Macroeconomic Policy Making,Exchange Rate Adjustment and Current Account Imbalances in Emerging Markets

Given a series of crisis events after 2007 the discussion about the adjustment channels of current account imbalances has been revived. We examine the role of exchange rates vs macroeconomic policies as determinants of current accounts for a set of 86 mainly emerging market economies between 1990 and 2013 to identify adjustment channels for global imbalances. We find that nominal exchange rates are not the main determinant of current account positions. Instead, depending on the region, monetary and/or fiscal policies are identified as the main driving force of current accounts. For East Asia and the oil exporting countries sterilization policies, i.e. relatively tight monetary policies, are the main determinants. In contrast for many European periphery countries fiscal policy stances are at the core of current account positions. Only for the Latin American countries does the exchange rate play a significant role as determinant of current account positions.     

On the Empirical Evidence of the Intertemporal Current Account Model for the Euro Area Countries

A simple intertemporal current account model is found to explain successfully the current account configuration in the euro area before the Great Recession. The analysis suggests that consumption smoothing, prompted by expectations of economic convergence and the removal of exchange rate risk, has been an important driving force for the build‐up of current account divergence in the euro area since the creation of monetary union. The model also predicts that current account deficits and surpluses would narrow under a post‐crisis scenario of moderate catching‐up and more segmented bond markets.     

The Euroland crisis and Germany’s euro trilemma

This paper investigates the causes behind the Euroland crisis, particularly Germany’s role in it. It is argued that the crisis is not primarily a ‘sovereign debt crisis’, but rather a (twin) banking and balance of payments crisis. Intra-area competitiveness and current account imbalances, and the corresponding debt flows that such imbalances give rise to, are at the heart of the matter, and they ultimately go back to competitive wage restraint on Germany’s part since the late 1990s. Germany broke the golden rule of a monetary union: commitment to a common inflation rate. As a result, the country faces a trilemma of its own making and must make a critical choice, since it cannot have it all – perpetual export surpluses, a no transfer/no bailout monetary union, and a ‘clean,’ independent central bank. Misdiagnosis and the wrongly prescribed medication of austerity have made the situation worse by adding a growth crisis to the potpourri of internal stresses that threaten the euro’s survival. The crisis in Euroland poses a global ‘too big to fail’ threat, and presents a moral hazard of perhaps unprecedented scale to the global community.     

Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Reassessing the Role of International Finance

Global current account imbalances have recently been singled out by many as a key factor contributing to the global financial crisis. Current account surpluses in several emerging market economies are said to have put significant downward pressure on world interest rates, thereby fueling a credit boom and risk taking in major advanced economies with current account deficits (the “excess saving” view). We argue that this perspective on global imbalances bears reconsideration. We highlight two conceptual problems: (i) explaining market interest rates through the saving-investment framework; and (ii) drawing inferences about a country's cross-border financing activity based on observations of net capital flows. We trace the shortcomings of this perspective to a failure to consider the distinguishing characteristics of a monetary (credit) economy. We conjecture that the main macroeconomic cause of the financial crisis was not “excess saving” but the “excess elasticity” of the international monetary and financial system.     

Trade imbalances within the euro area and with respect to the rest of the world

Many studies have explored the determinants of current account balances in Europe. However, only in a few studies has trade balance been decomposed into intra balance, trade balance vis-à-vis the euro area, and extra balance, trade balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This decomposition is necessary for us to understand why some core euro area countries are acting as financial intermediaries for the periphery countries. Furthermore, the determinants of intra and extra balances might be different because nominal exchange rate cannot adjust between the EMU countries while their financial markets are highly integrated. Thus, we apply this decomposition and supplement the previous studies by including a larger set of theoretically plausible explanatory variables, which is derived from the current account literature. Our contribution is twofold: We observe that, contrary to Schmitz and von Hagen (2011), the introduction of a common currency has not increased the elasticity of net capital flows to per capita incomes within the euro area for the member countries. On the other hand, there is a great heterogeneity among the usual determinants of trade balances whether those contribute to intra balances or extra balances. These results increase our understanding of the imbalances in the euro area.     

Manufacturing and the Trade Balance

When the world shifted to the regime of flexible exchange rates after 1970, economists expected that large trade imbalances would soon disappear. Instead, such imbalances not only persisted but soared in the 1980s and 1990s, in spite of significant changes in important currencies such as the yen, the mark and the dollar. This paper reports that manufacturing importers tend to suffer trade deficits whereas exporters of manufacturing products tend to enjoy trade surpluses. The reason lies in the higher rates of productivity growth experienced by exporters of manufactures.     

THE USA AS THE 'DEMANDER OF LAST RESORT' AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA'S CURRENT ACCOUNT

Abstract.  The present paper evaluates the current account patterns of 69 countries during 1981–2006. We identify an asymmetric effect of the USA as the 'demander of last resort': a 1% increase in the lagged US imports/GDP is associated with a 0.3% increase in current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but results in insignificant changes in the current accounts of countries running deficits. The impact of US demand variables is larger on the current accounts of developing countries than that of OECD countries. We also contemplate China's current account over the next 6 years, and project a large drop in its current account/GDP surpluses.     

CHINA'S EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE EARLIER JAPANESE EXPERIENCE

Abstract.  For creditor countries such as China on the periphery of the dollar standard with current account surpluses, foreign mercantile pressure to appreciate their currencies and become more flexible is misplaced. Just the expectation of variable exchange appreciation seriously disrupts the natural tendency for wage growth to balance productivity growth and thus worsens the (incipient) deflation that China now faces. It could create a zero-interest liquidity trap in financial markets that leaves the central bank helpless to combat future deflation arising out of actual currency appreciation, as with the earlier experience of Japan.     

Behavioural equilibrium exchange rate and total misalignment: evidence from the euro exchange rate

In the present paper we attempt to investigate whether the nominal exchange rate of the euro against the currencies of the four major trading partners of the eurozone, namely China, Japan, the UK and the USA, converges or not to its equilibrium level. Applying recent unit root and system cointegration techniques in the presence of structural shifts in the data, our results indicate that there exist an equilibrium relationship between each of the euro/yuan, euro/yen, euro/UK pound and euro/US dollar nominal exchange rates and the fundamentals defined by the monetary model. Following these results, our modified Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate model suggests that at the end of the estimated period, the euro/Chinese yuan and the euro/UK pound nominal exchange rates follow an equilibrium process. Our empirical results also imply that the single European currency is considered as overvalued against the US dollar, while it is considered as undervalued against the Japanese currency.     

美元本位与中美货币政策的福利分配——基于新开放经济宏观经济学视角

本文从以中国为代表的外围国家出发,采用新开放经济宏观经济学动态一般均衡的方法,分析了美元本位在中美货币政策福利分配中的影响。结果表明,当外围国家采用扩张性的货币政策时,美元本位导致了汇率传递的不完全,美国作为美元本位的核心国始终能够获得正的福利增量,而外围国家的福利是否增加,受到美元本位程度、消费替代弹性和国家规模等因素的影响。其中,美元本位程度和消费替代弹性主要影响两国福利分配的总量,而国家规模的大小将直接影响两国福利分配的比例。总的来说,中国可以通过推动人民币国际化、提高出口厂商的议价能力以及加强中美国际货币政策合作来减少美元本位带来的福利损失。     

Bi‐currency versus Single‐currency Targeting: Lessons from the Russian Experience

This paper examines how the 2005 shift in Russian exchange rate policy from US dollar (USD) single‐currency to USD–EUR (euro) bi‐currency targeting has impacted domestic interest rates. The finding show that this policy shift has disconnected Russian interest rates from US dollar‐denominated interest rates, while instead linking them to a synthetic interest rate composed of USD and EUR rates at the same proportion as that of these two currencies in the currency basket against which the ruble's exchange rate is set. The Russian experience shows that while the adoption of bi‐currency targeting may help ensure that domestic interest rates are less dependent on the monetary cycle of a single country, these rates are instead likely to reflect financial developments in all countries whose currencies are included in the currency basket. This insight is likely to be relevant for other countries that pursue basket‐targeting policies.     

Hot Money Flows,Cycles in Primary Commodity Prices,and Financial Control in Developing Countries

Because the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is at the center of the world dollar standard, it has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except during international crises, the Fed focuses on domestic American economic indicators and generally ignores collateral damage from its monetary policies on the rest of the world. Currently, ultra-low interest rates on short-term dollar assets ignite waves of hot money into Emerging Markets (EM) with convertible currencies. When each EM central bank intervenes to prevent its individual currency from appreciating, collectively they lose monetary control, inflate, and cause an upsurge in primary commodity prices internationally. These bubbles burst when some accident at the center, such as a banking crisis, causes a return of the hot money to the United States (and to other industrial countries) as commercial banks stop lending to foreign exchange speculators. World prices of primary products then collapse. African countries with exchange controls and less convertible currencies are not so attractive to currency speculators. Thus, they are less vulnerable than EM to the ebb and flow of hot money. However, African countries are more vulnerable to cycles in primary commodity prices because food is a greater proportion of their consumption, and—being less industrialized—they are more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices of their commodity exports. Supply-side shocks, such as a crop failure anywhere in the world, can affect the price of an individual commodity. But joint fluctuations in the prices of all primary products—minerals, energy, cereals, and so on—reflect monetary conditions in the world economy as determined by the ebb and flow of hot money from the United States, and increasingly from other industrial countries with near-zero interest rates.     

Exchange rate policy during transition to the European Monetary Union: The option of euroization

Countries of central eastern Europe which are candidates for accession to the European Union face fundamental challenges in the conduct of macroeconomic policies. These countries are characterized by growth rates faster than those of EU countries, along with large current account deficits and an equilibrium appreciation of the real exchange rate. In such a context, an early adoption of the euro may be beneficial to central eastern European countries, while the ERM‐II system and the Maastricht criterion on inflation may give rise to serious drawbacks for candidate countries. JEL classification: F15, F41     

Current Account Imbalances and Real Exchange Rates in the Euro Area*

Global current account imbalances have been one of the focal points of interest for policymakers during the last few years. Less attention has been paid, however, to the diverging current account balances of the individual euro area countries. In this paper we consider the dynamics of current account adjustment and the role of real exchange rates in current account determination in the EMU countries. After controlling for the effects of income growth, we find the relationship between real exchange rates and current accounts to be substantial in size and subject to nonlinear effects. We find that real exchange rates can offer further insights, beyond the effects of the income catch‐up process, relevant to current account determination in the EMU.     

TOWARD A REGIONAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IN EAST ASIA

Abstract.  Deepening market-driven economic integration in East Asia makes intraregional exchange rate across the region increasingly desirable and necessary. The paper suggests that East Asia's emerging economies begin to choose a currency basket as a monetary policy anchor to enable all East Asian currencies to collectively appreciate vis-à-vis the US dollar, while maintaining intraregional rate stability, in the event of surges of capital inflows or a rapid unwinding of global payments imbalances. Following this initial step, East Asia may agree on more rigid intraregional exchange rate stabilization schemes through, for example, an Asian Snake or an Asian Exchange Rate Mechanism.     

Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy

This paper looks at the relation between exchange rates and monetary policy. It focuses in particular on the role of the exchange rate of the euro in the context of the ECB's monetary policy strategy. The objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The euro area is a large and relatively closed economy. Therefore, the exchange rate of the euro is not an intermediate target nor is it an objective. Nevertheless, the ECB's stability–oriented monetary policy strategy does not neglect the exchange rate of the euro. Clearly, exchange rate developments are taken into account both when looking at the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and when assessing the current economic situation and prospects for the euro area.     

Solving the Currency Conundrum

This paper reviews the prospects for the exchange rate system in different parts of the world. It discounts radical changes like a single world currency and a trio of regional monetary unions: in Europe, where intergration is political as well as economic and financial, the euro should provide the basis for an expanding zone of monetary stability; in the Americas, in contrast, dollarization is likely to be the solution for countries with strong financial links to the USA that find it difficult to run an autonomous monetary policy; and in Asia, continued floating is the only plausible outcome, given the obstacles to the alternatives.
(J.E.L.: F3)     

Unconventional monetary policy and capital flows

This paper examines the connection between the stance of domestic monetary policy and international capital flows. It first provides a simple theoretical framework describing the mechanisms behind the cross-border spillovers of domestic monetary policy. Then, it empirically investigates the impact of U.S. unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), implemented in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, on U.S. capital flows to developing economies and non-UMP advanced economies. The results suggest that the use of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve has been associated with increased net portfolio flows to developing countries and, to a lesser extent, non-UMP advanced economies. An exit from these UMPs is likely to cause capital flow reversals in U.S. capital-importing countries. Countries with greater exchange rate flexibility, stronger fiscal and current account positions, and higher capital mobility are likely to fare well following an exit from UMPs in the U.S.     

Tobin Tax and Volatility: A Threshold Quantile Autoregressive Regression Framework

From an original data set on the euro–dollar and on the won–dollar currency pairs (2008–2010), we conduct a threshold quantile autoregressive model to explain the role of a Tobin tax (TT) on the exchange rate volatility, taking into account two types of nonlinearity (regimes and quantiles). We find evidence that the impact of a TT would not be monotonic. A TT may be a good instrument to stabilize foreign exchange volatility only in normal times and/or in efficient markets. In contrast, a TT could be counterproductive in turbulent periods by increasing the volatility. In addition, by comparing a major currency pair (euro/dollar) and a minor currency pair (won/dollar), it appears that the potential stabilizing effect of a TT would be more clear‐cut in the low volatility regime of a major currency pair, similar to the euro/dollar. Our results do not corroborate the previous studies that derived a monotonic and positive impact of a TT on volatility.     

Euro depreciation and trade asymmetries between Germany and Italy versus the US: industry-level estimates

Since April 2014 to March 2015, the European Central Bank expansionary monetary policy instigates a huge depreciation of the euro in terms of dollar. According to the mainstream monetary theory, these dynamics should make the exports cheaper and at the same time make the imports more expensive. Has real depreciation of the euro helped in the improvement of European countries’ trade balances? Following the main methodologies in the recent literature, our study analyses the effects of this depreciation both for Italy and Germany towards the US. We use industry-level data at monthly frequency. The results are different from each bilateral relationship. We find that 11 industries register a long-run improvement (8 for Italy and 3 for Germany). The J-curve effect is proven just in six cases, always for Italy. The inverted J-curve effect is proven in eight cases, four for Germany, and four for Italy. These results seem to be an indirect demonstration of the structural asymmetries between German and Italian economies: German economic system is more able to be competitive with a strong currency, than Italy.