Toward an Archival Measure of the Likelihood of Auditor–Client Management Negotiation: An Exploration of the Audit Lag Measures Conjecture*

Salterio (2012) hypothesized that adaptations of an audit efficiency measure, audit report lag (the length of time between the financial statement year‐end date and the auditor's report date), could provide measures of underlying auditor–client management (ACM) negotiation likelihood. Salterio argued that these measures would enable archival researchers to examine issues that heretofore were the exclusive domain of experimental and field researchers. Using an audit report lag measure and a measure of abnormal audit report lag lags (the residual based on audit report lag determinants model), we show that a larger lag is associated with higher audit fees after controlling for other known determinants of audit fees. We also show that larger lags are associated with higher levels of discretionary accruals—that is, lower accrual quality. Based on our findings, we suggest that there is support for Salterio's hypothesis that audit report lags and abnormal audit report provide valid archival proxies for the differences in year‐end ACM negotiation likelihood. We suggest that this proxy will allow researchers to study issues related to published accounting numbers in light of whether negotiations are likely to have occurred in addition to providing regulators and others the means to determine what clients of audit firms are more likely to have different types of ACM relationships.     

Audit committee diligence around initial audit engagement

Studies focusing on governance mechanisms argue that auditor monitoring is one of several governance mechanisms that exist in the firm, and these mechanisms supplement each other. Extending this argument, I examine whether firms support auditor monitoring with audit committee monitoring when auditor oversight is deemed to be weak. Prior auditing literature argues that audit quality is affected by auditors' lack of familiarity with their clients' activities. Since lack of auditor–client familiarity exists in the first year of auditor–client tenure, I examine whether firms increase their audit committee monitoring during the year of auditor change. For a sample of firms that changed auditors between 2006 and 2012, the findings show that audit committees meet more frequently in the first year of audit engagement. Further tests show that firms' past reporting behavior play a significant role in the demand for more audit committee meetings and the increase in the audit committee meetings in the initial year of auditor engagement positively affects reporting quality.     

The impact of auditor rotation on auditor–client negotiation

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory audit firm rotation affects auditor–client negotiations. Drawing upon process theories of negotiation, we examine the strategies used by auditors and clients as well as the outcomes of their negotiations in alternative settings in which mandatory rotation is imposed or is not imposed. We posit that mandatory rotation changes (1) the dynamics of the audit market by increasing the number of clients who are in the market for a new auditor, and (2) the political costs to a client who switches auditors. These changes, in turn, alter the willingness of the auditor and the client to cooperate during negotiation. The results suggest that with mandatory rotation auditors adopt less cooperative negotiation strategies, producing asset values that are more in line with the auditor’s preferences than with the client’s preferences and more negotiation impasses.     

Auditor–client management relationships and roles in negotiating financial reporting

We carry out an interview based field study of chief financial officer (CFO)–audit partner dyads to examine the assumption that the roles played by each side and the nature of the relationships are similar across negotiations. These dyads freely discussed with us their relationship, a specific issue negotiated and it’s resolution process. Employing the lens of social positioning negotiation research, we find these negotiations are ‘fluid’, with continual redefinition not only of the substantive issues under negotiation, but also of the negotiation roles and relationships (i.e. ‘shadow’ negotiations). The CFO’s actions and expectations in these ‘shadow’ negotiations appear to define the auditor’s role and the relationship’s parameters, but both can evolve over time. The audit partners express a desire to be in the “ideal” relationship where they assume the role of the ‘expert advisor’ (as opposed to a ‘police officer’) but they seemingly have no explicit strategy to move the relationship toward a ‘proactive’ (rather than ‘reactive’) state. Furthermore, the audit partner is always the ‘relationship manager’ whose job it is to see that client management remains “happy”. These roles and relationships negotiated in the ‘shadows’ also affect how the negotiation process unfolds, including the set of alternative accounting treatments considered during negotiations. Finally, audit firms appear to manage the assignment of partners to engagements based on CFO preferences and remove those partners who are in “poor” relationships, irrespective of why the relationship is considered by the CFO to be “poor”. Implications for the broader research program on auditor–client management negotiations are discussed.     

Non‐audit Services and Auditor Independence Depending on Client Performance

We posit that the effect of non‐audit fees on auditor independence in Korea is based on audit client performance. Further, we suggest that an audit client with low performance has an incentive to purchase non‐audit services (NAS) from an incumbent auditor to facilitate earnings management and steer accounting practices in a preferred direction. We find evidence that as non‐audit fees in Korea increase, auditor independence is reduced only for low‐performing audit clients. Thus, unconditional prohibition of NAS seems unnecessary. Regulators and policymakers should examine the motivation for purchasing NAS, particularly among audit clients with poor performance.     

事务所战略、行业特征与客户选择

本文试图通过客户选择行为来研究事务所专门化经营战略及其实施的具体策略,以期为事务所从内涵发展方面实现做大做强提供有益的途径。研究发现,事务所的专门化经营战略促使客户偏好于集中选择事务所,而行业内的客户出于竞争驱动偏好于选择不同于竞争对手的事务所,从而促使其分散选择;说明专门化经营战略是有效的竞争战略,且更容易在竞争程度较低的行业内得到发展。这一结论将为我国事务所经营竞争战略和未来发展方向提供经验证据。     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.     

The relative effectiveness of persuasion tactics in auditor–client negotiations

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of four persuasive arguments that auditors may use to convince clients to accept their desired position in auditor–client negotiations. In addition, we investigate how the style in which the argument is communicated by the auditor impacts its effectiveness. Our results indicate that the type of persuasion tactic used by auditors significantly impacts the amount of concessions made by clients. Specifically, we find that, while threatening to qualify the audit opinion can result in significant client concessions, a tactic of simply informing the client that other companies have handled the accounting issue in a way consistent with the auditor’s preference is as effective, or more effective, than all of the other tactics examined at eliciting significant concessions as well as engendering positive affect toward the auditor. This result is consistent with findings from the persuasion literature relating to the pervasive power of social validation. We also find that clients offer more concessions, evaluate the auditor more positively, and are more satisfied with the negotiation outcome when auditors communicate their arguments using a cooperative, as opposed to a contentious, communication style. The results of this study indicate that auditors may benefit from training in persuasion tactics in order to achieve more desirable negotiation outcomes.     

The Impact of Consulting Services on Audit Quality: An Experimental Approach

We use experimental markets to examine whether providing consulting services to a non‐audit client impacts audit quality. Our paper directly addresses concerns raised by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that the largest public accounting firms’ growth in their consulting practices threatens audit quality. We conduct an experiment proposed using a registration‐based editorial process. We compare a baseline where the auditor does not provide consulting services to conditions where auditors provide consulting to audit clients or where auditors only provide consulting services to non‐audit clients. Our unique design provides evidence on whether providing consulting to non‐audit clients strengthens the salience of a client‐cooperative social norm that reduces audit quality. We do not find differences in audit quality by condition in our planned analysis, however we find greater variation in audit quality in the conditions where auditors provide consulting services compared to the baseline. In unplanned analyses, our results suggest providing consulting services increases auditor cooperation with managers, increasing audit quality when managers prefer high audit quality and decreasing audit quality when managers prefer low audit quality.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Understanding the Restatement Process

Much research examines investors' reactions to restatements and the effects of restatements on chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and auditor turnover; however, little research explores the process of restating financial reports. In this study, we investigate the process of issuing a restatement. We specifically focus on the interactions among the parties involved (e.g., CFO, board, audit committee, audit partner, and regulators) in determining and ultimately resolving a restatement, as well as the impact of the restatement on the relationships among these parties. We investigate the restatement process via semi‐structured interviews. We immersed ourselves in the restatement process by interviewing all parties typically involved, such as CFOs, auditors, and regulators. Given the findings in the auditor–client management negotiation area, which suggest that negotiation of accounting treatment and disclosure is frequent, our findings indicate that negotiations and/or difficult discussions take place among the parties involved when determining whether a restatement is necessary as well as in achieving the ultimate restatement outcome. Our findings (based on a small sample) suggest that the restatement process may influence or be influenced by such factors as the nature of the misstatement, the party that identified the misstatement, the reaction of the various parties to the misstatement, disagreement among the parties on whether to restate, communication with the regulator, the press release, client size, the personality of the CFO, audit committee strength, and the relationships among the parties subsequent to the restatement.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.     

On the effort-saving effect of audit committee–auditor interlocking

Using unique data on audit hours from China, this paper investigates the effort-saving effect of the audit committee–auditor interlocking (AClk). We find that AClk is negatively associated with audit effort without any deterioration in audit quality. The results suggest that AClk has an effort-saving effect through information sharing between interlocked audit committee members and auditors. However, auditors retain the effort-saving benefits of AClk without sharing them with their client firms. Further analysis shows that the effort-saving effect of AClk is more pronounced for client firms whose auditors have industry expertise, for client firms that share the same individual auditor, or for client firms that share audit committee members with financial expertise.     

Do investment in and the sourcing arrangement of the internal audit function affect audit delay?

This paper investigates the association between the internal audit function attributes and audit delay using a sample of 432 publicly traded firms in Malaysia in 2009. In this unique setting, we capitalize on the publicly available data concerning the investment in and the sourcing arrangement of internal audit function. We find a negative relationship between the costs incurred for the internal audit function and audit delay. However, we do not find any significant association between the internal audit function sourcing arrangements and audit delay. Additionally, we find that greater audit committee independence and longer auditor–client tenure shorten audit delay, and more frequent audit committee meetings and higher misstatements in the preliminary unaudited earnings are associated with a longer audit delay.     

