Lobbying and discretion

When interest groups compete to influence legislators, the resulting legislation is often vague, and thus obliges the groups to continue their fight in the executive. On its face, this seems inefficient—at least from the point of view of the groups. We explore this intuition in a model of “nested lobbying” in which interest groups first compete to influence a legislative agenda setter, then compete to influence legislative votes over the resulting agenda. If the resulting legislation grants discretion to the executive, the final prize is allocated in yet one more contest in the bureaucracy. We find that when the status quo is non-discretionary, competition over the agenda never results in an agenda that includes discretion. Surprisingly, however, a discretionary status quo can stand with probability 1 if the preferences of the bureaucracy, the legislature, and the agenda setter are arranged in an “iron triangle”. Specifically, the bureaucracy and agenda setter must be biased in favor of one group, while the legislature is biased in favor of the other.     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

Interest rate convergence, capital controls, risk premia and foreign exchange market efficiency in the EMS

This paper examines interest rate convergence between Germany and the other EMS countries. We argue that earlier tests of convergence based on cointegration are not informative, because cointegration only implies that a linear combination of interest rates is stationary. We show that a conclusive judgment about convergence can be made if interest rate differentials exhibit a trend towards zero during the period when convergence occurred, and if the cointegrating vector has unit coefficients. We then establish that convergence has taken place in the “hard” EMS period. We also attempt to identify the sources of nonstationarities in interest differentials by examining the existence of stochastic or deterministic trends in the expected rate of depreciation and in the risk premium. Finally, the possibility of market inefficiencies is discussed.     

Convergence in Interest Rates and Inflation Rates Across Countries and Over Time

We examine the relationship between interest rates and inflation rates for 10 countries during the period 1974–95. We find evidence of a unique cointegrating relationship between nominal interest rates of European Monetary System (EMS) countries, the US and Canada, and the US, Germany, and Japan. No similar relationship is obtained between inflation rates with one exception, namely, that between the US and Canada. We interpret these results as convergence in inflation but not in interst rates. Hence, if interest rates represent an indicator of monetary policy, the countries considered have attempted to implement independent policies but not to an extent which produced divergent trends in inflation.     

Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions

We draw on the positive political theory and campaign financeliteratures to examine how interest groups allocate influenceactivities (e.g., monetary donations, lobbying) across multiplegovernment institutions when seeking more favorable agency policydecisions. By modeling agency behavior in the context of legislativeoversight, we derive testable predictions about the politicalconditions under which an interest group will influence (1)only the agency, (2) the legislature and/or executive insteadof the agency, and (3) the legislature or executive in additionto the agency in order to induce a shift in regulatory policy.One implication of our conclusions relating to (2) and (3) isthat empirical studies seeking to identify a relationship betweenelectoral campaign contributions and public policy using dataon legislative votes are potentially misspecified.     

Do interest groups reward politicians for their votes in the legislature? Evidence from the great recession

ABSTRACT

Interest groups lobby politicians in various ways to influence their policy decisions, especially, their voting decisions in the legislature. Most, if not all, of the studies on this issue examine ”pre-vote” lobbying activities of interest groups that occur before politicians vote in the legislature. In this paper, however, I examine ”post-vote” lobbying activities of interest groups that occur after politicians vote in the legislature. By using data on the amount of monetary contributions given by interest groups to the members of the U.S. House of Representatives who have served in the 109th (2005–06) through 111th (2009–10) Congress, I find evidence that voting in favour of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, one of the most significant pieces of legislation and possibly the biggest government bailout in U.S. economic history, has increased the amount of monetary contributions that politicians receive from the interest groups in the financial sector after the passage of the EESA. I also discuss two reasons for such post-vote lobbying and find empirical evidence for one of them.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

SPECIAL INTERESTS AND THE GAINS FROM POLITICAL INTEGRATION

This paper presents a formal study of economic influence by special-interest groups under political integration and separation. We first show that countries where more groups are organized to lobby gain from political integration on economic grounds. The reason is that a more organized country, under a political union, can affect policies in the other country to its advantage, something that a less organized country can do to a lesser extent. We then study the interaction of political integration and endogenous lobbying structure. We show that political integration affects the formation of interest groups. Moreover, if a country is more organized before political integration, this will continue to be the case afterward.     

Testing For Real Interest Rate Convergence In European Countries

We use cointegration tests that determine endogenously the regime shift to test for bilateral short-term and long-term real interest rate convergence in the European Monetary System in the 1979–1993 period. The results of these tests provide strong evidence in favour of bilateral real interest rate convergence between Germany and several countries in our sample, particularly for long-term real interest rates. This result carries the important policy implication that in several European countries monetary policy has lost some of its effectiveness as a stabilisation policy tool.     

Party-bosses vs. party-primaries: Quality of legislature under different selectorates

We compare the legislature quality under an exclusive, centralized selectorate (such as a party-principal) with that under an inclusive, decentralized selectorate (such as a party-primary). In our model, two parties compete over three districts: two are home districts of each party while the third is a battleground district characterized by weaker and uncertain policy preferences. We find that when home districts are “safe,” and the parties' candidate pools are of comparable quality, an equilibrium legislature under party-primaries is always of higher quality than an equilibrium legislature under party-principals. When we extend the model to include a general number of districts with candidates of only high or low quality, we show that, as long as there are not too few nor too many highest-quality candidates, party-primaries still perform better than party-principals.     

