MAINTAINING MARKET POSITION: TEAM PERFORMANCE,REVENUE AND WAGE EXPENDITURE IN THE ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE

This paper investigates the relationship between playing success and commercial success in team sports. Utilizing a data set relating to the English Premier League that combines both financial measures and indicators of playing skills and performances, our empirical analysis is based on three behavioural equations. Our analysis indicates that on‐field success can be directly related to players’ skills and abilities and that revenue is positively related to on‐field success. Wage expenditure is also shown to systematically reflect player skills and performances. One interpretation of this evidence is that investment in players’ skills and ability buys on‐field success, with richer teams becoming ever richer and able to maintain or even build upon success by spending more on players than less successful clubs. To the extent that richer clubs are successful in their objective there is a causal link between revenue earned and competitive imbalance via investments in players. The implications of this tendency within a league are discussed in our conclusion, which also considers the potentially wider implications of our study as they relate to the evolution of firm size and issues of market share.     

THE IMPACT OF ANTISMOKING POLICIES IN KOREA ON QUIT SUCCESS AND SMOKING INTENTIONS

In 2001 and 2002, the Korean government dramatically increased cigarette taxes, anti‐smoking advertisements, and smoking prohibitions as part of an anti‐smoking campaign. This paper examines the impacts of these policy changes by modeling quit success and smoking intentions pre‐ and post‐policy and attributing model differences to anti‐smoking policies. Model results provide evidence that national anti‐smoking policies increased both quitting success and intention to quit. However, the impacts of these policies are uneven throughout Korean society. Females and those who exercise for health maintenance experienced higher quit success. Heavy smokers and high frequency alcohol drinkers stated they are less likely to quit smoking post‐policy. One impact of national anti‐smoking policies is reduced provincial differences among Koreans in both quit success and intention to quit. Future anti‐smoking policies should address the different needs of these groups. (JEL D12, I19)     

THE IMPACT OF LOCAL FISCAL AND MIGRATION POLICIES ON HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND INEQUALITY IN CHINA

We develop and estimate a spatial overlapping generations model with heterogeneous households to study the feasibility of a recently proposed reform of internal migration policies that offers the potential of decreasing inequality within China. We find that this policy change significantly increases the college attainment of migrant children born in rural areas and, therefore, promises to increase the number of high-skill workers. However, it requires significant tax increases to offset the reduction of the positive fiscal externalities provided by migrants.     

EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON URBAN AND RURAL INCOME INEQUALITY

We use three conventional inequality indices—the Gini, the coefficient of variation of income, and the relative mean deviation of income—and the Atkinson index to examine the effect of income tax rates, the minimum wage, and all the major government welfare and transfer programs on the evolution of income inequality for rural and urban areas by state from 1981 to 1997. We find that these programs have qualitatively similar but quantitatively different effects on urban and rural areas. Most importantly, taxes are more effective in redistributing income in urban than in rural areas, while welfare and other government transfer programs play a larger role in rural areas.     

THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE AND THE COASE THEOREM

This paper considers the relevance of the Coase Theorem to the analysis of sports leagues. It is widely believed that there exists an ideal competitive balance between teams in a sporting contest, and that without competitive restraints to redistribute resources championships will be too unbalanced. The paper reviews the empirical evidence on this issue to date, and then examines a model where the outcome may be either too little or too much competitive balance. Empirical evidence from English football suggests that the bias is likely to be in favour of too much competitive balance. The implications for European football in general and the Champions League in particular are then discussed.     

FAVORITISM AND REFEREE BIAS IN EUROPEAN SOCCER: EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH LEAGUE AND THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE

In this paper, we test for, and find evidence of, referee bias in favor of home teams in European football using minute‐by‐minute analysis to control for within‐game events. The context for the analysis is Spain's Primera Liga and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League. We find that the award of sanctions by Spanish referees in the Champions League are not significantly different to those of the referees from other countries and as such are subject to the same sources of bias. In Primera Liga matches where the crowd is separated from the pitch by running tracks, we find that the probability of the award of a yellow card to the home team is higher and that of the away team is lower compared to matches played at stadia without running tracks. Similar results are found in the Champions League, where efforts are made to hire “neutral” referees. Referee behavior is also influenced by the size of the crowd in attendance. (JEL D8, J2)     

BARGAINING AMONG FARMERS,GOODWILL, AND THE SUCCESS OF COOPERATIVES

A model of concessional bargaining among farmers explains the success (or lack thereof) of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings in the developing regions. Concessional bargaining in day‐to‐day interactions generates goodwill, which helps smoothen future dealings amongst farmers as well as with outside agents. In particular, we model the existence of goodwill amongst farmers as enhancing their ability to collectively bargain with an outside dealer that buys their farm produce. Results suggest that when dealing with each other, farmers offer higher concessions when the risk of loss or reversal in bargaining power is high; however, the level of concession is also influenced by the degree of reciprocity and parameters that affect bargaining surplus. Findings provide further insights over the success of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings where inter‐farmer goodwill dynamics determines the cooperative's bargaining outcomes. Specifically, when farmers generously reciprocate each other's goodwill gestures, it leads to better outcomes through increasing their cooperative reservation price. In contrast, when the degree of reciprocity is lower, or when the risk of bargaining power switching is higher, farmers extract more surplus from other farmers, and this also lowers the cooperative's bargaining outcomes and makes the cooperative arrangement unviable in the long term.     

