The endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area criteria in East Asia

The Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 has increased interest in policies to achieve greater regional exchange rate stability in East Asia. It has renewed calls for greater monetary and exchange rate cooperation. A country's suitability to join a monetary union depends, inter alia, on the trade intensity and the business cycle synchronization with other potential members of the monetary union. However, these two Optimum Currency Area criteria are endogenous. Theoretically, the effect of increased trade integration (after the elimination of exchange fluctuations among the countries in the region) on the business cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Reduction in trade barriers can potentially increase industrial specialization by country and therefore resulting in more asymmetry business cycles from industry-specific shocks. On the other hand, increased trade integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles due to common demand shocks or intra-industry trade. If the second hypothesis is empirically verified, policy makers have little to worry about the region being unsynchronized in their business cycles as the business cycles will become more synchronized after the monetary union is formed. This paper assesses the dynamic relationships between trade, finance, specialization and business cycle synchronization for East Asian economies using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach. The dynamic panel approach improves on previous efforts to examine the business cycle correlations — trade link using panel procedures, which control for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Based on the findings on how trade, finance and sectoral specialization have effects on the size of common shocks among countries, potential policies that can help East Asian countries move closer toward a regional currency arrangement can be suggested. The empirical results of this study suggest that there exists scope for East Asia to form a monetary union.     

Optimal Currency Areas Scottish Economic Society/Royal Bank of Scotland Annual Lecture, 1999

Microeconomic efficiency and market transparency argue in favour of UK membership in EMU and for Scotland’s membership in the UK monetary union and also in EMU. UK seigniorage (government revenues from money issuance) would be boosted by EMU membership. Lender of last resort arrangements would not be substantially affected by UK membership in EMU. The UK is too small and too open to be an optimal currency area. The same point applies even more emphatically to Scotland. The ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’, ‘asymmetric shocks’ and ‘cyclical divergence’ objections to UK membership are based on the misapprehension that independent national monetary policy, and the associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, can be used effectively to offset or even neutralise asymmetric shocks. This ‘fine tuning delusion’ is compounded by a failure to understand that, under a high degree of international financial integration, market‐determined exchange rates are primarily a source of shocks and instability. Instead, opponents of UK membership in EMU view exchange rate flexibility as an effective buffer for adjusting to asymmetric shocks originating elsewhere. I know of no evidence that supports such an optimistic reading of what exchange rate flexibility can deliver under conditions of very high international financial capital mobility. The economic arguments for immediate UK membership in EMU, at an appropriate entry rate, are overwhelming. Monetary union raises important constitutional and political issues. It involves a further surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational institution, the ECB/ESCB. It is essential that this transfer of national sovereignty be perceived as legitimate by those affected by it. In addition, the citizens of the UK have become accustomed to a high standard of openness and accountability of their central bank since it gained operational independence in 1997. The ECB/ESCB must be held to the same high standard, and, while there are grounds for optimism, there still is some way to go there.     

Bank behavior, incomplete interest rate pass-through, and the cost channel of monetary policy transmission

This paper employs a New Keynesian DSGE model to explore the role of banks within the cost channel of monetary policy transmission for shaping the interest rate pass-through from money market rates to loan rates. Banks extend loans to firms in an environment of monopolistic competition by setting their loan rates in a staggered way, which means that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate to a monetary policy shock is sticky. We estimate the model for the euro area by adopting a minimum distance approach. Our findings exhibit that (i) financial costs are an important factor for price changes, (ii) frictions in the loan market have an effect on the propagation of monetary policy shocks as the pass-through from a change in money market rates to loan rates is incomplete, and (iii) the strength of the cost channel is mitigated as banks shelter firms from monetary policy shocks by smoothing loan rates.     

Monetary and Financial Integration in the EMU: Push or Pull?

This paper examines the channels through which monetary union increased financial integration, using panel data on bilateral international commercial bank claims from 1998–2006. I decompose the increase in claims into three channels: a "borrower effect," as a country's EMU membership may leave its borrowers more creditworthy in the eyes of foreign lenders; a "creditor effect," as membership in a monetary union may increase the attractiveness of a nation's commercial banks as intermediaries, perhaps through increased scale economies or through an improved regulatory environment after the advent of monetary union; and a "pairwise effect," as joint membership in a monetary union increases the quality of intermediation between borrowers and creditors when both are in the union. Isolating these three channels through a series of difference-in-differences specifications, I find that the pairwise effect is the primary source of increased financial integration. This result is robust to a number of sensitivity exercises.     

Financial frictions and optimal stabilization policy in a monetary union

Financial frictions differ across countries and thus cause international differences in the transmission of shocks. This paper shows how the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy depends on these country-specific financial frictions. To this end, we build a two-country DSGE-model of a monetary union. Financial frictions are captured by the cost channel approach. We show that the traditional solution to the assignment problem – the common central bank stabilizes the inflation rate at the union level and the national fiscal authorities stabilize the national economies – does not hold in a world with financial frictions. The cost channel decreases the efficiency of monetary policy and increases the need for fiscal stabilization even at the union level. Moreover, the more heterogeneous the union, the more important is fiscal policy in stabilizing shocks. Finally, we evaluate the scenarios in terms of welfare of the representative household.     

The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Economic and monetary union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with weak domestic policies and institutions exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with weaker policies and institutions by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability.
— Marcel Fratzscher and Livio Stracca     

Bond market and stock market integration in Europe: a smooth transition approach

This article investigates whether there has been a structural increase in financial market integration in nine European countries and the US in the period 1980 to 2003. We employ a GARCH model with a smoothly time-varying correlation to estimate the date of change and the speed of the transition between the low and high correlation regimes. Our test produces strong evidence of greater comovement across the board for both stock markets and government bond markets. Dates of change and speeds of adjustment vary widely across country linkages. Stock market integration is a more gradual process than bond market integration. The impact of European monetary union (EMU) is rather limited, as it has mainly affected the timing of bond market correlation gains (but hardly their size) and has had little discernible effect on stock market integration.     

Assessing the effects of financial heterogeneity in a monetary union a DSGE approach

The aim of this article is to analyze how financial heterogeneity can accentuate the cyclical divergences inside a monetary union that faces technological, monetary, budgetary and financial shocks. To this purpose, this study relies on a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model, where the two countries are supposed to be differently sensitive to the bank capital channel. The model allows us to demonstrate how a given symmetric shock causes cyclical divergences inside a heterogeneous monetary union. On this point, it allows reproducing some stylized facts recently observed in the Euro Area. Moreover, it appears that the more heterogeneous the union, the larger the effects of financial asymmetries on the transmission of shocks. Finally, we show that a common monetary policy contributes to worsen cyclical divergences, in comparison with monetary policies that would be nationally conducted.     

EMU in Reality: The Effect of a Common Monetary Policy on Economies with Different Transmission Mechanisms

The theory of optimal currency areas states that a single currency zone should have symmetry of shocks and structures across regions. Research on monetary union in Europe has either assumed these conditions to hold close enough not to cause problems, or has focussed on asymmetries in shocks. But what if economic structures and/or market responses differ between countries or regions? This paper examines the consequences of a single monetary policy when there are asymmetries in i) the monetary transmissions; ii) the wage/price transmissions; and iii) private sector asset holdings. We find the first and last destabilise the business cycle, and put countries out of phase with one another in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit constrained fiscal policies. The effect is to delay convergence.     

The prospects of a monetary union in East Asia

This paper assesses the empirical desirability of the East Asian economies to form a monetary union. The Structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) method is employed to assess the nature of macroeconomic disturbances among the East Asian countries, as a preliminary guide in identifying potential candidates for forming an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). In comparison with European countries, East Asia has less symmetric underlying structural shocks but the speed of adjustment to shocks is much faster. The empirical results suggest that there exists a scope among some small sub-regions, comprising mainly of ASEAN countries, for potential monetary integration. The finding of an increased symmetry of shocks among countries after the Asian Financial crisis indicates that the regional policy-coordinating effort after the crisis has put the region on the right track if monetary union is a desired goal.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

The Impact of 2007/08 Financial Crisis on the Stability and Enlargement of the EMU

Before 2007/08, the European Monetary Union (EMU) was expected to be enlarged on schedule, but the European sovereign debt problem, triggered by the exogenous US sub‐prime crisis, not only has revealed the EMU's fiscal coordination failure, but also has weakened regional financial integration. The stagnation of financial integration will therefore increase the cost of sustaining a monetary union, which in turn slows EMU enlargement and ruins the reputation of the euro. This paper aims to measure the damage to financial integration and to provide a more precise answer on real interest rate parity (RIP) convergence. Our estimation indicates that RIP between the EMU and some accession candidates is still valid after the interruptions of the financial crises. However, convergence of real interest rates cannot be achieved until 2030. This implies the EMU authority must strengthen regional financial integration to solidify the EMU and then be able to re‐start enlargement.     

