终极控制、治理环境与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司非货币性交易的分析

本文以发生非货币性交易的上市公司为研究样本，结合企业终极产权性质和公司所处治理环境的影响，对上市公司盈余管理进行分析。研究得出：不同终极产权性质的上市公司利用非货币性交易方式进行盈余管理，其会计行为不具有显著差异；而终极控制权比例和公司所处治理环境则是影响上市公司盈余管理的重要变量。同时本文的检验结果表明，我国上市公司利用非货币性交易进行盈余管理是基于配股动机、扭亏动机和被特别处理动机。     

上市公司盈余管理动机研究介绍

上市公司的盈余管理动机十分复杂，以往的献普遍地将盈余管理视为机会主义行为，近期的研究发现了盈余管理的其他一些动机，比较典型的有降低的交易成本的动机、获得比较业绩优势的动机以及对市场预期做出理性反应的动机等。也就是说，上市公司即使不存在委托一代理问题，仍然可能存在基于其他动机的盈余管理行为。这意味着，这些非机会主义动机会加剧上高龄的盈余管理。     

中国上市公司盈余管理的动机及手段

在对中美两国上市公司盈余管理的动机进行比较的基础上,分析中国特定经济环境中上市公司进行盈余管理的手段,提出规范我国上市公司盈余管理的建议。     

证券市场信息分布对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响

我国证券市场信息分布和发达国家证券市场信息分布相比具有其特点,这一特点才使我国上市公司进行盈余管理有了动机,笔者就是以我国证券市场信息极端部队成为切入点分析了我国上市公司进行盈余管理的动机和盈余管理机会以及如何进行盈余管理的。     

我国亏损上市公司盈余管理的动机及方式分析

在我国证券市场,上市公司进行盈余管理是较为普遍的现象,尤其是亏损上市公司的盈余管理行为,若过度,则容易导致会计信息失真,相关利益者的利益将受到不同程度的影响。文章通过两个方面即动机和方式来对亏损上市公司的盈余管理进行分析,并结合前人研究的理论成果,提出了研究结论。     

利用资产减值进行盈余管理的典型案例分析

上市公司为了达到不同的管理目标,存在利用资产减值会计政策的选择来进行盈余管理的动机与行为.文章通过这一典型案例的研究,详细分析了上市公司利用资产减值计提与转回等相关规定的模糊性进行盈余管理的主要手法.     

我国上市公司过度盈余管理行为分析

盈余管理问题在西方由来已久,被称为“市场参与者的游戏”,近年来也日益受到我国会计学界的关注。本文拟对我国上市公司过度盈余管理行为的动机进行探析,并提出对上市公司过度盈余管理行为的防范措施。     

关于转轨经济中上市公司盈余管理的动机研究

中国经济步入转轨经济时期 ,政府角色的转换、国有企业改革、市场体系的初步建立以及金融、会计制度的变革等都构成了上市公司盈余管理的制度背景。从经济学角度来看 ,由于存在制度的政治契约和特殊的公司约束机制 ,再加之会计准则的不完全性及注册会计师的无效监督 ,地方政府与上市公司控股股东的强有力的支持等因素 ,上市公司的盈余管理有着天然的外部环境 ,并出现了各种不同的动机 ,如报酬契约动机、首次公开发行股票动机、配股动机、防亏或扭亏动机以及保牌动机、银行借款动机、高级管理人员的变动、市场动机、税收动机。本文试图研究这些动机     

我国上市公司盈余管理的现状及对策

随着我国经济体制的不断完善和证券市场的迅速发展,上市公司施行盈余管理的情况也相当多见.上市公司过分的盈余管理会使其披露的财务信息严重失真,使财务报表的可靠性大大下降,从而误导利益相关者的判断.本文对盈余管理的有关问题进行了概述,剖析了上市公司盈余管理的动机、现状以及存在的问题,针对这些问题提出规范上市公司盈余管理的合理措施.     

隧道行为与盈余管理——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究

本文利用"隧道行为"理论解释我国家族上市公司的盈余管理活动。通过对2002-2004年间我国家族上市公司样本的实证检验,结果发现,控制性家族控制权偏离现金流量权的程度越大,公司盈余管理幅度越高。这说明控制性家族有动机操纵盈余以隐藏其掏空公司资源的"隧道行为",从而补充了现有对公司盈余管理动机的研究。     

上市公司关联交易利益输出的影响因素研究

本文以我国327家上市公司在2001～2003年之间的关联交易数据为基础,对影响关联交易利益输送的各个变量进行分析。结果显示：有控股股东存在的上市公司比没有控股股东存在的上市公司更有可能存在关联交易利益输出行为；国有资产管理局控股的公司中关联方的利益输出程度显著低于企业集团控股的公司；上市公司的关联交易经历了上市初期的盈余管理、上市中期盈余管理与利益输出并存阶段。     

Ill-intentioned or well-intentioned: earnings management and trade credit

The use of trade credit as important short-term financing for firms is increasing. This study explores the differential impact of firm earnings management on trade credit financing under different motives, using A-share listed firms in China from 2009 to 2020. The results show that accrued and real earnings management reduce a firm's trade credit. On the other hand, the classification shifting earnings management increases a firm's trade credit. Accrued and real earnings management are opportunistically motivated, while classification shifting earnings management is non-opportunistically motivated. Moreover, external audits weaken the negative effect of accrued and real earnings management on trade credit and enhance the positive effect of classification shifting earnings management on trade credit, indicating the ‘bilateral matching effect’ between external audits and firms. Finally, financing constraints weaken the impact of earnings management on trade credit.     

A review of earnings management in China and its implications

This paper discusses the motivations behind the earnings management of listed firms in China and provides evidence on earnings management using various accounting measures. The literature shows that earnings management occurs most often before the issue of securities or when a firm is facing the risk of being delisted. While non‐core income was widely used to measure earnings management in China, as it is easily detected, researchers are now focusing on accrual‐based models. We explore the underlying causes of earnings management in China, and conclude that the two main causes are the concentrated ownership structure and the strong political and economic connections between government and the listed companies. We review the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and government supervision on earnings management in China.     

Industry competition in China: an external governance mechanism or an external incentive

We focus on the impact of industry competition on earnings management in listed companies in China. Empirical analysis reveals the following: (1) When competition within an industry is relatively low, it lowers the extent of earnings management; (2) when competition is relatively high, earnings management is promoted.; (3) within an industry, the more intense the competition, the more companies manipulate earnings when in an inferior competitive position; and (4) state‐owned enterprises that are at a competitive disadvantage within an industry rely more on real earnings management strategies, whereas these effects are insignificant in private firms.     

Parents’ Use of Subsidiaries to “Push Down” Earnings Management: Evidence from Italy

We find evidence consistent with Italian nonlisted subsidiaries engaging in accrual and real earnings management, so that their listed parents can meet or beat benchmarks. Thus, the parent firm drives the earnings management of the subsidiaries. We identify parents that are more likely to have managed earnings as the ones that avoid a small loss or meet or beat analyst forecast by a few cents. Cross‐sectional analysis reveals that Big 4 auditors mitigate accrual earnings management at the subsidiary level and that family‐owned firms use earnings management through nonlisted subsidiaries mainly to avoid reporting losses. Finally, we find that parent firms communicate earnings management strategies to their subsidiaries using board proximity. Our evidence shows that business groups manage earnings differently from single firms, pushing earnings management down to subsidiaries. It also supports the monitoring role of Big 4 auditors in a business group setting and contributes to understanding financial reporting decisions in family‐owned firms.     

Market Consequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in China*

Under the 1996‐98 security regulations in China, the accounting rate of return on equity (ROE) has to be greater than 10 percent for three "consecutive" years for a firm to qualify for stock rights offers. Despite declining economic conditions during this period, the percentage of firms reporting ROE between 10 and 11 percent is about "three" times that for 1994‐95. This unique regulatory environment provides a natural experimental setting for the empirical assessment of earnings‐management behavior and its consequences. This study examines whether listed Chinese firms manage earnings to meet regulatory benchmarks and whether regulators and investors consider the quality of earnings in their respective regulatory and investment decisions. On the basis of a sample of listed Chinese firms from 1996 to 1998, we observe that managers execute transactions involving below‐the‐line items and use income‐increasing accounting accruals to meet regulatory ROE targets for stock rights offerings. The firms that apply for, but fail to receive, regulatory approval manage earnings more significantly than do firms that receive approval and pair‐matched control firms. Our market study also suggests that investors differentiate the quality of earnings and put less value on earnings suspected of a greater degree of management. Overall, our results imply that the regulatory bodies and investors to some extent make rational adjustments for the quality of earnings.     

大股东控制与盈余管理行为研究:来自配股公司的证据

在上市公司配股融资过程中，大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票价格的强烈动机。本文以1998—2002年间456家实施配股的上市公司为样本，基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征，并分析了大股东控制对盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为；（2）配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒u型关系：当第一大股东持股比例低于53．20％时表现出正相关关系，而当第一大股东持股比例高于53．20％时则表现出负相关关系；（3）盈余管理程度与前2—10大股东持股集中度、负债比率和资本支出水平之间具有负相关关系．而与管理层持股比例和公司规模之间具有正相关关系。大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应。造成了上市公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。     

How Are Earnings Managed? An Examination of Specific Accruals*

There is relatively little evidence on the specific accruals used to manage earnings. This paper examines this issue by considering the use of specific accruals in three earnings‐management contexts: equity offerings, management buyouts, and firms avoiding earnings decreases. We argue that the costs of managing earnings through different income statement items vary and that the benefits of earnings management through each of these items depend on the context. We thus make differential predictions regarding which specific accrual will be used to manage earnings in each of the three contexts we consider. To measure earnings management for specific accruals, we develop performance‐matched measures to capture the unexpected component of accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, accrued liabilities, depreciation expense, and special items. Consistent with our predictions, we find that firms issuing equity appear to prefer managing earnings upward by accelerating revenue recognition. Specifically, we find that accounts receivable for these firms are unexpectedly high. Conversely, for the management buyout context, we predict and find unexpected accounts receivable to be negative. For firms trying to avoid reporting an earnings decrease, we expect firms to be less concerned with earnings persistence and therefore more likely to use more transitory, and less costly, items to achieve their goal. We find that special items are significantly more positive for this group. This paper provides a further step toward understanding how the incentives behind earnings management affect the method used to achieve earnings goals, and it illustrates the usefulness of examining individual accruals in specific contexts.     

盈余管理、CEO特征与碳信息披露——来自中国高碳排放行业上市公司的证据

在全球气候变化不断加剧的背景下,碳密集型行业正面临着日益增长的公众压力。此种情况下,推动绿色低碳经济已然成为实现可持续发展的必然选择。选取2012—2020年中国高碳排放行业上市公司为研究对象,探究盈余管理对碳信息披露的影响,以及CEO特征对碳信息披露和盈余管理的调节作用。结果显示,盈余管理程度越大,碳信息披露越少;CEO性别为女性、CEO教育背景越高、CEO任期越长、CEO财务背景越强,盈余管理对碳信息披露的反向促进作用会得到加强;CEO年龄越大,盈余管理对碳信息披露的反向促进作用会得到削弱。