隐性存款保险制度、显性存款保险制度与中国的选择

存款保险制度是金融安全网的三大构成要素之一，是银行危机防范和管理的补充手段。作为沟通银行监管和中央银行最后贷款人制度的桥梁，其最主要的功能就是维护公众信心，防止挤兑风潮，以抑制系统性银行危机的发生和蔓延。存款保险制度分为隐性存款保险制度和显性存款保险制度。目前，两种存款保险制度共存并具有一定的替代性。本文通过建立模型，分析了显性存款保险制度和隐性存款保险制度之间的替代性和不同制度引发的道德风险的差别，     

银行脆弱性与存款保险制度

银行内在的脆弱性是导致银行挤兑并引发银行危机的关键。为防止存款者因个别金融机构倒闭而对其他金融机构丧失信心，保证银行经营的安全和稳定，建立银行存款保险制度，已刻不容缓地摆到了银行经营决策者和监管者的面前。我国建立存款保险制度的必要性主要体现在;高额城乡居民储蓄的安全需要明示的存款保险制度；在华外资银行需要明示的存款保险制度；民营银行需要存款保险制度；完善的银行业监管体系需要存款保险制度。     

利率市场化、存款保险制度与银行挤兑

在推进利率市场化的过程中,避免银行挤兑和实现金融体系的平稳运行是中国在转型过程中面临的重要理论和现实问题。本文基于多轮次噪音信息传递市场环境,构建了一个银行挤兑动态模型,通过综合考虑存款者对银行持有资产收益率的预期、信息加工和传播效率以及不同类型的提前取款动机等方面,探讨银行挤兑的动态过程,给出了各轮次银行挤兑的比例和数量,并刻画出相应的动态均衡;进一步通过引入存款保险制度对基准模型进行扩展,探讨实施存款保险制度与银行挤兑之间关系的作用机理。结果表明,实施存款保险制度通过影响存款者的两类提前取款动机,具有稳定预期和道德风险两个方向相反的效应;存款保险制度的实施效果取决于两种效应的力度对比,而两者之间的比较内生于制度环境。得到的政策启示如下:在实施存款保险制度时,需要建立和健全相应的制度建设配套措施,强化市场约束和完善银行内部治理机制的监督作用来减弱潜在的道德风险问题;继续深化金融体制改革,提高信息的加工和传播效率,促使存款者形成稳定的取款预期,从而增强稳定效应。     

金融稳定性与存款保险制度--一个基于代理人理论的分析

存款保险制度作为一种风险防范机制,在发生银行挤兑风险时,有利于维护存款人的信心,对于避免银行挤兑风潮的扩散及金融危机的爆发均起到有效的风险隔离作用。但另一方面,由于存款担保而引发的道德风险将危害金融体系的稳定性,严重时甚至可能成为银行或金融危机爆发的导火线。那么存款保险制度与金融安全之间到底有何联系?本文试图通过一个简要的代理人理论来阐述两者之间的相互关系。     

银行危机、道德风险与存款保险

存款保险制度是一国金融安全网的核心,在一定程度上防止对银行因存款挤兑而破产。但是,如果缺乏对银行业的有效监管,存款保险制度又会引起银行的道德风险。     

金融稳定牲与存款保险制度——一个基于代理人理论的分析

存款保险制度作为一种风险防范机制，在发生银行挤兑风险时．有利于维护存款人的信心，对于避免银行挤兑风潮的扩散及金融危机的爆发均起到有效的风险隔离作用。但另一方面，由于存款担保而引发的道德风险将危害金融体系的稳定性，严重时甚至可能成为银行或金融危机爆发的导火线。那么存款保险制度与金融安全之间到底有何联系？本文试图通过一个简要的代理人理论来阐述两者之间的相互关系。     

