Building a leadership brand

How do some firms produce a pipeline of consistently excellent managers? Instead of concentrating merely on strengthening the skills of individuals, these companies focus on building a broad organizational leadership capability. It's what Ulrich and Smallwood--cofounders of the RBL Group, a leadership development consultancy--call a leadership brand. Organizations with leadership brands take an "outside-in" approach to executive development. They begin with a clear statement of what they want to be known for by customers and then link it with a required set of management skills. The Lexus division of Toyota, for instance, translates its tagline--"The pursuit of perfection"--into an expectation that its leaders excel at managing quality processes. The slogan of Bon Secours Health System is "Good help to those in need." It demands that its managers balance business skills with compassion and caring. The outside-in approach helps firms build a reputation for high-quality leaders whom customers trust to deliver on the company's promises. In examining 150 companies with strong leadership capabilities, the authors found that the organizations follow five strategies. First, make sure managers master the basics of leadership--for example, setting strategy and grooming talent. Second, ensure that leaders internalize customers' high expectations. Third, incorporate customer feedback into evaluations of executives. Fourth, invest in programs that help managers hone the right skills, by tapping customers to participate in such programs. Finally, track the success of efforts to build leadership bench strength over the long-term. The result is outstanding management that persists even when individual executives leave. In fact, companies with the strongest leadership brands often become "leader feeders"--firms that regularly graduate leaders who go on to head other companies.     

Building brands without mass media

Costs, market fragmentation, and new media channels that let customers bypass advertisements seem to be in league against the old ways of marketing. Relying on mass media campaigns to build strong brands may be a thing of the past. Several companies in Europe, making a virtue of necessity, have come up with alternative brand-building approaches and are blazing a trail in the post-mass-media age. In England, Nestlé's Buitoni brand grew through programs that taught the English how to cook Italian food. The Body Shop garnered loyalty with its support of environmental and social causes. Cadbury funded a theme park tied to its history in the chocolate business. H?agen-Dazs opened posh ice-cream parlors and got itself featured by name on the menus of fine restaurants. Hugo Boss and Swatch backed athletic or cultural events that became associated with their brands. The various campaigns shared characteristics that could serve as guidelines for any company hoping to build a successful brand: senior managers were closely involved with brand-building efforts; the companies recognized the importance of clarifying their core brand identity; and they made sure that all their efforts to gain visibility were tied to that core identity. Studying the methods of companies outside one's own industry and country can be instructive for managers. Pilot testing and the use of a single and continuous measure of brand equity also help managers get the most out of novel approaches in their ever more competitive world.     

See your brands through your customers' eyes.

Subaru markets an L.L. Bean Outback station wagon. Dell stamps Microsoft and Intel logos on its computers. Such inter-weaving of different companies' brands is now commonplace. But one of the central tools of brand management-portfolio mapping--has not kept pace with changes in the marketplace. Most conventional brand maps include only those brands owned by a company, arranged along organizational lines with little regard for how the brands influence customer perceptions. In this article, the authors present a new mapping tool--the brand portfolio molecule--that reveals the way brands appear to customers. The brand portfolio molecule includes all the brands that factor into a consumer's decision to buy, whether or not the company owns them. The first step in creating a brand portfolio molecule is to determine which brands should or should not be included. The second step is to classify each brand by asking five key questions: 1) How important is this brand to customers' purchase decisions about the brand you're mapping? 2) Is its influence positive or negative? 3) What market position does this brand occupy relative to the other brands in the portfolio? 4) How does this brand connect to the other brands in the portfolio? 5) How much control do you have over this brand? The last step is to map the molecule using a 3-D modeling program or by hand with pen and paper. Individual brands take the form of atoms, and they're clustered in ways that reflect how customers see them. The usefulness of the tool lies in its ability to show the many forces that influence a customer's buying decision--and to provide a powerful new way to think about brand strategy.     