Why was the euro weak? Markets and policies

Against all odds, the euro turned out to be a weak currency. We argue that this outcome can readily be explained by the policy-mix that was chosen at the onset of the period: tight fiscal policies following the convergence mechanism that was imposed by the Maastricht treaty and loose monetary policy that resulted from the convergence of interest rates to the lower point of the spectrum. We investigate this outcome empirically and show that the euro's weakness can be understood as the result of an excess supply in the zone, which is channelled abroad in the usual beggar my neighbor way.     

WTO,the Trips and Indian Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper analyzes the efficiency of firms in Indian Pharmaceutical Industry before and after the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. The analysis reveals that the efficiency of firms has increased after the Indian legislature has passed the bill for accepting patent applications in early 1999. We find that R&D intensity and market share influence efficiency of firms. The impact of import intensity enhances inefficiency. Our result indicates absence of ownership effects after the Indian legislature had passed the bill for accepting patent applications.

     

THE SELECTION OF POLICIES FOR BALLOT INITIATIVES: WHAT VOTERS CAN LEARN FROM LEGISLATIVE INACTION

This paper models the process through which proposals are placed on the ballot as initiatives. Importantly, proposals that reach the ballot were not enacted by the legislature. We show that this fact has important consequences for the type of policy proposals that reach the ballot: as the legislature would enact any proposal that increases everyone's utility (in expectation), proposals that reach the ballot must be bad for some segment of the population. We partition the population into voters who would benefit from a group's proposal and those who would not and show that voters can use the legislature's inaction to obtain a better estimate of the initiative's expected value. In particular, we show that voters that are not in the sponsoring group infer that proposals that become initiatives have negative expected value and that the expected value of an initiative is decreasing in the size of the group that sponsors it.     

Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty

We study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters׳ preferences to uninformed political candidates. We conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are (initially) unknown and change over time. In the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences. We find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group. In fact, we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups, which convey new information, and uninformative advocacy groups, which do not. Overall, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter. However, advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.     

Technology policy making as a social an political process: liberalizing india's software policy

This paper investigates the policy-making process i n a high-technology Indian industry—software—that epitomizes the liberalizing, export-oriented India of the 1980s. Although policy making is a political process, with different groups in both state and industry lobbying for different measures, there are, nevertheless, dominant forces. Within industry, the very large companies have favoured limited liberalization of policy. Within the state, Finance Ministry bureaucrats do not oppose liberalization per se, but their interests are such that they have tended to oppose most liberalization measures. Overlain on this static picture is a dynamic one, in which the balance of power between the various coalitions of interest groups has changed over time. After the early 1980s) liberalization came to be part of the political agenda through the rise to power of policy makers committed to this ideology. However, other interest groups gained in strength and by early 1987 the liberalization process had become piecemeal and in many areas was prevented from progressing further, From this it can be seen that in order to understand the making of a technology policy and its consequent impact, one mustjrst understand the underlying social and political forces that constrain and determine these processes.     

Technology policy making as a social an political process: liberalizing india's software policy

This paper investigates the policy-making process i n a high-technology Indian industry—software—that epitomizes the liberalizing, export-oriented India of the 1980s. Although policy making is a political process, with different groups in both state and industry lobbying for different measures, there are, nevertheless, dominant forces. Within industry, the very large companies have favoured limited liberalization of policy. Within the state, Finance Ministry bureaucrats do not oppose liberalization per se, but their interests are such that they have tended to oppose most liberalization measures. Overlain on this static picture is a dynamic one, in which the balance of power between the various coalitions of interest groups has changed over time. After the early 1980s) liberalization came to be part of the political agenda through the rise to power of policy makers committed to this ideology. However, other interest groups gained in strength and by early 1987 the liberalization process had become piecemeal and in many areas was prevented from progressing further, From this it can be seen that in order to understand the making of a technology policy and its consequent impact, one mustjrst understand the underlying social and political forces that constrain and determine these processes.     

The Crisis of America’s Cities

This paper aims to show how state intervention within the European Monetary Union can have positive effects not only on growth but also on public balances and debt. The relation between centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy partly solves the lack of coordination between the two. Each time a fiscal expansion in an EU country is not accompanied by a Central Bank interest rate increase, the expansionary effect of public spending, initially financed through the emission of public bonds, will be reinforced by endogenous money creation due to the increase in growth. The final result, if growth exceeds the rate of interest, is not only an increase in equilibrium income, but also a reduction in debt.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

A pair-wise approach to output convergence between European regions

We apply the Pesaran (2007) pair-wise approach of convergence to the per capita outputs of 195 European regions for the period 1980-2006. Pesaran's approach is based on the computation of the percentage ratio of output gaps which fulfil a given convergence criterion. A high ratio will be interpreted in favour of convergence. In a first step, we define stochastic convergence between two regions as level stationarity of their output gap. Deviations from its equilibrium value will only have a temporary effect. Results from several usual unit root or stationarity tests show us that the percentage ratio of level stationary output gaps is low, which stands against this definition of convergence. However, this convergence criterion excludes the possibility of changes in output gap equilibrium value or catching up between regions. To fit these cases, we combine the pair-wise approach with unit root or stationarity tests with structural breaks. Structural breaks are modelled by dummies (Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Kurozumi,2002) or as smooth structural breaks (Christopoulos and León-Ledesma, 2009). Overall results are not changed as convergence is not accepted more often. Finally, we consider the autocorrelation function approach of Caggiano and Leonida (2009). Autocorrelations and their confidence intervals are estimated for each output gap. Convergence between two regions is accepted if their per capita output gap autocorrelations become nonsignificantly different from zero after some lag. Results show that a high percentage of regions satisfy this convergence criterion. Contrary to the conclusions which could be made from previous results, shocks to output gaps seem to disappear as time passes.