Rebalancing in China: A taxation approach

The rebalancing of the Chinese economy is analyzed through a heterogeneous taxation of various types of firms. Based on a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, the paper applies tax reforms to raise consumption, reduce some firms' overinvestment (overcapacities) and maintain a high level of welfare.To rebalance consumption and investment, taxation may allow reallocating a part of the labor force to firms that are not overinvesting (via business taxes and social security contributions). Moreover, the correction of distortions in production factor costs (capital and labor) is necessary during certain reforms applied in the model; that is, on the one hand, higher credit costs for firms that face soft budget constraints (via financial transactions taxes) and, on the other hand, a catch-up of foreign firms' wages by domestic firms (via social security contributions).These tax reforms bring welfare benefits to households and stabilize the welfare reaction to productivity shocks. Another interesting result is that in this framework, the rebalancing of the domestic demand in China does not require the readjustment of the external financial position. Indeed, the aggregate savings rate remains high and the supply of domestic assets is reduced.Finally, another model proposes a heterogeneous taxation of consumption across home and foreign goods to enhance consumption.     

Capital income taxation under majority voting with aging population

An old person typically has a mixed attitude toward the welfare-state benefits, when they are financed by capital taxes, because her income derives mostly from capital. We develop a majority-voting model which focuses on the effect of aging on this dilemma. Surprisingly, the theory predicts that tax rates on capital income could actually rise as the population ages, even though older individuals would be expected to own more capital than the young and thus vote against higher taxes. We then confront the key prediction of the model with panel data for ten European Union countries, over the period 1970–1996. We investigate the asymmetric effect of aging on the taxation of capital and labor. The implications of the model are shown to be consistent with panel data. JEL no. H0, H5, P1     

Capital income taxation under majority voting with aging population

An old person typically has a mixed attitude toward the welfare-state benefits, when they are financed by capital taxes, because her income derives mostly from capital. We develop a majority-voting model which focuses on the effect of aging on this dilemma. Surprisingly, the theory predicts that tax rates on capital income could actually rise as the population ages, even though older individuals would be expected to own more capital than the young and thus vote against higher taxes. We then confront the key prediction of the model with panel data for ten European Union countries, over the period 1970–1996. We investigate the asymmetric effect of aging on the taxation of capital and labor. The implications of the model are shown to be consistent with panel data. JEL no. H0, H5, P1     

The Timing of Redistribution

We investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted toward low income families, but that may distort savings decisions, can “dominate” early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted as a result of information constraints. We use simple two‐period overlapping generations models with heterogeneous agents under six policy regimes: a model calibrated to the U.S. economy (benchmark), two early redistribution (lump sum) regimes, two (targeted) late redistribution regimes, and finally a model without taxes and redistribution. Redistribution programs are financed by a labor tax on the young generation and a capital tax on the old generation. We argue that if the programs are small in size, late redistribution can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output. Better targeting of low income households cannot completely offset savings distortions. In addition, we find that the optimal transfer and tax policy implies a capital tax of 100% and transfers exclusively to the young generation.     

Time-consistent linear taxation and redistribution in an overlapping-generations framework

We study time-consistent labour and capital income linear taxationusing an infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model of asmall open economy. Individuals have different productivitiesand the government intervenes for purely redistributive purposes.The study of time-consistent taxation requires the introductionof borrowing restrictions in the economy. We characterize thetime-consistent solution and consider alternative solutionsbased on a simple tax rule. We demonstrate the existence andthe uniqueness of the time-consistent solution using a log-linearutility function. We provide numerical comparisons between time-consistentand time-inconsistent linear taxation: the importance of beingable to make commitment decreases when the differences betweenindividuals increase.     

Does inheritance taxation reform promote to build inexpensive rental housing?

The inheritance taxation reform of 2015 in Japan substantially increased the amount of tax levied on large inheritances. This potentially served as a good incentive for people to build inexpensive low-rise apartments for tax savings, which increased the number of low-cost apartments. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of inheritance taxation reform on housing rents. Using the difference-in-differences method, we reveal that the inheritance taxation reform decreased the housing rents of wooden or light steel-framed apartments by 1.3%. Moreover, our results indicate that while the rental of slightly older housings belonging to the treatment group decreased, the rental of new housing belonging to the treatment group did not change.     

