Economic Benefits of Renting Software

In this article, we analyze the economics of a monopoly firm selling and renting a packaged software product by employing an intertemporal monopoly pricing game to model the firm's pricing strategy. The game models the software product as two versions; the first version is available in the first period and the second, a revised version, is available in the second period. The second version benefits from consumer reports of bugs and requests for additional features. This is modeled using delayed network externalities that take effect only in the second period. We observe that the introduction of the rental product in the first period leads to an increase in profits. We also find that the firm's profits are monotonically increasing with the intensity of the network effect. As the intensity of the network effect becomes stronger, the firm chooses to reduce its prices in the first period to expand the size of its network and later increases prices in the second period. Because many of the customers who choose to rent in the first period subsequently make a purchase in the second period, the firm is able to capture the benefits of network externalities in the first period without reducing sales in the second period. For high levels of network intensity, consumer surplus and social welfare are also higher.     

Monopoly Pricing of Social Goods

We analyse the roles of network connectivity and topology on the monopoly pricing of network goods which enable social interaction between consumers. Connectivity between network members induces the well-known network externalities effect, while the topological effect is caused by the incompleteness of the social network’s linkage, and it has not been previously recognised in this context. We find that the topological effect counteracts, and dominates, the connectivity effect by reducing the monopoly’s capacity to extract consumer surplus. Our results are seen to hold in real cases of social network businesses. The monopolist benefits from price discrimination based on consumers’ social connections, but this has a social cost as consumer surplus loss is higher than the increase in profits, with the highly connected consumers being the primary losers. Therefore, privacy policies restricting excessive social profiling and tracking can have an antitrust role too. Our approach also extends the theory of multi-sided markets in relation to the underlying relations graph of different market sides.     

Fee or free? How much to add on for an add-on

Sellers often provide complimentary “no extra charge” add-ons (e.g., free Internet connection) to consumers who buy their primary products (e.g., a hotel stay), but recently add-ons that used to be free are offered for a fee. The conventional wisdom is that unadvertised add-ons for high fees help competitors increase profits that are competed away by advertising low prices for the basic products. This theory cannot explain why complimentary add-ons are still offered by some sellers. We show that providing complimentary add-ons can be profitable for sellers with monopoly power under certain demand conditions. If these demand conditions are not met, it is optimal to charge a supplementary fee for the add-on. We also show how pricing policy can be designed to selectively target or deter different consumer segments from purchasing the add-on to boost sellers’ profits, providing a strategic role for selling add-ons at either below-cost or at exorbitantly high prices. Yet such behavior may have repercussions for economic welfare when it results in socially inefficient giveaways when consumers would be better served with a lower price on the basic product without the add-on or, with the other extreme, when it results in excessively high prices for an add-on that restricts sales and leads to its under-provision from a societal perspective. The paper also provides managerial insights on the design and use of add-ons.     

Seller honesty and product line pricing

We study upselling in markets where the seller observes consumer need but the consumer herself may not (e.g., medical care, durable repairs, financial and legal services). The seller may recommend excessive product features to uninformed consumers. In a monopoly with two types of consumer (one with a basic need and the other an advanced need) and two types of service (a basic service which fulfills only the basic need and an advanced service which fulfills both needs), we investigate the firm’s honesty and product-line pricing. We reach several results. First, the firm is honest if the basic service is superior (in that it generates higher per-capita social surplus than the advanced service under the efficient allocation) or if the consumers with the basic need are sufficiently many. Second, when there exist informed consumers who neglect seller recommendation, the presence of informed consumers may cause consumer welfare to decrease, and a larger informed population may cause firm profits and social welfare to increase or decrease. Lastly, when the informed consumers boycott a dishonest firm and withhold purchase, firm profits may increase because the threat of boycotting makes the firm more credible and allows a higher price of the advanced service.     

Which manufacturing industries and sectors are most vulnerable to Brexit?

When the UK leaves the EU, trade arrangements between the UK and EU will change. Most of the options for future UK‐EU relationships currently under discussion imply increased trade barriers, which will reduce trade and also have effects on output and prices. In this paper, we use a multi‐market partial equilibrium model to analyse the vulnerability of 122 manufacturing industries to Brexit. In all five Brexit scenarios we model, there is an overall reduction in UK manufacturing output. Output grows in some industries but at the expense of higher consumer and intermediate goods prices. High tech and medium–high tech sectors are more at risk of a decline in domestic production than lower tech sectors. In most areas of the country, demand for high‐skilled workers falls more than for medium and low‐skilled workers.     

