Earnings Attribution and Information Transfers

Managers frequently attribute the news in their earnings forecasts to various economic events. Using textual analysis, we identify the economic factors underlying earnings news from press releases. We document a wide range of industry‐wide shocks and firm‐specific actions to which the earnings news in management forecasts is attributed. As expected, earnings attributions significantly affect peer firms’ price reactions to the earnings news. Specifically, earnings news attributed to industry‐wide trends or firm structural changes leads to positive information transfers but earnings news attributed to firm competitive moves triggers negative information transfers. Information transfers are much stronger when each economic factor is mentioned the first time in a given industry‐year. Further analysis reveals that the strength of information transfers varies with firm‐level rivalry within the industry (i.e., similar business strategies, market position, and level of competition).     

The Relation Between Earnings Management and Non‐GAAP Reporting

Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non‐GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts’ expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non‐GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non‐GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non‐GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non‐GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non‐GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non‐GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior‐period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non‐GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.     

A Simple Approach to Better Distinguish Real Earnings Manipulation from Strategy Changes*

Researchers typically infer real earnings management when a firm's operating and investing activities differ from industry norms. A significant problem with classifying deviations from industry averages as myopic earnings management is that companies can change their operating and investing decisions for strategic business reasons rather than to mislead stakeholders. Using principal components analysis, we systematically evaluate existing measures and develop a comprehensive real activities measure to better capture earnings manipulation. Our measure reflects (i) deviations from industry averages across multiple activities and (ii) other signals of manipulation. This approach is promising because, although there are many sources of abnormal activities, manipulation is more likely the cause when managers engage in multiple income-increasing abnormal activities that coincide with other signals that indicate an elevated risk of manipulation. This simple approach results in a metric that associates negatively with future operating performance and earnings persistence, yields high-power tests, and captures manipulation reasonably well across most life-cycle stages. Importantly, this approach performs better than the standard real earnings management metrics across all dimensions. Specifically, it generates the expected reduction in future earnings and reduced earnings persistence in 82% of the tests compared to 36% and 46% in common alternatives. Also, because this innovation does not require a long time-series or rely on future period realizations for classification, it can be useful in more research settings than other recent innovations in the literature.     

中国互联网三巨头竞争互动研究

随着互联网信息服务企业的不断壮大,附随扩散等跨领域竞争行为使得企业间的竞争互动更加复杂多样。能否在纷繁的竞争中探寻出互动规律,从而为企业制定合理的战略,直接关系着企业的竞争力水平与未来市场地位。文章以BAT企业为样本企业,根据竞争互动理论,运用结构内容分析法,从市场行为和非市场行为角度研究互联网信息服务业的竞争互动特点和规律。通过研究发现,互联网信息服务企业通常采取"附随扩散"的行为来进行跨领域竞争,并且这种现象与日俱增;互联网信息服务企业对于竞争对手的非市场进攻行为更为敏感,对非市场行为的回应速度更快;在相同业务领域中,企业之间更加倾向于采取战术性竞争互动,对于竞争对手的进攻,企业会采取相同类型的竞争行为予以回应,相关研究可为互联网信息服务企业战略的制定提供一定参考。     

Competition in the electricity industry in England and Wales

When the electricity industry was privatized, the governmentmade structural changes to encourage competition in generationand in supply to consumers. The conventional power stationswere only divided between two companies, however, and we showthat duopolistic competition in an unregulated spot market mightimply undesirably high prices. Most sales are hedged in thecontract market, which makes the spot market more competitive,and a realistic threat of entry could also force generatorsto keep their prices down. In the event, a large amount of entrytook place, supported by the regional electricity companies'franchise monopoly over smaller consumers. That monopoly endsin 1998, so that further entry might become very difficult,while competition between firms already in the generation marketis still limited. Vertical integration between the major generatorsand regional electricity companies might make entry even harder,and should be blocked until the industry is more competitive.     

Credit Rating Agency and Equity Analysts’ Adjustments to GAAP Earnings

Moody's analysts and sell‐side equity analysts adjust GAAP earnings as part of their research. We show that adjusted earnings definitions of Moody's analysts are significantly lower than those of equity analysts when companies exhibit higher downside risk, as measured by volatility in idiosyncratic stock returns, volatility in negative market returns, poor earnings, and loss status. Relative to the adjusted earnings definitions of equity analysts, adjusted earnings definitions of Moody's analysts better predict future bankruptcies, yet they fare significantly worse in predicting future earnings and operating cash flows. These findings persist after controlling for optimism incentives of analysts, reporting incentives of companies, credit rating levels, and industry and year effects. Our findings suggest that credit rating agencies cater to their clients’ demand for a more conservative interpretation of company‐reported performance than what is offered by equity analysts.     