Profit taxation and capital accumulation in a dynamic oligopoly model

We illustrate a differential oligopoly game using the capital accumulation dynamics à la Ramsey. We evaluate the effects of profit taxation, proving that there exists a tax rate yielding the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. Contrary to the static approach, our dynamic analysis shows that, in general, profit taxation affects firms’ decisions concerning capital accumulation and sales. In particular, it has pro-competitive effects provided that the extent of delegation is large enough (and conversely).     

Capital income taxation of Swedish households, 1862–2010

This study describes the evolution of capital income taxation, including corporate, dividend, interest, capital gains and wealth taxation, in Sweden between 1862 and 2010. To illustrate the evolution, we present annual time-series data on the marginal effective tax rates on capital income (METR) for a marginal investment financed with new share issues, retained earnings or debt. These data are unique in their consistency, thoroughness and time span. We identify four tax regimes separated by shifts in economic policy. The first regime stretches from 1862 until the Second World War. The METR is low, stable and does not exceed 5% until the First World War, when the METR begins to drift upwards and varies depending on the source of finance. The outbreak of the Second World War establishes the second regime, when the magnitude and variation of the METR sharply increase. The METR peaks during the third regime in the 1970s and 1980s and often exceeds 100%. The 1990–1991 tax reform represents the beginning of the fourth regime, which is characterised by lower and smaller variations in the METR. The METR varies between 15% and 40% at the end of this period.     

休闲餐饮业的现状分析及营销对策

电子商务在全球范围内迅速发展 ,对现有经济运行及管理模式产生了极大的冲击。传统的税收制度对此无法适应 ,由此引发了征管稽查难度加大、网上交易国际税收问题加剧、政府税款大量流失等一系列重大税收问题。本文根据我国电子商务发展现状 ,探讨电子商务对传统税收的冲击和我     

Long-Run Implications of Social Security Taxation for Growth and Fertility

This paper compares long-run implications for growth and fertility of four types of taxation for social security with positive bequests. A tax rise under lump-sum taxation enhances growth but lowers fertility, while other types of taxation do so under additional restrictions. A tax rise under consumption taxation is less likely to stimulate growth and to reduce fertility than under payroll taxation. A rise in an interest income tax raises fertility, reduces both savings and human capital investment, and hence is harmful for growth. The case with zero bequests is also discussed.     

Welfare Effects of Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy

In a small open economy, the welfare effect of capital taxation depends on the allocation of the tax revenue as well as the tax system. If tax revenues are used to finance debt or government spending, an increase in either residential or territorial capital taxation will reduce the welfare of the representative individual. If tax revenues are transferred intergenerationally, an increase in the residential capital tax rate will increase the steady-state welfare when the after-tax interest rate is greater than the growth rate. If the revenue is rebated to the tax payer, an introduction of territorial capital taxation may increase welfare when the growth rate is relatively high. In the case where either the revenue from residential capital taxation is rebated to the tax payer or the revenue from territorial capital taxation is transferred intergenerationally, the welfare-maximizing tax rate appears to be zero.     

On optimal income taxation with heterogeneous work preferences

This paper considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals are assumed to differ with respect to their earnings potential and work preferences. A numerical method for solving this two-dimensional problem has been developed. We assume an additive utility function, and utilitarian social objectives. Rather than solve the first order conditions associated with the problem, we directly compute the best tax function, which can be written in terms of a second order B-spline function. Our findings show that marginal tax rates are higher than might be anticipated, and that very little bunching occurs at the optimum. Our simulation results show that the correlation between taste for work and productivity has a crucial role in determining the extent of redistribution in our model.     

Taxes and Pensions

Pension benefit rules depend on individual history far more than taxes do, and age plays a much larger role in pension determination than in tax determination. Apart from some simulation studies, theoretical studies of optimal tax design typically contain neither a mandatory pension system nor the behavioral dimensions that lie behind justifications commonly offered for mandatory pensions. Conversely, optimizing models of pension design typically do not include annual taxation of labor and capital incomes. After spelling out this contrast and reviewing (and rejecting) zero taxation of capital income based on the Atkinson‐Stiglitz and Chamley‐Judd results, this article raises the issue of tax‐favored retirement savings, a topic where the two subjects come together.     

