地方政府债务绩效考核指标体系构建及评价模型研究

公共产品理论认为,地方政府债务是一把"双刃剑"。一方面,对债务资金借、用、还各环节的合理把握,可以充分发挥债务资金作为扩张性财政政策的杠杆作用;另一方面,各环节或某个环节的失误极有可能导致地方经济进入恶性循环,严重者甚至危害地方经济和社会安全。本文基于投入产出理论和"4E"理论,对地方政府债务支出绩效及支出过程的内涵进行充分剖析,系统全面地选取绩效考核指标,结合因子分析法进行验证并最终建立指标体系;在此基础之上,运用主成分分析法,构建评价模型;在指标体系和评价模型的构建过程中引入实证分析,针对性地提出相应改进对策和建议。     

Public debt and social security: Level of formality matters

This paper presents a contribution to the empirical literature concerning the relationship between social security and public debt in emerging economies. In particular, several economic and social shocks, as income inequality, were considered in the analysis. Based on the Brazilian data from 2004 to 2010, and taking into account the effects of shocks on variables which are essential to the public debt and the social security deficit, two sets of GMM models were considered. Furthermore, with the objective of testing the results, a GMM system model was built. The findings confirmed that the social security deficit significantly contributes to an increase in the public debt. Regarding the effects on social security, it was observed that an increase in the level of formality in the economy reduces the deficit. In contrast, a reduction in income inequality, real increase in the minimum wage, and increase in health benefits imply an increase in the social security deficit. Therefore, these variables play a crucial role in the search for an efficient social security management system and cannot be overlooked in ensuring fiscal sustainability.     

Generalised Social Security Finance in a Two-Country World

This paper develops an overlapping generations model with generalised finance of social security in a two-country world. Social security finance includes a pay-as-you-go, a fully funded, and an optimal system as special cases. An increase in social security funding of country 1 increases capital, income and consumption per head in both countries. Also, it increases foreign assets in country 1 and foreign debt in country 2. The optimal level of social security funding is below the golden rule level. During adjustment an increase in funding has negative effects on country 1 and positive effects on country 2.     

Fertility choice and financial development

We study the consequences of broader access to credit and capital markets on household decisions over the number of children. A model of the net reproduction rate is estimated on data from 78 countries over the period 1995–2010. Liquidity constraints are approximated by private credit and household credit, while opportunities for financial investment are measured by domestic public debt. We use the Index of Financial Liberalisation (Abiad et al., 2009) as one of the instruments for financial variables. We find that improved access to credit increases fertility with an elasticity of around 30%, while the effect of the development of capital markets is negative (–10%). The regression model takes the role of social security into account. Quantile regression shows that our results are robust to outliers and parameter heterogeneity.     

The Intergenerational State Education and Pensions

When credit markets to finance investment in human capital are missing, the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient. When generations overlap, this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements. We show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation. Neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones. In our mechanism, via the public education system, the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital. They pay back the debt via a social security tax, the proceedings of which finance pension payments. When the complete market allocation is achieved, the rate of return implicit in this borrowing–lending scheme should equal the market rate of return.     

Elimination of Social Security in a Dynastic Framework

Much of the existing literature on social security has taken the extreme assumption that individuals have little or no altruism; this paper takes an opposite assumption that there is full two-sided altruism. When households insure members that belong to the same family line, privatizing social security can gain public support. In our benchmark model calibrated to the U.S. economy, privatization without compensation is favoured by 52% of the population. If social security participants are fully compensated for their contributions, and the transition to privatization is financed by a combination of debt and a consumption tax, 58% experience a welfare gain. These gains and the resulting public support for social security reform depend critically on a flexible labour market. If the labour supply elasticity is low, then support for privatization disappears.     

