Securities Regulation, the Timing of Annual Report Release, and Market Implications: Evidence from China

Using a sample of earnings announcements of Chinese firms in the fiscal years 1994–1999, covering the periods before and after the introduction of a regulation to stagger the release of annual reports, we reassess the relation between earnings news and the timing of earnings announcements. We find that even though the reporting lag has significantly shortened as a result of the regulation, the pattern whereby good news is announced earlier than bad news persists. We then examine the behavior of stock prices before earnings announcements and find some indication of information leakage. These findings suggest that the regulation had the expected effect of reducing reporting delay and earnings release clustering. Yet, it did not appear to reduce the extent of the pre‐announcement leakage of information.     

Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?

Can managers improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital by providing voluntary earnings guidance? This study examines the impact of profit warnings on market liquidity and finds that voluntary disclosure of bad news actually improves market liquidity. By conducting an empirical study over the period 1995–2010 on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms, we find that firms that issue profit warnings show enhanced market liquidity during the post-announcement period. We show that profit warnings reduce information asymmetry and lower bid-ask spreads and increase trading volumes. These results are invariant to daily (short run) and monthly (long run) data after controlling for firm specific attributes. The results have major corporate policy implications. By voluntarily disclosing negative earnings guidance by managers, firms will experience significant improvement in market liquidity, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Our results are even more profound for firms that release bad news with extremely negative stock market impact. In other words, voluntary disclosure of bad news is good for market liquidity.     

The Effects of Conservative Reporting on Investor Disagreement

We examine whether the level of a firm's conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around earnings announcement dates. Investor disagreement is relevant for its repercussions on stock market efficiency. However, the literature related to the effect of firms’ reporting policies on disagreement is scant. Prior research suggests that conservatism, by requiring higher verifiability of profits, constrains earnings overstatements and encourages more complete revelations of losses, thus improving the information environment. In this paper, we further hypothesize that these effects of conservatism enhance news credibility and decrease information asymmetry, particularly for bad news announcements. This results in a lower disagreement and improved interpretation of earnings news. We consistently find that conservatism measures are negatively associated with proxies of announcement-time investor disagreement and that this effect is stronger when the firm is reporting bad news. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of conservatism is stronger when market surprise to the announcement is greater, while it is weaker in the presence of frequent and precise voluntary disclosure that preempts the earnings announcement. Finally, we show that a higher percentage of institutional investors’ ownership and a higher level of commitment to conservatism reinforce the impact of the latter.     

年报预约披露日变更、时机选择与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

上市公司年度报告普遍存在"好消息早,坏消息晚"的披露现象,但会计准则中稳健性原则对"好消息"、"坏消息"的确认具有非对称性。本文从会计稳健性的视角探讨了盈余稳健性与年报预约披露日变更、时机选择的关系,经验证据表明:相比延迟发布年报,提前披露的年报的会计稳健性更高;而相比非周末披露年报,在周末披露的年报的会计稳健性更低;上市公司年报的会计稳健性与其披露及时性显著正相关,会计稳健性越高,披露越及时。     

定期报告预约披露日期的信息含量

沪深两交易所从2002年初开始对外公布上市公司向其预约的定期报告披露日期,本文研究了这一日期是否包含对投资者有用的信息。我们发现,在交易所公布预约日期时,公司的预约披露日期越早,则其异常回报越高,反之则低。市场的这种反应可以用随后公布的实际会计业绩好坏加以解释。我们还考察了市场的这种反应在横截面上的差异,对发布过”好消息”的预警公告及规模较大的公司,市场的反应程度较低;同时还发现预约披露日期的信息含量并未被”坏消息”的业绩预警公告所取代,这说明预约披露日期对“坏消息”的预警公司起到了进一步的证实作用。     

Market Implications of the Audit Quality and Auditor Switches: Evidence from China

