Do LGBT‐supportive corporate policies enhance firm performance?

Prior research provides evidence that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)‐supportive corporate policies are related to important human resource functions, such as enhanced recruitment and retention. In addition, prior research indicates that investors view the adoption of such policies positively. We examine the firm‐performance mechanisms underlying favorable stock‐market reactions based on an integration of perspectives from corporate social responsibility and the business case for diversity. Specifically, we estimate a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to account for the nested nature of our data (firms nested within states) and find that (1) the presence of LGBT‐supportive policies is associated with higher firm value, productivity, and profitability; (2) the firm‐value and profitability benefits associated with LGBT‐supportive policies are larger for companies engaged in research and development (R&D) activities; and (3) the firm‐value and profitability benefits of LGBT‐supportive policies persist in the presence of state antidiscrimination laws. In supplemental analyses, we find that firms implementing (discontinuing) LGBT‐supportive policies experience increases (decreases) in firm value, productivity, and profitability. We are among the first to link LGBT‐supportive policies specifically to financial performance outcomes as well as to develop and test a multilevel model of these relationships. Our results have important implications for theory and research on LGBT issues in organizations, human resource managers, and policymakers.     

Balancing board? The effects of board independence and capital on firms offering work‐family benefits

While prior research demonstrates the strategic human resource (HR) advantages associated with offering work–family benefits (WFBs), firms continue to be reluctant in providing their employees with these benefits. Drawing on the corporate governance and stakeholder orientation literatures, this study examines the role of board independence and capital for WFBs being offered in publicly‐traded firms. Our results demonstrate that various director independence and capital attributes are related to the firm offering WFBs. Specifically, board directors who are outsiders, women, and holders of additional directorships, with their broad stakeholder orientation, increase the likelihood of WFBs being offered by the firm [Correction added on December 14, 2017, after first online publication: the preceding sentence has been updated to clarify the findings of the study.]. These findings are of importance to HR practitioners considering the influence that corporate boards can have on the firm's use of HR practices, such as WFBs, that affect all employees, not just the executives.     

The effect of corporate governance on credit ratings: Evidence from China's bond market

This paper examines the association between firms’ corporate governance and credit ratings (both bond ratings and issuer ratings) in China. In addition to considering the financial attributes of bond issuers, we ask to what extent do credit rating agencies consider the corporate governance attributes of issuers? In concept, bondholders are concerned with the financial effects of how corporate governance resolves the agency conflicts between bondholders and managers, majority and minority shareholders, and shareholders and bondholders. We find that corporate governance affects bond issuer credit ratings in China. After controlling for firms’ financial attributes, we find that issuer ratings are positively related to dual‐listing, whether the firm is a state‐owned enterprise, the ownership of the second to the tenth largest shareholder; and negatively related to the relative scale of audit fees. We attribute the positive association between dual‐listing and credit rating to higher quality and transparency of information reported by the dual‐listed firm. The value to bondholders of the implicit government guarantee of debt payments more than offsets the negative association between firm value and being an SOE. Bond rating agencies expect that the change in agency costs with a reduction in the ownership of the largest shareholder benefits bondholders. To credit rating agencies, the scale of audit fees (relative to total assets of the accounting firm) signals interest binding between the client firm and the accounting firm that threatens the independence of auditing and the quality of financial reporting. We also find that bond‐specific attributes: collateral and issue size, are positively related to bond credit ratings.     

Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay‐for‐Firm‐Performance

Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome‐based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay‐for‐firm‐performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. We find that Australian boards exhibiting best practice structural arrangements – those chaired by non‐executives and dominated by non‐executive directors at the full board and compensation committee levels – are no more adept at enforcing CEO pay‐for‐firm‐performance than are executive‐dominated boards. These findings suggest that policy makers' faith in incentive plans and the moderating influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. Our findings also hold significant implications for corporate governance theory. Specifically, the findings lend further support to a contingency‐based understanding of board composition, reward choice and monitoring; an approach integrating the insights afforded by behavioural approaches to Agency Theory and by social‐cognitive and institutional understandings of director outlook, decision‐making and behaviour.     