Customer value propositions in business markets

Examples of consumer value propositions that resonate with customers are exceptionally difficult to find. When properly constructed, value propositions force suppliers to focus on what their offerings are really worth. Once companies become disciplined about understanding their customers, they can make smarter choices about where to allocate scarce resources. The authors illuminate the pitfalls of current approaches, then present a systematic method for developing value propositions that are meaningful to target customers and that focus suppliers' efforts on creating superior value. When managers construct a customer value proposition, they often simply list all the benefits their offering might deliver. But the relative simplicity of this all-benefits approach may have a major drawback: benefit assertion. In other words, managers may claim advantages for features their customers don't care about in the least. Other suppliers try to answer the question, Why should our firm purchase your offering instead of your competitor's? But without a detailed understanding of the customer's requirements and preferences, suppliers can end up stressing points of difference that deliver relatively little value to the target customer. The pitfall with this approach is value presumption: assuming that any favorable points of difference must be valuable for the customer. Drawing on the best practices of a handful of suppliers in business markets, the authors advocate a resonating focus approach. Suppliers can provide simple, yet powerfully captivating, consumer value propositions by making their offerings superior on the few elements that matter most to target customers, demonstrating and documenting the value of this superior performance, and communicating it in a way that conveys a sophisticated understanding of the customer's business priorities.     

Should you take your brand to where the action is?

When markets turn hostile, it's no surprise that managers are tempted to extend their brands vertically--that is, to take their brands into a seemingly attractive market above or below their current positions. And for companies chasing growth, the urge to move into booming premium or value segments also can be hard to resist. The draw is indeed strong; and in some instances, a vertical move is not merely justified but actually essential to survival--even for top brands, which have the advantages of economies of scale, brand equity, and retail clout. But beware: leveraging a brand to access upscale or downscale markets is more dangerous than it first appears. Before making a move, then, managers should ascertain whether the rewards will be worth the risks. In general, David Aaker recommends that managers avoid vertical extensions whenever possible. There is an inherent contradiction in the very concept because brand equity is built in large part on image and perceived worth, and a vertical move can easily distort those qualities. Still, certain situations demand vertical extensions, and Aaker examines both the winners and the losers in the game. Managers may find themselves facing a situation that presents both an emerging opportunity and a strategic threat, and alternatives to vertical extensions may have even higher risks and costs. Furthermore, a number of brands have been extended vertically with complete success. If after assessing the risks and rewards you conclude that a vertical extension is on the horizon, proceed with caution. And keep in mind that your challenge will be to leverage and protect the original brand while taking advantage of the new opportunity.     

Manage marketing by the customer equity test

Managers have recently begun to think of good marketing as good conversation, as a process of drawing customers into progressively more satisfying relationships with a company. And just as the art of conversation follows two steps--first striking up a conversation with a likely partner and then maintaining the flow--so the new marketing naturally divides itself into the work of customer acquisition and the work of customer retention. But how can managers determine the optimal balance between spending on acquisition and spending on retention? Robert Blattberg and John Deighton use decision calculus to help managers answer that question. That is, they ask managers to approach the large, complex problem through several smaller, more manageable questions on the same topic. Then they use a formal model to turn those smaller judgments into an answer to the larger question. The ultimate goal, the authors say, is to grow the company's customer equity the sum of all the conversations-to its fullest potential. Recognizing that managers must constantly reassess the spending points determined by the decision-calculus model, the authors also provide a series of guidelines and suggestions to help frame the issues that affect acquisition, retention, and customer equity. When managers strive to grow customer equity rather than a brand's sales or profits, they put a primary indicator of the health of the business at the fore front of their strategic thinking: the quality of customer relationships.     

Kill a brand, keep a customer

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. These audits make the need to prune brands apparent throughout the organization. In the next stage, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need in order to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained. Done right, dropping brands will result in a company poised for new growth from the source where it's likely to be found--its profitable brands.     

Independent financial adviser (IFA)-based brand equity pyramid

This paper aims to evaluate the applicability of the existing brand equity pyramid models in the context of independent financial advisers (IFAs) in the UK financial services sector. Nine in-depth interviews with IFAs and nine in-depth corroboration interviews with senior marketing managers and employees in one of the UK’s largest financial services providers were undertaken for the purpose of the study. The findings indicate that when applied in the context of IFAs, the existing brand equity pyramid models require modification. These findings lead to the development of an IFA-based brand equity pyramid. The new model can provide insight for financial services marketing academics and practitioners on how IFAs perceive and evaluate financial services brands to be recommended to their customers. Our findings will help financial services providers to develop strong brands in the mind of IFAs.

