A Note on the Desirability of Merger among Complements

This paper examines the effects of the merger of firms producing complementary components on the quality choice. We extend the model of Economides 1999 to considerably general situations about the quality function, utility function, and distribution function of consumers, and establish the results that a complementary merger provides products of higher quality, and achieves higher market coverage, higher profits and higher consumer surplus than independent ownership.     

Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Research & Development and Patenting: Evidence from Merger Challenges in the U.S.

This paper contributes further empirical evidence on the effects of mergers on innovation using company level data. Evidence on this issue has implications for the relationship between innovation and market concentration. Our departure from previous work is that we focus on a sample of horizontal mergers whose market concentration impacts were flagged by U.S. antitrust authorities as potentially posing a problem for antitrust law compliance. We employ propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation to compare the innovation activities of challenged and non-challenged merger firms to a control group of non-merged firms. We use R&D, patent grants, and citation-weighted patent grants to measure the innovation activities of firms before and after a merger. Our results indicate that the post-merger innovation outcomes of firms whose mergers were challenged are lower than they would have been had the firms not merged. But for non-challenged mergers, or mergers that do not raise concerns about market concentration, post-merger innovation outcomes are not significantly different from what they would have been without a merger.     

On the Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control

In this paper, we analyze the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which simultaneously assert jurisdictions. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. Our main finding is that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, economic integration should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is more likely to arise between countries of similar market size and for moderate competition policy rules.     

Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the Macmillan Gap during the 1930s

By the end of World War I successive merger waves had producedan oligopolistic, tightly cartelized, English banking system,which was widely viewed as having restricted lending to small-medium-sizedfirms—the famous ‘Macmillan Gap’ in industrialfinance. We explore the reasons behind the failure of marketentry to bridge this gap. The clearing banks are shown to haveacted as ‘jealous monopolists’, obstructing theactivities of the Credit for Industry Ltd (CFI), the only significantfirm established to breach the gap (rather than narrow its upperlimit). By poaching many clients it had vetted and approved,the banks blocked CFI's growth, deterring further market entry,and thus, preserving their monopoly position.     

Price-Increasing Competition on Two-Sided Markets with Homogeneous Platforms

We make a case for price-increasing competition on “competitive bottleneck” two-sided markets. We argue that demand interrelation might be sufficient to cause either no observable price effect of competition or price-increasing competition. Under price equality, total demand on both market sides in the duopoly market exceeds total demand in the monopoly market. Furthermore, even though there is no observable price effect, there is still a competitive effect that becomes manifest in total duopoly equilibrium profits being strictly smaller than monopoly profits. The relationship of total welfare is ambiguous in subsidization cases, while without subsidization, welfare is strictly greater in duopoly.     

Complementary Goods: Prices and Consumer Welfare Under Duopoly and Monopoly

We examine prices, profits, and consumer surplus for differentiated complementary goods under duopoly and a multi‐product monopoly. We find that little can be said about the relative magnitudes of prices of the components of a system of complementary goods under the alternative market structures. Although demand complementarity can lead to lower prices for either the primary or the secondary good under monopoly, both prices are not necessarily lower. The results unique to this paper are that, when two complementary goods form a system, the system price is unambiguously lower and consumer surplus and profits are higher under a multi‐product monopoly.     

Income Distribution in Network Markets

We enquiry about the effects of first and second order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, within the standard model of a market with network externalities and hump-shaped demand curve. This issue is analyzed in the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. We find that, while under perfect competition both types of distributional changes result in higher output, provided marginal costs are low enough, in the monopoly case the final outcome depends on the way income distribution and the network externality interact in determining market demand elasticity.     

Merger Control in the New Economy

This paper addresses the potential for conflict between antitrust authorities in the arena of merger control in the new economy. By new economy we mean two related developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the ability to sell and produce products world-wide, and secondly, markets with certain characteristics such as network effects and other aspects of natural monopoly. We focus on three types of substantive issues in merger control – market definition, assessment of competitive effects, and the role of remedies. We argue that the scope for conflict varies significantly across these three arenas. In particular, conflict over market definition is less likely. By contrast, the assessment of competitive effects and the role of remedies are areas where conflict between antitrust authorities may be more likely in new economy-type markets.     

