Trade Policy in Lobbying Equilibrium: With Non‐Traded and Traded Final Goods and Intermediate Inputs

The paper derives trade policies endogenously for final consumption and intermediate input industries in the presence of a non‐traded sector. Contrary to what the existing literature suggests, results show that there is no definite relation between lobbying status and the direction of trade policy of an industry. Trade protection of an industry depends on how its consumption (horizontal) and production (vertical) linkages with other industries reinforce or cancel out its lobbying efforts. To cite a few results, (i) an organized industry may face trade tax, whereas an unorganized one may obtain protection; (ii) an organized downstream industry may not be able to impose trade tax to an unorganized upstream industry, (iii) an organized upstream industry may not hurt unorganized downstream industry, (iv) lobby for non‐traded industry alone can influence trade policies, and (v) lobby for traded industry affects the size of the non‐traded sector in the economy.     

Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.     

Concentration history and market power in US manufacturing industries

For a 1963–1992 panel of US manufacturing industries, the relationship between seller concentration and both price-cost margins (PCMs) and prices is investigated for industries divided by whether concentration has recently increased or decreased. Regressions of PCM in levels and first differences, and price equations in first differences, establish that the positive effect of concentration on prices and profits is always weaker in industries where concentration has recently increased and always stronger in industries where concentration has recently decreased. These results are attributed to the different endogeneity biases in the two samples. Increasing concentration industries are more likely the ones where leading firms have lowered prices to gain share, while decreasing concentration industries are more likely the ones where smaller firms have lowered concentration by lowering prices. An additional conclusion is that the cost-reducing effects of changes in concentration are greater for increasing concentration industries, meaning that increasing concentration industries have lower price increases compared to decreasing concentration industries.     

Semi‐Parametric Examination of Industry Risk: The Australian Evidence

This paper examines the time variation form of the systematic risk measurement, beta, in Australian industry sectors. By using a semi‐parametric approach, the systematic risk measurement, beta, is defined as a combination of one stable parametric component and one varying non‐parametric component. Two categories of industries were identified. The Energy, Material, Mining, Industrial and Property Trust industries had a generally increasing beta for most of the sample period, while the Consumer Discretionary, Financials Excluding Property Trust, IT and Telecommunications had a decreasing beta for the same period. The betas of the Health and Utility industries are more stable than others. The variation of industry risk is linked with the market conditions, as well as the change of interest rates.     

Evaluation of the green technology innovation efficiency of China's manufacturing industries: DEA window analysis with ideal window width

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) window analysis with ideal window width is applied to evaluate the green technology innovation efficiency of 28 manufacturing industries in China during 2006–2014. The obtained results are compared with those calculated using the traditional DEA model, and convergence analysis of the efficiency is conducted. Five years is the obtained ideal window width and DEA window analysis with ideal window produces results closer to reality for China's manufacturing industry. The overall efficiency of the green technology innovation in the manufacturing sector is low following a wave-shaped curve – first decreasing, then increasing and decreasing again, with large inter-industrial differences. There are 8 high-, 14 medium- and 6 low-efficiency industries. A convergence trend in the green technology innovation efficiency within the 28 manufacturing industries exists, implying a catch-up effect between them.     

加拿大应对金融危机促进科技发展的新举措

为应对经济危机,2009年加拿大政府推出经济行动计划,把投资科技创新作为主要手段之一,增加51亿加元投资科技,增加1亿加元支持中小企业实现技术商业化和雇用新毕业大学生,投资20亿加元支持大学加强科研基础设施,增加12．5亿加元投资创新基金,扩大研究生奖学金计划,增加资助硕士生和博士生继续学业。加大对汽车和航空航天业的研发投入支持,加强环保与清洁能源,卫生与生命科学,信息通信等领域的科技优势,实现了增加就业。改善科研条件,吸引人才,取得加快经济复苏和促进科技发展的良好效果。     

Protection for sale or surge protection?

This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman “protection for sale” model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.     

LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Tariff bindings and administered protection are two characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are little understood. Tariff bindings place a ceiling on tariffs that is not always reached, whereas administered protection provides all industries with some minimum import protection, effectively creating a floor for protection. How do these policies affect applied most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates that are enacted through the legislature? I model tariffs determined by a dynamic legislative process and show that low applied MFN tariffs are less likely with tariff bindings and more likely with administered protection than under purely legislated protection.     