What drives firms' commitment to fighting corruption? Evidence from the UK

The recent leak of the FinCEN files has highlighted the widespread presence of corruption in developing and developed economies, including the UK. Accordingly, this study aims to investigate the factors that drive companies to implement measures for preventing corruption in developed countries using FTSE 350 nonfinancial firms. Specifically, the research examines the influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments, board structure, and shareholding structure on adopting strategies, policies, and procedures aimed at countering corruption. Drawing upon agency, stakeholder, and legitimacy theories, our empirical evidence supports that CSR commitments and board independence positively influence firms' engagement in anticorruption measures. Conversely, institutional and managerial shareholdings are found to have a negative association with firms' efforts to combat corruption. In addition, the study shows that the effect of board characteristics became more pronounced following the enactment of the UK Bribery Act 2010, indicating risk-averse behavior. Various models, including cross-sectional and two-stage least squares (2SLS), are employed to analyze the data. Our findings have significant implications for understanding the complex relationship between CSR, corporate governance, and the ethical infrastructure of organizations. Ultimately, our results provide valuable insights for policymakers, companies, and other stakeholders in developing effective strategies, policies, and procedures to combat corruption activities.     

Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis

How has the impact of ‘good corporate governance’ principles on firm performance changed over time in China? Amassing a database of 84 studies, 684 effect sizes, and 547,622 firm observations, we explore this important question by conducting a meta‐analysis on the corporate governance literature on China. The weight of evidence demonstrates that two major ‘good corporate governance’ principles advocating board independence and managerial incentives are indeed associated with better firm performance. However, we cannot find strong support for the criticisms against CEO duality. In addition, we go beyond a static perspective (such as certain governance mechanisms are effective or ineffective) by investigating the temporal hypotheses. We reveal that over time, with the improvement in the quality of market institutions and development of financial markets, the monitoring mechanisms of the board and state ownership become more strongly related to firm performance, whereas the incentive mechanisms lose their significance. Overall, our findings advance a dynamic institution‐based view by substantiating the case that institutional transitions matter for the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance in the second largest economy in the world.     

Carbon emissions,corporate governance,and staggered boards

Carbon emissions have been identified as a major cause of global warming and are harmful to the environment. Given the seriousness of climate changes, businesses are encouraged to adopt corporate strategies to improve environmental performance. Staggered boards (or classified boards) are one of the controversial corporate governance devices being employed by corporations that protect managers from the market for corporate control. This paper explores whether staggered boards can be a useful business strategy to improve carbon emissions. Relying on a novel data set in which the presence of a staggered board is identified through advanced machine learning algorithms and textual analysis, we find that staggered boards bring about significantly worse emission performance by 10.67%. Our results corroborate the premise that staggered boards insulate self-interested managers from market discipline and thus exacerbate agency problems, resulting in more unfavorable outcomes. Further analysis validates the results, that is, propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis, and generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimation. Importantly, we include firm fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that de-staggered boards may help improve emission performance.     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文利用上市公司的数据,分析了公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。结果发现:股权集中度国家股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模、治理环境、公司透明度、企业规模与代理成本显著负相关;股权制衡度、领取报酬的董事比例、领取报酬的监事比例、董事会会议次数、股东大会会议次数与代理成本显著正相关;高管持股、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、两职分离与代理成本无显著关系;财务杠杆率与代理成本的关系是混合的;国有上市公司和民营上市公司的公司治理与代理成本之间的关系与总样本基本一致。     

Do Board's Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy and Orientation Influence Environmental Sustainability Disclosure? UK Evidence

The environmental implications of corporate economic activities have led to growing demands for firms and their boards to adopt sustainable strategies and to disseminate more useful information about their activities and impacts on environment. This paper investigates the impact of board's corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy and orientation on the quantity and quality of environmental sustainability disclosure in UK listed firms. We find that effective board CSR strategy and CSR‐oriented directors have a positive and significant impact on the quality of environmental sustainability disclosure, but not on the quantity. Our findings also suggest that the existence of a CSR committee and issuance of a stand‐alone CSR report are positively and significantly related to environmental sustainability disclosure. When we distinguish between firms with high and low environmental risk, we find that the board CSR/sustainability practices that affect the quantity (quality) of environmental sustainability disclosure appear to be driven more by highly (lowly) environmentally sensitive firms. These results suggest that the board CSR/sustainability practices play an important role in ensuring a firm's legitimacy and accountability towards stakeholders. Our findings shed new light on this under‐researched area and could be of interest to companies, policy‐makers and other stakeholders. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

The Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Temporal View

Time plays an important role in corporate social responsibility (CSR) decisions. In the context of time and the boardroom, the consideration of CSR can be affected by board structure. For example, because of considerable short‐term pressures, this study posits that insiders on the board are less likely to prioritize the longer‐term time horizons needed to affect CSR. Following this perspective, a hypothesis is put forth that insiders generally have temporal orientations that are more short term in nature and that they therefore have a negative effect on CSR. A study of 300 of Australia's largest firms confirmed this hypothesis. However, when inside director compensation linked to environmental and social metrics and inside director CSR training are introduced as moderating variables, their interactive effects lead to positive results: both positively moderate the negative insider–CSR relationship in environmental and social dimensions. The study contributes to a temporal view of boards of directors, as well as to corporate governance and CSR. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Outside Directors on Korean Boards: Governance and Institutions

Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines the factors that pressured Korean firms to appoint outside directors to their boards. While this practice could be considered to be a management innovation in Korea, in the Anglo‐American corporate governance system it has long been used as one of several mechanisms to mitigate agency costs between management and shareholders. As such, this response by Korean firms, following the 1997–98 currency crisis in Asia, could be seen as an example of corporate governance convergence on the Anglo‐American model, where higher levels of outside director representation on the board are the norm. We examine the antecedents of having a higher proportion of outside directors on Korean boards. Our findings indicate that larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have higher representation of outside directors on the board. We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of outside directors and business group affiliation, poor prior firm performance, higher levels of debt and foreign ownership.     

Corporate Governance and the Environment: What Type of Governance Creates Greener Companies?

We build on a stakeholder–agency theoretical perspective to explore the impact of particular corporate governance mechanisms on firm environmental performance. Our empirical evidence shows that several important corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, managerial incentives, the market for corporate control, and the legal and regulatory system determine firms' environmental performance levels. These results suggest that these different governance mechanisms resolve, to some extent, the existing divergence of interests between stakeholders and managers with respect to environmental activities.     

Board gender diversity and corporate environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority ownership structures

While prior work has investigated the impact of (a) ownership structure and (b) board gender diversity separately on corporate environmental performance, researchers have not studied the potentially important relationship between ownership control and female board diversity in influencing corporate environmental performance jointly. We do so in the context of majority ownership in family‐controlled and dual‐class firms whose motives and influence are theoretically different from that of the firm's minority shareholders. Drawing on resource dependency, socioemotional wealth theory, and secondary agency theory, we hypothesize that majority family owners and dual‐class owners likely choose women directors to help advance their personal preferences for environmental corporate social responsibility. Our empirical tests utilizing 2,755 U.S. firm years over the 2010–2015 show that, as hypothesized, these two majority ownership types interact with board gender diversity to positively influence corporate environmental performance.     

Reputation and Corporate Social Responsibility Aberrations,Trends, and Hypocrisy: Reactions to Firm Choices in the Stock Option Backdating Scandal

Drawing on strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and reputation theory, this paper examines the market reaction to firm disclosures of involvement in the US stock option backdating scandal. We examine how a firm's prior signals regarding ethical behaviour and values, as demonstrated through CSR initiatives, may both ameliorate and exacerbate market reactions. CSR initiatives may buffer a firm against general wrong‐doing but expose it to greater scrutiny and sanction for related wrong‐doing. Our results show that firms with enhanced overall reputations for CSR are partially buffered from scandal revelations. However, we find that when firms possess an enhanced reputation for CSR associated with corporate governance, violations pertaining specifically to governance are viewed as hypocritical and more harshly sanctioned. We also find lower and negative market reactions for firms that delay but self‐disclose their involvement in the scandal. The study extends the emergent, related literatures on strategic CSR and reputation management, and documents dynamics in the relationship between corporate social and financial performance.     