制度实施后上市公司盈余管理的分项实证研究

1999年非货币性交易准则和2001年关联方交易准备的实施在一定程度上限制了上市公司利用线下项目进行盈余管理的行为,同时,2002年中国宏观经济尚未走出通缩的阴影,这样必然导致上市公司盈余管理出现新特点。文章针对2002年上市公司年报线上应计项目和线下利润,并进一步将线上项     

风险管理报告的模式及内容研究

在世界范围内,企业风险管理报告还没有一个标准、规范的框架。本文探讨了内部控制报告在美国和英国的实践,对影响风险管理报告模式的各种要素进行了深入分析。最后,利用矩阵分析法,对风险管理报告的相关内容进行了较为系统地研究,提出了全球第一个风险报告的内容模本框架。     

上市公司盈余管理幅度、方向与高管薪酬——来自沪深股市的经验证据

本文以沪深两市2002年-2009年上市公司为研究对象,考察了高管层总体薪酬水平与盈余管理幅度、方向之间的关系.研究发现：在其他条件不变的情况下,盈余管理与高管层薪酬之间存在正相关关系;向下的盈余管理更能促进高管层薪酬的增加,在国有企业这种促进作用更明显.研究结果支持薪酬契约理论,不支持管理层机会主义观点.     

The Consequences of Audit‐Related Earnings Revisions

In this study, we investigate the consequences that auditors and their clients face when earnings announced in an unaudited earnings release are subsequently revised, presumably as a result of year‐end audit procedures, so that earnings as reported in the 10‐K differ from earnings as previously announced. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an auditor “losing the client” is greater following such revisions, and whether the likelihood of dismissal is influenced by revisions that more negatively impact earnings, that cause the client to miss important earnings benchmarks, by greater local auditor competition, or by auditor characteristics. We also examine audit pricing subsequent to audit‐related earnings revisions for evidence of pricing concessions to retain the client. Finally, we examine whether client executives experience a greater likelihood of turnover following an audit‐related earnings revision. Consistent with expectations, we find that auditor dismissals are more likely following audit‐related earnings revisions. We also find that dismissals are more likely when revisions cause clients to miss important benchmarks and when there is greater local auditor competition. Among nondismissing clients, we find that future audit fees are lower when the effect of the revision on earnings is more negative, consistent with auditors offering price concessions to retain clients when revisions are more displeasing. We also find a greater likelihood of future chief financial officer (CFO) turnover as the effect of the revision worsens. Our findings offer important insights into the consequences that auditors face when balancing their responsibility for high audit quality and client satisfaction, as well as into the consequences that CFOs face when releasing inflated but not fully audited earnings.     

上市公司税负及其影响因素——来自沪深股市的经验证据

我们以1994～2004年全国上市公司9536组数据为样本,考察上市公司税负及其影响因素,结果发现:①上市公司税负至少占利润的62.04%,上市公司总体税负并不轻;②上市公司总体税负存在地区差异,东部地区税负高于中部和西部地区;③上市公司总体税负存在行业差异,2004年度采掘业、房地产业等五个行业平均总体税负较高;④总体税负与所得税负担、流转税负担、资产规模、盈利能力、资本密集度和年度变量显著正相关,却与负债水平和投资收益显著负相关。本文的政策含义在于:①若要保持税收的可持续增长,应该紧紧抓住典型重点企业,比如资产规模大、盈利能力强的企业,这些企业是重点税源;②由于总体税负与资本密集度显著正相关,税收受到投资的强劲拉动,因此,它会显著地受到国家宏观调控之影响;③在企业方面,可以适度负债,合理地利用负债的税收档板作用;④企业可以适度地进行多元化长期投资、分散风险。     

我国第三方物流企业战略联盟研究

随着我国加入WTO后对服务业的开放,国外第三方物流企业的大量涌入,对于我国物流企业形成了巨大的冲击,激烈竞争的格局已经形成。建立战略联盟成为了我国第三方物流企业适应市场竞争,促进企业发展的必然选择。建立第三方物流企业战略联盟需要注意以下问题：树立明确的联盟目标;慎重选择合作伙伴;处理好联盟各方的企业文化差异;加强风险防范和提高联盟管理水平。     

A review of earnings management in China and its implications

This paper discusses the motivations behind the earnings management of listed firms in China and provides evidence on earnings management using various accounting measures. The literature shows that earnings management occurs most often before the issue of securities or when a firm is facing the risk of being delisted. While non‐core income was widely used to measure earnings management in China, as it is easily detected, researchers are now focusing on accrual‐based models. We explore the underlying causes of earnings management in China, and conclude that the two main causes are the concentrated ownership structure and the strong political and economic connections between government and the listed companies. We review the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and government supervision on earnings management in China.     

Improving Financial Reports by Revealing the Accuracy of Prior Estimates*

Several researchers (e.g., Lundholm 1999; Ryan 1997; Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen 2000) have proposed a reporting mechanism to enhance the reliability of estimates and other forward‐looking information in financial reports. Their proposals require companies to report reconciliations of prior‐year estimates to actual realizations as supplemental information in their financial reports. Such disclosures would enable investors to distinguish between accurate and opportunistic reporting behavior, and, arguably, should create incentives for companies to estimate accurately in the first place. Our study provides evidence on these proposals. Specifically, we conduct two experiments within the context of an important intangible asset requiring estimation ‐ software development costs. Our results show that the proposed reporting mechanism is effective in communicating information about the accuracy of financial estimates. We find, however, that not all disclosures are equally useful. The most effective disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation (if any) on both the balance sheet and on earnings, thereby reducing the computational complexity associated with less explicit disclosures. Furthermore, our results show that when the disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation, investors reward accurate estimators but do not explicitly punish those who are inaccurate. We conclude that information about previous estimate accuracy is useful to investors and that regulators should consider the type of disclosure, because not all disclosures may be equally effective in creating management incentives for accurate estimation. Moreover, the competitive advantage conferred on firms that provide accurate estimates arguably should create incentives for all companies to estimate accurately in the future.     

