Monetary and Fiscal Policy Switching

A growing body of evidence finds that policy reaction functions vary substantially over different periods in the United States. This paper explores how moving to an environment in which monetary and fiscal regimes evolve according to a Markov process can change the impacts of policy shocks. In one regime monetary policy follows the Taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with debt; in another regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and taxes are exogenous. An example shows that a unique bounded non-Ricardian equilibrium exists in this environment. A computational model illustrates that because agents' decision rules embed the probability that policies will change in the future, monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth effects. When it is possible that fiscal policy will be unresponsive to debt at times, active monetary policy (like a Taylor rule) in one regime is not sufficient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime and it can have the unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand effects of tax shocks. The paper also considers the implications of policy switching for two empirical issues.     

Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

I characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker controls the short‐term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under discretionary policy, accounting for fiscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare losses associated with the presence of the zero bound. Under commitment, the gains associated with the use of the fiscal policy tool remain modest, even though fiscal stabilization policy is part of the optimal policy mix.     

Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union at the Zero Lower Bound

This paper constructs a two‐country core–periphery New Keynesian model of a currency union to address the interaction between the objectives of regionally directed fiscal policy constrained by a single currency and the aggregate use of fiscal policy in face of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy interest rates. We identify an optimal path of aggregate and relative fiscal policy responses to a negative region‐specific demand shock. Our results show that (i) in a monetary union, the optimal policy response to an asymmetric reduction in demand concentrated in the periphery always entails a relative shift of fiscal expenditure toward the worse‐affected regions, (ii) though no aggregate fiscal response is required outside the ZLB, and (iii) optimal union‐wide fiscal policy is expansionary at the ZLB. Therefore, optimal policy always entails an expansion in the periphery at the ZLB, but the optimal fiscal response in the core regions can be either expansionary or contractionary depending on the parameters of the model. However, (iv) fiscal expansion in the core is warranted if the periphery cannot implement an expansion due to constraints on public spending.     

The Response of Equity Prices to Movements in Long‐Term Interest Rates Associated with Monetary Policy Statements: Before and After the Zero Lower Bound

Monetary policy actions since 2008 have influenced long‐term interest rates through forward guidance and quantitative easing. I propose a strategy to identify the comovement between interest rate and equity price movements induced by monetary policy when an observable representing policy changes is not available. A decline in long‐term interest rates induced by monetary policy statements has a larger positive effect on equity prices prior to 2009 than in the subsequent period. This change appears to reflect the impact of the zero lower bound on short‐term interest rates.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at the Effective Lower Bound

I discuss what determines the effective lower bound (ELB) for the policy rate and argue that the ELB is not hard, but rather soft, and that it is probably slightly negative. I argue that, at the ELB, current output can be increased by (i) monetary policy that extends the period of credibly low policy rates and generates inflation expectations, (ii) financial‐stability policy—which is distinct from monetary policy—that reduces the spreads between market interest rates and the policy rate, and (iii) fiscal policy that increases the neutral real rate by reducing expected growth of government expenditure and increases potential output by increasing current government expenditure.     

Keynesian Inefficiency and Optimal Policy: A New Monetarist Approach

A simple model of monetary/labor search is constructed to study Keynesian indeterminacy and optimal policy. In the model, economic agents have trouble splitting the surplus from exchange appropriately, and we consider monetary and fiscal policies that correct this Keynesian inefficiency. A Taylor rule neither implies determinacy, nor does it support an efficient outcome. An optimal policy yields an efficient and determinate allocation of resources, but equilibrium policy actions, wages, and prices are indeterminate at the optimum.     

Monetary Policy and Banking Structure

In this paper, I examine the differences in optimal monetary policy in various banking systems. In particular, I compare two monetary economies: one with a competitive banking system and the other with a monopolistic one. In addition, the optimality of the discount window policy is considered. It is shown that the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy in a monopolistic banking economy, and the zero‐inflation policy is optimal in a competitive banking economy under appropriate parameters. In addition, the combination of the Friedman rule and the discount window policy can achieve efficient allocation in both banking systems.     

One Size Fits All? Monetary Policy and Asymmetric Household Debt Cycles in U.S. States

I investigate the nonlinear effects of monetary policy through differences in household debt across U.S. states. After constructing a novel indicator of inflation for the states, I compute state‐specific monetary policy stances as deviations from an aggregate Taylor rule. I find that the effectiveness of monetary policy is curtailed during periods of large household debt imbalances. Moreover, a common U.S. monetary policy does not fit all; it may have asymmetric effects on the economic performance across states, particularly at times of high dispersion in the household debt imbalances, as it may have been the case around the Great Recession.     

A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy

I show that multiple equilibria are a general property of economies under full monetary policy discretion. Three simple conditions are sufficient to rule out, generically, a unique equilibrium in a static economy. The key departure from Barro and Gordon (1983) is to consider bounded welfare costs of inflation. I also show that in a two Markov equilibrium economy the inflation response to certain perturbations is, generically, qualitatively different in each equilibrium. Finally, I discuss some evidence on inflation dynamics that supports the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy was caught in an expectation trap during the high inflation episode of the 1970s.     

