Tax reform in a two-class growth model

This paper analyzes the welfare and distributional effects of tax reforms in a two-class model with exogenous labour supply. It extends the empirically calibrated, standard life-cycle model to include both pure life-cycle savers and households with an altruistic bequest motive. The tax reform simulations cover the move from an income to a wage and a consumption tax, respectively. The role of borrowing constraints is studied and a dynamic analysis of tax reforms using a static expectation approach is performed. The simulation results indicate that the two tax reforms have different impacts on the welfare of the two classes: while the pure life-cycle savers are better off with the consumption tax, the altruistically motivated households gain more under a wage tax. The results further show that while the introduction of a consumption tax is distributionally neutral, the move to a wage tax substantially increases income and wealth inequality.     

Corruption and the public display of wealth

We study an agent–client model of corruption, in which potential corruptors are uncertain about the probability with which officials are subjected to an audit, either high or low. We characterize a signaling equilibrium, in which officials who are less likely to be audited engage in public conspicuous consumption, whereas those who are more likely to be audited do not. In this equilibrium, officials are better off than in the equilibria without conspicuous consumption. The signaling equilibrium exists if the officials' bargaining power vis‐à‐vis potential corruptors is sufficiently high, which implies that corruption can be curbed by creating competition among officials.     

WHO BENEFITS FROM PRICING REGULATIONS WHEN ECONOMIC SPACE MATTERS?

Reinterpreting Hwang‐Mai (AER, 1990) by both simplifying and generalizing their analysis in terms of two key demand parameters representing income and market size, we probe the welfare effects of spatial price discrimination to determine how robust the previous welfare findings in the literature are. Endogenous location matters when a monopolist chooses asymmetric location under different pricing schemes. If he/she remained at the same location, outcomes of fixed and endogenous location models must be analytically the same. Endogenous and different location changes outcomes radically. When non‐discriminatory pricing regulations benefit the poor, different transportation burdens mean that the rich become poor, even worse off than the ex‐poor, and the society becomes worse off accordingly.     

THE SIZE OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS AND THE STANCE OF MONETARY POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

Implementing fiscal programs during monetary policy expansions seems to improve significantly their economic stimulus. We find this result by estimating the effect of government consumption shocks on gross domestic product (GDP) using a panel of 23 developing economies. Our goal is to better understand the reasons for the low fiscal multipliers found in the literature by performing estimations for alternative exchange rate regimes, business‐cycle phases, and monetary policy stances. In addition, we perform counterfactual simulations to analyze the possible gains from fiscal‐monetary policy coordination. Our results also show lower multipliers in developing economies with flexible regimes, especially during economic slowdowns. (JEL E62, E63, F32)     

Greenfield FDI and skill upgrading: A polarized issue

Outbound FDI is often accused of increasing income inequality in developed countries by shifting labour demand from low‐skilled towards high‐skilled workers (wage polarization). In response, we employ data on greenfield FDI that, in contrast to M&As, may be more clearly linked to skill upgrading. Our data also delineate greenfield FDI by sector, function and destination, allowing us to control for different motives and skill intensities for 17 developed countries for 2003–2005. We find that greenfield FDI in support services, e.g., back and front office services, induces polarized skill upgrading, benefitting high‐skilled workers at the expense of medium‐skilled workers, thereby polarizing wages.     

Income or Consumption: Which Better Predicts Subjective Well‐Being?

The positive relationship between income and subjective well‐being has been well documented. However, work assessing the relationship of alternative material well‐being metrics to subjective well‐being (SWB) is limited. Consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, we find that a consumption‐based measure out‐performs (surveyed) income in predicting subjective well‐being. When objective measures of consumption are combined with self‐assessments of a household’s standard of living, income becomes insignificant altogether. We obtain our result utilizing household‐level data from Statistics New Zealand’s New Zealand General Social Survey which contains measures of income, SWB and a measure of material well‐being called the Economic Living Standard Index that combines measures of consumption flows and self‐assessments of material well‐being.     

