平台厂商市场势力测度研究——以搜索引擎市场为例北大核心CSSCI

在双边市场中,交叉网络外部性和非对称定价等特性使得平台厂商的市场份额与市场势力之间的关系变得错综复杂,使用传统市场势力评估方法容易导致误判,而互联网行业中的零边际成本等因素又进一步扩大了二者的差距。基于对勒纳指数核心思想的延伸,本文从平台厂商市场势力的实质入手,构建了一个同时包含市场整体层面和厂商个体层面信息的市场势力衡量指标,从整体角度对平台厂商的市场势力进行衡量,解决了多侧产品、非对称定价等因素对平台厂商市场势力判定的干扰。通过对中国搜索引擎市场的实际检验,本文发现市场份额与市场势力之间具有明显的不对等性,具有最大份额的平台厂商并不具有最强的市场势力,而市场份额很小的平台厂商依然可能具有较强的市场势力。在涉及互联网行业的反垄断执法中,如果过多强调市场份额与市场势力的关系,将有可能忽略实际具有强市场势力的厂商,同时高估大份额厂商的市场势力,由此导致的反垄断执法将不利于市场竞争机制的发挥,也有悖于反垄断的初衷。     

制造业外资进入与市场势力波动:竞争还是垄断

对外资市场效应的评估和计量是处理好外资政策、产业政策和反垄断政策关系的重要问题。本文采用中国1999—2010年28个两位数和447个四位数代码制造业面板数据,首先估计了两位数代码制造业的市场势力水平,然后进一步考察外资进入的市场效应,并测度外资引致的福利变动。研究表明:制造业各行业存在显著的市场势力,但金融危机前后市场势力溢价水平波动较大。全样本结果显示制造业市场势力溢价约为6.2%,但金融危机前样本证实市场势力溢价高达22.1%。细分产业中,外资的竞争效应占主导,但在部分产业中外资表现出了反竞争效应。制造业总体层面上,外资进入与市场势力波动之间呈现U形非线性关系,拐点稳定在外资比重为47.3%—54.0%的区间内。从福利角度看,外资进入的竞争效应,使得垄断带来的无谓损失减少了3334.70亿元;但FDI的反竞争效应使得相应行业垄断福利损失增加2407.45亿元。     

中国工业行业市场扭曲程度的测定

本文将市场扭曲界定为由于市场的不完善所导致的资源配置对帕累托最优状态的偏离,并根据其在生产可能性曲线上的不同状态,把市场扭曲分为三类:技术扭曲、产品市场的价格扭曲、要素市场的价格扭曲。在此基础之上,本文选取1996—2007年的年度数据,建立一个包含全国36个工业部门的Panel Data模型来统一测度我国工业行业市场的扭曲程度,并将数据在时间上划分为三个阶段,进一步研究我国市场扭曲程度随时间变化的趋势。计量分析结果表明:我国工业行业的市场扭曲程度在不同的时间段内差异很大,但总体上呈现出下降的趋势;转轨阶段国有企业的体制变化和国家的产业政策是影响我国市场扭曲的重要因素;由于我国传统意义上的垄断行业形成的特殊性,垄断行业的市场扭曲程度在这三个阶段里并没有发生明显的变化。因此,应通过深化经济体制改革,特别是对垄断行业的企业体制和价格体制改革,以及完善现行的产业政策,建立充分竞争的市场机制,来降低我国工业行业市场扭曲的程度。     

市场势力与规模效应的直接测度——运用新产业组织实证方法对中国钢铁产业的研究

在反垄断与管制过程中,最核心的问题就是对产业市场势力给出直接有效的测定。本文引进近年来发展的新产业组织实证方法(New Empirical IndustrialOrganization),根据中国产业数据的实际进行调整,引入动态的技术进步模型结构,允许企业之间存在生产率差异和规模效应,采用2004—2007年间的面板数据,运用双向随机效应模型GMM估计方法,直接估计了中国钢铁业的市场势力溢价和规模弹性。通过计量得到结论:①目前中国的钢铁产业不存在系统性的市场势力。钢铁产业依然处于完全竞争状态,竞争十分激烈;②传统意义上认为钢铁业所具有的规模效应在中国上市钢铁企业中没有体现,相反中国钢铁产业存在规模不经济的重要特征。     

