Estimating Trend Inflation Based on Unobserved Components Model: Is It Correlated with the Inflation Gap?

Building on the work of Stock and Watson (2007), this paper empirically shows that a negative correlation between innovations to trend inflation and the inflation gap plays an important role in the dynamics of postwar U.S. inflation. Additional features that we incorporate in our model include regime‐switching inflation gap persistence and association between inflation and inflation uncertainty. The resulting estimate of trend inflation is smooth, and our model provides superior out‐of‐sample forecasts than Stock and Watson's (2007) unobserved components model with stochastic volatility or than Atkeson and Ohanian's (2001) random walk model does.     

Endogenous Price Stickiness,Trend Inflation,and Macroeconomic Stability

Previous studies show that higher trend inflation is more likely to induce indeterminacy of equilibrium in sticky‐price models based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged. This paper demonstrates that when the degree of price stickiness is endogenously determined in a Calvo model, indeterminacy caused by higher trend inflation is less likely. A key factor for determinacy is the long‐run inflation elasticity of output implied by the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This elasticity declines substantially with higher trend inflation in the case of exogenously given price stickiness, whereas in the case of endogenous price stickiness the decline in the elasticity is mitigated because higher trend inflation leads to a higher probability of price adjustment.     

中国核心通货膨胀率的度量及其货币政策涵义

基于包含实际总产出、货币供给M2和CPI的向量自回归模型(VAR),将CPI分解为长期变动趋势和短期波动项。将长期趋势部分定义为核心通货膨胀率。运用1994～2009年中国季度数据进行实证检验,核心通胀率与CPI有长期均衡关系,主导CPI的长期变动趋势,是CPI的前导变量,能够为预测CPI提供有用信息,对为中央银行判断总体通货膨胀走势、制定及时有效的货币政策有所启示。     

Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations

Disagreement in inflation expectations observed from survey data varies systematically over time in a way that reflects the level and variance of current inflation. This paper offers a simple explanation for these facts based on asymmetries in the forecasters' costs of over- and underpredicting inflation. Our model implies (i) biased forecasts, (ii) positive serial correlation in forecast errors, (iii) a cross-sectional dispersion that rises with the level and the variance of the inflation rate, and (iv) predictability of forecast errors at different horizons by means of the spread between the short- and long-term variance of inflation. We find empirically that these patterns are present in inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. A constant bias component, not explained by asymmetric loss and rational expectations, is required to explain the shift in the sign of the bias observed for a substantial portion of forecasters around 1982.     

A New Time‐Varying Parameter Autoregressive Model for U.S. Inflation Expectations

We study the evolution of U.S. inflation by means of a new noncausal autoregressive model with time‐varying parameters that outperforms the corresponding causal and constant‐parameter noncausal models in terms of fit and forecast accuracy. Our model also beats the unobserved component stochastic volatility (UCSV) model, one of the best‐performing univariate inflation forecasting models, in terms of both point and density forecasts. We also show how the new Keynesian Phillips curve can be estimated based on our noncausal model. Both expected and lagged inflation turn out important, but the former dominates in determining the current inflation.     

Survey Measures of Expected Inflation and the Inflation Process

The accuracy of inflation forecasts obtained from household and professional surveys has deteriorated noticeably of late, to the extent that a simple autoregressive specification outperforms survey forecasts. The decline in (absolute and relative) accuracy has taken place at about the same time as an apparent change in the inflation process. Projections of household forecasts on realized inflation suggests that households have not recognized this change. For the professionals, projections of expected inflation on headline inflation have changed, but on core inflation have not. By contrast, projections of realized headline inflation on core have changed sharply.     

Out of Bounds: Do SPF Respondents Have Anchored Inflation Expectations?

Since the Federal Open Market Committee announced a 2% inflation target in 2012, the median long-run inflation forecast of professional forecasters has been near target. We show, however, that most individual forecasters' long-run inflation expectations fluctuate substantially, with sizeable departures from target. We propose a new “bounds anchoring” indicator based on deviations of individuals' long-run forecasts from target. This indicator sheds new light on gradual changes in expectations since the 2012 announcement. We find that bounds anchoring gradually strengthened in the years following the target announcement, but that this trend has recently started to reverse.     

Uncertainty,Inflation, and Welfare

This paper studies the welfare costs and the redistributive effects of inflation in the presence of idiosyncratic liquidity risk, in a microfounded search‐theoretical monetary model. We calibrate the model to match the empirical aggregate money demand and the distribution of money holdings across households and study the effects of inflation under the implied degree of market incompleteness. We show that in the presence of imperfect insurance the estimated long‐run welfare costs of inflation are on average 40% to 55% smaller compared to a complete markets, representative agent economy, and that inflation induces important redistributive effects across households.     

Inflation Dynamics When Inflation Is Near Zero

We discuss the likely evolution of U.S. inflation in the near and medium terms on the basis of (i) past U.S. experience with very low levels of inflation, (ii) the most recent Japanese experience with negative inflation, and (iii) some preliminary U.S. micro evidence on downward nominal wage rigidity. Our findings question the view that stable long‐run inflation expectations and downward nominal wage rigidity will necessarily provide sufficient support to prices to avoid further declines in inflation. We show that an inflation model fitted on Japanese data over the past 20 years, which accounts for both short‐ and long‐run inflation expectations, matches the recent U.S. inflation experience quite well. While the model indicates that U.S. inflation might be subject to a lower bound, it does not rule out a prolonged period of low inflation or even mild deflation going forward. In addition, micro‐level data on wages suggest no obvious downward rigidity in the firm's wage bill, downward rigidity in individual wages notwithstanding. As a consequence, downward nominal wage rigidity may not be enough to offset deflationary pressures in the current situation.     

