Broadcasting,Attendance and the Inefficiency of Cartels

The English Premier League is a cartel of soccer teams that collectively sells the rights to broadcast its matches. Despite considerable demand for their product from broadcasters, the clubs agreed to sell only a small fraction of the broadcast rights (60 out of 380 matches played each season between 1992 and 2001). The clubs have explained this reluctance by claiming that increased broadcasting would reduce attendance at matches and therefore reduce cartel income. However, this paper produces detailed econometric evidence to show that broadcasting has a negligible effect on attendance and that additional broadcast fees would be likely to exceed any plausible opportunity cost. The paper concludes that a more likely explanation for the reluctance to market their rights is the failure of the cartel to reach agreement on compensation for individual teams.     

The Housing Market and Real Estate Brokers

The major development in this paper concerns the failure, in earlier studies, to consider interaction between alternative methods of arranging sales in the housing market. A seller may market a house by direct negotiations with buyers, without the intermediation of real estate brokers, or by listing the house with a broker. A rational seller would choose the option which offers the higher expected return on the house. In a sequence of models we argue that the seller's option of a method of sale induces competitive pressure in the choice of the commission rate by the broker. We also consider the split rate in a multiple listing system, ease of entry of brokers and the cartel hypothesis as applied to brokers. We conclude that the competitive pressure of direct negotiations between sellers and buyers, relative free entry of brokers and the inappropri-ateness of the cartel hypothesis cast serious doubt about a general consensus of opinion that the brokerage system is characterized by price fixing, excessive commissions and excessive marketing costs.     

Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee

We extend Green and Porter's (1984) model to considerentry, by studying twoalternative types of incumbent firms' post-entryreactions: cartel breakdownand accommodation of the entrants. We show thatcooperation is more unstableif entry costs are low and if incumbents accommodatethe new firms. We thentest the applicability of the theoretical model tothe type of collusionthat characterizes the nineteenth-century railroadcartel in the US. Theresults provide support for the model predictions.In particular, cartelstability has been found to be negatively correlatedwith the number of firms in the agreement.     

The discontent cartel member and cartel collapse: The case of the German cement cartel

We hypothesize a particular source of cartel instability and explore its relevance to understanding cartel dynamics. The cartel instability is rooted in the observation that, upon cartel formation, the relative positions of firms are often fixed which may lead some growth-conscious members to be discontent. This incongruity between a cartel member's allocated market share and its desired market share may result in systematic deviations and the eventual collapse of the cartel. This hypothesis is then taken to the German cement cartel of 1991–2002. We argue that Readymix was such a discontent cartel member and, using a rich pricing data set, are able to characterize how Readymix deviated, how other firms responded, and how it led to the collapse of the cartel.     

Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus, explore antitrust spillovers, the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms.     

A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports

The centralized sale of TV broadcasting rights in league sports constitutes a cartel which in many European countries is allowed only if it complies with certain conditions set by competition authorities. Two of the most important conditions are: i) partial unbundling, i.e. the rights must be unbundled into several separate packages; and ii) the no-single-buyer rule, i.e. the packages must be sold to different broadcasters. This article shows how a combinatorial auction can be employed to sell broadcasting rights allocating them endogenously based on the broadcasters’ bids and, thus, without requiring the seller to pre-determine the packages of such rights. This feature can address various competition policy issues, including facilitating market entry and preventing coordination among bidders. Also, a combinatorial auction has the potential to achieve higher levels of allocative efficiency and higher revenue levels compared to auctions with pre-determined packages of broadcasting rights.     

Cartel sustainability in retail markets: Evidence from a health service sector

This paper studies the role of cost asymmetries and product differentiation on cartel sustainability by drawing data from a failed retail cartel. Unlike the extensive theoretical literature, little empirical evidence exists on these relationships. First, we analyze cartel compliance and find that players are more likely to comply when cost is symmetric and own cost is high. Next, based on a structural model and counterfactual experiments, we show that a cartel price that satisfies all cartel members does not exist. This result indicates an inherent difficulty of sustaining collusion in retail markets with heterogeneous players. We also show that firm heterogeneities, especially product differentiation rather than cost asymmetries, hinder collusion more. Finally, we derive the level of patience (or the discount factor) required for cartel sustainability when firms split profits based on the Shapley value.     

