ESG信息披露能够改善资本市场定价效率吗？

ESG信息披露是上市公司与投资者沟通的重要方式,分析其是否能改善资本市场定价效率,对新时期助力市场资源配置功能发挥,增强金融服务实体经济能力具有重要意义。考虑到股价同步性是衡量资本市场定价效率的有效指标,本文以2016－2020年中国A股上市公司为样本,分析ESG信息披露对资本市场定价效率的影响及其作用渠道。研究发现：（1）中国当前股票市场信息环境整体表现为噪声环境,即随公司基本面信息的增加,代表资本市场定价效率的股价同步性将上升;（2）在噪声环境中,ESG信息披露可以揭示公司基本面信息,反映公司内在价值,进而改善资本市场定价效率;（3）ESG信息披露可以通过减少投资者噪声交易行为、缓解市场信息不对称程度,继而改善市场定价效率。本研究为完善信息披露制度、优化资本市场信息环境、提升市场定价效率提供了决策参考。     

上市公司自愿进行信息披露存在的障碍和改进措施

上市公司自愿性信息披露对市场交易行为、金融工具创新等资本市场发展的因素有着重要的影响.然而,当前中国上市公司自愿性信息披露的实践并不令人十分满意.我们应当从完善上市公司的治理结构、提升投资者素质以及调整相关政策法规入手,改善我国上市公司自愿披露的现状.     

优化财务信息披露管理

在资本市场中,信息披露行为所产生的经济后果会对上市公司造成重大影响,因此上市公司实施的信息披露行为均表现出较强的自我服务特性.但是,如何通过对信息披露行为的恰当选择来实现其自我服务功能,并不是一个孤立的决策问题,由于资本市场中存在各式各样的影响信息披露行为的约束条件,故对信息披露时间、内容、频率和方式必须进行综合权衡与取舍.具体而言,上市公司实施信息披露行为时,不仅要考虑信息披露的具体内容与相应的披露监管要求,还需要考虑信息使用者对不同披露方案的不同反应,以及竞争对手可能采取的信息披露策略等.     

加强交易所监管职能 提升上市公司透明度

证券交易所对上市公司的监管，核心内容就是信息披露的监管。信息披露的质量，是上市公司透明度的标志．是资本市场公开．透明这一特点得以体现的基础．是提高资本市场配置资源效率的保障，另外，信息披露的质量，还是上市公司质量的重要内容之一。证券交易所虽然也关注上市公司业绩．     

信息披露质量与资本市场估值偏误

资本市场估值偏误阻碍了证券市场的健康发展。信息不对称是导致上市公司市场价值长期偏离内在价值的根本原因,因此信息披露行为对资本市场估值偏误的影响值得研究。采用剩余收益模型(RIM)估计上市公司内在价值,在此基础上构建度量资本市场估值偏误的代理变量,并采用KV度量法从总体上考察上市公司信息披露质量,本文检验了信息披露行为对资本市场估值偏误的影响。本文研究发现上市公司市场价值对其内在价值的偏离程度与信息披露质量显著负相关;进一步的研究表明,信息披露修正资本市场估值偏误的主要途径,是降低市值高估公司的市场价值泡沫。     

上市公司会计信息披露问题探析

资本市场是市场经济的重要组成部分,其发展程度是一国经济发展程度的重要标志。证券市场又是各种信息的聚集地,高质量的会计信息披露是证券市场有效运行的基础。目前,多数学者认为我国资本市场为弱式有效,正处于向半强式有效市场过渡阶段。提升我国证券市场的效率,规范会计信息披露迫在眉睫。本文对我国上市公司的会计信息披露方式和会计制度进行了研究,旨在进一步地完善我国会计信息披露体系。文章通过对我国会计制度研究,指出我国上市公司信息披露现存的主要问题并分析其成因,提出规范与完善我国上市公司信息披露的几点对策。     

关于如何加强上市公司财务舞弊监管工作

我国正处于市场经济体制逐渐成熟的阶段,"诚信"已经成为该过程中对资本市场有着重大影响的因素.资本市场是进行资源配置、价格发现以及资金筹集的重要市场,其运行效率的高低很大程度上取决于上市公司的信息披露质量.而且上市公司的财务舞弊行为极易对股价产生不利影响,严重损害资产市场的基本职能,对投资者的信心、市场效率都有极大的负面影响,甚至会对国家经济与政治安全造成不利影响.因此加强上市公司财务舞弊的监管工作有利于提升资本市场效率、最大程度的营造出良好的投资环境,从而推动金融资本市场的完善与成熟.     

上市公司定期信息披露的期间制度研究

期间制度是上市公司信息披露制度的重要组成部分。它不仅体现着上市公司信息披露的及时性要求,而且还在一定程度上承担着维护资本市场"三公"原则的重任。因此,进一步完善上市公司信息披露的期间制度,不仅有利于保护投资者的知情权,而且有利于提高资本市场的公平与效率,同时,也有利于减少内幕交易的发生。     

浅议P2P借贷与自愿性信息披露

信息不对称一直都是资本市场上试图解决的根本问题之一,为此,必要的信息披露对于完善资本市场有着十分重要的作用。以往的研究均主要集中在资本市场上的信息披露,如审计过的上市公司财务报告对资本市场的影响,而对于自愿性信息披露的研究尚存不足。本文通过新兴的P2P视角研究,完善了资本市场信息披露的理论与实务。     