How Do Local Labor Markets and Human Capital Affect Employment Outcomes after Job Loss?

This article uses the Longitudinal Employer‐Household Dynamics to evaluate how local industry concentration affects earnings losses for displaced workers. “Concentrated industries” are those industries with a high employment share within a labor market. This article compares earnings changes between displaced workers and job stayers within concentrated industries to the same within less concentrated industries. A separate comparison is made based on the expected level of job availability within the labor market. The findings show that earnings changes for displaced workers relative to job stayers are 7–13% higher within concentrated industries when job loss occurs during periods of high job availability. Earnings changes are 4.5–6% lower, however, when the same comparison is made during periods of low job availability. When firms are hiring workers, they are more likely to hire those previously employed within the same industry, since these workers have accumulated more relevant human capital.     

市场环境下的股权投资与企业盈余管理

为了考察市场环境、股权投资对拟上市企业盈余管理的影响,重点关注以下两个问题:市场环境是否影响了拟上市企业的盈余管理行为?股权投资是否发挥了单方面的抑制或者助长拟上市企业盈余管理的作用?通过单变量检验和多变量回归分析发现:在市场环境好时上市的企业,其盈余管理水平要高于在市场环境差时上市的企业;同时研究还发现当股权投资介入拟上市企业的盈余管理行为时,会根据市场环境的好坏来决策是抑制还是助长企业的盈余管理水平,巧妙的解决了关于股权投资"认证说"和"躁动效应说"之间的矛盾。     

股权集中度与盈余管理的实证研究——基于中国房地产业上市公司的数据

盈余管理与公司治理结构存在着密切联系,一般认为股权越集中的上市公司盈余管理程度越高。鉴于此,选取2008-2015年中国房地产业上市公司样本数据,利用门槛回归模型检验了股权集中度对盈余管理的影响,研究发现两者之间存在双重门槛效应：仅当第一大股东持股比例处于13.77%～17.73%时,股权集中度的上升对盈余管理存在促进作用。同时,研究发现相比高持股比例激励大股东监管管理层从而减少盈余管理的发生,分散的股权结构对盈余管理的抑制效应更好。     

Voluntary Disclosures When There Is an Option to Delay Disclosure

What incentives drive managers to disclose immediately when they have an option to delay disclosures? I examine this question in a two-period setting in which public news that is positively correlated with firm value arrives periodically. I show that, when the manager's likelihood of receiving information is independent of the public news, an informed manager is more likely to disclose immediately when the public news is good. This happens even as the disclosure threshold itself increases in the public news. My model provides a potential explanation for why managers have a higher propensity to provide earnings forecasts when current earnings are high. I also show that, even when disclosures are credible, the average price reaction to a voluntary disclosure is (i) decreasing in the magnitude of the public news and (ii) lower when the manager is more myopic. These results have potential implications for studies that use stock returns to measure the news contained in management disclosures.     

大股东控制与盈余管理行为研究:来自配股公司的证据

在上市公司配股融资过程中，大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票价格的强烈动机。本文以1998—2002年间456家实施配股的上市公司为样本，基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征，并分析了大股东控制对盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为；（2）配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒u型关系：当第一大股东持股比例低于53．20％时表现出正相关关系，而当第一大股东持股比例高于53．20％时则表现出负相关关系；（3）盈余管理程度与前2—10大股东持股集中度、负债比率和资本支出水平之间具有负相关关系．而与管理层持股比例和公司规模之间具有正相关关系。大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应。造成了上市公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。     

The Effect of External Monitoring on Accrual‐Based and Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Venture‐Backed Initial Public Offerings*

This paper investigates the effect of venture capitalist (VC) quality on earnings management in firms conducting initial public offerings of their equity stock, focusing on manipulation of both accruals and real activities. I develop a measure of VC quality based on a principal components factor analysis using data that are obtainable for virtually all VC firms. This metric is highly correlated with VC funds’ financial returns, and with the likelihood of successful exits through initial public offerings or trade sales. After going public, companies backed by higher quality VCs have lower abnormal accruals, lower earnings management through real activities manipulation, and a lower likelihood of financial restatement. Companies backed by top‐quartile VCs do not appear to engage in real activities manipulation as a substitute for accruals manipulation. Companies backed by lower‐tier VCs exhibit earnings management behaviors which are indistinguishable from those of non‐VC‐backed companies. The results continue to hold when controlling for endogeneity. Overall, the results suggest that higher quality VCs are better able to constrain opportunistic financial reporting by their portfolio companies going public.