Fiscal strategies,foreign indebtedness,and overlapping generations

Conclusions This paper offers a unifying dynamic system approach to real government debt and real capital formation in a world economy. The sustainability of permanently maintained primary fiscal deficits is investigated in an open economy. In particular if national governments compete in the issuance of debt at an international capital market sustainable debt profiles appear only as a theoretical (i. e., not empirically valid) curiosity. Within the more realistic regime of an undercapitalized world economy a nation can only run a permanently maintained primary surplus. Starting from a PMP surplus the paper also demonstrates the viability of temporary deficits implying an increase in taxation later to stabilize the fiscal debt. By reversing the argument this shows, the right way to reduce government debt in a non-traumatic manner is to run a higher temporary surplus via higher taxation. Using this extrasurplus to buy back fiscal debt the economy may reduce taxation later while enjoying vigorous capital accumulation towards a higher capital-labour ratio. Furthermore, the paper shows that ceteris paribus a relatively high social security load and a relatively high size of a balanced budget causes external indebtedness via consumption oriented current account deficits. It is left for further research to see what happens if government borrows for public investment instead of public consumption.My research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. While preparing the paper 1 had access to unpublished work by M. Carlberg and T. Ihori. Discussions with M. Carlberg, H. Großmann, J. Michaelis, and H. Schmid are gratefully acknowledged. The diagrams were mastered by C. Schwarz.     

Public investment,national debt,and economic growth: The role of debt finance under dynamic inefficiency

Public investment is a central issue in the dynamic analyses of fiscal policy and economic growth. Debt financing for public investment and its effects have recently received great attention because interest rates have been low, almost invariably remaining below economic growth rates. This paper presents examination of the effects of debt-financed public investment subject to a simple fiscal rule in an overlapping generations model with public capital. This topic includes capital budgeting and the debt–deficit criterion of the Maastricht treaty. We show herein that debt financing for public investment enhances economic growth if an economy is dynamically inefficient and if public capital has a sufficiently large productivity effect. Moreover, it reduces economic growth rates in a dynamically efficient economy. Debt and growth can have a monotonic or non-monotonic relation, depending on the steady-state interest rate, growth rate, and productivity effect of public investment. The findings indicate that debt–growth relations match with controversial empirical evidence. Furthermore, existing generations choose perfect debt finance if dynamic inefficiency exists. In contrast, a balanced budget is preferred in a dynamically efficient economy with low productivity effects of public capital. However, an economy with high productivity effects of public capital might cho ose debt financing. This paper contributes to the elucidation of currently emphasized issues of public investment.     

Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

Loss aversion and social security: a general equilibrium approach

Introducing an intertemporal model of loss aversion, I study the role of social security in determining intergenerational redistribution when consumers have reference-dependent preferences with loss aversion. Using a unified social security model in which different social security plans are specified via different degrees of fundedness, I examine the effect of the transition from a less funded system to a more funded one on savings, consumption, and capital accumulation for an OLG production economy. A general equilibrium analysis shows that the direction of intertemporal equilibrium is dependent on how the total savings responds to the interest rate change, but the effect of the payroll tax on capital accumulation is ambiguous. By deriving closed-form solutions, I find that an increase in fundedness intensity unambiguously increases capital accumulation in steady states, while the tax effects on consumption and savings are not conclusive. Moreover, simulation exercises show that when consumers are prone to over-consume because they care more about the contemporaneous gain utility, the fully funded system may help the individuals smooth out their lifecycle consumption.     

Social security,saving, and macroeconomics

Arguing within the framework of a life-cycle hypothesis of consumption of the individual household, Martin Feldstein has claimed that a pay-as-you-go, unfunded social-security system implies a private-sector perception of wealth which both depresses private saving and raises aggregate consumption. But the effects in a macro-economic context are not the same. With less than full employment, perceived increments to private wealth in social security or any other government obligations should increase current and planned future consumption and saving, raising employment and output. With full employment, as long as monetary policy is appropriately accommodating, such increments to wealth should raise prices but leave all real variables, including capital accumulation, unaffected. Increases in social-security wealth would merely substitute for real private wealth in the form of explicit government bonds. Econometric estimates from corrected U.S. data on social security, public debt, income, and employment are consistent with these hypotheses.     

AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL WITH PUBLIC CAPITAL AND SUSTAINABLE GOVERNMENT DEBT*

This paper presents and analyses an endogenous growth model with public capital and public debt. It is assumed that the ratio of the primary surplus to gross domestic income is a positive linear function of the debt income ratio which assures that public debt is sustainable. The paper then derives necessary conditions for the existence of a sustainable balanced growth path for the analytical model. Further, simulations are undertaken in order to gain insight into stability properties of the model and in order to analyse growth effects of deficit financed increases in public investment. The latter is done for the model on the sustainable balanced growth path as well as for the model along the transition path.     

Environmental Quality,Public Debt and Economic Development

This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal.     

