综合配套改革：制度需求、改革重点与推进战略

制度改革起步于制度变革需求,决定于制度变革的激励。综合配套改革与26年前的农村经济体制改革和20年前的城镇经济改革相比,均有不同的制度变革需求和制度变革激励,基于此,文章认为综合配套改革应关注四个推进战略:以“以自主性制度创新”推进综合配套改革;主张有效制度创新;提供足够而持续的改革激励;探索普适性的制度创新内容。     

基础设施产业市场化改革的公共风险及其控制

基础设施产业市场化改革可能带来的公共风险包括体制与政策风险、公共安全风险、国家经济安全风险、社会安全风险、规制风险。可以考虑从改革政府行政管理体制、健全相关的法律制度。完善改革的配套经济政策和加强公共监督三个方面予以控制;同时,为顺利推进我国基础设施市场化改革,必须由相对独立的综合机构制定、实施改革方案,要坚持总体同步配套,渐进分步实施原则,构建基础设施产业改革的利益均衡博弈机制。     

后股权分置时代机构投资者治理结构完善探讨

随着我国证券市场中股权分置问题的逐步解决,机构投资者将成为我国公司治理的主要主体之一,很大程度上决定了证券市场的功能能否正常发挥。但这些机构本身也存在大量问题,如问题券商的大量出现、违法收益的"私人化"和违法成本的"社会化"等问题,并且随着我国资本市场的逐渐开放,金融的脆弱性逐渐显现,因此,迫切要求对机构投资者的公司治理结构进行完善。     

Institutional Root Cause of the Irregularity of Social Security Funds in China

This paper analyzes institutional defects in the Chinese social security system, based on irregularities in social security funds revealed in the Audit Report by the China National Audit Office. The author divides the irregularities into five categories according to the nature of fund use. The results show that the institutional root cause of the irregularities lies in the unreasonable design and operation of the social security system, which currently faces management and institutional risks. This paper argues that simple rhetoric about strengthening regulation and supervision cannot help to reduce illegal practices, or to realize risk control. The only solution is to reform the social security system. Specifically, the Chinese Government should regulate the administrative cost of the social security system, and the behavior of its agencies, through legislation, reform the investment regime to increase rate of return of pension assets, and adjust and reshape the existing social security system, so as to elevate its pooling level.     

Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near‐Term Earnings over Long‐Run Value?*

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.     

我国农村发展的制度性难点与创新

目前,农村经济社会发展中面临许多制度性的难点,影响了农村经济和社会的快速发展。文章阐述了我国农村发展面临的土地供求、农业保护和政府权责等制度性难点,分析了影响农村发展的行政、财政和农业补贴等体制性障碍,提出了正确处理农业与工业化、城市化的关系,粮食安全与土地流转的关系,改革农业经营体制和土地流转制度,完善农业补贴政策等农村制度创新对策。     

SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM BY THE CARDOSO GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL: CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF REFORM TEN YEARS AFTER “DEMOCRATIZATION”

This article has two purposes. The first is to analyze politically why the Cardoso government's social security reform could not be completed. Though democratic political systems (election and political party systems) were reintroduced after the re‐democratization in 1985, Brazil continued to suffer from elements of its traditional political culture such as corporatism, clientelism, nepotism, etc. These were the stumbling blocks for Cardoso's reform. The second purpose is to deepen understanding of Brazilian democracy by casting light on the behavior of political actors (the government, congress, and political parties) over social security reform issues under the Cardoso and Lula governments.     

Food‐aid dependency in Lesotho: Issues and policy implications

This article analyses food‐aid dependency in Lesotho and how it can be reduced. The study uses primary data on food aid, statistics collected from various food‐aid agencies and institutions, and secondary data obtained from government sources. Food‐aid de pendency is likely to continue in the long term, as food aid enhances food security in Le sotho by supplementing commercial imports to meet the shortfall in local cereal produc tion. Food aid improves the nutritional and consumption levels of vulnerable Lesotho households but shows no correlation with producer and consumer prices. If the level of food‐aid dependence is to be reduced, measures to alleviate poverty and generate income must be implemented.     

