Misperceiving inequality

A vast literature suggests that economic inequality has important consequences for politics and public policy. Higher inequality is thought to increase demand for income redistribution in democracies and to discourage democratization and promote class conflict and revolution in dictatorships. Most such arguments crucially assume that ordinary people know how high inequality is, how it has been changing, and where they fit in the income distribution. Using a variety of large, cross‐national surveys, we show that, in recent years, ordinary people have had little idea about such things. What they think they know is often wrong. Widespread ignorance and misperceptions emerge robustly, regardless of data source, operationalization, and measurement method. Moreover, perceived inequality—not the actual level—correlates strongly with demand for redistribution and reported conflict between rich and poor. We suggest that most theories about political effects of inequality need to be reframed as theories about effects of perceived inequality.     

The Impact of Inequality and Redistribution on Growth

In this paper, we reassess the impact of inequality on growth. The majority of previous papers have employed (system) GMM estimation. However, recent simulation studies indicate that the problems of GMM when using non‐stationary data such as GDP have been grossly underestimated in applied research. Concerning predetermined regressors such as inequality, GMM is outperformed by a simple least‐squares dummy variable estimator. Additionally, new data have recently become available that not only double the sample size compared to most previous studies, but also address the substantial measurement issues that have plagued past research. Using these new data and an LSDV estimator, we provide an analysis that both accounts for the conditions where inequality is beneficial or detrimental to growth and distinguishes between market‐driven inequality and redistribution. We show that there are situations where market inequality affects growth positively while redistribution is simultaneously beneficial.     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched

In democratic countries, elected policymakers determine public spending. The level of public spending depends on taxes that are decided by a voting mechanism. Policymakers also decide how to allocate funds among different policies, such as public education and pure redistributive transfers. How are the levels of funding for public education and redistribution determined in the political process? What impacts do votes on these two policies have on inequality, growth and social mobility? We develop a politico-economic model that highlights a novel mechanism: public education provides opportunities for the children of the poor to be recognized for their talent. This reduces the probability of a mismatch, which takes place when individuals with low talent who come from rich families find jobs that should go to people with high talent (and vice versa). Hence, the poor may prefer public spending on education to direct redistribution, while the rich prefer redistribution, as education implies more competition for good jobs from the poor.     

Populist policies in the transition to democracy

This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this kind of redistribution as populist redistribution because, first it does not increase the poor's productive capacity (human capital), and second it seeks to “buy” political support (peace) to perpetuate the elite's control of political power. We examine the conditions under which ruling elites choose to deter the poor (by means of military repression and/or populist redistribution), to engage in a dispute with the poor for the control of political power, or, alternatively, to extend democracy. According to the results of the model populist redistribution (or military repression), if any, increases with initial wealth inequality and with the amount of redistribution that the poor can undertake under democracy, and decreases with the relative importance of a human capital externality in production. The model explains why in some cases the use of an apparently inefficient policy of populist redistribution turns out to be optimal for both groups (the ruling elite and the poor class) when the alternative is the use of military repression or default to conflict.     

POLITICAL INEQUALITY,CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS,AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS

Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

THE 2005 LAWRENCE R. KLEIN LECTURE: EMERGENT CLASS STRUCTURE*

This article presents a model of the emergent class structure, in which a society inhabited by inherently identical households may be endogenously split into the rich bourgeoisie and the poor proletariat. For some parameter values, the model has no steady state where all households remain equally wealthy. In this case, the model predicts emergent class structure or the rise of class societies. Even if every household starts with the same amount of wealth, the society will experience “symmetry‐breaking” and will be polarized into two classes in steady state, where the rich maintain a high level of wealth partly due to the presence of the poor, who have no choice but to work for the rich at a wage rate strictly lower than the “fair” value of labor. The nonexistence of the equal steady state means that a one‐shot redistribution of wealth would not be effective, as wealth inequality and the class structure would always reemerge. Thus, the class structure is an inevitable feature of capitalism. For other parameter values, on the other hand, the model has the unique steady state, which is characterized by perfect equality. In this case, the model predicts dissipating class structure or the fall of class societies. Even if the society starts with significant wealth inequality, labor demand by the rich employers pushes up the wage rate so much that workers will escape from the poverty and eventually catch up with the rich, eliminating wealth inequality and the class structure in the long run. In an extension, we introduce self‐employment, which not only provides the poor with an alternative to working for the rich, but also provides the rich with an alternative to investment that creates jobs. Due to this dual nature of self‐employment, the effects of self‐employment turn out to be quite subtle. Yet, within the present framework, it is possible to offer a complete characterization of the steady states even in the presence of self‐employment.     

Does public‐sector employment fully crowd out private‐sector employment?

Employment matters for development because it can raise household income, lower inequality, promote economic growth, and contribute to political stability. Many countries have high rates of public employment, but what effect does this have on overall employment and unemployment rates? This paper investigates if and to what extent public‐sector employment crowds out (reduces) private‐sector employment. In particular, we estimate regressions of unemployment or private‐sector employment on two measures of public‐sector employment. The study uses an especially assembled dataset, which is novel for its coverage of a large sample of developing countries as part of a panel of rich and poor countries. Our results point to full or just about full crowding‐out for the entire sample. Unlike previous cross‐country studies, which were restricted to advanced economies, we are able to show that these results also apply to developing countries, although crowding‐out may not be quite as high as in advanced economies. The results mean that high rates of public employment have an offsetting large negative impact on private employment rates and do not reduce overall unemployment rates. With the qualifier that government activities may help the economy in other ways, our results imply that, rather than creating public‐sector jobs, scarce fiscal resources could be better spent on other developmental needs.     

