REFORMING FINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

Financial reforms initiated in most transitional socialist economiesdo not yet adequately provide many of the financial servicesassociated with market-oriented financial systems. Such services—mobilizingresources, selecting firms and allocating capital, monitoringfirm managers, and facilitating the management of transactionsand risk—are a necessary condition for economic reformto improve living standards. This article envisages four central strategies to guide reformof the financial sector: • Building an infrastructure based on clear and enforceableproperty rights, modern accounting and auditing standards, reliablepayments systems, sound prudential and enforcement regulations,and professionals trained in finance • Ending the shell game of trying to hide the losses ofstate-owned enterprises, and separating government decisionsto finance "priority" firms from the allocation decisions ofindependent financial institutions • Privatizing some financial institutions early—althoughnot necessarily precipitously—in concert with the privatizationof firms and supervisory capabilities, meanwhile cleaning upbank loans to maximize the chances that firms and banks willsucceed as private entities • Improving the tax system and stressing a prudent interestrate policy to reduce uncertainty, distortions, and excessiverepression of the financial sector.      

Economic Reform and Labor Unions: A General-Equilibrium Analysis Applied to Bangladesh and Indonesia

Noting the trend toward more independent trade unions in developingcountries, this article examines whether the presence of unionsstrengthens or weakens the benefits to be gained from economicpolicy reform. We show that the presence of "passive" unions—onesthat choose their wage-employment contract given the firm'scost-minimizing strategy—increases the welfare gains fromtrade liberalization, because trade reform lowers the wage premiumenjoyed by the unionized sector, reducing a distortion in thelabor market. These gains are amplified when the unions are"active", namely, when they negotiate a contract with the firmthat is off its labor demand curve. Such a contract resultsin featherbedding—paying workers more than their marginalproduct—and trade reform reduces the amount of featherbedding.The policy implication for Bangladesh—a country with strongtrade unions and a protected unionized sector—is thatthe benefits of further trade liberalization may be greaterthan otherwise predicted. In Indonesia, where both unionizationand import tariffs are low, allowing greater independence tounions may preserve flexibility and reward workers better thanthe current minimum-wage policy.     

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR HEALTH PROJECTS

This paper applies to the health sector a method of projectanalysis advocated recently by Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput.A health project evaluation should establish a firm justificationfor public involvement; establish the counterfactual—whatwould happen with and without the project; and determine thefiscal effect of the project and the appropriate levels of feesin conjunction with project evaluation. The evaluation shouldalso acknowledge the fungibility of project resources and examinethe incentives both for high-level public servants to shiftgovernment resources away from project-funded activities tothose that have not been evaluated and for lower-level contractorsand civil servants to provide good or bad service. Market failuresin health services and insurance markets should serve as a startingpoint for economic analysis, not as a reason to ignore economicsin health projects. Project outputs should be predicted aftertaking into account the reaction of consumers and providersin the private sector as well as market structures of supply,demand, and equilibrium for health services.      

Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price

The article shows that two measures of the amount of privateinformation in stock price—price nonsynchronicity andprobability of informed trading (PIN)—have a strong positiveeffect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price.Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controlsfor managerial information and for other information-relatedvariables. The results suggest that firm managers learn fromthe private information in stock price about their own firms’fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporateinvestment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternativeexplanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namelythat it is generated by capital constraints, and show that boththe learning channel and the alternative channel contributeto this sensitivity. (JEL G14, G31)     

FINANCIAL MARKETS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE

Many factors contributed to the rapid growth of the economiesof East Asia in the past quarter century. This article examinesone important aspect of that growth—commonly referredto as the "East Asian miracle"—public policies affectingthe financial markets. East Asian governments intervened extensivelyin financial markets at all stages of their development. Whatsets their actions apart from those of other developing countriesthat have not fared as well? We do not have the informationto answer conclusively what effect particular actions had (thatrequires a counterfactual test of what growth would have beenwithout the particular intervention). But we can identify themarket failures the East Asian governments addressed, assesssome of the theoretical reasons why each policy might be growthenhancing, and provide some data attesting to the impacts ofthe policy. Several characteristics of financial sector interventionsin East Asia stand out: they incorporated design features thatimproved the chances of success and reduced opportunities forabuse; interventions that did not work out were dropped unhesitatingly;and policies were adapted to reflect changing economic conditions.      