Social costs of public service obligation routes—calculating subsidies of regional flights in Norway

In this note we describe an iterative procedure of how to estimate unit costs per leg of a public service obligation (PSO) route network if certain data is publicly available. The aim of this approach is to make judgments in benchmarking and in regulation if revenues, costs and profits (or losses) per flight and its distribution among these route networks are typical compared to carriers serving networks under a competitive regime. Particularly this note aims to set a reference for the question, if market or bargaining powers are abused and to which extent. This work is thus especially important for PSO cases where a particular network cannot be operated in a profitable manner; therefore, its routes are offered to monopoly providers in a bidding competition and (in most cases) the service needs to be publicly subsidized. We shall apply the procedure on origin-destination matrices from tender documents published by the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications. The Ministry covers incurred losses produced by the bidding and winning carrier. As a first result we can observe that the PSO allocations show indications of an inefficient allocation process reflected in more than three-fold quoted costs on PSO routes above estimated market levels.     

Trade Liberalisation,Market Structure and the Incentive to Merge

In this article, we consider whether a movement towards freer international trade generates incentives for firms to merge and if so what forms of merger are most profitable. In a linear Cournot framework, we show that a reduction in trade costs may, but will not necessarily, encourage mergers. Both market structure and the level to which trade costs fall are shown to play a decisive role. Domestic mergers will be encouraged only if the product market is not highly concentrated and trade costs fall below a threshold level. International mergers can be encouraged in any market structure, and are generally more profitable than domestic mergers.     

DURABILITY CHOICE AND THE PIRACY FOR PROFIT OF GOODS

We explore the impact of durable goods piracy in a simple two‐period durability choice setting where an originator faces a future for‐profit pirate that clones or duplicates copies of the durable good. We find that a social planner, as well as a monopoly originator, may well engage in a sort of ‘reversed planned obsolescence’. In other words, they manufacture a product that is more durable than the first‐best cost‐minimizing level, if they cannot directly control the pirate. We show this occurs even in rental or committed sales settings, indicating Swan's market independence result does not hold here.     

On Market Integration and Product R&D: A Monopoly Case

Applying a monopoly model with endogenous quality choice to the case of multiple national markets, we consider the effect of market integration on product R&D incentives (i.e., quality-improving), profit, and consumer surplus. We demonstrate that the effect of market integration depends on the difference in income distributions between two countries and the level of trade cost. In particular, if the difference in income distributions between two countries is large (small) and/or trade cost is low (high), market integration can decrease (increase) the level of product quality and social welfare in the two countries.     

Can the Canadian Wheat Board Extract Monopoly Rents? The Case of the Spring Wheat Market

The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is a monopoly seller of wheat, durum and malting barley from western Canada. This paper examines the question whether the CWB monopoly can extract a premium in the international market place. Using actual transaction data (i.e. actual transaction prices) we estimate that the CWB charged importers an average price premium of $13.35/tonne for wheat over the period 1980-94. In periods when high quality wheat was in short supply the CWB was able to charge higher premiums.We also show that during the period of export subsidies the CWB earned farmers a premium by avoiding subsidized markets.     

Manufacturer Mergers and Product Variety in Vertically Related Markets

We study the incentives of final product manufacturers to introduce new products into the market and the impact of a manufacturer merger on them. We show that when manufacturers distribute their products through multi-product retailers, a manufacturer merger, although it leads to an increase in the wholesale prices, it can enhance product variety. The merger induced product variety enhancement though arises only when vertical relations are present: when manufacturers sell directly their products to consumers, a merger never results in more product variety. Still, both with or without vertical relations, a manufacturer merger hurts consumers and decreases welfare.     

