Centralized versus decentralized decision-making in a county government setting

During the November 1988 election cycle, the residents of Mississippi's 82 counties were allowed to choose whether or not to switch to an alternative system for governing the construction and repair of county roads. Under the system then used statewide – the so-called beat system – each of a county's five elected supervisors determined spending priorities and allocated funds within the boundaries of his or her own district. Under the alternative system – the so-called unit system – such choices were to be made by the supervisors collectively and then executed by a hired professional road manager. This paper models the decision of voters to retain the beat system (38 counties) or to switch to the unit system (44 counties). Theory and evidence suggest that the choice between centralized versus decentralized governance depends on the perceived costs and benefits of the alternatives to voters and their elected representatives. Received: February 24, 2000; Accepted: September 20, 2001     

The Welfare Effects of Consumers' Reports of Bribery

A primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. Yet this important control mechanism has received very little attention in the literature on corruption. I study a signaling game of corruption in which uninformed consumers require a government service from informed officials. A victim of corruption can report corrupt officials whose supervisors are negligent or conscientious but an official's type is his private information. I find that social welfare may be nonmonotonic in the proportion of conscientious supervisors. Several examples show that an increase in the proportion of conscientious supervisors decreases social welfare if the mass of conscientious supervisors is below a critical level. I find that this perverse result does not hold if (a) the bribe is very large, or (b) bribe‐giving is legalized. I also find that there is an equilibrium in which no one reports corruption.     

Corruption in transition economies: Effects of government size, country size and economic reforms

This paper uses annual pooled data over 1998–2002 for transition countries to examine whether government size or country size matters more in its impact on corruption; and whether piecemeal reforms or comprehensive transition reforms are desirable for corruption reduction. Our results show that greater economic prosperity leads to lower corruption, and contrary to findings for other nations, a bigger government size seems toreduce corruption in transition nations. The geographic size of a country is positive and significant, suggesting that more spread out countries would have a harder time controlling corruption. Comprehensive transition reforms might work best at corruption reduction. A version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, March 2005. Comments of participants at the Mediterranean meetings, especially Utku Teksoz, and two anonymous referees are appreciated. Insightful comments by Prof. Vojmir Franicevic on an earlier version and research assistance of Richard Connelly are also appreciated. Remaining errors are our own.     

Interpersonal Targets and Types of Workplace Aggression as a Function of Perpetrator Sex

We investigated the relationship between biological sex of the perpetrator and enactment of two forms of psychological workplace aggression (i.e., overt and covert) against two different interpersonal targets (i.e., supervisors and co-workers). Based on theories of power, we tested hypotheses using two samples (n ₁  = 155, 57% females; n ₂  = 152, 54% females). In comparison to women, results showed that men enacted greater levels of overt aggression against both supervisors and co-workers. Men and women reported enacting equal levels of covert aggression against both supervisors and co-workers. Taken together, these findings suggest that although biological sex of the perpetrator distinguishes levels of enacted overt aggression in the workplace, there are no differences between the sexes on levels of enacted covert aggression in the workplace.     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.     

The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector

This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.     

Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility

This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a ‘payment satisfaction’ effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge. RID="*" ID="*" Acknowledgments: We are indebted to Johann Graf Lambsdorff for calling our attention to Fujimori's gender policy and to Ernst Fehr, Bruno Frey, Alireza Jay Naghavi, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries with high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. The reverse is true for developed countries.      

公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文利用上市公司的数据,分析了公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。结果发现:股权集中度国家股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模、治理环境、公司透明度、企业规模与代理成本显著负相关;股权制衡度、领取报酬的董事比例、领取报酬的监事比例、董事会会议次数、股东大会会议次数与代理成本显著正相关;高管持股、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、两职分离与代理成本无显著关系;财务杠杆率与代理成本的关系是混合的;国有上市公司和民营上市公司的公司治理与代理成本之间的关系与总样本基本一致。     

Industry Mix, Wages, and the Divergence of County Income in Pennsylvania

Per capita incomes have diverged across Pennsylvania counties. County incomes may differ because of differences in industrial structures and because of differences in earnings within industries; a county may have a below-average income because its industry mix is comprised of low paying jobs or because county jobs pay low wages compared to the same jobs in other counties. A procedure developed by Hanna (1951) is utilized to separate income differences into these two components by constructing two counterfactual incomes for each county. The handful of high-income counties in Pennsylvania have favorable wages while the counties with incomes below the state average, although with employment mixes comparable to the overall state mix, tend to have workers who receive low wages relative to the state industry average. Wages are low in the relatively poor counties due to less investment in physical and human capital.     

