Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence. The results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism. The results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.     

Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank

This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.     

Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries

Empirical studies of the influence of central bank independence and inflation have yet delivered quite inconclusive results. We argue this to be due to the failure to focus an actual central bank independence and to take the degree of conservatism of the government and the central bank into account. In this paper, we propose a new methodology of measuring the joint degree of central bank independence and conservatism from observed central bank behaviour. After applying the method to 13 OECD countries, we find our indicator to be negatively correlated with a legal index of central bank independence, but positively correlated with the turnover rate. As the latter exclusively focuses on factual central bank independence, the remaining difference might be attributed to conservatism.     

Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency

The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.     

Monetary Policy Delegation and Transparency of Policy Targets: A Positive Analysis

Abstract. We show that, in a two‐stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society's endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution.     

Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?

This paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank's preferences are unknown. Two key conclusions emerge from the paper. First, even with optimal targets or contracts, central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society. Second, if the delegation solution is preferable, and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks, the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets, i.e. by making it goal-independent     

Optimal price‐level drift under commitment in the canonical New Keynesian model

Abstract In both the canonical and many extended versions of the New Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy under commitment implies price‐level stationarity as long as expectations are rational. We show that this is no longer the case if the central bank and private agents make decisions before observing current shocks. The optimal amount of price‐level drift in response to unexpected innovations to inflation is quantitatively important. This result has important implications for monetary policy, including the design of the optimal loss function for the central bank if it cannot commit to its future policies.     

The payment mechanisms and liquidity effects

A general equilibrium model with multiple means of payment in segmented markets is constructed to study the liquidity effects. It is shown that, under certain conditions, stored value – money issued by private entrepreneurs weakens, but does not completely eliminate the liquidity effects that exist when stored value is prohibited. The Friedman rule can be optimal in the regime with floating stored value. The impact of monetary policy now depends not only on the monetary intervention of the central bank, but also on the quantity of the outstanding private money and its velocity.     

More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries

This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries.     

THE OPTIMALITY AND CONTROLLABILITY OF MONETARY POLICY THROUGH DELEGATION WITH CONSISTENT TARGETS

This paper uses two game‐theory models, where monetary policy is first ineffective and then effective, to illustrate a delegation scheme that makes consistent policy optimal and controllable. The delegation scheme produces the minimization of both the social and the central bank loss functions. Minimizing the social loss function generates optimality conditions. Minimizing the central bank loss function produces controllability conditions. Optimality conditions depend on specific models, and controllability conditions do not. We propose a concept of consistent targets, which refer to the targets that satisfy both optimality and controllability conditions. Consistent policy proves optimal and controllable in both example models when the government delegates consistent targets to the central bank.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area

This paper reviews recent work on macroeconomic management with varying organization of wage/price bargaining and degrees of credible monetary conservatism. The emerging literature synthesizes and extends theory and empirics on central bank independence (CBI) and coordinated wage/price bargaining (CWB), arguing that the degrees of CBI and CWB interact with each other and with other political-economic conditions (sectoral composition, international exposure, etc.) to structure the incentives facing actors involved in monetary policy and wage/price bargaining. The core implication, theoretically surprising but empirically supported, is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-run, equilibrium, on-average real effects, even with fully rational expectations, and that these effects depend on the organization of wage/price bargaining. Conversely, wage/price-bargaining structure has real effects that depend on the degree of credible conservatism reflected in monetary-policy rules. Each also has interactive nominal effects though this is less surprising. Some disagreement remains over the precise nature of these interactive effects, but all emerging theory and evidence agree that a common, credibly conservative European monetary policy has nominal and real effects that depend on the Europe-wide institutional-structural organization of wage/price bargaining. Indeed, the one specific piece of theoretical and empirical agreement suggests that, for many member countries, the nominal gains from monetary-policy delegation to a credibly conservative European Central Bank will worsen these bargaining-policy interactions.     

Central bank independence and stock market returns in emerging economies

We investigate the effect of central bank independence on stock market returns in emerging economies. We find evidence for a positive overall effect, but economic independence of the central bank appears to be more relevant than political independence.     

Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?

Recent empirical contributions demonstrate that countries with less independent central banks enjoy lower output losses during disinflationary cycles. To explain these somewhat surprising empirical findings, some authors suggest that independent central banks probably face a flatter short-run Phillips curve. In this paper, we provide both theoretical and empirical arguments to rationalize this intuition. We demonstrate that, since central bank independence reduces the mean inflation rate and its variance, wage setters opt for a lower degree of nominal wage indexation leading to more wage and price inertia and, thus, to a flatter short-run Phillips curve. Consequently, this paper put forward a channel of positive influence of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio through its impact on nominal wage indexation. Empirical tests, performed using a sample of 19 OECD countries during the 1960–1990 period, show that these theoretical results hold also empirically.     

Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?

One objection to delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is that it causes lack of coordination with fiscal policy. Nordhaus has recently shown, in a simple game-theoretic model, how this generates too-contractionary monetary policy and too-expansionary fiscal policy, with interest rates becoming excessively high. In this note we incorporate the time-consistency, inflation-bias problem into the analysis, since it is this that has motivated most proposals for granting independence. We show that when the inflation-suppressing benefits are modelled alongside the high-interests rate costs, delegation may still be, on balance, against society's interests.     

Noisy information, interest rate shocks and the Great Moderation

In this paper we evaluate the hypothesis that the Great Moderation is partly the result of a less activist monetary policy. We simulate a New Keynesian model in which the central bank can only observe a noisy estimate of the output gap and find that the less pronounced reaction of the Federal Reserve to output gap fluctuations since 1979 can account for a substantial part of the reduction in the standard deviation of GDP associated with the Great Moderation. Our simulations are consistent with the empirically documented smaller magnitude and impact of interest rate shocks since the early 1980s.     

Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules

The inconsistency of optimal policy comes from inconsistency between the social loss function and the economic structure. Accordingly, this paper designs a central bank loss function, which proves consistent with the economic structure. Under the designed central bank loss function discretionary policy proves optimal for social welfare. Optimal discretionary policy emerges because the implied behavioral equation is identical with that under commitment to the social loss function. Consequently, this paper also designs policy rules. To some extent, policy rules appear more basic, flexible, and operational than social and central bank loss functions, but the social loss function serves as an ultimate objective and the central bank loss function explicitly identifies the attainable targets and appropriate weight to achieve the social optimum.     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

澳中中央银行独立性:比较与借鉴

澳大利亚中央银行经过几十年的改革和发展，其独立性已有很大进展，这一点已为学们的研究所证实。建立市场经济体制的中国迫切需要一个独立的中央银行，为此需借鉴包括澳大利亚在内的西方发达国家的经验，增强和完善中国中央银行的独立性。