产品异质条件下市场势力估计与垄断损失测度——运用新实证产业组织方法对白酒制造业的研究

作为政府经济管制和反垄断的基础,市场势力的定量测度以及福利损失的有效估算是至关重要的基本问题。由于产品异质性带来的模型设定陷阱,之前陈甬军,周末(2009)使用的新实证产业组织模型仅适用于测度少数产品差异很小的产业的市场势力。本文在Klette和Desouza的基础上给出了一种更具一般性的,可以在异质性产品市场测度市场势力和垄断损失的方法,克服了不可观测的产品异质性和技术冲击导致的影响。随后,采用全国规模以上工业企业数据库数据,估计了产品差异非常大的白酒制造业市场势力溢价,并以此为依据,计算了由于市场势力溢价带来的福利净损失,验证了模型的有效性和稳健性。计量结果证明尽管白酒制造业市场结构较为分散,但是具有极强的市场势力,2008年白酒制造企业运用市场势力带来的福利净损失高达180.97亿元。     

电信主导运营商价格压榨的竞争效应

在纵向相关市场结构下,电信在位主导运营商的价格压榨行为是一种恢复纵向垄断市场势力和获取纵向一体最大化垄断利润的策略性行为,它会严重伤害下游市场的竞争,并降低社会总福利。在反垄断执法中,判定反竞争的价格压榨行为需要分析市场结构条件和进行竞争伤害检验,本文提出了基础的归因检验规则和具体的四种不同类型价格压榨检验方法。基于上述分析,对中国电信和中国联通网络接入价格歧视行为反垄断审查的结构条件和归因检验进行了分析,并认为不合理接入管制政策是价格压榨长期存在的重要原因。     

我国行政性垄断的危害——市场势力效应和收入分配效应的实证研究

垄断者所具有的市场势力一般而言将导致高价,从而造成整个社会的福利损失;不仅如此,在我国,由于行政性垄断行业较高的工资福利所导致的收入分配效应也是极大的,即它可能拉大社会各行业职工的收入差距。本文通过对1997—2005年我国行政性垄断行业的福利损失的测算,以及这一研究区间行政性垄断行业与其他行业职工收入差异的分析,实证检验了行政性垄断对我国经济社会的危害,进而强调了打破行政性垄断的必要性和紧迫性。     

垄断与反垄断的效应评价

从净配置效应这一角度提出了垄断与反垄断的效应评价标准,指出垄断既会造成社会无谓损失,又会在自然垄断行业中体现出成本节省的效应。在电力行业适度引入竞争过程中,既要考虑净配置效应,又要考虑市场支配力参数。市场支配力参数是考察市场竞争效率的重要指标。     

市场势力、技术创新与价格歧视

本文从反垄断视角出发, 将纵向交易互动关系中的价格歧视与市场势力问题纳入到上游制造商工艺创新决策研究框架中, 比较分析不同定价模式下买方市场势力对上游创新程度、厂商利润以及消费者剩余的影响情况。研究结果表明： 当下游市场中存在买方市场势力时, 上游制造商在歧视定价策略下攫取最大利润; 统一定价策略下的创新程度最大。对于具有买方市场势力的零售市场而言, 三种定价模式下的消费者福利相同, 且均高于下游两个市场无买方势力的消费者福利。对于不具有买方势力的零售市场而言, 采取统一定价策略能够实现消费者福利最大化。     

纵向一体化企业的理性策略:价格压榨

本文分析了在纵向相关市场结构下的一体化企业价格压榨的激励,为科学认定价格压榨提供了一定的理论基础。我们提出上游市场结构决定了纵向一体化企业是否采用价格压榨来获取单一垄断利润。当上游为寡头市场时,纵向一体化企业有价格压榨激励。相反,当上游为垄断市场时,没有实行价格压榨的激励。此时一体化企业的价格压榨虽然抬高了市场价格,但仍不能给其带来最大利润。另外,虽然价格压榨被普遍认为具有反垄断性质,但我们的分析表明当上游为寡头市场时,价格压榨却能增加消费者福利。本文的分析为反垄断法中的价格压榨案例和纵向合并案例,尤其是网络行业案例提供了一定的执法理论性依据。     

Estimation of price-cost margins and union bargaining power for Belgian manufacturing

This paper extends Hall's (1988) [Hall, R.E., 1988. The relationship between price and marginal cost in US industry, Journal of Political Economy, 96, 921–947] methodology to analyze imperfections in both the product and the labor market for firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988–1995. We investigate the heterogeneity in price-cost mark-up and workers' bargaining power parameters among 18 sectors within the manufacturing industry as well as the relationship between both parameters. Using a sample of more than 7000 firms, our GMM results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labor market leads to an underestimation of the price-cost margin evaluated at perfect competition in the labor market. These findings are confirmed in the sectoral analysis. Sectors with higher workers' bargaining power typically show higher price-cost margins.     