HMO Participation in Medicare+Choice

In recent years, many health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have exited Medicare+Choice (M+C), the program that provides a managed‐care option to Medicare. This paper answers the following questions: How does the equilibrium number of HMOs participating in county M+C markets vary with the capitation payment they are offered? How large a payment is required at the margin to ensure that various percentages of county markets have a M+C HMO, or to ensure that various percentages of Medicare beneficiaries have the choice of a M+C plan in their county of residence? The strategy for identifying the effect of government payment on HMO participation relies on a natural experiment; in 1997, Congress divorced M+C payments to HMOs from changes in underlying costs. The results in this paper suggest that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has consistently underestimated the payment necessary to support HMOs in rural, sparsely populated areas. We also find that it would require a large incremental payment to support HMOs in M+C for the final 10% of counties or final 10% of Medicare beneficiaries.     

Gathering Information and Exercising Influence: Two Forms of Civic Virtue Organizational Citizenship Behavior

Political behavior at work often is disparaged as self-serving activity that undermines the efficient pursuit of organizational goals. Yet politics has a more benign meaning as well: responsible participation in decision-making processes, keeping informed, and promoting innovative ideas that serve long-term organizational interests. To date, the negative image of organizational politics among managers and scholars has limited research on the positive contributions of responsible political participation, a form of Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) known as civic virtue.This paper draws on political philosophy and organizational research to consider two forms of civic virtue OCB: gathering information and exercising influence. Both are proactive and can have beneficial results for individuals, organizations, and society. Conceptually, the two forms of civic virtue are related. Yet they also are different. Results of a field study of 245 employees and their supervisors provide support for similarities and differences in the two forms of civic virtue. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our study, and the benefits of continued research on both aspects of civic virtue OCB.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Orlando FL, April 2003, in a symposium entitled “New Perspectives on the Dimensionality of Organizational Citizenship Behavior.” A newer version of this paper was presented at the October 2005 International Meeting of the Association on Employment Practices and Principles (AEPP) in Baltimore, MD.     

Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?

In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers. The paper has been presented at the “Atelier Retraites”, Bordeaux, October 2003. We would like to thank the participants and in particular our discussant, Ronan Mahieu, for their remarks. We are also grateful to our two referees who provided detailed and constructive comments and suggestions. Support for this research project has been provided by the European RTN program through the FINRET network     

State and local fiscal policy and growth at the border

The paper studies the connection between state and local fiscal policy, as measured by the share of government spending and revenues in personal income, and the economic activity of counties that share a state border. I construct a panel of pairs of US counties that share a state border from the 1970s to 2012. Economic activity is measured by county employment, wages and business establishments. The state and local government spending and revenue shares are aggregates for the states on the respective sides of the border. I estimate distributed lag regressions of changes in economic activity on changes in state and local government budgets in two ways. The first (double difference) utilizes change in the difference between border counties. This suggests a quite modest relocation of economic activity away from states with fiscal expansion. I then look at activity on each side of the border separately and find more substantial and consistently negative effects of fiscal expansion on both sides of the border. A border county shares the negative consequences for its neighbor of growth in the size of that neighbor's state and local governments. This negative fiscal externality is roughly half the size of the direct negative effects from similar own-state spending increases, and the sum of the two is substantial economically.     

Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa

This paper uses panel data from African countries and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effects of corruption on economic growth and income distribution. I find that corruption decreases economic growth directly and indirectly through decreased investment in physical capital. A unit increase in corruption reduces the growth rates of GDP and per capita income by between 0.75 and 0.9 percentage points and between 0.39 and 0.41 percentage points per year respectively. The results also indicate that increased corruption is positively correlated with income inequality. The combined effects of decreased income growth and increased inequality suggests that corruption hurts the poor more than the rich in African countries. Received: March 19, 2001 / Accepted: December 14, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" An earlier version of this paper was presented at the first AmFiTan International Conference on Development Ethics in February 2000, Dar er Salaam, Tanzania. I thank two anonymous referees of this Journal for helpful suggestions. I am, however, solely responsible for any remaining errors.     