     

M&A needn't be a loser's game

Three out of four acquisitions fail; they destroy wealth for the buyer's shareholders, who end up worse off than they would have been had the deal not been done. But it doesn't have to be that way, argue the authors. In evaluating acquisitions, companies must look beyond the lure of profits the income statement promises and examine the balance sheet, where the company keeps track of capital. It's ignoring the balance sheet that causes so many acquisitions to destroy shareholders' wealth. Unfortunately, most executives focus only on sales and profits going up, never realizing that they've put in motion a plan to destroy their company's true profitability--its return on invested capital. M&A, like other aspects of running a company, works best when seen as a way to create shareholder value through customers. Some deals are sought to help create better value propositions for the business or to better execute current strategies--or to block competitors from doing these things. But most deals are about customers and should start with an analysis of customer profitability. Some customers are deliciously profitable; others are dismal money losers. The better an acquirer understands the profitability of its own customers, the better positioned it will be to perform such analyses on other companies. In this article, the authors show that customer profitability varies far more dramatically than most managers suspect. They also describe how to measure the profitability of customers. By understanding the economics of customer profitability, companies can avoid making deals that hurt their shareholders, they can identify surprising deals that do create wealth, and they can salvage deals that would otherwise be losers.     

The growth crisis--and how to escape it

At a time when companies are poised to seize the growth opportunities of a rebounding economy, many of them, whether they know it or not, face a growth crisis. Even during the boom years of the past decade, only a small fraction of companies enjoyed consistent double-digit revenue growth. And those that did often achieved it through short-term measures--such as mergers and inflated price increases--that don't provide the foundation for growth over the long term. But there is a way out of this predicament. The authors claim that companies can achieve sustained growth by leveraging their "hidden assets," a wide array of underused, intangible capabilities and advantages that most established companies already hold. To date, much of the research on intangible assets has centered on intellectual property and brand recognition. But in this article, the authors uncover a host of other assets that can help spark growth. They identify four major categories of hidden assets: customer relationships, strategic real estate, networks, and information. And they illustrate each with an example of a company that has creatively used its hidden assets to produce new sources of revenue. Executives have spent years learning to create growth using products, facilities, and working capital. But they should really focus on mobilizing their hidden assets to serve their customers' higher-order needs--in other words, create offerings that make customers' lives easier, better, or less expensive. Making that shift in mind-set isn't easy, admit the authors, but companies that do it may not only create meaningful new value for their customers but also produce double-digit revenue and earnings growth for investors.     

Knowing what to sell, when, and to whom

Despite an abundance of data, most companies do a poor job of predicting the behavior of their customers. In fact, the authors' research suggests that even companies that take the greatest trouble over their predictions about whether a particular customer will buy a particular product are correct only around 55% of the time--a result that hardly justifies the costs of having a CRM system in the first place. Businesses usually conclude from studies like this that it's impossible to use the past to predict the future, so they revert to the timeworn marketing practice of inundating their customers with offers. But as the authors explain, the reason for the poor predictions is not any basic limitation of CRM systems or the predictive power of past behavior, but rather of the mathematical methods that companies use to interpret the data. The authors have developed a new way of predicting customer behavior, based on the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel McFadden, that delivers vastly improved results. Indeed, the methodology increases the odds of successfully predicting a specific purchase by a specific customer at a specific time to about 85%, a number that will have a major impact on any company's marketing ROI. What's more, using this methodology, companies can increase revenues while reducing their frequency of customer contact-evidence that overcommunication with customers may actually damage a company's sales.     

Holding fast

CEO Peter Walsh faces a classic innovator's dilemma. His company, Crescordia, produces high-quality metal plates, pins, and screws that orthopedic surgeons use to repair broken bones. In fact, because the company has for decades refused to compromise on quality, there are orthopedic surgeons who use nothing but Crescordia hardware. And now these customers have begun to clamor for the next generation technology: resorbable hardware. Resorbables offer clear advantages over the traditional hardware. Like dissolving sutures, resorbable plates and screws are made of biodegradable polymers. They hold up long enough to support a healing bone, then gradually and harmlessly disintegrate in the patient's body. Surgeons are especially looking forward to using resorbables on children, so kids won't have to undergo a second operation to remove the old hardware after their bones heal, a common procedure in pediatrics. The new products, however, are not yet reliable; they fail about 8% of the time, sometimes disintegrating before the bone completely heals and sometimes not ever fully disintegrating. That's why Crescordia, mindful of its hard-earned reputation, has delayed launching a line using the new technology. But time is running out. A few competitors have begun to sell resorbables despite their imperfections, and these companies are picking up market share. Should Crescordia join the fray and risk tarnishing its brand? Or should the company sit tight until it can offer a perfect product? Commenting on this fictional case study are Robert A. Lutz, vice chairman of product development at General Motors; Clayton M. Christensen, the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; Jason Wittes, a senior equity analyst covering medical supplies and devices at Leerink Swann; and Nick Galakatos, a general partner of MPM Capital.     