Independent audits enhance the credibility of corporate financial reports and assist investors to make rational decisions in the capital market. Nonetheless, the utility of the auditing function depends upon the quality of audits, which is determined by the independence and expertise of auditors. Hence, auditor choice and switch will not only affect an audit's quality, but will also influence decisions made by investors and other market participants. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how investors respond to the quality of audits and auditor switches in the Chinese context. Empirical results show that the quality of an audit and switching to a larger auditor have a positive (negative) impact on earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for firms with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. In contrast, switching to a smaller auditor has a negative (positive) impact on ERCs for firms with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. These results suggest that large auditing firms (Top 10) in China are perceived as more effective for curbing income-increased earnings management, which leads to higher (lower) ERCs for clients with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. Firms' switching to a larger auditor may signal high-quality earnings. Therefore, investors more often increase stock prices when firms have positive abnormal earnings and less often depreciate prices for negative abnormal earnings. Similarly, switching to a smaller auditor may signal lower earning quality, resulting in opposite market responses. In general, the empirical evidence suggests that audit information is valued by the capital market in China. Large auditing firms have been able to product-differentiate themselves within the Chinese stock market.     

A Comparison of Reporting Lags of Multinational and Domestic Firms

This study examines whether multinational firms report earnings sooner than domestic firms. When compared with domestic firms, the reporting environment and business operations of multinational firms are significantly more complex. There is a greater amount of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders of multinational firms. Therefore, multinational firms potentially face higher monitoring and external financing costs. To reduce these costs, we conjecture that managers of multinational firms take steps to reduce the information asymmetry between shareholders and management by increasing the timeliness (a proxy for relevance) of their earnings reports. Specifically, we expect multinational firms to announce earnings earlier than domestic firms. We separate earnings reporting delay into auditor‐related delay and management's discretionary delay. While test results weakly support the hypothesis that auditors take longer to audit multinational firms, there is strong evidence that managers of multinational firms release their earnings reports sooner than domestic firms.     

未预期盈余、审计意见与年报披露及时性——来自上海证券交易所上市公司年报的证据

以2001-2004年度所有沪市上市公司为样本,实证检验了未预期盈余、审计报告类型、公司业绩等多个因素对上市公司年报披露绝对及时性和相对及时性的影响。研究结果发现,未预期盈余为正的年报、被出具标准审计意见的年报以及业绩好的年报披露较早;反之亦然;当年会计师事务所变更的公司和亏损公司年报披露较晚。在变更年报预约披露日期的公司中,未预期盈余为正的公司、被出具标准审计意见的公司以及业绩好的公司通常提前披露年报;反之亦然。     

Voluntary Disclosure and Analyst Forecast

Empiricists document that firms more often voluntarily disclose bad news than good news and link this pessimism to managers’ increased incentives not to fall short of earnings expectations. This paper analyzes the voluntary disclosure of a manager’s private information by explicitly considering her incentives to meet or beat an analyst’s earnings forecast. The model predicts that managers who face strong incentives to meet or beat these forecasts more frequently disclose bad news than good news in order to guide analysts’ expectations about future earnings downward. This pessimism is higher in markets with less informed managers and may hold even if the manager has strong incentives for high stock prices and meet-or-beat incentives are comparably low.     

Risk reporting and stock return in the UK: Does market competition Matter?

This study examines the extent to which market competition influences risk reporting practice. It also explores how market competition affects the usefulness of risk reporting. The automated textual analysis measures the level of risk reporting [how much to report] and its tone [how it is reported] of UK FTSE 350 firms. The abnormal stock return is used as a proxy for the usefulness of risk reporting. In contrast to the proprietary cost hypothesis, our results indicate that the level of risk reporting is a positive function of market competition. Besides, UK firms are likely to disseminate more (less) negative (positive) news about their risks when market competition increases. However, after examining the informativeness of this reporting, we provide evidence that the level of reported risk information does not significantly enhance the abnormal stock returns of UK firms. Nevertheless, the tone of the reported risks carries incremental information indicative of a firm’s abnormal stock return, especially when market competition decreases. The findings suggest that firms are likely to alleviate their proprietary costs by framing their reporting of risk information in a way that deters potential competitors from entering their market and that market competition diminishes the perceived informativeness of such reporting. The results provide implications for investors as they should not acknowledge the disclosure of higher risk information when asking for more corporate transparency, as it lacks informativeness. Besides, policymakers may impose extra compulsory requirements on the UK firms to avoid reporting overly optimistic risk news to protect investors and avoid the adverse effects of this reporting.     