Digital distribution and the prohibition of resale markets for information goods

An existing theoretical literature finds that frictionless resale markets cannot reduce profits of monopolist producers of perfectly durable goods. This paper starts by presenting logical arguments suggesting this finding does not hold for goods consumers tire of with use, implying the impact of resale is an empirical question. The empirical impact is then estimated in the market for video games, one of many markets in which producers may soon legally prevent resale by distributing their products digitally as downloads or streamed rentals. Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, demand parameters are estimated using a dynamic discrete choice model in a market with allowed resale, using data on new sales and used trade-ins. Then, using these parameter estimates, prices, profits, and consumer welfare are simulated under counterfactual environments. When resale is allowed, firms are unable to prevent their goods from selling for low prices in later periods. The ability to do so by restricting resale outright yields significant profit increases. Renting, however, does not raise profits as much due to a revenue extraction problem.     

Optimal retail sales strategies for old and new products in monopoly and horizontal competition scenarios

Advances in technology have made product updates more frequent and allowed consumers to choose different versions of the same product based on their preferences. It is crucial for retailers to understand how to formulate optimal sales strategies based on those different consumer preferences. To this end, we develop game models that consider the heterogeneity of consumer preferences under both monopoly and horizontal competition scenarios and perform the sensitivity analysis to examine the impact of consumer proportions and consumer preferences on retailers’ sales strategies. The results show that (i) regardless of competition or monopoly status, the original retailer can always maximize profit by setting prices based on the market share of traditional consumers, as long as the retailer sells both new and old versions of the product; (ii) the greater the competitive advantage of the competitor, the more advantageous the hybrid sales mode; (iii) if the price of the old product is below a certain threshold, there will be a positive profit for the original retailer when selling both the old and new products; and (iv) when consumer acceptance of competing retailers is lower, entering the retail market is not a good choice for competing retailers.     

The Network Industry,Monopoly Regulation,and Social Optimum

This paper examines pricing policy, quality levels, consumer surplus and social welfare for the monopoly and non‐monopoly case. It is shown that given certain realistic assumptions, the network industry under unregulated monopoly would yield more social welfare than in the case of several producers in the industry, and would therefore be socially preferred.     

Advertising and Price

The relationship of advertising and price is contentious. In this paper it is shown that advertising can increase demand elasticity, permit the attainment of scale economies, and encourage more efficient methods of distribution. By reference to empirical studies it is further demonstrated that advertising can increase competition and consumer awareness and hence decrease prices and monopoly profits.     

Price competition during and after promotions

We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Balancing Profitability and Customer Welfare in a Supermarket Chain

We investigate the impact of price discrimination by a large Chicago supermarket chain. First we measure the impact of the chain's current zone-pricing policy on shelf prices, variable profits and consumer welfare across its stores. Using the chain's database to simulate a finer store-specific micro-pricing policy, we study the implications of this policy on profits and welfare. We show how a store-pricing policy that is constrained to offer consumers at least as much surplus as a uniform chain wide pricing policy still enables the retailer to generate substantial incremental profits.To ensure our pricing problem exhibits a well-defined optimum, we use the parsimonious, mixed-logit demand function that allows for flexible substitution patterns across brands and also retains a link to consumer theory. We discuss the issue of price endogeneity when estimating the demand parameters with weekly store-level data. Standard instrumental variables techniques used to account for such endogeneity also seem to increase the magnitudes of own-price elasticities thereby offsetting the problem encountered by previous researchers of predicted prices from a demand model exceeding those in the actual data.     

Value-based pricing in competitive situations with the help of multi-product price response maps

This article introduces multi-product price response maps for various value pricing applications in competitive situations. The maps are based on the direct elicitation of individual willingness to pay (WTP) as a range for competing products; they reveal an individual's or market's choice probability for a focal product, at its own and competing products' prices. Transforming the price response into profit, revenue, or unit sold maps supports optimal pricing decisions. The maps are also useful for optimizing profit differences from the closest competitor and for portfolio pricing. Managers can use a consumer indecisiveness map, gained from the WTP range data, to devise complementary marketing measures at prices where consumer uncertainty is high. The illustration of this approach uses two empirical examples, featuring two or more competing consumer goods, and demonstrates the predictive and external validity of these proposed maps.     