Differential mortality and social security

Abstract This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between individuals who differ in their lifespans. We discuss aspects related to the objective function and argue that aversion to multiperiod inequality should be taken into account. Then, we study the properties of the social optimum both with full information and with asymmetric information. We highlight the role of aversion to multiperiod inequality and show that it has substantial consequences on the design of Social Security schemes. In particular, we show that for a low (resp. high) aversion to multiperiod inequality, a negative (resp. positive) implicit tax rate on continued activity is desirable.     

The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public‐private mixed health care system, where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors. Voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income, and public policy choices are part of a multi‐dimensional, competitive political equilibrium. We show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence. We also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure.     

Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances*

For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects in dirty industries. Against the background of an emerging European‐wide emission trading system, we examine the trade‐off between such compensation and economic efficiency under output‐based and emissions‐based allocation rules. We show that the emissions‐based allocation rule is more costly than the output‐based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in energy‐intensive industries. When the international allowance price increases, the inferiority of emissions‐based allocation vis‐à‐vis output‐based allocation becomes more pronounced, as emission subsidies drastically restrict efficiency gains from international trade in emission allowances.     

Old‐age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

This paper introduces an overlapping‐generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labour income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where low‐income and high‐income individuals form a coalition in favour of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle‐income individuals favour a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with a borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youth consumption.     

Redistribution and entrepreneurship with Schumpeterian growth

We examine the effects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality in a Schumpeterian model with risk-averse agents. There are skilled and unskilled workers, and the growth rate is determined by the occupational choice of skilled agents between entrepreneurship and employment. We show that redistribution provides insurance to entrepreneurs and increases the growth rate. The effects on inequality are such that low tax rates increase inequality relative to laissez-faire due to changes in wages, but higher tax rates can simultaneously raise growth and reduce inequality. We contrast the optimal linear income tax with alternative policies for promoting R&D and find that it is preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds.      

人力资本和社会资本能提高失地农民就业水平吗*——基于北京地区连续跟踪的调查数据

本文以北京地区失地农民为研究对象,基于2008年和2015年两次失地农民社会调查数据,通过失地农民的就业机制分析,构建Logistic回归模型并进行“稀有事件偏差”检验,分析在城镇化进程中,人力资本和社会资本对失地农民就业机会、职务晋升和就业行业的影响。研究发现,在失地农民获得非农就业机会方面,2008年人力资本和社会资本对其有着显著的正向影响,2015年人力资本和政治面貌的影响不显著,不过求职途径和户籍的影响显著;在职务晋升方面,两次调查结果基本一致,政治面貌、受教育程度和职业培训对其有着显著的正向影响,求职途径、户籍的影响不显著;在就业行业方面,随着时间的推进,2015年失地农民的就业行业选择出现了新的变化,有44%的失地农民开始到公共部门就业,2008年人力资本、政治面貌和求职途径变量对其进入传统行业就业无显著影响 ,2015年开始凸显,特别是对其进入公共部门就业有着显著正向影响,而户籍对进入传统行业有着正向影响,对进入公共部门无影响。     

The Political Economy of the "Minimum-Wage Institution" in an Internationally Integrated Market

The paper explores the political economy of the “minimum‐wage institution (MWI)” in an internationally integrated product market. The authors consider a two‐sector Economic Union (EU) with a perfectly competitive agricultural sector and a unionized oligopolistic manufacturing sector in which there exist productivity asymmetries across firms. It is shown that efficient firms have an incentive to strategically opt for intercountry minimum‐wage agreements high enough to raise their inefficient rivals’ costs and thus gain business in equilibrium. The unions of workers in all countries also find these agreements in their best interest. As a consequence, the MWI may emerge as the equilibrium institutional resolution of alternative political processes (i.e., an EU‐wide referendum or special‐interest politics), despite its negative effect on aggregate employment.     

Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!

We study self‐selection into politics and effort once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high‐ability motivated (public‐fit) politicians exert higher effort in politics than high‐ability non‐motivated (market‐fit) politicians, and that high‐ability citizens, both public‐fit and market‐fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996–2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market‐fit and public‐fit parliamentarians. We also show that public‐fit parliamentarians have higher voting attendance and that only voting attendance of market‐fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.     

Income distribution, borrowing constraints and redistributive policies

This paper sheds light on the relationship between income inequality and redistributive policies and provides possible guidance in the specification of empirical tests of such a relationship. We model a two-period economy where capital markets are imperfect and agents vote over the level of taxation to finance redistributive policies that enhance future productivity. In this context, we show that the pivotal voter is not necessarily the agent (class) with median income. In particular, the poor, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained, may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution. The effects of an increase in income inequality on the level of redistribution turn out to depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or the middle class. Empirical results from a panel of 22 OECD countries provide preliminary evidence consistent with our main theoretical implications.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.