A Global Ex-vessel Fish Price Database: Construction and Applications

Synopsis We describe the first effort at creating a global ex-vessel fish price database, which is required for understanding the economic behavior of participants in the world’s fisheries. We demonstrate potential applications of the database by linking it to a spatially defined catch database, which makes it possible to attach landed values to species in both time and space. This is the first database available publicly where interested members of the public, researchers and managers can easily find and access ex-vessel prices of the world’s major commercial fish species. Preliminary results indicate that the average real price of a number of species have declined between 1950 and 2002. The estimated landed value of fish globally, in year 2000 dollars, was about US$24 billion in 1950. It increased steadily to about US$90 billion in the early 1970s, reached a peak of US$100 billion at the end of the 1980s, and declined to about US$80 billion in 2000. The top 15 fishing countries cumulatively account for 79% of total real landed value, with Japan leading, even though the value of its landings has been declining.      

Economic impact of ocean fish populations in the global fishery

Our goal in this paper is to estimate the total output in an economy that is currently dependent (at least partially) on current fisheries output. We therefore applied the Leontief technological coefficients at current production and then estimate total output supported throughout the economy at the current level of production. Estimates of gross revenue from capture fisheries suggest that the direct value of output for this sector is US $80–85 billion annually (Sumaila et al., Journal of Bioeconomics 9(1):39–51, 2007; Willmann et al., The Sunken Billions, World Bank, FAO, Washington DC, Rome, 2009). However, as a primary or a potential economic base industry, there are a vast number of secondary economic activities—from boat building to international transport—that are supported by world fisheries, yet these related activities are rarely considered when evaluating the economic impact of fisheries. This study applies an input–output methodology to estimate the total direct, indirect, and induced impact of marine capture fisheries on the world economy. While results suggest that there is a great deal of variation in fishing output multipliers between regions and countries, when we apply the output multipliers to the capture fisheries sector at the global level, we find that significant indirect and induced effects place the impact of this sector to world output nearly three times larger than the value of landings at first sale, at between US $80–85 billion annually (Sumaila et al., Journal of Bioeconomics 9(1):39–51, 2007; Willmann et al., The Sunken Billions, World Bank, FAO, Washington DC, Rome, 2009). However, as a primary or a potential economic base industry, there are a vast number of secondary economic activities—from boat building to international transport—that are supported by world fisheries, yet these related activities are rarely considered when evaluating the economic impact of fisheries. This study applies an input–output methodology to estimate the total direct, indirect, and induced impact of marine capture fisheries on the world economy. While results suggest that there is a great deal of variation in fishing output multipliers between regions and countries, when we apply the output multipliers to the capture fisheries sector at the global level, we find that significant indirect and induced effects place the impact of this sector to world output nearly three times larger than the value of landings at first sale, at between US 225 and 240 billion per year.     

Alertness, local knowledge, and Johnny Appleseed

Anderson and Hill argue that property rights entrepreneurs, driven by non-replicable Kirznerian alertness, identify unowned and unpriced attributes of a resource and capture rents to those resources by limiting access to them. I argue that alertness is non-replicable, but it is also not random. Kirzner’s analytical framework emphasizes an individual’s local knowledge and subjective interpretative schema. Incorporating these concepts and emphasizing two types of local knowledge, about social and commercial conditions, explains why some people are alert to profit opportunities and others are not. This implies that economic restrictions are more detrimental to entrepreneurship than previously understood. I provide evidence by examining Johnny Appleseed’s successful nursery business.     

Challenges for economic policy in sustainable management of marine natural resources

The sustainable management of marine natural resources presents particular challenges to the managers of those resources. While such management has typically been based on biological considerations, it is argued that this has resulted in overexploitation and destruction of important marine assets in industries such as fishing and tourism. Consequently, it is concluded that other approaches are needed, with the use of economic concepts and management tools particularly relevant. At the same time, the human welfare outcomes of the application of various policy instruments must be carefully considered. While biological information is critical to the formulation and implementation of successful management regimes, it is concluded that the application of economic instruments will become more attractive to resource managers, with these instruments underpinned by consideration of property rights and an appropriate allocation of economic rents. A greater focus on these economic matters will take resource managers further in the direction of sustainable management of increasingly scarce marine resources. The conclusions in the paper are supported by various case studies from fisheries and tourism.     

Corruption and natural resource rents: evidence from quantile regression

This study examines the impacts of oil rents on corruption for 157 countries. While existing studies have primarily focused on average effects, we employ quantile regression to estimate the effects of natural resource abundance for different corruption levels. We consider the effects of natural resource rents, mainly oil rents and then compare them with those of total and non-oil natural resources rents. The estimation results show that, generally, more oil rents increase corruption. Specifically, impacts are larger in countries with an intermediate level of corruption and smaller in highly corrupt countries. While total resource rents increase corruption significantly, non-oil resource rents do not. This may be due to non-oil resource rent management (mainly inland) being more subject to public scrutiny. Non-oil natural resources are concentrated in the less-developed sub-Saharan African countries, where corruption is prevalent; therefore, the impacts of natural resource rents are unremarkable.     

PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CRISES IN WORLD FISHERIES: TURNING THE TIDE?

This paper addresses the crises in the world's fisheries involving dwindling stocks, overcapitalization, and jurisdiction disputes from a property rights perspective. In particular, it examines the causes of the problems fishers face and explores the potential of privatizing the right to catch fish as a means to address the crises. The analysis assesses experiences of private harvesting rights with reference to monitoring and enforcement, allocating rights, economic benefits, adjustments in the fishery, and resource rents. It also examines issues such as fluctuating fish stocks, straddling stocks and high seas fisheries, and the endemic poverty of many artisanal fisheries in the context of current fisheries practice.     

Endogenous growth and property rights over renewable resources

We study how different regimes of access rights to renewable natural resources – namely open access versus full property rights – affect sustainability, growth and welfare in the context of modern endogenous growth theory. Resource exhaustion may occur under both regimes but is more likely to arise under open access. Moreover, under full property rights, positive resource rents increase expenditures on manufacturing goods and temporarily accelerate productivity growth, but also yield a higher resource price at least in the short-to-medium run. We characterize analytically and quantitatively the model׳s dynamics to assess the welfare implications of differences in property rights enforcement.     

The Political Economy of Water Abstraction Charges

An important economic instrument in the management of a river catchment's water resources is the charges made by government for the abstraction of water from ground and surface sources. Abstraction charges are a form of rent. However, the classical theory of differential rent has limited application to abstraction prices because that theory's assumption of competition in the supply of the natural resource does not hold in this case. Here, the property rights of individual households and of institutions to draw water are assigned by a state monopoly. In order to understand the specific and contingent practices of government in different countries, a taxonomy of charge-setting principles is proposed. This paper sets out six principal fields of action for sustainable water resource planning and, in that context, recommends full incentive charging as the basis of catchment policy.     

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

We model how the “supply and demand” for bribes affects resource use by an economy, and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets. This requires adjusting the World Bank’s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption. The impacts of corruption on long-run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across African and Asian economies from 1970 to 2003. Corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of African countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term, but for Asian countries, corruption is less important than point resources. Corruption influences long-run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries, and is also the “pathway” through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use, trade and abundance.     

Product Lifetime: A Determinant of Entry Decision by Multinational Firms

Existing literature on the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection has painted an ambiguous picture about the size of the effects of stronger IPR on the choice of the multinational firm’s mode of entry into foreign market. Some empirical studies suggest that improving IPR in recipient countries will have higher effect on licensing, while others found larger effect on foreign direct investment (FDI). The available indices of protection only measure country-wide characteristics and do not pick inter-industry variation, while the data show significant differences in losses of US multinationals by industry. In this paper, we introduce and empirically estimate a new dimension to multinational firm’s decision to enter a foreign market—a parameter that reflects the length of positive profits that the firm can earn in various industries. We dub the estimated parameter a perceived time of rent extraction. The introduction of the time parameter allows us to differentiate the effects of stronger IPR on the entry modes in different industries and reconcile the ambiguity results in the literature. Particularly, strengthening IPR has higher impact on FDI in industries with shorter rent extraction time, while licensing is affected more than FDI in industries with longer rent extraction time.     

Property Rights, Renewable Resources and Economic Development

This paper analyzes the role of endogenous property rights in the development of an open resource-based economy. I incorporate renewable resources and endogenous decisions on property rights into a convex growth model with the formal and informal sectors. I find that along the transition path to steady state, property rights enforcement is not constant but improves with time as well as involves intermediate property rights specification (between open access and perfect property rights). International trade and labor market are driving these endogenous changes. Property rights improve with favorable terms of trade when the economy exports resource services and stronger property rights help maintain the resource stock by deterring illegal harvest. This pushes labor away from the informal harvest sector toward greater participation in the formal sector of the economy. In turn, more labor participation in the formal sector along with capital formation increase the country’s output and consumption. Overall, with an open economy and well-functioning institutions, renewable resources have a positive impact on economic growth.     

Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

产权管制放松与制度绩效变迁——来自广东经济非均衡转轨的证据

过去大量的研究强调政策、区域、禀赋等对广东经济转轨绩效的影响,论文从产权管制放松的角度出发,构建了一个简单的博弈论模型,旨在分析广东政府放松对资源配置权利的管制对经济转轨产生的制度效应。研究发现,广东各级地方政府放松对资源配置权利的管制,大幅节约了租金耗散,并衍生出更多给予经济个体发挥比较优势的获利空间,扩展了市场范围,从而促进了地区经济均衡转轨。论文对于理解广东经济转轨问题提供了一个新的视角和框架,它尤其有助于揭示产权管制放松与经济绩效变迁二者之间的内在机理和制度逻辑。     

THE BACKWARD-BENDING SUPPLY CURVE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY1

Proceeding from an article by Gordon, published in 1954, the substance of an economic theory of the fisheries has emerged from the writings of a number of economists.² The theory has emphasized the common- property nature of the fishery resource, generally leading to an ‘over-exploitation’ that results in dissipation of the rent that the resource could yield.     