Market coverage and “love of software variety” in the supporting services approach

This paper uses a model of system product monopoly to examine the supporting services approach in network economics. We find that the monopoly sets the software price at the average cost of developing each variety of software. Furthermore, if the function defined for “love of software variety” exhibits too much “love of variety of software,” then there exists only the boundary solution that corresponds to full market coverage. We also show that if the market is partially covered, then there always exist positive network externalities. However, if the market is fully covered, then network externalities vanish.      

Sequential Product Design

I consider a model of duopoly where firms make sequential product design changes prior to price competition. I show that a socially desirable outcome is possible in this model. In equilibrium, the leader's product is less specific, implying a customer attraction strategy, and the follower's product is more specific, implying a customer retention strategy. This outcome is in contrast with the equilibrium outcome of a similar model, where simultaneous design competition takes place prior to price competition. In this latter model, the product designs are more specific and the prices are higher in equilibrium, leading to a reduction in welfare. I compare the design incentives under price competition with those in models where price collusion or merger is expected and with multi-product monopoly. In models with no price competition, less specific designs may serve to attract more customers, to improve current or future pie of monopoly profits, or to improve the outside option in bargaining game, depending on the model.     

Cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry: theory and evidence

We present a tractable model of oligopoly to identify the linkages between local competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. We show that the incentives for cross-border mergers rise with vertical integration in an industry when the premerger concentration in that industry is sufficiently high relative to the concentration in the same industry in a foreign country. We also show that the incentives for a merger between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm will be higher than that for a merger between a foreign firm and a disintegrated home firm, when the premerger concentration at home is low relative to the premerger concentration in the foreign country. We then analyze a firm-level panel of 90,614 M&A observations, between 1990 and 2012, from 86 countries. Logistic regressions confirm that market concentration is an important determinant of cross-border M&A. Our results support the conjectures of our theoretical model and are consistent with recent empirical findings and theoretical predictions.     

The Relationship Between Competition and Incumbent’s Innovation

A static model is developed to analyse the incumbent’s innovation strategy under monopoly and duopoly. A number of potential objectives for the incumbent are modelled here, including the maximization of revenue, profit, and welfare (which are common among the network industries). Its marginal cost depends upon investment in new technologies and processes. The incumbent chooses its price and its level of investment in innovation. The incumbent’s elasticity of demand under both market structures and the incumbent’s market share under duopoly determine which market structure creates more incentives to innovate. For certain values of these variables, duopoly provides more incentives to innovate than monopoly. As expected, the incentives to innovate increase when the incumbent places greater weight on social welfare.     

跨国市场竞争企业合并决策研究

通过构建一个两阶段古诺模型研究在跨国市场竞争的企业合并行为,发现企业的合并选择与国外市场相对规模、合并带来的边际成本降低程度相关,只有当国外市场规模变小或合并能够降低成本的程度较大时企业才会愿意合并。根据模型,促进整体福利的政府政策也应有针对性:对于能够带来提高生产效率的合并,政府应提供充足资金和政策支持;对于不能提高生产效率的合并,政策应激励企业进行研发和创新。     

生产商-零售商双边垄断中的所有权配置效应研究

文章在生产-流通-消费框架下,在供零双边垄断这一纵向关系中考虑了所有权配置效应问题。发现所有权配置会对市场绩效或配置效率产生重大影响。均衡分析表明,无论所处哪一个环节,国有企业的存在具有内部化垄断外部性、减轻或消除双重加价、稳定市场均衡价格和销售量的作用。这一模型可为我国在改革开放初期,在流通领域保留部分国有企业,采用渐进式改革提供了一定的理论解释。当市场处于严重的不完全竞争,或生产-流通环节的某一端处于垄断状态时,适当地保留国有企业或对有关企业进行严格监管,有利于整体社会效益的提升和保障消费者的权益。文章从纵向生产和流通关系的角度,在一定程度上证实了我国经济转型过程中部分流通经济学家们曾经提出的“国有商业具有稳定市场作用”的观点。