Monetary Shocks and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics: a Reappraisal

This paper proposes a two‐country general‐equilibrium model incorporating a tradable sector with pricing‐to‐market as well as a nontradable sector. In that case, real exchange rate fluctuations arise from two sources: changes in the relative price of traded goods, that exemplify deviations from the law of one price, and movements in the relative price of traded to nontraded goods across countries. Our framework sheds light on the propagation mechanisms through which monetary shocks affect the real exchange rate. More specifically, the two components respond in opposite directions to monetary disturbances, which is consistent with data. Besides, the introduction of nontraded goods does not alter the predictive power of monetary shocks because the presence of nontraded goods magnifies the response of the deviation from the law of one price.     

The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone

When entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way; that is, they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries’ sovereigns into defaulting. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments. It also makes it possible that self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. I analyse the implications of this fragility for the governance of the Eurozone. I argue that the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort is crucial in reducing the fragility of the Eurozone. In addition, steps towards a budgetary union are key in structurally strengthening the union.     

The optimality of a gulf currency union: Commonalities and idiosyncrasies

A high degree of shared national elements that drive the bulk of observed output volatility between countries is generally seen as a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a successful monetary union. This is because countries in a monetary union accept a one-size-fits all, resigning regions to policies that are based on some aggregate macroeconomic target rather than a country-specific one. For this reason, the cost of monetary union membership depends on the incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks rather than symmetric, or common shocks. This criteria is examined for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, who reaffirmed plans for the implementation of a single currency. This paper quantifies, using structural factor models with common factor restrictions, changes in output synchronisation, the importance of common factor or idiosyncratic shocks between the regions, and the synchronisation of these shocks across the GCC as well as the implications for GCC-wide macroeconomic policy at short-to-medium term horizons. Despite current difficulties in fulfilling the convergence criteria goals to monetary union, the results show the synchronisation of output growth fluctuations between economies of the GCC to have increased over the past 25 years. This paper also finds that a fairly sizeable proportion of output fluctuations in business cycle frequencies are driven by a common component that, to some degree, reflects U.S. monetary policy and U.S. demand shocks as well as changes in crude oil prices.     

Monetary and real shocks in a monetary Union: The Swiss case

We analyze to what extent real and monetary shocks affect price levels and real exchange rates in seven Swiss regions. A structural time series model is set up and estimated using the Kalman filter under two assumptions on the persistence of monetary shocks. We find that the variability of changes in price levels is mainly due to real shocks. The variance of monetary shocks is small but the monetary component of inflation differences across regions differs from zero with some persistence. As the Swiss case shows this does not seem to be a major obstacle to forming a monetary union.We thank Ernst Baltensperger, Tobias Rötheli, and participants at the Econometric Society European Meeting 1994 for stimulating discussions. The paper has also benefitted from constructive comments of two anonymous referees. Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support provided by the Swiss National Foundation through Grants no: 8210-040206 (T.J.) and 12-40498.94 (C.L.).     

Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.     

Business Cycle Synchronization in the Proposed East African Monetary Union: An Unobserved Component Approach

This paper uses the business cycle synchronization criteria of the theory of optimum currency area (OCA) to examine the feasibility of the East African Community (EAC) as a monetary union. We also investigate whether the degree of business cycle synchronization has increased after the 1999 EAC Treaty. We use an unobserved component model to measure business cycle synchronization as the proportion of structural shocks that are common across different countries, and a time‐varying parameter model to examine the dynamics of synchronization over time. We find that although the degree of synchronization has increased since 2000 when the EAC Treaty came into force, the proportion of shocks that is common across different countries is still small implying weak synchronization. This evidence casts doubt on the feasibility of a monetary union for the EAC as scheduled by 2012.     

The effects of economic policy uncertainty on China’s economy: evidence from time-varying parameter FAVAR

ABSTRACT

This article explores the effects of China’s economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on its fiscal policy, monetary policy and a wide range of macro-economic variables using a time-varying parameter FAVAR model. Based on monthly data from 07/2003 to 08/2017, the time-varying structure of the model allows us to capture the time-varying characteristics of the macro-economic variables and which channel is relevant. Empirical results reveal that the reaction of monetary and fiscal policies to EPU is highly asymmetric across macro-economic circumstances. Loose monetary and fiscal policies are adopted in response to EPU shocks during the financial crisis, while policies are moderately tightened after the crisis. The China Interbank Offered Rate (Chibor) responds more sensitively and severely than M2 to EPU shocks. Additionally, EPU shocks have a significant and negative impact on economic growth, consumption, exchange rates, bonds and the stock market, but showing a positive impact on credit, real estate and fixed asset investment (which might be due to China’s special economic market environment and the high investment return). The results indicate that EPU shocks significantly affect macroeconomic fundamentals through precautionary savings and financial market channels but lose their effectiveness through a ‘real options’ effect.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.