Endogenous Tariff Formation: The Case of Mercosur

Mercosur appears as an interesting case study for analyzingthe determinants of exceptions in regional trade agreements.Its member countries—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, andUruguay—intended to make Mercosur a full customs unionby January 1995. This goal turned out to be too ambitious, andthe Protocol of Ouro Preto and other agreements signed in December1994 led to a hybrid solution. Overall, out of a total of 9,119tariff lines, around 30 percent are subject, in at least onemember country, to either external deviations from the commonexternal tariff or internal deviations from free trade. Thusan important set of holes remains under the existing agreement,leading some authors to consider Mercosur an incomplete customsunion. This article compares the results of the theoretical literatureon endogenous tariff formation with evidence from Mercosur.The results show that Mercosur's common external tariff andmember countries' deviations from it and from internal freetrade can be explained by sector or industry lobbying as predictedby the endogenous tariff literature. If a viable political economyis a key to success, then Mercosur is here to stay.     

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND COMMERCIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE: The Effect on the Poor

Do the economic gains brought by technological innovation andcommercialization in agriculture work their way through to thepoor? The prevailing optimistic view is that they do. But thisview is not universal: some hold that these forces for changecan interact with, or even induce, institutional and marketfailure, with adverse consequences for the poor. Adherents of the pessimistic view point to real-world instancesin which the poor have failed to reap the benefits, or evenhave lost, from the technological change or commercialization.Where these effects have occurred we find that they are mostlyattributable to inelastic demand or adverse institutional features;often, when technology or commercialization has been blamedfor the decline in income of the poor, other—not necessarilyconnected—policies have in fact been responsible for thedamage. This article contends that the optimistic view is, by and large,correct: normally, technology and commercialization stimulateagricultural growth, improve employment opportunities, and expandfood supply—all central to the alleviation of poverty.The evidence does not offer much encouragement to an extensionof this view—that through "social engineering" the benefitsfrom technology and commercialization can easily be targetedtoward the poor; the limited opportunities for such targetingshould of course be seized.      

THE DANGERS OF DECENTRALIZATION

Demand for decentralization is strong throughout the world.But the benefits of decentralization are not as obvious as thestandard theory of fiscal federalism suggests, and there areserious drawbacks that should be considered in designing anydecentralization program. An analysis of these dangers makesit easier to understand some of the real choices. These choicesare not so much whether to decentralize in general, but ratherwhat functions to decentralize, in which sectors, and in whichregions. In many cases the problem is not so much whether acertain service should be provided by a central, regional, orlocal government, but rather how to organize the joint productionof the service by the various levels. In many—if not most—cases, such measures have anenormous potential and could, if properly designed and implemented,significantly improve the efficiency of the public sector. Decentralizationmeasures are like some potent drugs, however: when prescribedfor the relevant illness, at the appropriate moment and in thecorrect dose, they can have the desired salutary effect; butin the wrong circumstances, they can harm rather than heal.This article looks at some of the negative effects of decentralizationin the hope that a better understanding of its dangers willcontribute to a wiser application of potentially desirable decentralizationprograms.      

Half a Century of Development Economics: A Review Based on the Handbook of Development Economics

The Handbook of Development Economics provides an unmatchedperspective on the past half century of research in the field.This article reviews some of the significant findings of theHandbook and identifies areas of development economics not coveredthere. It describes the evolution of the field, beginning withthe postwar Indian Congress consensus, which emphasized stateplanning. That paradigm was complemented in the 1970s by thedual economy paradigm and the work of the Latin American structuralists.As the costs of protectionism came to be recognized, many economiesadopted an outward orientation with respect to both trade andforeign investment. This outward orientation later formed partof a new consensus on macroeconomic management, sometimes referredto as the Washington consensus. This consensus— more accuratelydubbed the One World consensus— is now widely acceptedthroughout the world, as developing and industrial countriesalike have embraced its emphasis on fiscal discipline, tax reform,outward orientation, privatization of state enterprises, deregulation,and the safeguarding of property rights. Despite SO years ofresearch, large gaps in the understanding of development remain.Adopting Sen's framework of beings and doings and focusing oncollective action and the roles played by individuals may helpto fill some of these gaps.     