The four faces of mass customization

Virtually all executives today recognize the need to provide outstanding service to customers. Focusing on the customer, however, is both an imperative and a potential curse. In their desire to become customer driven, many companies have resorted to inventing new programs and procedures to meet every customer's request. But as customers and their needs grow increasingly diverse, such an approach has become a surefire way to add unnecessary cost and complexity to operations. Companies around the world have embraced mass customization in an attempt to avoid those pitfalls. Readily available information technology and flexible work processes permit them to customize goods or services for individual customers in high volumes at low cost. But many managers have discovered that mass customization itself can produce unnecessary cost and complexity. They are realizing that they did not examine thoroughly enough what kind of customization their customers would value before they plunged ahead. That is understandable. Until now, no framework has existed to help managers determine the type of customization they should pursue. James Gilmore and Joseph Pine provide managers with just such a framework. They have identified four distinct approaches to customization. When designing or redesigning a product, process, or business unit, managers should examine each approach for possible insights into how to serve their customers best. In some cases, a single approach will dominate the design. More often, however, managers will need a mix of some or all of the four approaches to serve their own particular set of customers.     

Smart customers, dumb companies

Customers today are being bombarded with an overwhelming array of choices. To alleviate customer frustration, say Steven Cristol and Peter Sealey in Simplicity Marketing, companies should stop creating new brands and product extensions. Better to consolidate product and service functions by following a four R approach: replace, repackage, reposition, and replenish. That's an outmoded, dictatorial view of markets, says Christopher Locke. Far from being stymied by choices, customers are rapidly becoming smarter than the companies that pretend to serve them. In this networked economy, people are talking among themselves, and that changes everything. Locke predicts we'll see a growing number of well-defined micromarkets--groups of customers converging in real time around entertaining and knowledgeable voices--such as NPR's car guys and the Motley Fool investment site. "Micromedia" Web sites will replace traditional advertising because they'll provide credible user-supplied news about products and services. Locke contends that an open exchange of information solves the "problem" of choice much better than manipulative strategies like simplicity or even permission marketing. Companies can participate in micromarkets through what Locke dubs "gonzo marketing." If Ford, for example, discovers that a subset of its employees are organic gardeners, it may offer support to a big independent organic-gardening Web site with donations and employee volunteers. This marketing effort would be driven not by advertising managers but by people with genuine interest in each micromarket, so it would have credibility with customers. With gonzo marketing, both companies and their markets will benefit.     

Bottom-feeding for blockbuster businesses

Marketing experts tell companies to analyze their customer portfolios and weed out buyer segments that don't generate attractive returns. Loyalty experts stress the need to aim retention programs at "good" customers--profitable ones- and encourage the "bad" ones to buy from competitors. And customer-relationship-management software provides ever more sophisticated ways to identify and eliminate poorly performing customers. On the surface, the movement to banish unprofitable customers seems reasonable. But writing off a customer relationship simply because it is currently unprofitable is at best rash and at worst counterproductive. Executives shouldn't be asking themselves, How can we shun unprofitable customers? They need to ask, How can we make money off the customers that everyone else is shunning? When you look at apparently unattractive segments through this lens, you often see opportunities to serve those segments in ways that fundamentally change customer economics. Consider Paychex, a payroll-processing company that built a nearly billion-dollar business by serving small companies. Established players had ignored these customers on the assumption that small companies couldn't afford the service. When founder Tom Golisano couldn't convince his bosses at Electronic Accounting Systems that they were missing a major opportunity, he started a company that now serves 390,000 U.S. customers, each employing around 14 people. In this article, the authors look closely at bottom-feeders--companies that assessed the needs of supposedly unattractive customers and redesigned their business models to turn a profit by fulfilling those needs. And they offer lessons other executives can use to do the same.     