试论上市公司信息披露失真问题及规制

随着社会经济不断发展,我国经济市场逐渐趋向规范化和标准化发展,信息资源的重要性愈发突出.就证劵市场而言,上市公司信息披露失真问题一向是其关注的重点问题,直接决定了资本市场的实际效率.我国上市公司存在的信息披露失真问题成因相对复杂,兼有内部体制和外部监管两方面的问题,亟需采取相应的调整措施,建立规范的信息披露体系,以促进证券市场的进一步发展.笔者从上市公司信息披露失真问题入手,就国内市场信息披露体系的完善措施,发表几点看法,以供相关人员参考.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

资本市场会计信息披露暨治理问题研究--基于上市公司会计信息披露不对称的视角

上市公司会计信息生产和披露质量直接影响了资本市场的稳定健康发展。资本市场会计信息生产和披露存在着一定的供求机理,直接影响了会计信息生产和披露的质量。由于管理主体上的虚化、内控弱化和治理结构上的偏差、会计信息系统的集成和共享性弱以及从业人员素质上的差异,使得上市公司会计信息披露存在着不充分性、非主动性、虚假性和滞后性问题,由此增加了资本市场信息不对称和风险发生的可能。因此,严厉打击资本市场会计信息造假,规范资本市场会计信息披露,需要进一步完善资本市场会计信息披露制度,创新和完善新技术背景下会计准则和会计制度,加强对现有上市公司会计信息生产和会计信息披露标准的制定和使用,提升上市公司会计信息生产和会计信息披露独立审计监督的标准化和规范化水平,加强上市公司会计信息生产和披露监督标准化体系建设。     

资本市场开放能否提高企业信息披露质量？——基于“沪港通”和年报文本挖掘的分析

提高信息披露质量对于改善上市公司治理结构和保护股东权益具有重要意义。本文利用2014年开通的“沪港通”机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放是否提高了企业的信息披露质量。从2010-2019年A股上市公司年报文本中提炼可读性指标衡量信息披露质量,使用匹配和双重差分方法进行实证研究,发现“沪港通”机制实施以后,标的公司(纳入“沪港通”的A股上市公司)的信息披露质量显著提高。这一结论对不同的估计方法、样本区间及控制变量组均保持稳健。异质性分析表明,对于盈余操纵水平较高、股价信息含量较低的企业,资本市场开放能够更好地改善其信息披露质量。本文丰富了资本市场开放对企业行为和绩效影响的实证研究,为继续推进资本市场开放政策提供了理论依据。     

国有商业银行上市与信息披露机制完善研究

在中国加入WTO和四大国有商业银行积极准备股改上市的背景下,建立和完善适应资本市场要求的信息披露机制意义重大.对照国际银行业的通行标准和资本市场的监管要求,我国国有商业银行的信息披露机制仍存在较大的完善空间.本文在归纳巴塞尔委员会和国内相关监管部门对上市银行信息披露要求的基础上,指出国有商业银行应尽快完善对风险管理定量信息、非财务信息、公司治理信息和表外业务信息的披露,充实会计报表附注的披露要素,并妥善处理信息披露与商业秘密保护的关系;通过完善信息披露机制,树立与国有商业银行资产规模和市场地位相称的上市公司形象.     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

Secrecy versus patenting

We develop an equilibrium search model of innovation with the possibility of multiple independent discovery. We distinguish innovations from ideas, and we view patents as probabilistic property rights that are constrained by the innovators' option to keep the innovation secret. We find that the patent system can simultaneously stimulate innovation, information disclosure and welfare. An optimal patent may provide more or less protection than secrecy, and in many cases, it provides less, suggesting that its main function is information spreading rather than rewarding the costs of the innovative activity.     

Public and private enforcement of securities laws: Resource-based evidence

Ascertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent work in academic finance and an issue for policy-making at international development agencies. According to recent academic work, private enforcement of investor protection via both disclosure and private liability rules goes hand in hand with financial market development, but public enforcement fails to correlate with financial development and, hence, is unlikely to facilitate it. Our results confirm the disclosure result but reverse the results on both liability standards and public enforcement. We use securities regulators’ resources to proxy for regulatory intensity of the securities regulator. When we do, financial depth regularly, significantly, and robustly correlates with stronger public enforcement. In horse races between these resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity and the most common measures of private enforcement, public enforcement is overall as important as disclosure in explaining financial market outcomes around the world and more important than private liability rules. Hence, policymakers who reject public enforcement as useful for financial market development are ignoring the best currently available evidence.     

R&D的重要性及其信息披露方式的改进

本文以在上海证交所上市的公司为研究对象 ,以 1995 - 1999年作为研究考察区间 ,考察了我国上市公司R&D信息披露现状及R&D信息披露对我国上市公司会计信息有用性的影响。研究结果表明 ,企业对R&D信息的不当披露是导致我国上市公司会计信息有用性逐年下降的重要因素之一。在借鉴国外对R&D信息披露规范的基础上 ,我们提出了改进我国上市公司R&D信息披露的建议     

柜台市场会计信息披露研究——国外文献述评与启示

会计信息披露是降低信息不对称的重要方式,柜台市场信息的不对称影响做市商的报价价差,从而影响市场的流动性。本文分别围绕会计信息披露对买卖价差的影响、会计信息披露对市场流动性的影响、会计信息披露与柜台市场有效性的关系三方面,对国外文献进行梳理和分析,并阐明会计信息披露对构建我国柜台市场的重要意义。     

Informational Feedback,Adverse Selection,and Optimal Disclosure Policy

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.