Economic, Demographic, and Institutional Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption across Countries

Life insurance has become an increasingly important part ofthe financial sector over the past 40 years, providing a rangeof financial services for consumers and becoming a major sourceof investment in the capital market. But what drives the largevariation in life insurance consumption across countries remainsunclear. Using a panel with data aggregated at different frequenciesfor 68 economies in 1961–2000, this article finds thateconomic indicators—such as inflation, income per capita,and banking sector development—and religious and institutionalindicators are the most robust predictors of the use of lifeinsurance. Education, life expectancy, the young dependencyratio, and the size of the social security system appear tohave no robust association with life insurance consumption.The results highlight the importance of price stability andbanking sector development in fully realizing the savings andinvestment functions of life insurance in an economy.     

Liquidity-Based Competition for Order Flow

We present a microstructure model of competition for order flowbetween exchanges based on liquidity provision. We find thatneither a pure limit order market (PLM) nor a hybrid specialist/limitorder market (HM) structure is competition-proof. A PLM canalways be supported in equilibrium as the dominant market (i.e.,where the hybrid limit book is empty), but an HM can also besupported, for some market parameterizations, as the dominantmarket. We also show the possible coexistence of competing markets.Order preferencing—that is, decisions about where ordersare routed when investors are indifferent—is a key determinantof market viability. Welfare comparisons show that competitionbetween exchanges can increase as well as reduce the cost ofliquidity.     

DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT

This article examines the role of the discount rate in makingdecisions that will have significant implications for the environment.The authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting ingeneral and by describing the main factors that determine thediscount rate. These factors—the private and social ratesof time preference, the opportunity cost of capital, risk anduncertainty, and the interests of future generations—allhave an environmental dimension. The article goes on to examinethat dimension and to explore the connections between the choiceof the discount rate and environmental concerns, such as excessiveexploitation of natural resources, inadequate investment inconservation, and insufficient attention to the irreversibleloss of certain environmental resources. The authors conclude that, in general, environmental concernsare not best addressed by lowering the discount rate—anaction that might have both benefits and costs for the environment.A more promising course would be to incorporate a criterionof sustainability into certain aspects of decisionmaking. Howsuch a criterion could be made operational is touched upon butnot developed in this article.      

Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies

We compare two competing theories of financial anomalies: "behavioral"theories built on investor irrationality, and "rational structuraluncertainty" theories built on incomplete information aboutthe structure of the economic environment. We find that althoughthe theories relax opposite assumptions of the rational expectationsideal, their mathematical and predictive similarities make themdifficult to distinguish. Even if irrationality generates financialanomalies, their disappearance still may hinge on rational learning—thatis, on the ability of rational arbitrageurs and their investorsto reject competing rational explanations for observed pricepatterns.     

Developing Countries and a New Round of WTO Negotiations

This article summarizes some of the results and findings emergingfrom an ongoing World Bank research and capacity-building projectthat focuses on the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiatingagenda from a developing country perspective. Recent researchsuggests that the potential gains from further multilateralliberalization of trade remain very large. The payoffs associatedwith attempts to introduce substantive disciplines in the WTOon domestic regulatory regimes are much less certain. This suggeststhat the focus of current and future negotiations should beprimarily on the bread and butter of the multilateral tradingsystem—the progressive liberalization of barriers to tradein goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis. In addition,priority should be given to ensuring that rules are consistentwith the development needs of poorer countries and to helpingdeveloping countries implement WTO obligations.      

USING RANDOMIZED CONTROL DESIGNS IN EVALUATING SOCIAL SECTOR PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Seven case studies—from Bolivia, Colombia, Indonesia,Mexico, Nicaragua, Taiwan (China), and Turkey—demonstratethe feasibility of conducting rigorous impact evaluations indeveloping countries using randomized control designs. Thisexperience, covering a wide variety of settings and social programs,offers lessons for task managers and policymakers interestedin evaluating social sector investments. The main conclusions are: first, policymakers interested inassessing the effectiveness of a project ought to consider arandomized control design because such evaluations not onlyare feasible but also yield the most robust results. Second,the acute resource constraints common in developing countriesthat often make program rationing unavoidable also present opportunitiesfor adopting randomized control designs. Policymakers and programmanagers need to be alert to the opportunities for buildingrandomized control designs into development programs right fromthe start of the project cycle because they, more than academicresearchers or evaluation experts, are in the best positionto ensure that opportunities for rigorous evaluations are exploited.      