“十一五”时期我国社会保障体制改革展望

我国“十五”计划期间社会保障体制改革取得了重大进展。城市初步建立了一个社会统筹与个人账户相结合的社会保障体系。“十一五”规划期间,我国将着力推进医疗保障体制改革和农村社会保障体系建设。在完善社会保障体系过程中,需要从扩大社会保障体系覆盖面、增加财政投入、提高社会保障体系监管水平,以及做好农村社会保障体系建设整体规划等方面着手,解决社会保障体系建设所面临的若干深层次问题,从而实现社会保障体系可持续发展。     

COLONIALISM AND LONG‐RUN GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA: AN EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN VICTORIA'S WATER SECTOR DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Institutional change in water rights in the nineteenth century Australian colony of Victoria raised institutional efficiency, which contributed to long‐run economic growth. High‐quality human capital and the extension of voting rights (franchise) were crucial for efficient institutional change in the water sector. Quality human capital (literacy) appeared to increase the rural population's awareness of the economic impact of the existing structure of water rights that may have constrained growth in the agricultural sector and reduced investment incentives. Extension of the franchise allowed the rural population to exert political pressure for enactment of change in water rights, which resulted in efficiency‐enhancing policies and efficient institutions. The findings show these two factors were more important than Victoria's British colonial heritage in determining whether growth‐enhancing institutional change took place.     

Beyond privatization: Institutional innovation and growth in China's large state-owned enterprises

This article demonstrates that China's large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not stagnant fossils waiting to die. Under economic reform policies this sector has undergone large change due to enhanced enterprise autonomy, the impact of market forces, rapid growth of domestic demand for upstream products, strategic integration with the world economy and the state's policy to promote large businesses. China's large SOEs are developing new institutional forms that do not neatly fit into existing patterns. China is experimentally changing its institutions through a combination of central policy, local initiative and interaction with international investment. This presents a challenge to the “transitional orthodoxy” and to ideas concerning property rights in development economics. There is not a universal model of property rights and government action that works best in all circumstances. China's experience with the reform of large SOEs shows the diverse possibilities for effective industrial institutions.     

China＇s Urban and Rural Old Age Security System： Challenges and Options

I. Introduction In the process of economic transition, China has adopted an urban-priority reform approach in establishing its old age security system, which conforms to international development experiences. China’s rapid aging of people with low-incomes, however, is unprecedented compared with other developed or developing countries. The urban-priority reform ensures a relatively high coverage in urban areas, whereas it imposes a heavy burden ofold age support on rural households. Current …     

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: CHINA AND INDONESIA COMPARED

China's and Indonesia's development strategies have been compared with others, but rarely with each other. Radically different political contexts have produced both similar and distinctly different development patterns. Each using formal planning, Indonesia spurred radical reforms to promote growth, whereas China opted for incremental reforms to ‘grow out of the Plan’, as a political device and to discover what policies and institutions worked. Both strategies produced environments largely conducive to rapid development. Indonesia relied on a few economic technocrats to oversee development; China used decentralisation and party reforms to create a credible environment for non-state investment. Both shared concern for agricultural reform and food security; both opted to open up for trade—China gradually, Indonesia radically. Both did well in growth and poverty reduction following reform. China's growth performance is in a league of its own, especially since Indonesia's Asian crisis setback, but Indonesia had more equitable growth and survived a difficult political transition with, in hindsight, modest costs.     

制度变迁理论对农村社会保障体制改革的启示

文章运用新制度经济学的制度变迁理论,从制度变迁的诱因、潜在利润或预期收益、制度变迁的成本和路径依赖等几方面,对我国农村保障制度的改革进行了分析,得出对农村社会保障体制改革的动因是制度供给与需求之间出现了非均衡、制度变迁的预期收益大于预期成本、二元经济结构形成的农村社会保障制度的“路径依赖”阻碍了制度的变迁进程等结论。文章最后给出加快我国农村保障制度改革的对策建议：大力发展农村经济、确立社会公平的建制理念、合理界定政府责任等。     

Institutional Investors' Trading in Speculation: Evidence from China

The trading behaviour of institutional investors has attracted much attention. However, many issues related to their trading behaviour cannot be addressed without high‐frequency changes in institutional ownership. Based on a measure of the trading behaviour of institutional investors by using an institutional account dataset from China, we find that (i) active institutions trade speculatively by taking advantage of individual investors; (ii) individuals buying high and selling low offer liquidity only on average; (iii) foreign investors do not show significant patterns in speculation; and (iv) trading of active institutions significantly affects price. This study casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that institutional or sophisticated investors improve market efficiency by correcting mispricing, and provides direct evidence for institutional investors' speculation behaviour and their destabilising effect on the stock market. Results suggest that regulators in emerging markets should monitor institutions' speculation to bring fairness and justice to the stock market.     