The bakers of Washington cartel: Twenty-five years later

Craig M. Newmark challenges the findings of a 1965 Federal Trade Commission decision and Economic Report that a price fixing cartel increased bread prices in the state of Washington from the mid-1950s to 1964. Newmark believes prices were higher during the cartel's existence because retailers in the west had higher margins and that bakers in the west had higher wages and higher normal profits than elsewhere in the country. Newmark ignores evidence that the cartel had set the higher retailer margins in Washington and that the labor costs and profits of Washington bakers were not higher than elsewhere. The Washington bakers had inflated distribution costs and excess capacity prior to the cartel's breakup. This result is commonplace when a cartel stimulates costly nonprice competition, so that the higher prices of the cartel members end up primarily in higher unit cost. Finally, Newmark claims that the reason prices fell in 1965 was the entry of a significant size price cutter, not the demise of the cartel. What Newmark characterized as a principal entrant was actually a tiny, two-man operation, with less than a 1.0 percent market share. The record shows that this entrant did not trigger the precipitous price decline occuring when the cartel was destroyed.     

Advantageous Semi-Collusion

The textbook view that cartels increase industry profits and lower consumer welfare ignores the effects of competition in other activities. A revisionist view shows that when cartel members compete in other activities, i.e. when they semi-collude, the cartel members may be worse off and consumers better off. Using a two-stage model in which the non-production activity is R&D and is subject to technological spillovers, we show that both the traditional and revisionist views can be wrong, that consumers and producers can both be made worse off, or both better off, by a semi-collusive production cartel.     

Internal cartel stability with time-dependent detection probabilities

To account for the illegal nature of price-fixing agreements, per-period detection probabilities that can vary over time are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly. The resulting ICCs for internal cartel stability indicate that for discount factors up to 10% per-period detection probabilities of 5% are needed to reduce the number of cartel members by 50%. For the special case of stationary supergames with constant per-period detection probabilities p elegant rules emerge: internal cartel stability requires the discount factor to increase with 100 × p / (1 − p) percent while a fixed fine of 100 × (1 − p) / p percent of incremental cartel profits is required for making the ICC always binding.     

An oligopoly model of ocean liner shipping

In this paper I develop a simultaneous equations oligopoly model of the regulated international ocean liner shipping industry. The firms act as a cartel to determine price jointly and then set their own quality levels to maximize individual profits. The cartel does not attain monopoly profits, because each conference member myopically determines quality without regard for overall cartel profits. The results indicate that an increase in the number of firms in the cartel will increase both cartel price and quality level. An increase in price will also lead to an increase in quality level.I would like to thank Professors Alamarin Phillips, Robert Summers, and Bruce Allen for their helpful comments on earlier research for my dissertation in the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania on which this work is based. I am especially grateful to Professor Lawrence J. White for his encouragement and valuable suggestions at various stages of my work.     

Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia

It is well known that instability is a limit to the formation of cartels, and that some synergies are required to give cartel members an advantage over outsiders. In this paper, we explore theoretically the linkage between cost-reduction alliances (like research joint ventures) and the formation of cartels. The former have negative external impacts on outsiders, while the latter have positive external effects on outside (independent) competitors. We find that when the decisions to join both are made simultaneously the cartel can be profitable and stable for a smaller number of members than previously found for cartel formation alone by Salant et al. (1983, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 185–199). This result follows both for open membership and exclusive membership rules, and suggests a possible anticompetitive impact of research joint ventures.     

Rolling Seas in Liner Shipping

This paper examines the current economic environment and recent legislative changesin the U.S. international liner shipping industry, which has operated under antitrustimmunity for cartel agreements since 1916. Specifically, we address the impact ofthe Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998, which increased cartel enforcementcosts by reducing the transparency of freight rates and mandating that cartel membershave independent contracting rights. Our analysis looks at industry trends andinvestigates whether OSRA has affected cartel membership, contracting practices,horizontal integration, and freight rates.     

Collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly

In the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities. We compare a price cartel with a price-quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former. Output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic. If market demand is sufficiently inelastic, then the cartel faces a trade-off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction. We find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production. In this case, a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable.     

Collusion at the extensive margin

We augment the multi-market collusion model of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) by allowing for firm entry into, and exit from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement: Collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other's markets or territories. We characterise parameter values that sustain this type of collusion and identify the assumptions where this collusion is more likely to hold than its intensive margin counterpart. Specifically, it is demonstrated that where duopoly competition is fierce collusion at the extensive margin is always sustainable. Finally, we provide a theoretic foundation for the use of a “proportional response” enforcement mechanism.     

Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants,consequences, and prevention

We experimentally investigate the determinants of post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC), the effects of PCTC on market outcomes, and potential policy measures aimed at its prevention. PCTC occurs robustly with or without fines or leniency and is determined both by collusive price hysteresis and learning about cartel partners’ characteristics and strategies. As a result, it is also strongly related to the preceding cartel success. PCTC generates a downward bias in the estimated cartel overcharges. This threatens the effectiveness of deterrence induced by private damage litigation and fines imposed on colluding firms based on the overcharge. This bias further increases with preceding cartel stability such that especially more stable sets of colluding firms may be deterred less when PCTC is present. Rematching colluding subjects with strangers within a session prevents PCTC. This indicates that barring colluding managers from their posts could help impede PCTC in the field.     

Stable heterogeneous cartels

We define a nation of cartel stability which allows firms to perceive the impact of their actions on overall competitiveness in the market. We demonstrate that in an industry with linear demand and diverse linearly increasing marginal cost functions a stable cartel always exists. Furthermore, we examine uniqueness and size of such cartels as well as the impact of cost and demand conditions on their characteristics. In particular, we establish that the most efficient firms will be in the cartel while the less efficient ones will remain outside.     

The Soviet burden on the world food system : Challenge and response

Through its disruptive entry into western food markets and its non —participation in global efforts at food policy management the Soviet Union has placed a burden upon the world food system. Dr Paarlberg examines this burden and the US response which has been to seek better information on Soviet agriculture, impose ad hoc controls on food sales and to enter a bilateral agreement in 1975. Three other suggested responses —grain reserves held without Soviet participation, a US wheat board, and a North American export cartel —are discussed. The author concludes that the Soviet burden is decreasing and is best lifted by increasing the free supply available for export. In future. Soviet reliance on food imports may draw it into a greater dependence on the non-socialist world.     

Dark network tensions and illicit forbearance: Exploring paradox and instability in illegal cartels

In this case study investigating illegal cartels, we contribute to our understanding of the dark side of business relationships in three different areas. First, we expand upon the dark side of business relationships theme, by investigating the nature of opportunism in price-fixing cartels and the role of illicit forbearance. Due to their illicit nature, cartels are forced to operate outside legally binding contractual frameworks requiring other ways to facilitate agreements to avoid opportunistic behaviour. Second, our investigation contributes to our understanding of tensions in business relationship settings. Our findings indicate that network tensions are made significantly worse by the illicit nature of cartels, resulting in inherently unstable relationships. Third, in addition to cartels, we argue for a broadening of the scope of the ‘dark side of business relationships towards one that recognises the importance of illicit practices undertaken by marketing managers. This is significant because illicit relationships are often archetypal examples of opportunistic behaviour, which are likely to result in different types of conflict in a business relationship/network context. In the case of cartels, this opportunistic behaviour influences cartel participants, customers, suppliers (not privy to the cartel agreement) and the wider public. Theoretical and practical implications are provided.     

Prosecution and Leniency Programs: The Role of Bluffing in Opening Investigations

This paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the Competition Authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case. I show that the Competition Authority can then exploit firms’ uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even when the case is weak. More generally, I show that offering full leniency allows the Competition Authority to open more successful investigations (what I refer to as the ‘activism effect’ of leniency), which overall raises both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of the model.