Inequality Constraints in the Fractionally Integrated GARCH Model

In this article we derive necessary and sufficient conditionsfor the nonnegativity of the conditional variance in the fractionallyintegrated generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic(p, d, q) (FIGARCH) model of the order p 2 and sufficient conditionsfor the general model. These conditions can be seen as beinganalogous to those derived by Nelson and Cao (1992, Journalof Business & Economic Statistics 10, 229–235) forthe GARCH(p, q) model. However, the inequality constraints whichwe derive for the FIGARCH model illustrate two remarkable propertiesof the FIGARCH model which are in contrast to the GARCH model:(i) even if all parameters are nonnegative, the conditionalvariance can become negative and (ii) even if all parametersare negative (apart from d), the conditional variance can benonnegative almost surely. In particular, the conditions forthe (1, d, 1) model substantially enlarge the sufficient parameterset provided by Bollerslev and Mikkelsen (1996, Journal of Econometrics73, 151–184). The importance of the result is illustratedin an empirical application of the FIGARCH(1, d, 1) model toJapanese yen versus U.S. dollar exchange rate data.     

Tracking NAFTA's Shadow 10 Years on: Introduction to the Symposium

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is arguablythe first "case study" of what might be expected from the increasingnumber of preferential trade agreements involving both developedand developing economies. Ten years after the treaty’sinception, it is time to assess how its outcomes compare withinitial expectations. The articles in this symposium issue provideinsights into the effects of NAFTA on economic geography, trade,wages and migration, and foreign investment from Mexico’sperspective. The contributions paint a complex post-NAFTA realitycharacterized by persistent intrabloc trade barriers, interregionalinequality within Mexico, labor market outcomes that seem closelytied to migration patterns and international trade and investment,and foreign investment flows that appear weakly related to tradeagreements. NAFTA seems to be the first trade agreement in historyfor which the traditional static trade creation or diversioneffects are likely negligible—and hard to identify inany case.     

PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FROM MARKET ECONOMIES

In the past decade governments all over the world have begunprivatizing state enterprises—indeed, it is becoming quitehard to find a country without a program of privatization underway or at least on the policy agenda. This striking reversalof the push to expand state ownership in the 1960s and 1970sresults from generally poor performance of state enterprisesand a disappointing record of past reform efforts that fellshort of ownership change. This article examines the objectives of privatization and thestrategies for achieving them, documenting recent trends andreviewing the experience with privatizing state-owned commercial,manufacturing, and service enterprises in both competitive andnoncompetitive markets. The authors analyze the various tacticsthat can be or have been employed, in relation to scope, pace,sequencing, and methods of implementation. The evidence showsthat privatization produces benefits of efficiency and innovation—ifdone right. The lessons of experience discussed in the articleoffer guidance on how to realize the promise of privatizationwhile minimizing the risks and costs.      

Corporate Performance in the East Asian Financial Crisis

The sharp decline in the once-stellar performance of East Asiancorporations following the 1997 financial crisis has sparkedan intense debate. Some observers argue that external shocks,including a drop in aggregate demand and a shortage of workingcapital, explain the corporate sector's poor performance. Othersassert that the difficulties were apparent well before the crisisand that the risky financial policies pursued by these firmsleft them vulnerable. A survey of the literature shows littlemicroeconomic evidence to support either view. This article compares the growth and financing patterns of EastAsian corporations in the years before the crisis with thosein other countries. It finds little microeconomic evidence thatcorporate growth was weakening but some support for the argumentthat many firms had a weak financial structure that left themvulnerable to an economic downturn. Based on a sample of morethan 850 publicly listed firms in the four crisis countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand and—andtwo comparators, Hong Kong (China) and Singapore, it appearsthat firm specific weaknesses already in existence before thecrisis were important factors in the deteriorating performanceof the corporate sector.      

Saving Transitions

This article takes a systematic cross-national approach to identifyingsaving transitions— defined as sustained increases inthe saving rate of 5 percentage points or more—to studytheir determinants and to reexamine the question of causalitybetween growth and saving. Countries that undergo saving transitionsdo not necessarily experience sustained increases in their growthrates. In fact, growth rates typically return to their levelsbefore the transition within a decade. By contrast, countriesthat undergo growth transitions—arising from improvedterms of trade, increased domestic investment, or other sources—doend up with permanently higher saving rates. Hence saving transitionsdo not appear to be causal with respect to superior economicperformance.