Real Earnings Management and Information Asymmetry in the Equity Market

The literature suggests that real earnings management (REM) activities can increase adverse selection risk in capital markets. Due to their opacity and the difficulties in understanding their implications, REM strategies may increase the level of information asymmetry among investors. This paper examines the association between earnings management through real activities manipulation and information asymmetry in the equity market. To estimate the level of adverse selection risk we use a comprehensive index of information asymmetry measures proposed by the market microstructure literature. For a sample of Spanish listed firms, we find that firms’ strategies of increasing earnings through REM are associated with higher information asymmetry in those firms that meet last year’s earnings. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management through real activities manipulation garbles the market, enhances private information production, and exacerbates information asymmetry in the stock market.     

On the Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure,Earnings Smoothing and the Value-Relevance of Earnings: The Case of Switzerland

Abstract

This paper examines whether voluntary disclosure by Swiss firms constrains the use of discretionary accruals to smooth earnings, and explores the effect of voluntary disclosure on the value relevance of earnings. We focus on Swiss firms because Switzerland's financial reporting system provides managers with extensive discretion in corporate disclosure, and there are important variations in the level of information provided in their annual reports. We consider that managers can choose two different ways to voluntarily convey information, either through the quality and quantity of annual report disclosure or, through compliance with International Accounting Standards (IAS)/International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Relying on a simultaneous equations approach, our results suggest that Swiss firms use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings. However, this relation is reduced for firms that voluntarily disclose more information in their annual report or comply with IAS/IFRS or US GAAP. Moreover, we show that discretionary accruals of high disclosers or of firms voluntarily complying with IAS/IFRS or US GAAP receive a lower valuation weight.     

业绩预告下的股份减持与内幕交易——会计稳健性是遏制还是助力？

选取2010—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察业绩预告发布前后大股东是否存在以及如何利用自身信息优势进行股份减持交易,会计稳健性是否以及如何对该内幕交易产生影响。研究结果表明:与强制性业绩预告相比,自愿性业绩预告披露前后发生大股东减持的概率更高,并且会计稳健性会显著抑制自愿性业绩预告披露前后的大股东减持行为。进一步将业绩预告消息区分为好消息和坏消息之后研究发现:坏消息的利空程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之前进行股份减持的规模越大;或者好消息的利好程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之后减持的规模也越大;稳健的财务信息能够抑制公司在隐匿坏消息方面进行的内幕交易,但会加剧公司在隐匿好消息方面进行的内幕交易。     

The Information Content of Concurrently Announced Earnings, Cash Dividends, and Stock Dividends: An Investigation of the Chinese Stock Market

The firms listed on China's stock market are less than ten years old and to date there has been relatively little research on the usefulness of their accounting disclosures for investors. This study focuses on the information content of annual earnings and dividend announcements made by listed Chinese companies. Earnings, cash dividends, and stock dividends are announced concurrently in China and so this allows for tests of their information usefulness and of the interactions between the three signals. Based on a data set of up to 1,232 announcements, we find that unexpected earnings, proxied by earnings changes, are positively related to abnormal returns. Thus, earnings are used by investors in setting market prices. Stock dividends corroborate or attenuate the earnings signal. If the sign of the unexpected stock dividend (increase, decrease) is the same as the sign of the unexpected earnings, then the earnings signal is stronger. If the signs are opposite, the earnings signal is weaker. Unexpected cash dividends have little impact on the earnings signal. Stock dividends per se have a small association with stock returns. In contrast, cash dividends have no discernible association with stock returns and this is consistent with dividend irrelevance arguments. Our results are robust across a number of sensitivity tests.     

Ownership Structure and Accounting Information Content: Evidence from France

This paper investigates how family and bank ownership affect the accounting information content of French firms. In Continental Europe, the existence of block‐holders triggers specific corporate governance issues, including the transparency of financial reporting. Our test results for the clean surplus model show that book value carries a significantly greater weight for family‐controlled firms. This finding is attributed to their lack of incentive to report timely and relevant earnings to outside (minority) investors. In contrast, bank owners are under more market pressure to achieve earnings persistence through the use of accounting accruals. Bank ownership is also associated with higher levels of debt. These results are consistent with findings that in code law countries, insiders dominate as a source of finance, and financial reporting is aimed at creditor protection.     