PRICE SEARCH,CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY AND EXPENDITURE INEQUALITY OVER THE LIFE ‐CYCLE

We differentiate consumption from expenditure by incorporating price search decision into an otherwise standard life‐cycle model. We first analytically show that, under very general conditions, poorer households search more and pay lower prices compared to wealthier ones. As a result, consumption inequality is smaller than expenditure inequality, and the gap between them increases over the life‐cycle. Next, using a plausibly calibrated model, we find that life‐cycle increase in consumption inequality is about 30% lower than the increase in expenditure inequality. Price search provides an insurance mechanism against income shocks and increases the welfare of a newborn by 3.9%.     

THE LORENZ ORDER AND THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION POLICIES

To any finite population of n individuals with associated incomes x ₁…, x _n we can associate a Lorenz curve. By associating this population with a random variable X representing the income of a randomly chosen individual of the population, the concept of a Lorenz curve and the associated partial order (the Lorenz Order) based on nested Lorenz curves is readily extended to be defined in the class of all non-negative integrable random variables. In this context well known results on inequality attenuating and inequality rank preserving taxation policies are found to admit simple more general proofs. Some results on the effects of random taxation are also reviewed. The effects of applying different taxation policies within subpopulations lead one to consider questions regarding inequality attenuation results in mixture settings. It is observed that, more generally, inequality comparisons can be unambiguously made between any non-negative variables even if measured in dissimilar units.     

INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND RENT-SEEKING

This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies.     

WAGE DISPARITY,TEAM PERFORMANCE,AND THE 2005 NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

This paper provides an empirical analysis of salary disparity and team performance in the National Hockey League during the first decade of the twenty‐first century. We find that the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) reduced average salaries immediately after it was introduced but did not change the trajectory of average salaries nor did it alter the salary disparity on the average team. Salary disparity harms overall team performance primarily through reduced defensive performance and this relationship was not altered by the 2005 CBA. (JEL J31, J42, L83)     

TRUST, INEQUALITY AND THE SIZE OF THE CO-OPERATIVE SECTOR: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE

ABSTRACT:  We provide the first empirical evidence on the determinants of differences in the size of the cooperative sector around the world. Our key data have been recently released by the ICA and are integrated with other standard sources, such as data from the World Values surveys. In our empirical work we concentrate on the links between inequality and trust and cooperative incidence and undertake selectivity correction estimates as well as a series of robustness checks. Consistent with theory we find strong support for the proposition that trust plays a causal role in accounting for differences in co-operative incidence. Also consistent with theory, we find support (albeit much weaker) for the role of inequality. Further support for our findings flows from our estimates for conventional, listed firms, where we do not find that trust and inequality play similar roles in accounting for the variation in the incidence of large listed firms across countries.     

要素积累、政府政策与我国城乡收入差距

基于1987—2003年省级面板数据的估计结果显示,一方面,基础教育的普及有利于缩小城乡收入差距,而资金和高水平人力资本向城市集聚则会显著扩大城乡收入差距,这体现了城乡要素积累差异。另一方面,城市化明显地缩小了城乡收入差距,对外开放和财政支出的扩大都拉大了城乡收入差距,这体现了政府政策的影响。     

CORRUPTION AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

In this study we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality. Our analysis advances the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of using one of the corruption indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we minimize the problems which are likely to arise because of data incomparability by examining the differences in income inequality across the United States. Finally, we exploit both time series and cross‐sectional variation in the data. We find robust evidence that an increase in corruption increases income inequality. (JEL D31, D73, I32)     

POLITICAL INEQUALITY,CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS,AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS

Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.     

INEQUALITY,INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS,AND THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS FIRMS*

This article analyzes the effects of intrafirm bargaining on the formation of firms in an economy with imperfect capital markets and contracting constraints. In equilibrium, wealth inequality induces a heterogeneous distribution of firm sizes, allowing for firms both too small and too large in terms of technical efficiency. The findings connect well to empirical facts such as the missing middle of firm‐size distributions in developing countries. The model can encompass a nonmonotonic relationship between aggregate output and inequality. It turns out that an inflow of capital may indeed decrease output in absolute terms.