Does auditor tenure affect accounting conservatism? Further evidence

Accounting regulators are concerned about the potential threat of long-term auditor–client relationships on auditor independence, leading to lower audit quality. Jenkins and Velury (2008, hereafter JV) document a positive association between the conservatism in reported earnings and the length of the auditor–client relationship. A primary objective of this study is to extend JV by providing evidence that the relationship between conservatism and auditor tenure is not unique for all firms. In particular, this study finds that the positive association only exists for large firms or firms strongly monitored by their auditors, while for smaller firms or firms weakly monitored by their auditors, I observe a significantly negative association between auditor tenure and conservatism.     

Effects of Multiple Clients on the Reliability of Audit Reports

This paper demonstrates the existence of two different kinds of externalities induced by an auditor servicing multiple clients at the same time. First, we show that the capital market price for a client can increase in the number of qualified reports that his auditor issues to his other clients, thus producing a stock price externality. Second, when the audit firm has limited wealth, an additional client can actually decrease the audit quality and increase the average likelihood of audit failure relative to a single‐client setting because of reporting externalities. Our analysis also demonstrates how requiring a more effective audit oversight mechanism can actually produce unintended consequences such as an increased likelihood of audit failures.     

Non-audit fees, long-term auditor–client relationships and earnings management

We examine whether auditor independence is affected by the amount spent on non‐audit services. Faster growth in non‐audit fees and longer time periods over which non‐audit services are purchased might reduce the auditor's independence from that client. Our results do not provide any support for a relationship between non‐audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non‐audit fee relationship with the client and discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. We do find some evidence that the interaction of the non‐audit fee time‐period measures and client importance is positive and significantly related to discretionary accruals.     

AUDIT PRICING, AUDITOR CHANGES, AND THE WINNER'S CURSE

This paper presents a two-period model of the audit market. In the first period, all auditors have symmetric information and adopt identical bidding strategies. In the process of performing the audit, the incumbent auditor learns the actual costs, thereby becoming informationally advantaged in the second period. In the model presented, unlike earlier ones found in the literature, audit costs include both a component common to all potential auditors and a private component that varies across auditors. The common component of auditor costs gives rise to a ‘winner's curse’ scenario. A winner's curse is said to exist because a non-incumbent bidder who does not take into account the superior information of the incumbent would be expected to generate a loss from winning the audit engagement. The adjustment of bids by sophisticated auditors to compensate for the winner's curse is shown to play a significant role in determining the degree of low-balling (first-period price cuts) and auditor turnover. In the model, low-balling is not associated with loss of audit quality. Additionally, it is shown that it is in the interest of the client to structure audit selection in a manner that gives rise to low-balling.     

Strategic Auditing: An Incomplete Information Model

This paper presents a stylized model of the strategy game between the auditor and the client. The client is assumed to have either good or bad inherent risk in her reporting system. She chooses a reporting effort level to maintain the accounting records and data management depending on her type of inherent risk. The auditor chooses a high or low level of audit procedures. A high level of auditing procedures will reveal the client's type and effort from which the auditor can decide either to qualify the financial statements or to issue a clean report. The client and the auditor are assumed to move simultaneously. Pure strategy equilibria are derived for all the undominated strategies between the auditor and the client in the region of the model that is more similar to the Fellingham and Newman (1985) model. Unlike their model in which a high auditing level is never a pure strategy in equilibrium, we obtain pure strategy equilibria for high auditing levels.     

Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors: Implications for Financial Reporting

Although the financial statements of an organization are considered a product of management, prior research suggests that a company's financial statements may be affected by the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor when resolving audit differences with management. However, little subsequent research discusses the potential strategies that auditors may employ during the negotiation process. Our study extends the literature by investigating, in a post–Sarbanes‐Oxley environment, whether auditors will employ a reciprocity‐based strategy for the resolution of audit differences and what client characteristics (client management's negotiating style and client retention risk) increase the extent to which it is utilized. Further, we explore the potential effect of a reciprocity‐based strategy on the quality of the financial statements. Such a strategy involves bringing inconsequential items to management and subsequently waiving these items in an effort to encourage management to be more cooperative in the posting of significant income‐decreasing adjustments. The results of experiment 1 indicate that client management's negotiating style and retention risk have an interactive effect on auditors' use of a reciprocity‐based strategy. Specifically, auditors are more likely to utilize a reciprocity‐based strategy when management's negotiating style is competitive and client retention risk is high. Experiment 2 findings suggest that the auditor's use of reciprocity during negotiation can actually result in more conservative financial statements by helping the auditor manage perceived client pressures to waive or reduce proposed adjustments.