersion but so do also other types of cross‐border acquisitions. Hence, it is the acquisition itself rather than foreign ownership that increases wage dispersion. The positive wage effect is concentrated to CEOs and other managers, whereas other groups are either negatively affected or not affected at all.     

A tale of two unions: divergent platforms and their constituencies

ABSTRACT

The median voter theorem has regularly been used in economics to represent the behaviour of teachers unions. Little empirical work, however, tests whether this framework is a good fit for teachers unions. We examine voting behaviour in union representative elections between the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers and find evidence of divergent constituencies. We investigate whether the median voter explains the outcomes of elections in 1977–1979. If both teachers unions select the platform desired by the median voter, there should be no systematic differences in voter preferences for unions. We find that these unions were fundamentally different and attracted distinct voting coalitions. The main implication of this study is that researchers should consider these two unions, and their effect on districts, as distinct.