The Impact of High Tech Production Techniques on Productivity and Profitability in Selected U.S. Manufacturing Industries

This paper examines the impact of high technology onmultifactor productivity and price-cost margins. Principal components obtained from five technologyvariables are related to multifactor productivityand price-cost margin. A negative and significantrelationship between price-cost margin and hightechnology methods when industry effects areexcluded, becomes insignificant in the industryeffects specification. The price-cost marginequations suggest that prior findings of a negativerelationship between profitability and hightechnology may result from omitting industryeffects. For multifactor productivity, there is apositive impact from high technology regardless ofwhether the specification includes industry effects.     

On the Relationship between International Outsourcing and Price–Cost Margins in European Industries

This paper sets up a model, where multinationals compete in quantities and domestic firms form a competitive fringe. Within this framework, we analyse the relationship between market concentration, international outsourcing and the industry price-cost margin. The empirical results of a panel of 66 industries and the EU12 countries in the 1990s strongly confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Market concentration and international outsourcing are positively related to industry price–cost margins. In a thought experiment, we show that industry price–cost margins would have decreased by 0.4 percentage points more in the 1990s, if international outsourcing had not changed since 1990. In addition, international outsourcing accounts for a convergence in margins across industries in the last decade.     

Cournot competition in wholesale electricity markets: The Nordic power exchange,Nord Pool

Horizontal shifts in bid curves observed in wholesale electricity markets are consistent with Cournot competition. Quantity competition reduces the informational requirements associated with evaluating market performance because the price-cost margins of all producers then depend on the same inverse residual demand curve instead of one for each firm. We apply the model to the day-ahead market of the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool, for the years 2011-13. We reject the null hypothesis of perfect competition in all specifications. Results suggest that the average price-cost margin across the sample period was around four percent.     

Investment under Demand Uncertainty,Ex-Ante Pricing,and Oligopoly

This paper considers the capacity choice of duopolists who set price ex-ante under demand uncertainty with risk-neutrality. The duopolists compete for market shares on the basis of availability of supply, rather than by price competition. Collusive pricing coexists with Cournot–Nash capacity choice. A formal model is presented, where the market share of each firm may deviate from the certainty share due to rationing. With shares reflecting different costs, capacity utilisation for the lower cost firm is expected to be substantially lower. The implications for the price-cost margin and capacity formation are also explored.     

动力煤期货强势引领 煤价有望走出低迷

动力煤期货的上市将会对我国煤电行业、我国期货市场和国际期货市场等方面产生深远影响,其中最为核心与显著的影响是将会深刻改变我国煤炭行业的定价机制。分别从国内外经济环境、动力煤供求关系、库存水平、运输能力、行业政策、进口动力煤价格、生产成本等方面的变动论证了当前动力煤期货价格将会引领煤炭价格的回升。     

Commodity price inflation, retail pass-through and market power

When commodity prices rise, wholesalers and retailers of products derived from basic commodities respond by passing along at least a portion of the price increase to consumers. In this paper we examine whether firms respond differently to positive commodity price shocks than to negative commodity price shocks; that is, whether commodity price volatility alters market power. We exploit recent volatility in food commodity prices over the period 2007-2010 to investigate how commodity price shocks translate into market power in two different vertically-structured food product industries: potatoes and fluid milk. For potatoes, we find both wholesale and retail market power decreases (increases) during periods of rising (falling) commodity prices. Moreover, price-cost margins widen a substantially greater degree in response to negative shocks than margins narrow in response to positive shocks, indicating that commodity price volatility increases market power. For fluid milk, we find that market power likewise declines during periods of rising commodity prices; however, market power does not significantly change during periods of falling commodity prices, suggesting that commodity price volatility decreases market power.