The Maghribi traders: a reappraisal?1

Previous studies concluded that a private‐order institution based on a multilateral reputation mechanism was particularly important in governing agency relations among the Maghribi traders who operated in the Muslim Mediterranean. The legal system and a bilateral reputation mechanism were particularly important among the Genoese traders. Initial cultural, social, and political factors led to this institutional distinction, while the incorporation of culture in the resulting institutions influenced subsequent institutional developments. In particular, the particularities of the late medieval European institutions contributed to the rise of the modern—impersonal—markets in Europe. The analysis also substantiates the contention that private‐order institutions can support sophisticated exchange and market‐promoting policies should take this into account, particularly in countries lacking an effective court system. An article by Edwards and Ogilvie challenges this analysis. It alleges that the Maghribis, like European traders, relied on court enforcement and a bilateral reputation mechanism in which a narrow social circle responded to opportunism. This article shows that Edwards and Ogilvie's analysis and conclusions are wrong. It refutes each of their empirical claims and presents additional pieces of evidence supporting the institutional distinction conjecture. The discussion is structured around the methodological challenge associated with comparative and historical institutional analysis.     

兼容性制度竞争:双层对冲与地区制度的嵌套设计北大核心

地区制度的兴起增加了全球治理机制的复杂性。竞争性多边主义理论强调制度竞争会导致国际机制的碎片化和规则冲突。制度聚合理论则认为制度背景会强化规则的一致性,甚至形成制度服从。这种冲突—聚合的二分法不足以分析地区制度与多边制度之间关系的复杂现实。作者提出一个双层对冲的分析框架,以解释地区制度与核心多边制度间的联系机制;一方面,地区成员要通过建立地区制度寻求外部选项,实现对现有多边制度的制衡。另一方面,地区成员又离不开现有多边制度,需要借用现有的多边制度资源来解决地区制度建设中的机会主义问题。为了实现双层对冲,地区成员国会根据地区制度的系统冲击效应和投资报偿结构,设计不同的制度嵌套。作者比较了金融救助领域的欧洲稳定机制、清迈倡议多边化以及拉美储备基金等地区金融安排,其结果符合预期。双层对冲框架下的兼容性制度竞争有利于推动国际制度的渐进变迁,限制了大国在国际秩序转型中的冲突烈度,为世界政治的和平权力转移提供了可能。     

泡沫经济前后日本宏观经济战略的调整

进入20世纪90年代,日本因泡沫经济破灭而步入了经济萧条期,这迫使日本政府对其宏观经济战略做出调整。从历史着眼,可对这一时期日本经济战略的调整有一个纵深的把握,也有助于对今后日本经济的发展前景得出一个较为客观的认识。20世纪90年代以来日本的经济调整有着深层次的制度根源。要振兴日本经济,关键不在于依托FTA这根"救命稻草",而是要克服原有制度"被锁定"的困境,并进行战略上的调整。一言以蔽之,结构性改革或者说制度改革是日本经济的唯一出路,要迈出这一步,日本政府需要足够的勇气。     

我国农村社会保障困境的思考

根据农村社会保障发展的困境及改革完善农村社会保障制度的深远影响，本文认为强化政府责任是突破农村社会保障困境的关键。政府的责任首先表现在明确社会保障制度建设的目标定位，还表现在进一步完善农村社会保障体系以及改革相关配套措施。     

Institutional Foundations for Shared Growth in Sub‐Saharan Africa*

Abstract: The paper examines the dynamically evolving triangular relationships between institutions, growth and inequality in the process of economic development, in order to deepen the understanding of institutional conditions for pro‐poor growth and shared growth. In this context, the paper discusses the institutional conditions found in sub‐Saharan Africa, which may have produced the growth pattern that is unequal and against the poor. The analysis shows that sub‐Saharan African countries require transforming institutions for embarking upon and sustaining a development path which would ensure shared growth in years to come. The paper first evaluates the growth‐inequality‐poverty nexus, as found in the recent literature, which increasingly challenges the trade‐off between growth and equity, as postulated in the traditional theories. Various definitions of pro‐poor growth are discussed and a sharper definition of the concept of ‘shared’ growth is provided. Definitions of institutions are then examined, as well as the triangular inter‐relationships between institutions, inequality and poverty. The paper finally analyses specific institutional conditions found in sub‐Saharan Africa that prevent economies from emerging out of low‐equilibrium poverty traps that are characterized by low economic growth, unequal distribution of income and wealth as well as unequal access to resources and power.