The Layoff Rat Race*

We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. Greater skill investments, especially in specific human capital, contribute more to a firm's bottom line, so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last. We show that as long as workers' bargaining positions are not too weak, workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities. Indeed, workers over‐invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only receive a share of any investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms, the probability that a firm will downsize, and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.     

Viewpoint: Further results on measuring the well‐being of the poor using income and consumption

Abstract We evaluate the relative merits of income‐ and consumption‐based measures of well‐being. Our results provide evidence that consumption better captures well‐being for those with few resources. The bottom deciles of expenditures exceed those of income, suggesting under‐reporting of income. The under‐reporting rate for government transfers is high and rising. Overall non‐response is more severe in U.S. income data than in expenditure data. Furthermore, a consumption data set requires fewer observations than an income data set to obtain the same level of precision for typical estimates. Finally, very low consumption is more strongly related to other bad outcomes than very low income.     

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives

This experimental article helps to understand the motives behind cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. It manipulates the pay-off in case both players defect in a two-player, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of four motives: efficiency, conditional cooperation, fear and greed. All motives are significant but some become only significant if one controls for all remaining ones. This seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner’s dilemma with personality have not been successful.     

Methods of privatization and economic growth in transition economies1

We examine how different methods of privatization might have affected growth in transition economies. Using several econometric specifications, including fixed effects and GMM, we estimate a cross‐country panel growth model for 1990–2003. We find only voucher privatization to have been significantly associated with faster growth. Moreover, neither private sector development per se nor capital market development exercised a significant influence. We speculate that voucher privatization may have been effective because of the speed with which links between firms and the state were severed.     

Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets,simple mechanisms may help!

This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level.     

HOW DO MINIMUM WAGE ADJUSTMENTS AFFECT WAGES IN CHINA: EVIDENCE BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONAL INCOME TAX DATA

By using unique administrative personal income tax data covering the population of a middle‐sized Chinese city from 2009 to 2013, we explore how minimum wage adjustments affect wages of low‐wage workers. The empirical evidence documented in this paper suggests a unique pattern of minimum wage regulation: while it permits wages to stay below the prevailing minimum wage threshold temporarily, it does encourage a higher growth rate for wages below the threshold. Overall, such a pattern might help lessen any downward pressures on employment, while ensuring that low‐wage earners gradually get better off over time. (JEL J3, J6, P5)     

Switching bubbles: From Outside to Inside Bubbles

The United States has recently experienced two asset price bubbles: the Dot-Com and the Housing Bubbles. These bubbles had very different effects on investment and debt of manufacturing firms. In this paper I develop a framework to understand the differential effect of two types of rational bubbles. I distinguish between (i) Outside Bubbles, which I define as savers purchasing and selling costless assets not-attached to inputs of production and (ii) Inside Bubbles, which I define as savers buying an input of production (e.g., land or houses) only as a store of value. The model is an OLG economy with savers and entrepreneurs. Savers save to consume when they are old. Entrepreneurs can borrow to invest but they face a collateral constraint. In this environment, rational bubbles can emerge. I show that the size of an Inside Bubble is larger. I also find that when the economy switches from an Outside to an Inside Bubble, manufacturing (or non-housing) investment and debt is lower, consistent with the U.S. experience. Finally, I show that even though steady-state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble, a social planner would prefer an Inside Bubble when the productivity of entrepreneurs is low.     

Cost‐Based Anti‐dumping as a Repeated Game

In this paper, we consider anti‐dumping (AD) duties as a tool to facilitate collusion between a domestic and a foreign firm in an infinitely repeated differentiated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observable and each firm receives a privately observed i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We consider second‐best scenarios, where market‐share or production arrangement with sidepayments is not allowed. We show that there exist equilibrium‐path reciprocal ADs. The collusive (trigger) price is distorted downward compared with complete information benchmark as a trade‐off between diminishing the incentive to deviate and ensuring off‐schedule deviation gains when private cost shocks are highly favourable. The model differs from Green and Porter ( 1984 ) and Rotemberg and Saloner ( 1986 ) in that it is the private cost shocks as opposed to public demand shocks that necessitate modifications of collusion. In conclusion, AD policy may encourage collusion, and therefore, unless the source of market imperfection is carefully examined, laissez faire might be a better choice.     

Conditions for Sustainable Optimal Economic Development

This paper shows that, for dynamic optimizing economies with different types of natural resource, environmental, and human‐made capital stocks, a necessary and sufficient condition for permanently sustaining an optimal utility/consumption level is the stationarity of the current‐value Hamiltonian. For economies whose development is not exogenously and directly affected by time (i.e., time‐autonomous economies), this stationarity condition generalizes Dixit et al.’s (1980 ) “zero‐net‐aggregate‐investment” rule of sustain‐ability, which in turn generalizes Solow‐Hartwick’s sustainability rule. For non‐autonomous economies, the stationarity condition is not generally fulfilled, and the current‐value Hamiltonian under (over) estimates the true welfare level by an amount equal to the discounted value of the net “pure time effect.” For the non‐autonomous case of a time‐dependent utility discount rate, a general condition on the discount rate function (of which the hyperbolic discount rate function is a special case) upholds the results obtained for autonomous cases. The paper concludes with a discussion of policies that promote both optimality and sustainability objectives.     

Fiscal Policy in Real Time*

In this paper, I estimate the ex ante or intentional cyclical stance of fiscal policy in OECD countries. I use the fiscal plans reported at the time of budgeting, together with other information available to fiscal policy‐makers in real time. Indeed, fiscal plans might be significantly different from ex post outcomes because governments do not have complete control over their implementation, which is influenced by several exogenous factors. When fiscal‐policy rules are estimated using real‐time data, I show in this paper that OECD countries have often planned a counter‐cyclical fiscal stance, especially during economic expansions. This contrasts with conventional findings based on actual data, which tend to point towards a‐cyclicality or pro‐cyclicality. Forecast errors for the government structural balance and the output gap play a central role in explaining the differences between estimates based on ex ante and ex post data.     

RIGHT ON TARGET: EXPLORING THE FACTORS LEADING TO INFLATION TARGETING ADOPTION

This paper examines which economic, fiscal, external, financial, and institutional characteristics of countries affect the likelihood that they adopt inflation targeting (IT) as their monetary policy strategy. We estimate a panel binary response model for 60 countries and two subsamples consisting of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and non‐OECD countries over the period 1985–2008. The findings suggest that past macroeconomic performance of a country, its fiscal discipline, exchange rate arrangements, as well as the structure and development of its financial system have a significant impact on the likelihood to adopt IT. However, the factors leading to IT adoption differ significantly between OECD and non‐OECD countries. (JEL E42, E52)     

TAXING SWEETS: SWEETENER INPUT TAX OR FINAL CONSUMPTION TAX?

Policymakers are considering various policies to reduce obesity and its associated costs, including consumption taxes on high‐calorie foods and specifically sweetened foods. We investigate two tax policies to reduce added sweetener consumption: a consumption tax on sweetened goods and a sweetener input tax. Both tax instruments can reach the same policy target of reducing added sweetener consumption and are found to be regressive. The tax on sweetener inputs targets sweeteners directly and leads to a loss in consumer surplus that is only one‐fifth of that caused by the final consumption tax. Previous analyses have overlooked this important point. (JEL I18, Q18)     

PRODUCTS LIABILITY WHEN CONSUMERS VARY IN THEIR SUSCEPTIBILITY TO HARM AND MAY MISPERCEIVE RISK

This article examines products liability when consumers have private information about their susceptibilities to product‐related harm. In this case, it is efficient for consumers to self‐select their purchases, with those especially prone to harm refraining from purchase. Achieving this outcome requires consumers to bear their own harm, given that producers cannot observe consumer types. When consumers also misperceive risk, the problem becomes more complicated because accurate signaling of risk requires that firms bear liability. A trade‐off therefore emerges between imposing liability on firms versus consumers. This article characterizes the choice among liability rules in the presence of this trade‐off. (JEL K13, L15)