A comparison of online recommendation methods: Simultaneous versus sequential approaches

This study investigates the relative profitability of online recommendations (sequential or simultaneous) of durable goods used by various firms, such as Walmart and Amazon. To achieve this, we develop a utility model (specified in terms of product attributes) that captures the complementarity between the recommended products. To recover customers’ utility for simultaneous or sequential purchases of durable goods, we conduct incentive-aligned conjoint experiments in which participants select a combination of fully or partially complementary products. The results reveal that the product attribute associations are more noticeable for fully complementary product categories. In addition, customers tend to balance comparable attributes when buying durable goods sequentially over time, while they reinforce comparable attributes when buying simultaneously. The profit analysis based on the estimates shows that the recommendations for simultaneous purchases can yield higher profits for fully complementary product categories than for sequential recommendation purchases. However, the recommendations for sequential purchases generate higher earnings for partially complementary product categories than for simultaneous recommendation purchases. A simulation study reveals that the profits differ considerably by combinations of product attributes because customers evaluate complementarity among attributes differently between the two recommendations.     

WELL‐BEHAVED PRODUCTION ECONOMIES

We show that production economies are tâtonnement stable if consumers satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. To ensure that producer supply decisions are well defined, we restrict prices in the tâtonnement so that positive profits cannot occur but do allow supply decisions to be multi‐valued. The model therefore permits linear activities and hence the technologies that admit capital theory paradoxes. The result thus shows that if the consumer side of the economy is well behaved then capital theory paradoxes are irrelevant for stability. Other features of the Walrasian general‐equilibrium model that have aroused suspicion (e.g. that a price below its equilibrium value may have negative excess demand and thus temporarily move even lower in a tâtonnement) may be a sign of trouble but also have nothing to do with capital theory paradoxes. We show that these phenomena arise even when there is no choice of technique and there is an aggregate production function.     

OBSERVABLE MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION

In this paper we investigate the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives within a circular city model with observable agency contracts. With respect to the case of unobservability studied by Raith (2003 ), we find that optimal managerial contracts provide lower incentives, and that equilibrium expected prices and profits are higher. Changes in competition fundamentals have ambiguous effects, but observable contracts alleviate their impact on incentives. Finally, observability involves three major implications: managerial incentives are higher under price regulation than under competition; prices may increase with the number of firms; consumer welfare may diminish when competition increases.     

To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Firms’ Choices under Pure Bundling

We examine the economic implications of pure bundling under the settings of monopoly and duopoly. We show that under monopoly and pure bundling of goods with independent demands, the bundled price is strictly less than the sum of the unbundled prices. In the setting of duopoly and Nash prices, we examine whether bundling can be used as a tool to deter entry. In contrast to the findings of previous studies, we show that with low entry costs, entry is deterred by unbundled as opposed to bundled sales. With high entry costs, however, the incumbent chooses to bundle.     

Distribution Channel Management in an Internet Age: Equilibrium and Social Welfare

This paper considers the conditions under which a monopoly manufacturer selling through independent retailers in a spatial market will add an Internet distribution channel (an e-channel), and analyzes the effect this would have on consumer surplus and social welfare. We find that an e-channel will be added only if consumer??s travel costs are high and the e-retailer??s delivery costs are low. Such double-channel operation will decrease consumer surplus if in the pre-entry case the market is fully covered by brick-and-mortar retailers. If instead the market is partially covered and delivery costs are sufficiently high, it will not decrease any consumer??s surplus. When delivery costs are low, social welfare will be improved by profitable double-channel operation even if consumer surplus is harmed by it. Finally, double-channel operation could be Pareto superior even if delivery costs are high.     

Product Strategy and Antitrust: A Consumer Choice Perspective

Traditionally antitrust law is strongly tied to price theory economics so that prices, costs, profits, and profit sacrifice are typically examined in antitrust cases. This paper proposes broadening traditional antitrust analysis to also explicitly examine the likely effect of allegedly anticompetitive conduct on product options and consumer choice. In order to accomplish this task, this paper proposes that various aspects of marketing strategy should be considered when examining product strategies that are accused of being anticompetitive. This paper further suggests that the current list of inconsistently and poorly defined product strategies used by the courts be augmented by three more straight forward but overlapping categories based on impact on consumer choice: Lock‐Outs, Lock‐Ins, and Hold‐Ups.     

Tariffs, quality reversals and exit in vertically differentiated industries

In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms’ quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality.