Forestalling capital regulation or masking financial weakness? Evidence from loss reserve management in the property–liability insurance industry

This study examines the extent to which capital thresholds induce insurers to strategically exert accounting discretion to forestall regulatory actions. Using a sample of US property–liability insurers during 1994–2009, we find that when managing their claim loss reserves, the average insurers are insensitive to the pressure of capital regulation as measured by the distance of their RBC ratio to the action threshold. Yet, when the insurers are virtually partitioned by their reserving tendency, the effect of regulatory pressure is significantly related to the downward reserve bias in the under-reserving insurer cohorts. This finding continues to hold even after we utilize the number of ratio violations in the insurance regulatory information systems to purge the financial weakness effect embedded in the distance to RBC bound ratio. Hence, our empirical evidence suggests that insurers that are about to trigger the regulatory threshold will have the incentives to understate their loss reserves to preclude the impending authorized preventive actions. Finally, our analyses also shed light on the heterogeneity of incentives to managing loss reserves among over- and under-reserving insurers.     

The Association between External Monitoring and Earnings Management in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry

This paper examines the association between external monitoring and earnings management by property-casualty insurers. We extend previous work by Petroni and Beasley (1996) by expanding the set of external monitors to include both auditors and actuaries. We investigate whether certain auditor-actuary pairs are associated with less understatement of the loss reserve account by financially struggling insurers. Our data consist of loss adjustments reported by 465 property-casualty insurers for reserves established in 1993. The results indicate that under-reserving by weak insurers is essentially eliminated when the firm uses auditors and actuaries that are both from Big Six accounting firms. In contrast, non-Big Six actuaries have less impact on under-reserving by weak insurers. Our results suggest that the quality usually associated with Big Six auditors falls when the audit firm relies on third party actuaries to evaluate the loss reserve estimates of struggling insurance clients. We conjecture that Big Six actuaries insist on more conservative loss reserve levels because, compared to actuarial consulting firms, they are more attuned to the liability exposure of the auditor.     

Loss Reserves and the Employment Status of the Appointed Actuary

Abstract

Property/casualty (P/C) insurers are required to establish loss reserves for unpaid losses at the time that the loss has occurred or is reasonably expected to have occurred. We examine factors that may impact the accurate setting of loss reserves. These include the level of rate regulation faced by the insurer and the incentives to underestimate or overestimate reserves to improve financial ratios or improve solvency scores, to reduce earnings, to defer taxes, or to smooth earnings volatility in order to meet shareholder expectations. The employment status of the Appointed Actuary, that is, whether the Appointed Actuary is an employee of the firm or a consultant, may also impact reserve accuracy. Using a variety of regression models with data from 1995 to 2010, we examine the impact of these factors on the accuracy of reserves posted by Canadian P/C insurers. Our results provide no evidence of systematic differences in the magnitude or direction of loss reserve errors between insurers that use company actuaries versus those that use consultant actuaries. However, we find that for both consultant and company actuaries positive reserve errors are associated with increases in global stock market returns and decreases in unanticipated inflation. The insurance market cycle impacts reserve errors for company actuaries and not consultant actuaries. As well, our results indicate that as the proportion of short-tailed business increases in a company, consultant actuaries are more likely to over-reserve. Similar to many previous studies using U.S. data, we do not find strong evidence regarding insurers’ incentives to deliberately overstate or understate reserves: Loss reserves are relatively unbiased estimates of the true losses paid. Thus these findings should be welcome news to the actuarial profession in Canada and to the prudential regulator: The Appointed Actuary, regardless of employment status, provides objective and unbiased estimates of insurers’ largest liability.     

Insurer Reserve Error and Executive Compensation

This article investigates incentives of insurance firm managers to manipulate loss reserves in order to maximize their compensation. We find that managers who receive bonuses that are likely capped or no bonuses tend to over‐reserve for current‐year incurred losses. However, managers who receive bonuses that are likely not capped tend to under‐reserve for current‐year incurred losses. We also find that managers who exercise stock options tend to under‐reserve in the current period.     

Leverage and reinsurance effects on loss reserves in the United Kingdom’s property–casualty insurance industry

We examine the relation between loss reserving errors, leverage and reinsurance in the UK’s property–casualty insurance industry. We find that financially weak insurers under-estimate reserves to reduce leverage, and so pre-empt costly regulatory scrutiny. However, at very high leverage, insurers over-reserve, suggesting a non-linear relation between leverage and reserving policy. We also investigate whether monitoring by reinsurers reduces reserving errors, and find that highly reinsured insurers are less likely to make loss reserve errors. However, the use of proportional reinsurance does not affect loss reserve accuracy.     