Passthrough of Exchange Rate and Tariffs into Import Prices of India: Currency Depreciation versus Import Liberalization*

This paper examines the extent of passthrough of exchange rate and tariff changes into import prices using sectoral panel data (at the two‐digit SITC level) for the post‐reform period in India (1990–2001). After having controlled for unobserved effects that might have an impact on the import prices by using sector dummies, we find that on average exchange rate passthrough (ERPT) is a dominant effect compared to tariff rate passthrough (TRPT) in explaining changes in India's import prices. The sectoral panel results suggest that the passthrough of exchange rates and tariff rates varies across products. ERPT into import prices is significant in 12 industries, whereas TRPT is significant only in six industries, with full passthrough. However, ERPT is incomplete only in four industries, but TRPT is incomplete in 36 industries, which means that firms exporting to India more frequently adopt strategies to maintain their market share against tariffs than against exchange rate changes. The sectoral differences in passthrough seem to be related to the sector's share in total imports and the sector's effective protection rate. Hence, India's relatively high levels of protection have an impact on the behavior of foreign exporters.     

The Economic Consequences of Mr Trump

The Trump administration has embarked upon two large economic policy initiatives at a time of full employment: increasing the budget deficit by cutting personal and corporate tax rates; and increasing protection, especially against countries with which the United States has bilateral trade deficits. These initiatives are meant to reduce trade deficits and increase employment and incomes in the US manufacturing sector. Economic analysis tells us that the result will be larger trade deficits, and weaker total tradeables, including manufacturing employment. There may or may not be a net gain for employment and incomes in those industries which have been the greatest beneficiaries of protection. Trump's protection policies will damage incomes in the United States and the rest of the world; the damage will be greater if other countries retaliate or emulate. Alternative policies that compensate losers from free trade would give better results.     

产业集聚对技术创新的非线性影响

从行业异质性的视角入手,将中国制造业的28个细分行业分为4类——劳动密集型、资本密集型、技术密集型和资源密集型,在控制了研发费用投入、外商直接投资、制度因素和行业规模等后,采用非线性门限模型考察了不同类型制造业行业的产业集聚对本产业技术创新的影响。研究表明:产业集聚对产业技术创新的影响并非单调递增(递减),该影响在不同行业、不同集聚区存在明显的差异性,即随着产业集聚度的不断提高,产业集聚对技术创新产生先正后负的影响。政府在制定产业政策时,切忌走入盲目集聚或降低集聚度的误区,应针对不同行业的要素特征和发展阶段,采取差异化的集聚政策。     

行业收入差距的形成机理实证研究——以浙江省为例

本文在对行业收入差距形成机理进行理论诠释的基础上，应用计量经济学中的Panel Data方法，以浙江省为例，对行业收入差距的形成机理进行了实证检验。模型结果显示，从对行业收入差距的影响效果上来说，行业问产业层次水平差异的影响最大，其次是垄断水平差异，人力资本水平差异的影响相对较小，而行业劳动水平差异则没有通过显著性检验。基于该实证结果，可以从严格限制垄断行业的不合理高收入和缩小行业人力资本水平差异这两方面着手以缓解行业收入差距，而由于产业结构升级所导致的行业收入差距则会在相当一段时期内继续维持或扩大。     

中国上市公司资本结构趋势研究

分行业分析了中国A股上市公司1990~2009年资本结构的变化。结果表明:中国A股上市公司资产负债率的行业均值呈递增趋势;不同行业上市公司的资产负债率具有显著差异,资产负债率高(45%~70%)的行业为建筑业、房地产业、批发和零售贸易业、制造业,资产负债率低(22%~45%)的行业为采掘业、交通运输仓储业、社会服务业;新上市公司的资产负债率水平较高,以后年度相对降低,这说明上市公司具有较强的股权融资偏好。最后分析了这一现象产生的原因并提出建议。     

Simple measures of endogenous free-riding in protectionist lobbies

Even though there is a well-known empirical and theoretical link between lobby and the free-rider problem, the existing literature only attributes its findings to the free-rider rather than the measurement of its extent. We develop broader theoretical micro-foundations for measuring free-riding and investigate the determinants of tariff rates from the perspective of corporate lobbying and free-riding. Our estimation result shows that the degree of free-riding not only varies across industries but is particularly high in larger industries indicating the underutilization of lobbying. The tariff rates under monopoly are about 8 times higher than under perfect competition in most industries suggesting that stakeholders should maintain higher industry protection levels through lobbying.     