Delayed price response to the announcements of earnings and its components in Finland

Several studies report that even after accounting earnings are announced, estimated cumulative unexpected returns continue to drift up for firms that report unexpectedly good earnings and down for firms that report unexpectedly bad earnings. This paper shows that because Finnish companies tend to pay more attention to tax considerations than so-called economic reality when preparing their financial reports, this drift does not exist for reported earnings, i.e. net profit based on Finnish accounting regulations. It appears, however, that several other income levels assessed by financial statement analysis are important in this respect. The results imply that firms that make extensive adjustments for tax purposes have high unexpected returns. This is explained by the fact that those firms have enough income to extensively exploit the depreciation and other earnings management possibilities.     

Developing a Reputation for Reticence

A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success of this strategy depends on receivers' beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical of past or future nondisclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair's reticence over his son's vaccine record during the measles–mumps–rubella scare in the United Kingdom.     

自愿性审计师变更原因与投资者反应

本文选取2001￣2004年发生自愿性审计师变更的公司作为样本,采用事件研究法考察投资者对审计师变更公告中所披露不同变更原因的反应。研究发现,市场对于不同原因的审计师变更反应存在差异,投资者根据变更原因判定审计师变更为好消息的反应显著大于判定其为坏消息的反应。由此可知,投资者对于披露的变更原因信息具有一定的识别能力,不同类型的审计师变更会影响公司的价值。监管部门强制披露审计师变更原因有助于提高市场有效性。     

The Impact of Introducing Estimates of the Future on International Comparability in Earnings Expectations

The objective of this paper is to assess whether the inclusion of improved estimates of the future in corporate annual financial statements has brought about greater international comparability. It is argued that including more relevant information in financial reporting enables users to estimate earnings that are more able to reflect current economic conditions and up-to-date expectations of the future and thus recognize news in a more timely manner. To reflect the underlying economics of integrating financial markets, earnings expectations must be not only more timely but also more comparable. Thus, in examining the increasingly widespread adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), this study considers both the timeliness and the comparability of earnings expectations in the European Union, before and after the mandatory IFRS implementation. The empirical findings support the view that users' earnings estimates have indeed become more timely in recognizing market news and significantly more comparable.     

Representative account or greenwashing? Voluntary sustainability reports in Australia's mining/metals and financial services industries

Why are more and more companies voluntarily issuing costly, potentially exposing standalone sustainability reports on environmentally and socially problematic issues? Using legitimacy theory, this study analyses ways companies seek to strategically enhance legitimacy by leaning towards either ‘representative’ reporting of both favourable and unfavourable information especially in an industry's highest impact domains, or ‘greenwashing’ (including whitewashing non-environmental issues), which downplays unfavourables and high-impact domains and highlights favourable but less relevant points. Content analysis compared Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) reports from 2011 to 2019 by Australian financial services companies (107 reports) and mining and metals companies (122). Specifically, to critique reporting quality in fine grain, it disaggregated results into levels (from omission to full quantitative treatment) of disclosure of good/bad/neutral news indicators and violation-related/non-violation-related ones and identified highest impact domains. Neither industry's reporting was very representative. Relatively though, mining and metals leant towards representation: fuller disclosure on environmental aspects (its highest impact domain), including unfavourables: bad and violation-related indicators. Financial services companies only led in disclosing neutral social indicators, not bad or violation-related ones, so leant towards greenwashing. Results also suggest that after the GRI clarifying materiality principle in 2016, financial services disclosure quality dropped further by de-emphasising environmental without lifting social disclosures, while mining and metals' stayed unchanged. The results confirm and better specify widely indicated reporting weaknesses, contributing to content analysis methodology and legitimacy theory. This arms guideline setters, investors and other stakeholders to better evaluate/design reports and might encourage firms to voluntarily improve disclosures.