建立我国存款保险制度的设想

为了保护存款人的利益，维护金融稳定，防止存款者因个别金融机构的支付危机而造成挤兑而引发银行恐慌和金融危机，我国应建立存款保险制度。存款保险制度在保护存款人利益、维持公众信心等方面有着重要的作用，随着我国国有银行的商业化和地方性、区域性银行、股份制银行的兴起，建立科学的、严格合理的存款保险制度已成为摆在我们面前的迫切任务。     

浅谈我国存款保险制度的建设与发展

市场经济对金融领域安排了有一项最基本的制度就是存款保险制度。伴随着国有银行的上市以及金融领域全方面的对外开放,日渐显现出对建立存款保险制度迫切的需要。银行体系帮自己设立了一套安全防范措施就是存款保险制度,通过对事前的预防以及事后的补救等措施,使得金融体系建立在稳定和安全之上。存款保险制度的建立,对我国金融改革起到重要的意义。     

论存款保险制度在中国的确立

存款保险制度作为金融安全保障的三大制度之一,其防范、分散风险的独特功能,在经济状况和金融体系稳定的条件下,设计良好的存款保险制度可以有效地保护存款人的利益,维护公众对银行体系的信心,同时它与央行的最后贷款人职能及银行业监管的其他措施相辅相成,共同组成了银行系统的"安全网",防止个别银行的危机扩散而引发银行挤兑与金融危机,从而有利于维护金融业整体稳定.存款保险制度还能加强对金融业的监管力度,减轻中央银行的负担,保障整个金融体系的稳定.     

我国存款保险制度问题研究

我国金融体制改革的逐步深入,以及现代企业制度和银行制度的初步建立,使个别经营不善的中小银行及其它金融机构陷入危机甚至破产倒闭成为了可能,同时也对存款人的利益构成了威胁。为此,以保护存款人财产安全为宗旨的存款保险制度受到各国的高度重视。存款保险制度是为整个银行体系设立的一道“安全网”,它可以通过事前预防和事后补救的各种措施,保护公众信心,抑制挤兑,减少银行的连锁破产,从而促进整个金融体系的稳定与安全。建立这一制度,对当前我国的金融体制改革尤其具有重大意义。     

Deposit insurance and depositor discipline: direct evidence on bank switching behaviour in Japan

As Japan's financial system becomes more market oriented, depositor discipline is playing a larger role in the monitoring of banks. Matching household survey data with banks’ financial data, we examine households’ response to bank risk and different deposit insurance schemes. We find that bank switching in response to risk increased between 1996 and 2001 and households’ choice of bank adequately reflects banks’ financial health. We also examine the determinants of households’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and how this affects switching behaviour. The results suggest that depositor discipline works and could play an important supplementary role in bank monitoring.     

我国银行存款保险制度的路径选择研究

明确存款保险制度应当作为我国金融安全的重要组成部分。基于风险定价的存款保险费应当由政府和银行共同承担。政府提供的隐性存款保险随着存款保险制度完善逐步减少,为银行积累资本赢得时间。银行应当通过充实资本,降低存款保险费,为实施明确存款保险创造条件。我国最终应当建立信息透明、市场机制主导、政府严格监管、风险处置及时的明确存款保险制度。     

Estimating the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees to Thai Banks

The paper estimates the contingent liability of the Thai government to their banking system prior to the 1997 financial crisis by maximizing a likelihood function that utilizes the established result that deposit insurance can be modeled as a put option on the value of bank assets. The results show that the estimated value of the government guarantee was large and statistically greater than the premium banks paid for this guarantee, suggesting that guarantees provided a subsidy to Thai banks. Additionally, the estimates are able to identify weak banks before the crisis emerged. These results suggest that the estimated value of implicit deposit guarantees can serve as an early warning indicator of banking crises. The paper contrasts the option pricing results with traditional balance sheet indicators, and demonstrates that these alternative indicators are unable to identify weaknesses in the Thai banking systems before the crisis.     