Property–Liability Insurer Reserve Error: Motive,Manipulation, or Mistake

We use two reserve error definitions found in the literature to investigate the joint impact of previously studied incentives on the magnitude of reserve error. We find many prior conclusions are dependent upon the restricted setting in which the hypotheses are tested and on the definition of the reserve error. We find strong evidence that financially weak insurers underreserve to a greater extent than other insurers. However, our evidence casts doubt on the conclusion that insurers manipulate reserves to avoid solvency monitoring. We also find insurers increase reserves for tax purposes and to reduce the impact of regulatory rate suppression.     

货币政策与银行风险承担

文章基于2013-2017年24家银行的微观数据,实证检验了货币政策银行风险承担渠 道的存在性与贷款损失准备金的调节作用,以及银行异质性特征对商业银行风险承担的异质 性影响。实证结果表明：（1）数量型和价格型货币政策风险承担效应存在,而结构型货币政策 风险承担效应不存在。（2）银行的贷款损失准备可以削弱货币政策对银行风险承担的影响。 因此,本文给出了央行应将银行风险承担状况纳入货币政策目标、实施不同的货币政策组合以 降低风险、监管当局应将贷款损失准备金率指标纳入监管框架的政策建议。     

Disclosure policy choices under regulatory threat

This article shows that firms “voluntarily” increase their disclosures in response to the threat of more stringent disclosure regulations. These disclosures are mostly just sufficient to deter regulation. However, when investment risk is low, both managers and investors might strictly prefer the regulation deterring equilibrium. We further find that in many cases, regulation can only be deterred by asymmetric disclosure behavior of the firms. This suggests that coordination issues and free‐riding may be important reasons why self‐regulation may fail. The results also indicate the importance of considering political pressure and regulatory threats to explain observed symmetric and asymmetric voluntary disclosure behavior.     

The Characteristics and Valuation of Loss Reserves of Property Casualty Insurers

This study examines characteristics and valuation of claim loss reserves of property casualty insurers. Using SEC disclosures of revisions (development) in loss reserve estimates, we document substantial serial correlation in loss reserve development, indicating that reported loss reserves do not fully reflect available information, consistent with management exercising discretion over reported loss reserves. We find that loss reserve development reported one year after the balance sheet date has significant explanatory power for firm value incremental to book value of equity and earnings, suggesting investors at least partially identify management's influence on reported loss reserves, and adjust firm values accordingly.     

Recognition of Reserve Values in the Extractive Industries

An issue that focuses clearly on the difference between market and book values is accounting for reserves in the extractive industries. The primary determinant of the value of a minerals or oil-and-producer is the value of the reserves it controls. Hence, one might expect that managers acting to maximise the value of the firm would try to account for the value of reserves in a credible way. However, we show that financial-statement recognition of reserve values is rare. We review the reasons for the general reluctance to recognise reserve values in financial statements and comment on the few exceptions.     

外汇储备的积极管理:新加坡、挪威的经验与启示

一定规模的外汇储备有助于保持汇率的稳定,保证正常的进口和偿债支出,并能有效应对外部冲击导致的金融风险。但是,中国当前的外汇储备规模已经远远超过了最优规模。本文试图借鉴新加坡和挪威等国的经验,介绍外汇储备的积极管理。新加坡和挪威的经验表明,外汇储备的积极管理可以提高本国储备资产的长期购买力、提升本国的国际竞争力并消除外汇储备增加对宏观政策自主性的影响。在消极外汇储备管理的模式下,中国优化外汇储备的货币结构和资产结构存在一定的局限性。本文对建立中国的外汇储备积极管理体制提出了建议并指出值得注意的若干问题。     

Exchange market pressure and absorption by international reserves: Emerging markets and fear of reserve loss during the 2008–2009 crisis

This paper evaluates how the global financial crisis emanating from the U.S. was transmitted to emerging markets. Our focus is on the extent that the crisis caused external market pressures (EMP), and whether the absorption of the shock was mainly through exchange rate depreciation or the loss of international reserves. Controlling for variety of factors associated with EMP, we find clear evidence that emerging markets with higher total foreign liabilities, including short- and long-term debt, equities, FDI and derivative products—had greater exposure and were much more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Countries with large balance sheet exposure – high external portfolio liabilities exceeding international reserves—absorbed the global shock by allowing greater exchange rate depreciation and comparatively less reserve loss. Despite the remarkable buildup of international reserves by emerging markets during the period prior to the financial crisis, countries relied primarily on exchange rate deprecation rather than reserve loss to absorb most of the exchange market pressure shock. This could reflect a deliberate choice (“fear of reserve loss”) or market actions that caused very rapid exchange rate adjustment, especially in emerging markets with open capital markets, overwhelming policy actions.     

Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? Evidence from recent bank failures

Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. Our evidence suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either economic principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that, in sharp contrast to the economic notion of capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, the positive association of add-backs with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital.     

Interest on bank reserves and optimal sweeping

A key rationale offered by the Federal Reserve for the payment of interest on reserves was to remove the incentive for banks to operate sweep accounts. Sweeping shifts funds from transactions deposits subject to reserve requirements to non-reservable deposits. This paper extends a conventional banking model to analyze sweeping behavior. Sweeping responds positively to increases in bank loan rates and reserve ratios and negatively to increases in the interest rate on reserves or exogenous increases in bank equity. Sweeping generates greater responsiveness in lending to changes in loan rates or the interest rate on reserves and lower responsiveness to changes in reserve ratios or equity than in its absence. Empirical analysis of an explicit condition that we derive suggests that, with an unchanged reserve requirement, the Fed could eliminate sweeping by setting the interest rate on reserves to no less than approximately 4% points below the market loan rate.     

VALUING PUD RESERVES: A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF REAL OPTION TECHNIQUES

Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) tools are fundamental to engineering and financial analysis in the oil industry, are well understood by managers, and generally provide accurate valuations of developed hydrocarbon reserves. Unfortunately, DCF techniques systematically undervalue proven undeveloped reserves (PUDs), may encourage premature development of certain reserves, and fail to identify important risk management opportunities. Real option valuation models overcome these shortcomings by providing a more complete picture of not only reserve values, but also of the drivers of that value.
The authors of this paper collaborated in developing a PUD real option model for a large U.S. E&P company (referred to as "XYZ Petroleum"). Based on an analysis of XYZ's drilling costs and other major inputs over a 12-year period, the authors show that PUDs are rich sources of option value. In addition to the volatility of oil and gas prices, a somewhat more surprising contributor to option value was the lack of correlation (which came as a surprise to XYZ's managers) between development costs and oil prices. During certain periods, the economic value of a PUD was more than twice the NPV estimated by static DCF techniques. In addition to valuing PUDs and explaining why undeveloped reserves are usually valued at more than their DCF value, the model can also be used to tell managers when is the value-maximizing time to drill—or, alternatively, how much value is likely to be forfeited if managers choose to drill too soon.     

以新思维审视中国外汇储备风险

外汇储备是一国国际经济活动往来形成的特殊的外币债权,中国经常项目、资本和金融项目的特点以及热钱的大规模流入决定了中国当前的外汇储备存在一定的不稳定因素。过多的外汇储备必将产生较大的机会成本风险,并且面临着较大且频繁的汇率风险以及境外金融机构倒闭和资产价格波动的风险,给国内的流动性控制和金融调控带来诸多的困难,增加了贸易摩擦的频率。要审时度势,通过加快国内经济结构调整、鼓励走出去、多元化运作储备资产等形式规避中国外汇储备所面临的风险。     

基于Copula-GJR-EVT模型的外汇储备投资组合实证研究

随着我国外汇储备规模的增长,如何实现外汇储备有效管理、降低资产管理风险越来越受到业界关注。本文通过建立Copula-GJR-EVT模型,对外汇储备投资组合进行了实证研究,求得投资组合收益及各资产最优权重。结果表明,外汇储备投资组合可以降低风险,投资能源和有色金属等战略储备,可以成为拓展我国外汇储备投资渠道、促进外汇储备保值增值的合理选择。     

Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm

A government's choice of regulatory stringency can depend on investments that a firm made in earlier periods. The regulated firm may therefore invest strategically, to effect the government's choice of regulation. To reduce its payment of emissions taxes, the firm may therefore reduce emissions below their socially optimal level. In contrast, a firm subject to regulation by quantity wants to reduce the stringency of regulations. A firm which invests little thereby reduces the marginal social cost of reducing emissions, and so can induce government to weaken its regulations.     

高额外汇储备对我国宏观经济的影响及政策建议

从新的外汇体制运行起,我国外汇储备急剧上涨,长年居于世界首位,2013年达到3.82万亿美元,创历史新高。适当规模的外汇储备可以抵御外部经济冲击,但高额外汇储备也增加了资产损失的风险。因此,如何改革使高额外汇储备保值增值,优化外汇储备结构是我们需要思考的问题。     

Disclosure of reserve quantum in the extractive industries

We explore why some firms in the extractive industries disclose mineral reserve quantum in their annual reports and others do not. We propose that the firms' reserve disclosure policies are a function of the extent of information asymmetries, as well as information production, litigation and proprietary costs. More specifically, we propose that a firm's decisions to disclose reserves in the annual report are a function of the stage of the firm's operations, use of project financing, and the cost of measuring reserves. Empirical tests are confirmatory.