Creating the living brand

It's easy to conclude from the literature and the lore that top-notch customer service is the province of a few luxury companies and that any retailer outside that rarefied atmosphere is condemned to offer mediocre service at best. But even companies that position themselves for the mass market can provide outstanding customer-employee interactions and profit from them, if they train employees to reflect the brand's core values. The authors studied the convenience store industry in depth and focused on two that have developed a devoted following: QuikTrip (QT) and Wawa. Turnover rates at QT and Wawa are 14% and 22% respectively, much lower than the typical rate in retail. The authors found six principles that both firms embrace to create a strong culture of customer service. Know what you're looking for: A focus on candidates' intrinsic traits allows the companies to hire people who will naturally bring the right qualities to the job. Make the most of talent: In mass-market retail, talent is generally viewed as a commodity, but that outlook becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. Create pride in the brand: Service quality depends directly on employees' attachment to the brand. Build community: Wawa and QT have made concerted efforts to build customer loyalty through a sense of community. Share the business context: Employees need a clear understanding of how their company operates and how it defines success. Satisfy the soul: To win an employee's passionate engagement, a company must meet his or her needs for security, esteem, and justice.     

Countering the biggest risk of all

Corporate treasurers and chief financial officers have become adept at quantifying and managing a wide variety of risks: financial (for example, currency fluctuations), hazard (chemical spills), and operational (computer system failures). To defend themselves, they use tried-and-true tools such as hedging, insurance, and backup systems. Some companies have even adopted the concept of enterprise risk management, integrating available risk management techniques in a comprehensive, organization-wide approach. But most managers have not addressed in a systematic way the greatest threat of all--strategic risks, the array of external events and trends that can devastate a company's growth trajectory and shareholder value. Strategic risks go beyond such familiar challenges as the possible failure of an acquisition or a product launch. A new technology may overtake your product. Gradual shifts in the market may slowly erode one of your brands beyond the point of viability. Or rapidly shifting customer priorities may suddenly change your industry. The key to surviving these strategic risks, the authors say, is knowing how to assess and respond to them. In this article, they lay out a method for identifying and responding to strategic threats. They categorize the risks into seven major classes (industry, technology, brand, competitor, customer, project, and stagnation) and describe a particularly dangerous example within each category. The authors also offer countermeasures to take against these risks and describe how individual companies (American Express, Coach, and Air Liquide, among them) have deployed them to neutralize a threat and, in many cases, capitalize on it. Besides limiting the downside of risk, strategic-risk management forces executives to think more systematically about the future, thus helping them identify opportunities for growth.     

The coming battle for customer information

Companies collect information about customers to target valuable prospects more effectively, tailor their offerings to individual needs, improve customer satisfaction, and identify opportunities for new products or services. But managers' efforts to capture such information may soon be thwarted. The authors believe that consumers are going to take ownership of information about themselves and start demanding value in exchange for it. As a result, negotiating with customers for information will become costly and complex. How will that happen? Consumers are realizing that they get very little in exchange for the information they divulge so freely through their commercial transactions and survey responses. Now new technologies such as smart cards, World Wide Web browsers, and personal financial management software are allowing consumers to view comprehensive profiles of their commercial activities-- and to choose whether or not to release that information to companies. Their decision will hinge, in large part, on what vendors offer them in return for the data. Consumers will be unlikely to bargain with vendors on their own, however. The authors anticipate that companies they call infomediaries will broker information to businesses on consumers' behalf. In essence, infomediaries will be the catalyst for people to start demanding value in exchange for information about themselves. And most other companies will need to rethink how they obtain information and what they do with it if they want to find new customers and serve them better.     

Creating new market space.

Most companies focus on matching and beating their rivals. As a result, their strategies tend to take on similar dimensions. What ensues is head-to-head competition based largely on incremental improvements in cost, quality, or both. The authors have studied how innovative companies break free from the competitive pack by staking out fundamentally new market space--that is, by creating products or services for which there are no direct competitors. This path to value innovation requires a different competitive mind-set and a systematic way of looking for opportunities. Instead of looking within the conventional boundaries that define how an industry competes, managers can look methodically across them. By so doing, they can find unoccupied territory that represents real value innovation. Rather than looking at competitors within their own industry, for example, managers can ask why customers make the trade-off between substitute products or services. Home Depot, for example, looked across the substitutes serving home improvement needs. Intuit looked across the substitutes available to individuals managing their personal finances. In both cases, powerful insights were derived from looking at familiar data from a new perspective. Similar insights can be gleaned by looking across strategic groups within an industry; across buyer groups; across complementary product and service offerings; across the functional-emotional orientation of an industry; and even across time. To help readers explore new market space systematically, the authors developed a tool, the value curve, that can be used to represent visually a range of value propositions.