The Taylor Principle and Monetary Policy Approaching a Zero Bound on Nominal Rates: Quantile Regression Results for the United States and Japan

This paper offers a new approach that estimates the response of interest rates to inflation and the output gap at various points (quantiles) on the conditional distribution of interest rates. This offers an improvement on empirical estimates conducted only at the mean and also allows us to test the propositions that policy shows greater aggression to inflation in the reaction function in terms of a greater response coefficient as interest rates reach low levels, and increasing aggression as the lower bound is approached. We find support for the Taylor principle, a more aggressive response to inflation than under a Taylor rule, but no detectable evidence of increasing aggression as the zero lower bound is approached in the US and Japan.     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.     

The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the U.S.: Evidence from Corporate Loan Data

To study the presence of a risk‐taking channel in the U.S., we build a comprehensive data set from the syndicated corporate loan market and measure monetary policy using different measures, most notably Taylor (1993) and Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. We identify a negative relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk‐taking, especially in the run up to the 2007 financial crisis. However, this effect is purely supply‐side driven only when using Taylor residuals and an ex ante measure of bank risk‐taking. Our results highlight the sensitivity of the potency of the risk‐taking channel to the measures of monetary policy innovations.     

Rational expectations,changing monetary policy rules,and real exchange rate dynamics

This paper reexamines the explanatory power of Taylor rule fundamentals for real exchange rate determination. We assume the agents know the time-varying parameters in central bank policy rules. The empirical results suggest that a monetary policy rule with regime switching is better able to explain the real Deutschemark/dollar exchange rate from 1976 to 1998 compared with a fixed-regime monetary policy rule. The findings show the importance of accounting for the expectation formation effect in changing policy rules as emphasized by the Lucas critique. Ignoring these effects can undermine the value of the rational expectations models.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Cross‐Country Evidence

We explain the heterogeneous response of central banks to financial stability risks based on a financial stability orientation (FSO) index, which reflects statutory, regulatory, and discretionary components of central banks' monetary policy frameworks. Our baseline results from a cross‐country panel of modified Taylor rules suggest that central banks with a high FSO increase their policy rates in response to elevated financial stability risks by 0.27 percentage points more than central banks with a low orientation. Back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations suggest that this policy rate differential translates into a reduced crisis probability but also into considerably lower inflation and output growth rates.     

Monetary Policy Expectations at the Zero Lower Bound

We show that conventional dynamic term structure models (DTSMs) estimated on recent U.S. data severely violate the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates and deliver poor forecasts of future short rates. In contrast, shadow‐rate DTSMs account for the ZLB by construction, capture the resulting distributional asymmetry of future short rates, and achieve good forecast performance. These models provide more accurate estimates of the most likely path for future monetary policy—including the timing of policy liftoff from the ZLB and the pace of subsequent policy tightening. We also demonstrate the benefits of including macroeconomic factors in a shadow‐rate DTSM when yields are constrained near the ZLB.     

The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Cross‐Country Analysis

This paper assesses the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policies by estimating a panel vector autoregression (VAR) with monthly data from eight advanced economies over a sample spanning the period since the onset of the global financial crisis. It finds that an exogenous increase in central bank balance sheets at the zero lower bound leads to a temporary rise in economic activity and consumer prices. The estimated output effects turn out to be qualitatively similar to the ones found in the literature on the effects of conventional monetary policy, while the impact on the price level is weaker and less persistent. Individual country results suggest that there are no major differences in the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policies across countries, despite the heterogeneity of the measures that were taken.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

Monetary–Fiscal Policy Interactions under Implementable Monetary Policy Rules

This paper examines the implications of forward- and backward-looking monetary policy rules in an environment with monetary–fiscal interactions. We find that the unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is always non-Ricardian under simple implementable monetary policy rules.     

Making Weak Instrument Sets Stronger: Factor‐Based Estimation of Inflation Dynamics and a Monetary Policy Rule

The problem of weak identification has recently attracted attention in the analysis of structural macroeconomic models. Using robust methods can result in large confidence sets making precise inference difficult. We overcome this problem in the analysis of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve and a forward‐looking Taylor rule by employing stronger instruments. We suggest exploiting information from a large macroeconomic data set by generating factors and using them as additional instruments. This approach results in stronger instrument sets and hence smaller weak‐identification robust confidence sets. It allows us to conclude that there has been a shift toward more active monetary policy from the pre‐Volcker regime to the Volcker–Greenspan tenure.     

The Credit Channel at the Zero Lower Bound through the Lens of Equity Prices

This study examines the impact of unconventional monetary policies on the stock market when the short‐term nominal interest rate is stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Unconventional monetary policies appear to have significant effects on stock prices and the effects differ across stocks. In agreement with existing credit channel theories, I find that firms subject to financial constraints react more strongly to unconventional monetary policy shocks [especially large‐scale asset purchases (LSAPs)] than do less constrained firms. These results imply that the credit channel is as important as the interest rate channel in the transmission of unconventional monetary policies at the ZLB.