从日本的"支付"解禁看存款保险制度的实施条件

日本实施存款限额保护措施所遇到的困难以至最终延期表明,存款保险制度是在一国金融体系整体状况良好的情况下,发挥约束银行经营行为和淘汰劣质银行作用的一种制度。只有在金融监管有效运行的情况下,存款保险制度才能切实发挥其功能。而且,它要求市场信息的高度透明和国民高水平的伦理素质。结合金融领域的实际情况,我国建立存款保险制度的时机尚未成熟。     

RESTRUCTURING U.S. FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

Despite changes over the past 70 yr, the U.S. federal financial regulatory system remains rooted in the reforms of the 1930s. The institutions governed by this system have, nevertheless, continued to evolve. Today, regulation of large, multiproduct, internationally active financial organizations poses challenges for a system designed largely to regulate smaller, distinct, locally based organizations. Reform of the regulatory system, however, is not an easy task—complex issues regarding deposit insurance, the role of the central bank, and the dual banking system must be addressed. In the absence of a crisis, however, regulatory restructuring will not likely generate much political interest . ( JEL G28)     

WHAT SHOULD BANKS REALLY DO?

With banking currently in turmoil, a new formula for bank structure and activities, for deposit insurance, and for bank regulation is necessary. This paper reviews the dilemmas of the current structure of banking in the United States and explains how the banking sector arrived at its current state of crisis. It then suggests three alternative formulas, along with their advantages and disadvantages, that could provide the future framework for banking, deposit insurance, and regulation.     

显性部分存款保险下的有效银行退出机制--基于成本收益分析下的博弈分析

目前,中国银行业还没有建立起有效的市场退出机制和相关的制度安排,这不符合市场经济条件下金融业的基本规则,也给国家带来了沉重的负担.本论文通过一个二阶段完全信息动态博弈模型的分析揭示,由于银监会未建立起有效的成本约束下的市场退出机制,使得相机抉择的关闭机制对于商业银行而言是一个不可置信的威胁,促进了商业银行的冒险投资,加之隐性存款保险的存在,形成巨大的社会成本和福利损失.目前条件下,加快市场退出机制建设并建立与之相配套的显性部分存款保险制度是一个上佳的选择.     

U.S. DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORM

Congress, late in 1991, enacted a banking reform measure that (i) authorizes $70 billion of additional FDIC funding, (ii) enhances bank regulation and supervision, and (Hi) adopts a "trip wire" system for increasingly severe regulation based on a bank's capital. Congress rejected a number of key elements of the Treasury proposal submitted early in 1991, such as interstate banking and expanded bank powers. The Congressional action does not end the debate over banking reform. In due time, other attempts likely will be made to restructure the banking system along the lines of the Treasury proposal.
The Treasury proposal's positive points failed to offset its fundamental problems. The Congressional action, though not subject to the Treasury proposal's problems, falls short of complete deposit insurance reform. Both proposals fail to recognize that regulatory oversight is a poor substitute for market discipline in the current financial environment.
This paper reviews problems with the financial reform process and failure of the Treasury proposal to recognize these problems. It also reviews alternative approaches to deposit insurance reform.     

Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan

Using data from prewar Japan, this paper investigates the impact of a liquidity shock induced by depositors' behavior on bank portfolio management during financial crises in a system lacking deposit insurance. It is found that banks reacted to the liquidity shock sensitively through an increase in their cash holdings not by liquidating bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market. Moreover, banks exposed to local financial contagion adjusted the liquidity of their portfolio mainly by actively selling and buying their securities in the financial market. Finally, there is no evidence to conclude that the existence of the lender of last resort mitigated the liquidity constraints in bank portfolio adjustments.     

BANK FAILURES: THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CONNECTION

It is generally accepted that banks must be regulated so as to avoid the moral hazard situation that deposit insurance generates. Accepting this argument implies that expanded bank powers must await deposit insurance reform. This article rejects the accepted view and argues instead that the existing regulatory system enhances rather than diminishes the riskiness of banks' portfolios. The article argues that the benefits from permitting banks to diversify probably would outweigh the costs. It concludes, however, that deposit insurance is a major culprit in the current wave of bank failures.