Measuring Inflation Expectations Uncertainty Using High‐Frequency Data

Inflation expectations play a key role in determining future economic outcomes. The associated uncertainty provides a direct gauge of how well‐anchored the inflation expectations are. We construct a model‐based measure of inflation expectations uncertainty by augmenting a standard unobserved components model of inflation with information from noisy and possibly biased measures of inflation expectations obtained from financial markets. This new model‐based measure of inflation expectations uncertainty is more accurately estimated and can provide valuable information for policymakers. Using U.S. data, we find significant changes in inflation expectations uncertainty during the Great Recession.     

Monetary Policy,Trend Inflation,and Unemployment Volatility

The literature has long agreed that the DMP model (after Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982, Pissarides 1985) with search and matching frictions in the labor market can deliver large volatilities in labor market quantities, consistent with empirical data, only if there is at least some wage stickiness. I show, however, that the model can deliver nontrivial volatilities without wage stickiness, as long as it has price dispersion and nonzero long‐run inflation rates. I find that by keeping inflation at a positive rate, monetary policy may be accountable for the large standard deviations observed on labor market variables. In addition, the Shimer (2005) puzzle disappears under monetary policy shocks.     

Unstable Inflation Targets

This paper studies long‐run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment. When central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated, agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares. Inflation targets can lead agents' beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels. First, implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting. Second, there can be nearly self‐fulfilling inflation, disinflation, or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks. Policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed.     

News on Inflation and the Epidemiology of Inflation Expectations

This paper examines the nexus between news coverage on inflation and households’ inflation expectations. In doing so, we test the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information model (Carroll 2003, 2006 ). We use both aggregate and household‐level data from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. We highlight a fundamental disconnection among news on inflation, consumers’ frequency of expectation updating, and the accuracy of their expectations. Our evidence provides at best weak support to the epidemiological framework, as most of the consumers who update their expectations do not revise them toward professional forecasters’ mean forecast.     

Economic Literacy and Inflation Expectations: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

We present experimental evidence of a link between economic literacy and inflation forecast accuracy. The experiment investigates two channels through which economic literacy may enable better forecasts: (i) choice of information and (ii) use of information. More literate subjects choose more relevant information and use the given information more effectively. Starting from a 10th percentile score, the boost in literacy from taking an economics course predicts a 0.64 standard deviation decline in mean absolute forecasting error. Our findings suggest that a significant portion of demographic heterogeneity in inflation expectations—observed in survey data—may be driven by heterogeneity in economic literacy.     

Implicit Inflation and Risk Premiums in the Brazilian Fixed Income Market

The breakeven inflation, the differential between nominal and real yields of bonds, is often used as a predictor of future inflation. The model presented here decomposes this interest rate differential into a risk premium and implicit inflation using a parametric formulation based on no-arbitrage conditions using nominal and indexed yield curves in Brazil, via an affine model of the Nelson–Siegel family. The measures of implicit inflation obtained from the model are shown to be unbiased estimators of future inflation for short horizons and carry some information for long horizons, and the model forecasts are superior to market surveys.     

Inflation,earnings forecasts,and post-earnings announcement drift

We examine whether financial analysts fully incorporate expected inflation in their earnings forecasts for individual stocks. We find that expected inflation proxies, such as lagged inflation and inflation forecasts from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, predict the future earnings change of a portfolio long in high inflation exposure firms and short in low or negative inflation exposure firms, but analysts do not fully adjust for this relation. Analysts’ earnings forecast errors can be predicted using expected inflation proxies, and these systematic forecast errors are related to future stock returns. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the Chordia and Shivakumar (J Account Res 43(4):521–556, 2005) hypothesis that the post-earnings announcement drift is related to investor underestimation of the impact of expected inflation on future earnings change.     

Do Expected Shifts in Inflation Affect Estimates of the Long-Run Fisher Relation?

Recent empirical studies suggest that nominal interest rates and expected inflation do not move together one-for-one in the long run, a finding at odds with many theoretical models. This article shows that these results can be deceptive when the process followed by inflation shifts infrequently. We characterize the shifts in inflation by a Markov switching model. Based upon this model's forecasts, we reexamine the long-run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation. Interestingly, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that in the long run nominal interest rates reflect expected inflation one-for-one.     

Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations and Learning

Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1‐year‐ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.     

Why Money Growth Determines Inflation in the Long Run: Answering the Woodford Critique

Woodford argues that it is not appropriate to regard inflation in the steady state of New Keynesian models as determined by steady‐state money growth. Woodford instead argues that the intercept term in the monetary authority's interest rate policy rule determines steady‐state inflation. In this paper, I offer an alternative interpretation of steady‐state behavior, according to which it is appropriate to regard steady‐state inflation as determined by steady‐state money growth. The argument relies on traditional interpretations of the central bank's power in the long run and appeals to model properties that are common to textbook and New Keynesian analysis. According to this argument, the only way the central bank can control interest rates in the long run is via affecting inflation, and its only means available for determining inflation is by determining the money growth rate.     

Measuring Inflation Anchoring and Uncertainty: A U.S. and Euro Area Comparison

We use several U.S. and euro‐area surveys of professional forecasters to estimate a dynamic factor model of inflation featuring time‐varying uncertainty. We obtain survey‐consistent distributions of future inflation at any horizon, both in the U.S. and the euro area. Equipped with this model, we propose a novel measure of the anchoring of inflation expectations that accounts for inflation uncertainty. Our results suggest that following the Great Recession, inflation anchoring improved in the United States, while mild de‐anchoring occurred in the euro area. As of our sample end, both areas appear to be almost equally anchored.