Long-run stock performance of German initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues

We estimate the long-run stock performance after initial public offerings (IPOs) in the German capital market with a larger sample than prior studies and alternative benchmarks (the equally and the value-weighted market portfolio, size portfolios and matching stocks). In addition we present the first results on the long-run performance after seasoned equity issues (SEOs) in Germany. We conclude that size portfolios and matching stocks are better benchmarks than market portfolios. Using buy‐and-hold abnormal returns, we estimate that German stocks involved in an IPO or in a SEO, on average, underperform a portfolio consisting of stocks with a similar market capitalization by 6% in three years. This is considerably less than the underperformance after IPOs and SEOs in the US market reported by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and the underperformance after IPOs in Germany reported by Ljungqvist (1997). We also show that the apparent underperformance of the 1988–1990 IPO cohort discussed by Ljungqvist (1997) disappears when the abnormal performance estimate is based on size instead of market portfolios.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.     

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

Signalling and the Long‐run Performance of Spanish Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)

Abstract:   Academic research into firms that have gone public has focused on the study of two anomalies: initial underpricing and long‐run underperformance. We analyse Spanish Initial Public Offerings to provide additional evidence on the long‐run performance of IPOs and its relationship with initial underpricing. Results reveal the existence of negative long‐run abnormal stock returns, in line with the international literature. Long‐run performance presents a positive relationship with underpricing and the volume of funds obtained in seasoned offerings, in consonance with the predictions of Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Welch (1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) .     

Initial and Long-Run IPO Returns in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT

This article provides original evidence on IPO underpricing and long-run underperformance in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and compares results to the European Union’s developed capital markets from 2000 to 2009. Using both index-adjusted and CAPM-adjusted returns, we find significant underpricing that is significantly higher than underpricing of comparable IPOs in the European Union’s developed capital markets. We show that the CEE’s initial IPO returns also exhibit significantly higher volatility. In line with the asymmetric information theory, we indicate that smaller IPOs in the CEE region have greater underpricing than the larger IPOs. Contrary to the literature, we unambiguously confirm long-run underperformance toward the benchmarks. In some model specifications, we also find that IPO long-run underperformance in the CEE region is less present than in the European Union’s developed capital markets.     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.     

The Really Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Pre-Nasdaq Evidence

Financial economists have intensely debated the performance of IPOs using data after the formation of Nasdaq. This paper sheds light on this controversy by undertaking a large, out‐of‐sample study: We examine the performance for five years after listing of 3,661 U.S. IPOs from 1935 to 1972. The sample displays some underperformance when event‐time buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns are used. The underperformance disappears, however, when cumulative abnormal returns are utilized. A calendar‐time analysis shows that over the entire period, IPOs return as much as the market. The intercepts in CAPM and Fama–French regressions are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting no abnormal performance.     

Characterizing the Risk of IPO Long‐Run Returns: The Impact of Momentum,Liquidity, Skewness,and Investment

We study 6,686 initial public offerings (IPOs) spanning the period 1981‐2005 and find that the new issues puzzle disappears in a Fama‐French three‐factor framework. IPOs do not underperform in the aftermarket on a risk‐adjusted basis and do not underperform a matched sample of nonissuers. IPO underperformance is concentrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and IPOs either perform the same as the market or outperform on a risk‐adjusted basis from 1998 to 2005. We find that outperformance in the later period is driven by large firms. Factors for momentum, investment, liquidity, and skewness help to explain aftermarket returns, although size and book‐to‐market tend to proxy for skewness. IPO investors receive smaller expected returns due to negative momentum and investment exposure and in exchange for higher liquidity.     

Three Decades of IPO Markets in Canada: Evolution,Risk and Return

This article explores the extent that the long‐run returns following initial public offerings (IPOs) can explain the asserted decrease in IPOs in Canada. The causes of such a decrease remain controversial, in part because of our limited knowledge of this market. We first describe in detail the evolution of Canadian IPOs on the senior and the venture stock exchanges over three decades (1986–2016). This evolution differs considerably between natural resource and non‐natural resource firms. Second, using other junior markets as a benchmark, we show that the Canadian IPO market is very particular, mainly because it lists very small firms at an early development stage. Third, using 2,145 Canadian IPOs, we provide evidence that these IPOs generate three‐year negative average abnormal returns, and more than 70 percent report negative abnormal returns. Large issuers reporting profits constitute the only subsample that provides fair returns, but they account for less than 5 percent of IPOs. Such a market probably survived for many decades because of investors' preference for skewness and the characteristics of the returns' distribution. We observe a high level of skewness of abnormal returns, consistent with the behavioral finance proposition that investors are often unduly optimistic when valuing lottery stocks.     

An empirical analysis of Mexican and US closed-end mutual fund IPOs

We examine 135 Mexican closed-end fund IPOs and 370 Mexican non-fund IPOs that issued between 1994 and 2003 along with 217 contemporaneous US fund IPOs and document three primary results. First, we find that Mexican IPOs in the aggregate experience no significant underpricing, unlike their US IPO counterparts. Both Mexican and US IPOs experience significantly negative long-run performance. Second, Mexican closed-end fund IPOs experience positive long-run performance, significantly better than Mexican non-fund IPOs which experience negative long-run performance. Unlike Mexican fund IPOs, US fund IPOs experience negative long-run performance. Third, we find that both Mexican and US debt-backed closed-end fund IPOs significantly outperform equity-backed closed-end IPOs. In Mexico, debt-backed funds experience positive abnormal returns, compared to negative abnormal returns for Mexican equity-backed funds, US debt-backed funds, and US equity-backed funds.     

Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies

We investigate the long-run underperformance of recent initial public offering (IPO) firms in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972–1992 and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975–1992. We find that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using equal weighted returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and substantially reduces underperformance for nonventure-backed IPOs. In tests using several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three factor asset pricing model, venture-backed companies do not significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed firms do. Underperformance, however, is not an IPO effect. Similar size and book-to-market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs.     

Odd‐lot Costs and Taxation Influences on Stock Dividend Ex‐dates

Abstract:   Past research has revealed significant abnormal ex‐date returns for stock dividends even though the ex‐date is known in advance and the distribution contains no new information. Various researchers have suggested that the higher transaction cost of selling odd‐lot share parcels compared to round‐lot share parcels is a key driver in the abnormal returns. However, no study to date has directly compared the ex‐date price reaction of stock dividends distributed when odd‐lot transaction costs were charged to those issued when odd‐lot costs were not evident. As odd‐lot trade costs were eliminated from the New Zealand Stock Exchange on 1 October, 1991, the New Zealand market provides a unique opportunity to directly test the role, if any, that odd‐lot transactions costs have in explaining stock dividend ex‐date returns. We find that prior to October 1991 stock dividend ex‐dates exhibit significantly positive returns, however, we do not find any significant ex‐date return once the higher odd‐lot transaction costs were removed. The New Zealand market also enables us to examine an imputation tax based argument of the ex‐date price reaction and we find evidence that imputation tax credits have a value greater than zero.     

Penny Stock IPOs

We examine underpricing, long-run returns, lockup periods, and gross spreads for penny stock IPOs over the 1990–1998 period. We find that penny stock IPOs have higher initial returns than ordinary IPOs, but significantly worse long-run underperformance. We also find that penny stock IPOs have longer lockup periods and larger gross spreads. To explore the effect of potential market manipulation, we examine IPOs led by a group of underwriters that were the subject of SEC enforcement actions and/or other penalties. Penny stock issues led by these banks are particularly underpriced and underperform ordinary IPOs led by other underwriters.     

Do Privatization IPOs Outperform in the Long Run?

This paper investigates the long-run stock returns of privatization initial public offering (IPO) firms using a sample of 241 privatization IPOs from 42 countries during the period 1981-2003. We compare one-, three-, and five-year holding period returns of privatization IPOs to those of the domestic stock market indices and to size and size- and book-to-market equity ratio (BM)-matched firms from the same countries. Consistent with previous studies, we find that privatization IPOs significantly outperform their domestic stock markets in the long run. However, they show less consistent abnormal long-term stock performance relative to their size or size- and BM-matched benchmark firms.     

Performance of Private to Public MBOs: The Role of Venture Capital

Abstract:   Using a unique dataset, we examine financial performance, and venture capital involvement in 167 MBOs exiting through IPOs (MBO‐IPOs) on the London Stock Exchange, during the period 1964 –1997. VC backed MBOs seem to be more underpriced than MBOs without venture capital backing, based on average value‐weighted returns. MBOs backed by highly reputable VCs tend to be older companies, and exit earlier than MBOs backed by less reputable VCs. The results contradict 'certification' and 'grandstanding' hypotheses supported by US data ( Megginson and Weiss, 1991 ; and Gompers, 1996 , respectively). We found no evidence of either significant underperformance, or that VC backed MBOs perform better than their non‐VC backed counterparts in the long run. However, MBOs backed by highly reputable venture capital firms seem to be better long‐term investments as compared to those backed by less prestigious venture capitalist firms. The results remain robust after using different methods to measure performance, and after controlling for sample selectivity bias.     

Explaining the Short‐ and Long‐Term IPO Anomalies in the US by R&D

Abstract:   Financial scholars who research the initial underpricing and long‐term underperformance of IPOs generally attribute these phenomena to information asymmetry and investors' misevaluations. Here, we identify, on a sample of 2,696 US IPOs issued during 1980–1995, a widespread source of information asymmetry and valuation uncertainty—the R&D activities of issuers—and document that these activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs (R&D is positively correlated with underpricing) and their long‐term performance (R&D is positively related to long‐term performance). Given the pervasiveness and constant growth of firms' R&D activities in modern economies, our identification of R&D as a major factor affecting IPO's performance contributes to the understanding of this important economic and capital market phenomenon.     

The under-pricing of IPOs in the Gulf cooperation council countries

We document the phenomenon of under-pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) for 47 Gulf firms that went public between 2001 and 2006. The IPOs had, on average, initial abnormal returns of 290 percent, far exceeding those documented for both developed and emerging markets. In aftermarket performance, we find that these IPOs provide investors with negative abnormal returns over a one-year period, which seems to be consistent with findings in other industrial and emerging markets. The empirical models fail, however, to provide us with a satisfactory explanation using the common independent variables employed in the literature. Nevertheless, it appears that country- and industry-specific characteristics, in addition to the timing of the offers, play a key role in explaining IPO behavior in the region. This paper's empirical findings support the hypothesis that investors are initially over-optimistic about an IPO's performance, but grow more pessimistic over time.     

Glamour Acquirers, Method of Payment and Post‐acquisition Performance: The UK Evidence

We study the effect of different acquirer types, defined by financial status and their payment methods, on their short and long‐term performance, in terms of abnormal returns using a variety of benchmark models. For a sample of 519 UK acquirers during 1983–95, we examine the abnormal return performance of acquirers based on their pre‐bid financial status as either glamour or value acquirers using both the price to earnings (PE) ratio and market to book value ratio (MTBV). Value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers in the three‐year post‐acquisition period. One interpretation is that glamour firms have overvalued equity and tend to exploit their status and use it more often than cash to finance their acquisitions. As we move from glamour to value acquirers, there is a greater use of cash. Our results are broadly consistent with those for the US reported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998). However, in contrast to their study, we find stronger support for the method of payment hypothesis than for extrapolation hypothesis. Cash acquirers generate higher returns than equity acquirers, irrespective of their glamour/ value status. Our conclusions, based on four benchmark models for abnormal returns, suggest that stock markets in both the US and the UK may share a similar proclivity for over‐extrapolation of past performance, at least in the bid period. They also tend to reassess acquirer performance in the post‐acquisition period and correct this overextrapolation. These results have implications for the behavioural aspects of capital markets in both countries.     

Are publicly held firms less efficient? Evidence from the US property-liability insurance industry

This paper studies the performance of publicly held firms in the US property-liability insurance industry by analyzing companies that issued initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 2005, using private firms as the benchmark. I investigate ex ante determinants and ex post effects of IPOs on firm efficiency, operating performance, and other financials. I also analyze stock returns and follow-on SEO and acquisition activities to provide further information on IPO motivation. The paper finds that the likelihood of an IPO significantly increases with firm size and premium growth. IPO firms experience no post-issue underperformance in efficiency, operations, or stock returns; register improvement in allocative and cost efficiency; and reduce financial leverage and reinsurance usage. Moreover, IPO firms are active in follow-on SEO issues and acquisition activities. The findings are mostly consistent with the theory that firms go public for easier access to capital and to ease capital constraints.