China's Growing Government Debt in a Computable Overlapping Generations Model

This paper simulates the effects of China's growing government debt in a computable equilibrium model of overlapping generations. Our model assumes that the government increases debt to finance its spending in the short run, and then increases taxes or cuts spending to keep the debt–GDP ratio constant. The spending‐driven government debt increases public capital and output in the short run, but decreases private investment, total capital stock, output, and net exports in the long run, and makes the future generations worse off. Among various means of debt control, a decrease in government spending seems to be the least harmful to private investment, capital stock, and output while an increase in capital taxation is most detrimental.     

Public Debt,Terms of Trade and Welfare: The Role of Capital Production Shares,External Balances,and Dynamic (In)efficiency

In view of still large external imbalances across the world economy and dramatically risen public debts in major advanced economies, this paper reconsiders the relationship between public debt, the terms of trade and welfare in a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model with technological differences across countries. We find that the terms of trade effect of a public debt shock depends only on international differences in capital production shares and the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy. As in a model with similar capital production shares, domestic welfare rises and foreign welfare decreases when Home has a positive external balance and the Golden Rule holds. Under dynamic efficiency, welfare decreases in the debt-expanding, net foreign creditor country if she has a relatively smaller capital production share, and if the welfare effect through the accumulation channel is negative. In contrast, under dynamic inefficiency she can increase her welfare by debt expansion.     

Public capital,sustainable debt and endogenous growth

We analyze an endogenous growth model with public capital and public debt where we posit that the primary surplus of the government is a positive function of cumulated past debt with an exponentially declining weight put on debt further back in time. We consider two scenarios: first, we study the model assuming that the government runs a balanced budget and, then, we compare the outcome to that of the model with permanent deficits. We analyze growth effects of the two scenarios and we study how fiscal policy of the government affects the dynamics of the model economy. It is demonstrated that the balanced growth rate is higher when cumulated past public debt is smaller. Further, we show that the debt policy of the government crucially determines the dynamics of the model economy and that endogenous growth cycles can arise.     

创业者社会资本与新企业融资工具选择

以社会资本理论为基础,构建模型分析在存在双重道德风险的情况下,创业者社会资本对债务融资与风险资本股权融资两种融资工具选择的影响。研究发现,当创业者有能力选择债务融资或者风险资本两种融资工具时,同时当创业者的社会资本拥有度较高或者较低时,创业者倾向于选择债务融资;而当创业者社会资本拥有度在中等水平时,倾向于选择风险资本股权融资。研究的主要贡献在于,将创业者社会资本纳入到新企业融资工具选择的研究框架之中,深化了新企业融资的研究成果。     

The political economy of Ecuador’s external debt default

The default of the 2012 and 2030 Global Bonds during the early stages of the Alianza PAIS government in Ecuador is best understood in the context of the social conflicts that characterized the exhaustion of neoliberalism in the country and the struggle between different fractions of capital for the direction of the process of accumulation. The restructuring of external debt and the new wave of public borrowing facilitated a boost in public spending that spurred economic growth and provided a ‘fiscal pacification’ of social unrest and political instability. The movements in public debt have also been a lever for State and geopolitical repositioning that reflects a new moment in the correlation of social forces and hegemony in the world economy. In this new scenario, however, Ecuador has not overcome the structural imbalances and contradictions that underpin its external debt problematic.     

Sustainability of public debt,public capital formation,and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations setting

Under the golden rule of public finance for public investment with a constant budget deficit/GDP ratio, we show that for the sustainability of government budget deficits there is a threshold of the initial public debt for a given stock of public capital, and that this threshold level of public debt is increasing in the stock of public capital. If the initial public debt is greater than the threshold, the government can no longer sustain budget deficits, while if it is smaller, the government can conduct a permanent deficit policy, which eventually leads to a positive public debt/GDP ratio.     

Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of “the golden rule of public sector borrowing”

In this paper I challenge the proposition that the golden rule of public sector borrowing is consistent with the principle of intertemporal allocative efficiency, in the sense that growth-enhancing public investment justifies a structural public deficit. I demonstrate that in the long run the social opportunity cost of debt-financed public investment exceeds the social opportunity cost of tax financed public investments. This result holds if the social rate of time preference is lower than the interest rate on government borrowing. Thus a benevolent government would use taxes to finance public investment. In the short run, debt financing is justified if public investment has a considerable growth effect on private consumption. This requires a corresponding initial undersupply of public capital.