A fisherian analysis of individual retirement accounts

Conclusions This paper has employed a Fisherian analysis of intertemporal choice to evaluate the use of IRA's. The analysis shows that with perfect capital markets assumptions, the presence of IRA's will generate no other effect on savings than would a simple tax rabate. Further, it shows that if the tax revenue loss due to IRA's is not accompanied by an expenditure reduction, but is financed with taxes or borrowing, rational households will still employ IRA's, but their effect on intertemporal choice will be nil. The analysis also shows that IRA's do act as a savings incentive to the extent that there are market imperfections, specifically to the degree that transactions costs are important. However, empirical evidence from the literature does not lend firm support to this possibility. The conclusion is that a market imperfection is not a firm basis on which to construct savings incentives. Finally, one can note that the same analysis applies to any tax-based savings incentive that is designed to operate by lowering the tax on interest income. The reason for this finding is that the provision of tax sheltered interest income, along with the deductibility of interest on borrowing, creates general tax arbitrage opportunities for households and that tax arbitrage opportunities do not, in general, generate greater savings in an intertemporal choice model. It follows that significant restriction or elimination of the deductibility of interest on borrowing is a prerequisite for IRA's and other tax based savings incentives to produce their intended effect.     

Persistent differences in national productivity growth rates with a common technology and free capital mobility: The roles of private thrift, public debt, capital taxation, and policy toward human capital formation

The paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model to investigate possible causes for the existence and persistence of productivity growth differentials between nations despite a common technology, constant returns to scale, and perfect international capital mobility. Private consumption is derived from a three-period overlapping generations specification. The source of productivity (growth) differentials in our model is the existence of a nontraded capital good (“human capital”) whose augmentation requires a nontraded current input (time spent by the young in education rather than leisure). We consider the influence on productivity growth differentials of private thrift, public debt, the taxation of capital and savings, and policy toward human capital formation.     

Revenue Effects of Tax Facilities for Pension Savings

Many countries have tax facilities for pension savings. These facilities are often associated with the application of the cash-flow treatment of pensions: pension contributions are tax-exempt, capital income of pension funds is tax-exempt, and pension benefits are taxed, but usually at a relatively low rate. This paper investigates the revenue effects of a cash-flow tax regime for pension savings by full present-value calculations. A comprehensive income tax system is used as a benchmark. We present an empirical analysis for the Netherlands as a typical example of a country with funded pensions. Our calculations show that current taxation of pensions implies a major tax revenue loss. For the year 2003, we estimate a fiscal pension subsidy of 1.4% to 1.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Comparing the welfare effects of income and excise taxes in the presence of the other taxation paradox

This paper implements numerically a general equilibrium model in which all private producers are price makers and the government utilizes tax revenues to provide a public good. After deriving the partial equilibrium condition for an excise tax to increase price by more than the tax (for a monopoly firm), numerical examples are given, demonstrating this phenomenon for both partial and general equilibrium. In the general equilibrium context, optimal excise taxation and optimal flat-rate income taxation are compared. In the excise tax regime, prices increase by more than the taxes. In the income tax regime, prices actually decline relative to the no-tax regime. In all of the examples given, flat-rate income taxation is superior to excise taxation in terms of welfare. The author has benefitted from exceptionally helpful comments received from J. Ronnie Davis, John D. Wilson, Ralph W. Pfouts, and Amy Crews. He has also benefitted from conversations with Franz Gehrels, David E. Wildasin, Herbert J. Kiesling, and Harold York. The usual disclaimer applies.     

构建我国地方税主体税种的探讨

地方税收是提供地方性公共产品的资金来源。由于缺乏主体税种,导致我国地方税收出现税源不稳定,增长难度大的局面。因此,有必要培育地方主体税种。从近期目标看,营业税与企业所得税是地方税主体税种;从远期目标看,财产税应建设成为我国地方税的主体税种。     

资本市场税收调控问题探析

本文主要结合现行税制中关于资本市场的税收政策,分析现行资本市场税收政策存在的不足,提出利用税收政策规范资本市场发展的对策建议。