A Comparison Between One‐Tier and Two‐Tier Board Structures in France

French companies operate in a unique environment characterized by the strong involvement of block shareholders such as families and banks. Furthermore, the French legal system allows firms to choose between a one‐tier or a two‐tier board structure. This study investigates whether this choice can affect the firm's operating and stock performance. Our regression results provide strong evidence that ownership and board structures are used together as corporate governance tools. In particular, the agency cost of debt is strongly affected by their interaction when institutional investors are also bank lenders. Our test results show that while family control has a negative impact on corporate governance, French institutional blockholders play a positive role as monitors of one‐tier structures. In contrast, they are more likely to misuse the two‐tier board system by promoting interlocked directorship, board opacity and their own interests as creditors. Our regression analysis reveals that foreign institutional investors do not have any impact on firm performance, regardless of board structure. Finally, we do not find any inverse relationship between board size and efficiency in France.     

The impact of sustainability (environmental,social, and governance) disclosure and board diversity on firm value: The moderating role of industry sensitivity

Using a large panel data set comprising 812 listed European firms, this study investigates whether sustainability disclosure (environmental, social, and governance) and female representation on boards affect firm value. We observe a positive impact of sustainability disclosure and board gender diversity on firm value, suggesting that the best management practices, enhanced stakeholder trust, and female representation on boards improve firm value. We observe that the firms in sensitive industries achieve superior social and governance performance. We also observe that the firms with higher female representation on their boards present significantly superior environmental, social, and governance performance. Our results are robust to different firm and country specific control variables and to year‐ and country‐fixed effects.     

Why a Multinational Firm Chooses Expatriates: Integrating Resource‐Based,Agency and Transaction Costs Perspectives*

abstract This paper develops an integrative organizational economics framework explaining and predicting multinational firms' managerial resource deployments based on resource‐based, agency, and transaction costs theories. Our empirical findings suggest that the governance decision for managerial services of multinational firms is influenced not only by the comparative capabilities of managers, but also by the economic costs to the firm of influencing the behaviours of managers through managerial contracting.     

Determinants of Conflict Minerals Disclosure Under the Dodd–Frank Act

This paper examines conflict minerals disclosure (CMD) as mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act. We rely on a thorough content analysis conducted by the Responsible Sourcing Network on a sample of 122 firms that filed CMDs with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2015. We document that firms with long‐term oriented incentives, a greater number of board meetings, strong corporate governance systems and inclusion in a sustainability index are associated with higher levels of CMD. Our results suggest that in the presence of enforcement leniency, both internal and external firm‐specific factors affect strategic (non‐)compliance with a mandatory social disclosure regime. We provide implications for supply chain managers, corporate reporters and policy‐makers involved in the adoption of responsible sourcing strategies. © 2018 The Authors. Business Strategy and The Environment published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd     

Does doing “good” always translate into doing “well”? An eco‐efficiency perspective

Does doing “good” always translate into doing “well”? Debate over the “value” of corporate social responsibility is high on the agenda of corporate finance research. Deeper understanding is required on managers' incentives to pursue and implement corporate social responsibility related strategies, as is more thorough comprehension of the effect of these strategies to firms' performance levels as well as shareholder and wider stakeholder valuations of the firm. This paper provides a new lens by approaching the subject from a different methodological paradigm, grounded in the performance benchmarking methods more commonly applied in operational research. In so doing, we provide novel evidence of the effect of corporate choices on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) strategic investment compliance (i.e., doing good) to firms' eco‐efficiency levels (doing well). In brief, our empirical findings suggest that ESG and firm's eco‐performance are nonlinearly related. Specifically, advanced ESG policies and disclosure levels are associated with a positive affect to firms' eco‐efficiency levels, but only up to a point, after which the effect becomes “neutral,” that is, ESG demonstrates a visible pattern of diminishing marginal returns. Thus, we may humbly conclude that a firm may “do well” by doing good, but it is not clear they should ever expect to “do great” just by “doing good.” The threshold at which this “neutrality” appears varies systematically with the characteristics of the sector in which the firm is operating, as well as dimensions of board diversity. Finally, it is evident that ESG implementation choices can be a source of managerial agency problems.