Food security implications of global marine catch losses due to overfishing

Excess fishing capacity and the growth in global demand for fishery products have made overfishing ubiquitous in the world’s oceans. Here we describe the potential catch losses due to unsustainable fishing in all countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the high seas over 1950–2004. To do so, we relied upon catch and price statistics from the Sea Around Us Project as well as an empirical relationship we derived from species stock assessments by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In 2000 alone, estimated global catch losses amounted to 7–36% of the actual tonnage landed that year, resulting in a landed value loss of between 6.4 and 36 billion (in 2004 constant US6.4 and 36 billion (in 2004 constant US). From 1950–2004, 36–53% of commercial species in 55–66% of EEZs may have been overfished. Referring to a species-level database of intrinsic vulnerability (V) based on life-history traits, it appears that susceptible species were depleted quickly and serially, with the average V of potential catch losses declining at a similar rate to that of actual landings. The three continental regions to incur greatest losses by mass were Europe, North America, and Asia—forming a geographic progression in time. But low-income and small island nations, heavily dependent on marine resources for protein, were impacted most profoundly. Our analysis shows that without the inexorable march of overfishing, ~20 million people worldwide could have averted undernourishment in 2000. For the same year, total catch in the waters of low-income food deficit nations might have been up to 17% greater than the tonnage actually landed there. The situation may be worst for Africa, which in our analysis registered losses of about 9–49% of its actual catches by mass in year 2000, thus seriously threatening progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals.     

探析环境资源消费的“租值耗散”问题

通过揭示环境资源的经济属性,指出其模糊的产权设置是造成＂租值耗散＂的根本原因,从而提出明晰环境资源的产权归属对于环境保护的重要性,并认为环境会计的核算对象是与环境有关的经济事项,这一点能够为环境资源产权明晰提供有力的技术支持。     

Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving?: Anticipation of better times or rapacious rent seeking

We investigate the Hartwick rule for saving of a nation necessary to sustain a constant level of private consumption for a small open economy with an exhaustible stock of natural resources. The amount by which a country saves and invests less than the marginal resource rents equals the expected capital gains on reserves of natural resources plus the expected increase in interest income on net foreign assets plus the expected fall in the cost of resource extraction due to expected improvements in extraction technology. Effectively, depletion is then postponed until better times. This suggests that it is not necessarily sub-optimal for resource-rich countries to have negative genuine saving. However, in countries with different groups with imperfectly defined property rights on natural resources, political distortions induce faster resource depletion than suggested by the Hotelling rule. Fractionalised societies with imperfect property rights build up more foreign assets than their marginal resource rents, but in the long run accumulate less foreign assets than homogenous societies. Hence, such societies end up with lower sustainable consumption and are worse off, especially if seepage is strong, the number of rival groups is large and the country does not enjoy much monopoly power on the resource market. Genuine saving is zero in such societies. However, World Bank genuine saving figures based on market rather than accounting prices will be negative, albeit less so in more fractionalised societies with less secure property rights.     

The economic costs of biological predation

This paper developes a bioeconomic model to analyse the economic losses from the reduced harvesting of prey species resulting from an increase in the stock of a natural predator. Examples of large mammals creating economic damage are whales and African elephants. The economic losses depend critically on the actual management of the prey stock, although the three measures we develop are equal when the stock is managed so as to maximize the sustained economic rent from the prey species. Predation losses are illustrated by the case of the Northeastern Atlantic Minke whale, where the estimate of the average predation cost per whale in 1991–1992 is between $US 1780 and $US 2370, using Norwegian cost and earnings data. A ten percent stock increase is estimated to cause a loss of almost $US 19 million to the fishers of the prey species. If half of this cost were assigned to Norway it would be equivalent to 2.8 and 6.7 percent of the gross profits of the Norwegian cod and herring fisheries, respectively.     

The curse of aid

Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the “curse of natural resources” literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using panel data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960–1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on institutions. In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of 5 years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.5 and almost one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. We find that aid is a bigger curse than oil.     

A bottom-up re-estimation of global fisheries subsidies

Using a recently developed database of fisheries subsidies for 148 maritime countries spanning 1989 to the present, total fisheries subsidies for the year 2003 is computed. A key feature of our estimation approach is that it explicitly deals with missing data from official sources, and includes estimates of subsidies to developing country fisheries. Our analysis suggests that global fisheries subsidies for 2003 are between US25 and 29 billion, which is higher than an earlier World Bank estimate of between US 25 and 29 billion, which is higher than an earlier World Bank estimate of between US 14–20 billion. This new estimate is lower than our 2000 global subsidies estimate of US$ 30–34 billion. We find that fuel subsidies compose about 15–30% of total global fishing subsidies, and that capacity enhancing subsidies sum to US$ 30–34 billion. We find that fuel subsidies compose about 15–30% of total global fishing subsidies, and that capacity enhancing subsidies sum to US 16 billion or about 60% of the total. These results imply that the global community is paying the fishing industry billions each year to continue fishing even when it would not be profitable otherwise—effectively funding the over-exploitation of marine resources.