Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

Aumann (1995) showed that for games with perfect information common knowledge of substantive rationality implies backward induction. Substantive rationality is defined in epistemic terms, that is, in terms of knowledge. We show that when substantive rationality is defined in doxastic terms, that is, in terms of belief, then common belief of substantive rationality implies backward induction. Aumann (1998) showed that material rationality implies backward induction in the centipede game. This result does not hold when rationality is defined doxastically. However, if beliefs are interpersonally consistent then common belief of material rationality in the centipede game implies common belief of backward induction.     

Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games

We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players’ capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We show in particular that those beliefs need not be ratifiable, and therefore that rational players can form action-dependent beliefs.     

Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality.     

Extensive and strategic forms: Games and models for games

This paper aims to make precise, in the context of epistemic models for games, some relations between the normal or strategic form representation of a game and the extensive or dynamic form representation. It is argued, first, that epistemic models defined for strategic form representations provide all the materials necessary for defining models for corresponding extensive form representations of the game, models that provide information about the way the game is played that is sufficient to evaluate the rationality of the choices that the players make, and are disposed to make, in the course of playing the dynamic game. Second, two definitions of rationality are compared — one for strategy choices in the normal form representation, and one for the individual choices that the player is disposed to make in the course of playing the dynamic game. It is shown that they are essentially equivalent in games with perfect recall. The main focus is on the intuitive foundational assumptions about rationality and dynamic choice that are needed to motivate the definitions. It is argued that to evaluate the rationality of a player's choices in a dynamic context, it is essential to distinguish passive knowledge (knowledge about nature and about the prior beliefs and strategy choices of other players that is based on observation and inference) fromactive knowledge (knowledge about one's own choices and future choices that is grounded in one's decisions).     

On the convergence of reinforcement learning

This paper examines the convergence of payoffs and strategies in Erev and Roth's model of reinforcement learning. When all players use this rule it eliminates iteratively dominated strategies and in two-person constant-sum games average payoffs converge to the value of the game. Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or if they are mixed and the game is 2×2. The long-run behaviour of the learning rule is governed by equations related to Maynard Smith's version of the replicator dynamic. Properties of the learning rule against general opponents are also studied.     

Self-admissible sets

Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes “rationality and common assumption of rationality.” We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest—Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.     

Group membership,team preferences,and expectations

Group membership is a powerful determinant of social behaviour in a variety of experimental games. Its effect may be channelled primarily via the beliefs of group members, or directly change their social preferences. We report an experiment with a prisoner's dilemma with multiple actions, in which we manipulate players’ beliefs and show that group identity has a consistent positive effect on cooperation only when there is common knowledge of group affiliation. We also test the robustness of the minimal group effect using three different manipulations: one manipulation fails to induce group identity, and we observe an unsystematic effect of group membership when knowledge of affiliation is asymmetric.     

Exploitable actions of believers in the “law of small numbers” in repeated constant-sum games

In repeated fixed-pair constant-sum games with unique equilibria in mixed strategies, such as matching pennies, the subgame perfect equilibrium is repeating the stage-game mixed-strategy equilibrium action. In such games rational players avoid strategies that are exploitable, in that current actions either deviate systematically from the equilibrium action probabilities or fail to be serially independent of past actions. I revisit classic experiments and find that subjects’ actions are sometimes exploitable because they are serially dependent. Subjects have difficulty in producing serially independent actions and in recognizing serially dependent sequences due to a bias called local representativeness.     

Universal type structures with unawareness

Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the playerʼs awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning can continue indefinitely. This paper constructs the universal type structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness.     

Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning

We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

In complex situations, agents use simplified representations to learn how their environment may react. I assume that agents bundle nodes at which other agents must move into analogy classes, and agents only try to learn the average behavior in every class. Specifically, I propose a new solution concept for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly represent the average behavior in every class. The solution concept is shown to differ from existing concepts, and it is applied to a variety of games, in particular the centipede game, and ultimatum/bargaining games. The approach explains in a new way why players may Pass for a large number of periods in the centipede game, and why the responder need not be stuck to his reservation value in ultimatum games. Some possible avenues for endogenizing the analogy grouping are also suggested.     

Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies

In this paper, we introduce a notion of epistemic equivalence between hierarchies of conditional beliefs and hierarchies of lexicographic beliefs, thus extending the standard equivalence results of Halpern (2010) and Brandenburger et al. (2007) to an interactive setting, and we show that there is a Borel surjective function, mapping each conditional belief hierarchy to its epistemically equivalent lexicographic belief hierarchy. Then, using our equivalence result we construct a terminal type space model for lexicographic belief hierarchies. Finally, we show that whenever we restrict attention to full-support beliefs, epistemic equivalence between a lexicographic belief hierarchy and a conditional belief hierarchy implies that an arbitrary Borel event is commonly assumed under the lexicographic belief hierarchy if and only if it is commonly strongly believed under the conditional belief hierarchy. This is the first result in the literature directly linking common assumption in rationality (Brandenburger et al., 2008) with common strong belief in rationality (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002).     

Iterated strict dominance in general games

We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS^*) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS^* is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS^* by means of a “stability” criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS^*. We show by an example that IESDS^* may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS^* preserves the set of Nash equilibria.     

Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality

For dynamic games we consider the idea that a player, at every stage of the game, will always believe that his opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the concept of common belief in future rationality, which we formalize within an epistemic model. We present an iterative procedure, backward dominance, that proceeds by eliminating strategies from the game, based on strict dominance arguments. We show that the backward dominance procedure selects precisely those strategies that can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality if we would not impose (common belief in) Bayesian updating.     

Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games

We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3×3 normal form games with unique equilibrium in pure strategies played by non-economists. In contrast to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, a majority of actions taken coincided with the equilibrium prediction (70.2%) and were best-responses to subjects' stated beliefs (67.2%). In constant-sum games, 78% of actions taken were predicted by the equilibrium model, outperforming simple K-level reasoning models. We discuss how non-trivial game characteristics related to risk aversion, efficiency concerns and social preferences may affect the predictive value of different models in simple normal form games.     

How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified probabilities concerning their environment. In our framework, any equilibrium set of rules must be simple enough so that the actions of all players are common belief with probability 1 at every state. Common belief with probability close to 1 will not do.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.     

What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?

Summary. This paper introduces the concept of firm belief, which is proposed as a new epistemic model for a wide class of preferences. In particular, firm beliefs are shown to have the following desirable properties: (i) they are derived from preferences according to a plausible rule of epistemic inference; (ii) they satisfy standard logical properties; and (iii) tractable representations of firm belief are available for all (suitably continuous) biseparable preferences [13, 14], including the Choquet expected utility [30] and maxmin expected utility [16] classes. We also use firm belief to construct a generalization of Nash equilibrium for (two-player) normal form games. Received: December 14, 1999; revised version: February 26, 2001     

RULE RATIONALITY

We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).     

Understanding Douglass North in game-theoretic language

By using game-theoretic language, this paper attempts to interpret the North's recent framework for institutional studies. Particularly relying on a foundational study of knowledge and culture in epistemic game theory, it clarifies three subtly different meanings of the beliefs used by North – behavioral, cultural, and elites’ subjective – in the evolutions of institutions. It also suggests the ways to respond to the North's call for interdisciplinary approach by applying analytical tools of strategic complementarities and linked games.