Evidence and explanation for the Tariff-lobbying paradox: endogenous Tariffs fall as protectionist lobbying rises

Recent empirical evidence suggests that U.S. protectionist lobbying expenditures rose while U.S. trade barrier fell. We find that the same result holds in our panel data sample from 28 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find two economic drivers cause the paradox between increasing protectionist lobbying and decreasing trade barrier. First, trade barriers decline as country capital-labour ratio endowments rise because of the rising political and economic power of capital that lobbies for free-trade. Second, factor intensities in production become more similar as factor-intensity convergence. This flattens the production possibility curve between exportable and import-competing production so that changes increased magnification in both factor rewards. In our panel, the magnification parameters are twice as high for capital as for labour (8.6 vs. 5.1). And, the elasticity of the capital return with respect to country capital-labour factor endowment ratios (.59) is nearly twice those of labour (.22). Increased magnification causes thus labour’s increased lobbying for protection to be more than offset by increased capital lobbying against protection. In short, while an increasing labour lobbies for protection as countries advance, combined tariff and non-tariff protection (OTRI) decline significantly as advanced countries get richer. This explains the tariff-protectionist-lobbying paradox.     

Technological Progress with Segmented Labor Markets

It is argued here that with segmented labor markets, all types of technological progress in the fixed wage organized sector always hurts the unorganized or informal workers. However, such technical progress in the informal sector always helps the informal workers. This result is independent of the factor intensity ranking between the sectors.     

Changes in job security and their causes: An empirical analysis for France, 1982-2002

In this paper, we analyze the changes in the risks of involuntary job loss in France between 1982 and 2002. We find that these risks are higher in the 1990s than they were in the 1980s. We develop an econometric analysis to separate the effects of institutional changes from the effects of new technologies. Our estimates show that the rise in job loss rates is significantly more pronounced in industries that have the largest share of R&D workers and the largest rate of new technologies’ users. These findings suggest that technological changes contribute to decreasing the incentive to keep workers for long period of time and to increasing job insecurity.     

环境保护税对经济和碳排放影响研究——以江苏省为例

环境保护税的征收,有效减少了污染物排放,同时也会对经济和碳排放产生一定影响。通过构建包含环境保护税模块的CGE模型和江苏省2018年环境社会核算矩阵,模拟分析不同环境保护税税率对江苏省经济发展和碳排放的影响。研究发现:(1)征收环境保护税会给江苏省经济带来负面影响,但影响程度较小,当征收税率上升时,江苏省GDP、出口、省际调出等会下降,而居民和地方政府收入几乎没有变化。(2)环境保护税税率上升时,不仅会增加环境保护税收入,还会减少江苏省碳排放水平。(3)对于大多数行业,环境保护税税率上升会造成行业产出下降,但是对于污染物排放强度较低的行业,行业产出会上升,碳排放会增加。(4)为了更好地完成碳减排目标,建议江苏省可以适度增加环境保护税税率或加征碳税,对于污染物排放浓度较低的行业,可以采取补贴措施鼓励发展;对于污染物排放强度较高的行业,要推动转型升级,降低排放强度。     

An investigation into the effects of ethnicity and immigration on self-employment

This paper examines self-employment across industries and states in the U.S. It attempts to determine whether self-employment is due more to pull or push factors and whether one or the other model fits some industries better or fits some states better. The 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples from the U.S. Census Bureau are used in the empirical analysis. It is found that self-employment rates differ considerably across ethnic groups, and that the rate of self-employment tends to be higher for immigrants. This paper also finds that increasing urbanization tends to reduce self-employment rates while the shift from manufacturing to service industries tends to increase self-employment rates.     

Lobbying under political uncertainty

This paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game; it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge. We characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies; we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence. We also offer some results for the general case, including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient.