Political corruption and accounting choices

We examine how political corruption affects firms’ accounting choices. We hypothesize and find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts manipulate earnings downwards, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Our finding is robust to alternative corruption measures, alternative discretionary accrual measures, alternative model specifications, the instrumental variable approach and difference-in-differences analyses based on firm relocation and high profile cases. We find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts prefer income-decreasing accounting choices and exhibit higher conservatism. Finally, we find that the effect of corruption on earnings management is more pronounced for geographically concentrated firms, for firms without political connections, for firms in politically sensitive industries, for firms with lower transient institutional investor ownership and for firms with less analyst coverage. In sum, our findings suggest that firms respond to corruption by lowering their accounting earnings.     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

Corruption exposure,political disconnection,and their impact on Chinese family firms

This study adopts a quasi-natural experimental approach to examine the responses of Chinese family firms to political disconnection following exposure to corruption scandals. Our results are consistent with the view that family firms build political connections to achieve better performance, for access to external financing, and to secure more investment opportunities. We also find that the impact of political disconnection is more profound for firms located in provinces with a low level of marketisation, located in the same provinces as their related corrupt officials, and belonging to industries with high levels of corruption. Our results are robust after ruling out the impact of corruption cases per se as well as to alternative measurements of key variables and sample selection methods.     

The decreasing value of non‐SOEs’ political connections during China’s anti‐corruption campaign: evidence and mechanism

In this paper, we find that China’s anti‐corruption campaign since 2012 significantly reduces the value of political connections for non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We provide evidence showing that the decline of the value of political connections for non‐SOEs is attributed mainly to the decreasing return from political connections, instead of increasing political risk. We further find that the decreasing return of the politically connected firms is driven mainly by the disappearance of the ‘resource effect’ of political connection in facilitating access to bank credit and government subsidies, but not due to the increasing cost of maintaining political connections.     

U.S. POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND LOAN PRICING

Using U.S. Department of Justice data on state-level political corruption, we find that banks charge higher loan spreads (all-in-drawn spreads) to firms in states with higher corruption and that these effects are more pronounced for firms facing financial constraints but less pronounced for firms experiencing greater external monitoring. These results are robust to additional controls, alternative corruption measures, a measure of the lack of oversight of lobbyist activities, and the use of instrumental variables. Overall, our findings are consistent with the harmful corruption environment hypothesis, which states that banks charge higher loan spreads to firms in states with greater political corruption environments as these firms are susceptible to making suboptimal financial decisions to fend off rent-seeking behavior.     

Media ownership,concentration and corruption in bank lending

Building on the pioneering study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), this study examines the effects of media ownership and concentration on corruption in bank lending using a unique World Bank data set covering more than 5,000 firms across 59 countries. We find strong evidence that state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption. We also find that media concentration increases corruption both directly and indirectly through its interaction with media state ownership. In addition, we find that media state ownership and media concentration both accentuate the positive link between official supervisory power and lending corruption and attenuate the negative link between the regulations that empower private monitoring and corruption in lending. Media state ownership or media concentration also accentuates the positive link between banking concentration and corruption in lending. Furthermore, the links between media structure and corruption are more pronounced when the borrowing firm is privately owned.     

Political connections and preferential lending at local level: Some evidence from the Italian credit market

We investigate the effect of political connections in Italy, for each level of government, on the credit markets and we find robust evidence that politically connected firms benefit from lower interest rates when the political link is at a local level. Our results show that this preferential treatment is stronger when connected firms borrow from banks with politicians on their boards and when the degree of autonomy granted to local loan officers is higher. The latter result provides a novel addition to the literature on the effects of the delegation of lending decisions within the bank. We also show that the effect is stronger in geographical areas where the incidence of corruption is higher. Overall, our results show that on aggregate the impact of political connections on interest rates is limited but it may rise significantly in specific (local) situations due to a combination of factors such as the delegation of lending decisions, a weaker rule of law and some governance characteristics of banks.     

Political connections,auditor choice and corporate accounting transparency: evidence from private sector firms in China

This article investigates the way in which political connections impact auditor choice. Using a political connection index constructed based on the bureaucratic ranks of executive managers and board members in Chinese private sector firms, we find that for firms with weak political connections, the likelihood of hiring high‐quality auditors increases with the degree of political connectedness, while it decreases with political connectedness for firms with strong political connections. This inverse U‐shaped relationship is particularly pronounced for firms with ownership structures that intensify agency problems. Finally, we find that political connections and accounting transparency also have an inverse U‐shaped relationship.     

Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms

We extend recent research on the links between political connections and financial reporting by examining the role of auditor choice. Our evidence that public firms with political connections are more likely to appoint a Big 4 auditor supports the intuition that insiders in these firms are eager to improve accounting transparency to convince outside investors that they refrain from exploiting their connections to divert corporate resources. In evidence consistent with another prediction, we find that this link is stronger for connected firms with ownership structures conducive to insiders seizing private benefits at the expense of minority investors. We also find that the relation between political connections and auditor choice is stronger for firms operating in countries with relatively poor institutional infrastructure, implying that tough external monitoring by Big 4 auditors becomes more valuable for preventing diversion in these situations. Finally, we report that connected firms with Big 4 auditors exhibit less earnings management and enjoy greater transparency, higher valuations, and cheaper equity financing.     

Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.     

Political connections,environmental violations and punishment: Evidence from heavily polluting firms

Using hand-collected data on violations of environmental regulations by heavily polluting firms in China, we examine the relationship between political connections and the probability of punishment for breach of such regulations. To this end, we exploit a regulatory reform, the enactment of Rule 18, a key component of China's anti-corruption campaign, which required politically connected independent directors to resign from their positions. Using difference-in-differences specifications, we find that firms from which politically connected directors resigned due to Rule 18 experience a significant increase in both the likelihood of ever being punished for environment-related violations and the frequency of punishment. The effect of Rule 18 is more pronounced among firms located in regions with less efficient judicial systems and higher levels of corruption, as well as firms that are not state-owned. Our evidence indicates that in the absence of effective regulation, political connections can be costly to the environment as they strongly affect the enforcement of environmental regulations.     

How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market reaction to CEO succession

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms between 2000 and 2010, the paper analyzes the stock market reaction to CEO succession. We document significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns when CEO succession is accompanied with increased political connections. We also show that the market reaction to political connections is significantly stronger for external successors and for poorly performing firms, while it is significantly weaker for firms in high-tech industries and firms located in more developed regions. Finally we find that political connections are valued significantly less in state owned enterprises than in privately controlled firms. Our findings suggest that Chinese investors do value political connections, and such valuation is conditioned by successor origin, prior firm performance, industry, region, and ownership structure.     

Stock Recommendations for Politically Connected Firms

Social network connections of corporations can significantly affect operating performance and firm valuation. Political connections are one form of social networking which often manifests into improved firm profitability as a result of political favors granted by politicians. However, analysts often have greater difficulty forecasting the earnings of politically connected firms than those of non‐connected firms. This is because politicians often grant political favors to firms in an unpredictable manner making it difficult for market participants to time precisely when political benefits will translate into higher firm profitability. I examine how political connections affect analysts’ stock recommendations using a unique dataset of political contributions in the US over the period 1993–2012. I show that analysts’ recommendations are less profitable for firms with high connectedness than for firms with low (or no) connectedness. I also find that analysts are less effective in translating earnings forecasts into profitable recommendations for highly connected firms. Overall, the findings suggest that analysts do not impound all of the information concerning corporate political connections efficiently into their primary research outputs.     

Politically Connected Private Equity and Employment

We investigate the employment consequences of private equity buyouts. We find evidence of higher job creation, on average, at the establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms than at those operated by targets of nonconnected private equity firms. Consistent with an exchange of favors story, establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms increase employment more during election years and in states with high levels of corruption. In additional analyses, we provide evidence of specific benefits experienced by target firms from their political connections. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate selection concerns.     

Media attention and regulatory efficiency of corporate violations: Evidence from China

We examine the influence of media attention on the regulatory efficiency of corporate violations in a restrictive media environment. Using a hand-collected sample of corporate violations in China during 1998–2018, we find that fraudulent firms accompanied by more negative media attention are associated with a higher hazard rate of the violation being investigated and enforced. The effect is not diminished by the political connections of the fraudulent firms and is robust after controlling for potential confounding factors. Our findings suggest that by influencing regulatory efficiency, the media serve as an effective governance mechanism even in markets with strict media control.     

Liquid asset sheltering,or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings

I posit that political corruption affects firms through an entrenchment between entrepreneurs and politicians instead of coercive extortion. Based on this postulate, I refute the claim that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash due to liquid assets sheltering from political extraction. Instead, I propose that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash because of the high cost of capital. In fact, I find that firms in more corrupt countries hold cash beyond their optimum for the given cost of carry due to severe financial constraints. This excess cash results in value destruction. I call this phenomenon the financial effect of corruption. Thus, I challenge the conventional wisdom and argue that the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings are primarily indirect through financial mechanisms.     

Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections

We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.     

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.     

Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis

Evidence from firms in 47 countries shows that companies with political connections have higher leverage and higher market shares, but they underperform compared to nonconnected companies on an accounting basis. Differences between connected and unconnected firms are more pronounced when political links are stronger. Differences also vary depending on the level of corruption and the degree of economic development in individual countries.     

Political connection,market frictions and financial constraints: evidence from China

This paper studies the relationship between market frictions and political connections in determining financial constraints. We develop a novel index to measure the depth of political connections (PC) at the firm level and provide robust empirical evidence that firms in China actively build PC to alleviate the costs of market frictions. Specifically, we find that firms facing severe market frictions are not as financially constrained as expected. This is because these firms also possess strong PC, which alleviate the costs of market frictions. We find that market frictions can significantly affect financial constraints in Chinese firms, but only for those firms with modest levels of PC.