Population growth in U.S. counties, 1840–1990

We examine the location and growth of the U.S. population using county-level census data from 1840 and 1990. Natural characteristics (e.g., access to water transportation) heavily influenced where populations located in 1840, and produced characteristics in existence in 1840 (e.g., educational infrastructure) had a significant influence on subsequent growth. Evidence of population convergence appears only when the most-heavily-populated counties in 1840 are excluded from the sample. Moreover, when counties located on the western frontier are excluded from the full sample, on the assumption that they were relatively far from their steady-state populations, there is evidence of population divergence.     

FDICIA and bank failure contagion: Evidence from the two failures of first city bancorporation

We investigate contagion effects from the two failures of First City Bancorporation—the only large regional bank to fail before and after FDICIA. FDICIA imposes changes in the bank failure resolution process that expose uninsured depositors to substantially greater risk. We find that shocks to First City’s weekly returns affect the conditional volatility of all but the most financially sound banks in the 1985–1987 period. This risk spillover effect is not evident in the period leading up to First City’s 1992 failure, however, which suggests that the regulatory changes embodied in FDICIA have not contributed to a more risky banking system. We appreciate the comments of Richard Cebula, Ken Kroner, Jim Pappas, Joseph Mason, an anonymous reviewer, and seminar participants at the 1996 meetings of the Financial Management Association.     

How institutions affect export quality

We examine the relationship between a country's institutional environment and the quality of its exports. Institutional factors such as widespread corruption, inefficient bureaucracy, and high risk of expropriation of private property by government can create uncertainty among producers and discourage them from investing and innovating over the long term. This can limit the ability of producers to improve the quality of their exports in the future. We find some evidence that a better institutional environment (i.e. lower corruption, more efficient bureaucracy and more secure property rights) is associated with better export quality. After accounting for potential endogeneity between institutional and economic variables, we conclude that better institutions lead to improvements in export quality. Among the institutional factors considered in this article, corruption appears to be most robustly associated with export quality. These results have important implications for policymakers.     

Equity in Financing Primary and Secondary Education

Abstract . Per pupil educational costs for Kansas counties are analyzed according to degree to which the county is rural. The loss or gain due to migration of educated young people is then added into the costs. Those costs are then compared to ability to pay according to a number of indicators in each category of the county. The impact of various forms of taxation to support schools is analyzed. Rural counties spend more per pupil and pay higher per capita property taxes. The differences in cost between rural and urban areas is even greater when the effects of migration are included. Household incomes tend to be lower in more rural counties. The effects of a court-ordered change in school finance will increase the inequalities between rural and urban areas. It is contended that reliance on the property tax contributes highly to this inequality.     

Decomposing the Triple-Helix synergy into the regional innovation systems of Norway: firm data and patent networks

The Triple Helix model of university-industry-government relations allows us to use mutual information among geographical, sectorial, and size distribution of firms to measure synergy at various geographical scales in a nation. In this paper we decompose the synergy in Triple Helix relations and analyze the decomposition at the county level. We use micro-level data for all Norwegian firms from 2002 to 2014. This provides new and more detailed insight into the factors explaining the previously reported variation in synergy at county level in Norway. Furthermore, we analyze the county and city level distributions of all national as well as USPTO granted patents with at least one Norwegian inventor. Co-inventor networks for Norwegian USPTO patents are visualized using Google maps. The counties with technology-dominated synergies and strong knowledge institutions have a higher level of international co-inventor networks. Sectorial and geographical networks characterize the oil and gas dominated county, Rogaland. In contrast the knowledge institution dominated county of Sør-Trøndelag has broader networks both with regard to sectors and geography. In the small industry dominated county of Møre og Romsdal with high synergy, the lack of international co-inventor network is striking. This might be interpreted as a sign of industrial lock-in. The use of both firm level and patent data together give a broader and more precise picture of the innovation systems under study. The use of both national and international patent data also broadens the picture of the innovation activity of the nation.