Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability

We examine strategic awareness in experimental games, that is, the question of whether subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others’ actions. We conduct a beauty contest game and elicit measures of cognitive ability and beliefs about others’ cognitive ability. We show that the effect of cognitive ability is highly non-linear. Subjects below a certain threshold choose numbers in the whole interval and their behavior does not correlate with beliefs about others’ ability. In contrast, subjects who exceed the threshold avoid choices above 50 and react very sensitively to beliefs about the cognitive ability of others.     

Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Energy Conservation

Policymakers use both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to induce consumers to change behavior. This paper investigates whether the use of extrinsic financial incentives is complementary to intrinsic incentives, or whether financial incentives undermine the effect of intrinsic incentives. We conduct a randomized controlled trial that uses information interventions to residential electricity customers to test this question. We find that adding economic incentives to normative messages not only does not strengthen the effect of the latter but may reduce it. These results are consistent with recent theoretical work that suggests a tension between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives.     

Regional culture and adaptive behavior of physicians

We examine the possibility that regional differentiation of occupations may shed light on how professional behavior adapts to environmental change. Based on the relative prevalence of occupational categories, we defined five geographic regions within the 48 contiguous United States. 77 psychometric, demographic and cultural metrics that covaried significantly with geographic regions by ANOVA were subjected to principal component analysis (PCA), from which three primary clusters emerged. A panel of judges scored the occupations in these clusters for three primary characteristics: generation of variance (Va), reconciliation of variance with institutional procedures (Re) or implementation of standard institutional practice (Pr). By plotting composites of the clustered elements in a 3-dimensional (Va, Re, Pr) matrix, substantially overlapping regional composites emerged for psychological, cultural and occupational metrics. Based on this putative psychological and cultural differentiation of geographic regions, we asked whether adaptive change in physician??and, by extension, of other professional??behavior might be more strongly correlated with intrinsic (e.g. psychological) or extrinsic (e.g. cultural) factors. Based on significant regional differences in patient behavior and minimal regional differences in physician psychology, we suggest that extrinsic factors may play a more direct role in changing professional behavior than intrinsic factors.     

浅论企业行为道德水平的提高

企业行为的道德水平已成为政府、社会、企业和公众共同关心紧迫问题。文章在简要阐述企业行为的道德水平现状基础上,探讨了社会转型期企业行为的道德问题产生的体制原因和机理,提出了从内控因素和外控因素两个角度去提高企业行为道德水平的对策。     

Potential user factors driving adoption of IPTV. What are customers expecting from IPTV?

Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), the convergence services of television and Internet, is being rapidly developed around the world. The advent of digital technologies has changed the convergence market dramatically with the wide diffusion of the convergent services. Using the Technology Acceptance Model as a conceptual framework and method of logistic regression, this research analyzes the demand for IPTV by drawing data from 452 consumers. Individuals' responses to questions about whether they accept IPTV are collected and combined with observations of their socio-economic status and intrinsic/extrinsic factors modified from the Technology Acceptance Model. Results of logistic regression show two variables (intrinsic and extrinsic factors) that seem to explain what influences consumer behavior towards adopting IPTV. Overall, the logistic regression model explains over 50% of the variance in the IPTV adoption. The variances shed light on the multi-open platform environment that IPTV will forge.     

Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies

We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness; and (2) Truncated QRE, where players have downward looking beliefs, systematically underestimating others' responsiveness. We show that the cognitive hierarchy model is a special case of Truncated QRE. We conduct experiments designed to differentiate these approaches. We find significant evidence of payoff responsive stochastic choice, and of heterogeneity and downward looking beliefs in some games.     

Volunteer Labour Supply: the role of workers' motivations

Abstract In this paper we study the determinants of volunteering. We depart from previous literature that considers only economic incentives and investigate the role that extrinsic and intrinsic motivations play in shaping the supply of voluntary labour. We build on previous theoretical research and derive a framework for interpreting results from our econometric analysis. We consider a sample of Italian workers of which we can observe proxies of motivations and volunteering choices in three different sectors: social services, political activism and union activism. We make due allowance for the endogeneity of motivations and show that both types of motivations have an effect on volunteering. Consistently with theoretical models, we find extrinsic motivations to lower voluntary labour supply, whereas the opposite holds for intrinsic motivations .     

The disappearing gay income penalty

Since 1995, labor economists have reported on the income disparities between individuals who engage in same-sex behavior and those that do not. Many of these papers report a significant wage penalty, while others find no effect, but few look at the trend over time. We find, using National Health and Examination Survey (NHANES) data from 1988 to 2007, that the income gap has reversed over time from a penalty to a premium.     

TRUST,VALUES, AND FALSE CONSENSUS

Individuals’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of a generic member of the population are both heterogeneous across individuals and persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that the relationship between behavior and beliefs is consistent with individuals extrapolating their trust beliefs from their own trustworthiness and that this tendency continues even after substantial learning opportunities. We go on to provide evidence suggesting that one's own trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing.     

DO MONETARY REWARDS CROWD OUT THE INTRINSIC MOTIVATION OF VOLUNTEERS? SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ITALIAN VOLUNTEERS

ABSTRACT 1 : The paper studies the determinants of regular volunteering, taking its cue from the previous literature on extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Its main contribution lies in the analysis of the role of monetary rewards in influencing intrinsic motivation. It uses frameworks that allow empirical hypotheses to be made about the effects of monetary rewards, intrinsic motivation and the combined term on volunteer labour supply. With an Italy‐based survey, the paper shows, controlling for endogenous bias, that monetary payments as well as intrinsic motivation have roles in the real‐life decision to supply volunteer work, but monetary rewards do not crowd out intrinsic motivation.     

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves.     

Fairness versus efficiency: how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination

We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer’s Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others’ actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs.     

Can individuals’ beliefs help us understand nonadherence to malaria test results? Evidence from rural Kenya

In malaria‐endemic countries about a quarter of test‐negative individuals take antimalarials (artemisinin‐based combination therapies [ACTs]). ACT overuse depletes scarce resources for subsidies and contributes to parasite resistance. As part of an experiment in Kenya that provided subsidies for rapid diagnostic test and/or for ACTs conditionally on being positive, we studied the association between beliefs on malaria status (prior and posterior the intervention) and decisions to get tested and to purchase ACTs. We find that prior beliefs do not explain the decision of getting tested (conditional on the price) and nonadherence to a negative test. However, test‐negative individuals who purchase ACTs report higher posterior beliefs than those who do not, consistent with a framework in which the formers revise beliefs upward, while the latters do not change or revise downward. We also do not find evidence that prior beliefs on ACT effectiveness and trust in test results play any major role in explaining testing or treatment behavior. Further research is needed to improve adherence to malaria‐negative test results.     

Beliefs and (in)stability in normal-form games

Experimental Economics - In this paper, we use experimental data to study players’ stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and choose actions. Subjects saw each...     

A model of noisy introspection

We present a theoretical model of noisy introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The model determines layers of beliefs about others' beliefs about …, etc., but allows for surprises by relaxing the equilibrium requirement that belief distributions coincide with decision distributions. Noise is injected into iterated conjectures about others' decisions and beliefs, which causes the predictions to differ from those of deterministic models of iterated thinking, e.g., rationalizability. The paper contains a convergence proof that implies existence and uniqueness of the outcome of the iterated thought process. In addition, estimated introspection and noise parameters for data from 37 one-shot matrix games are reported. The accuracy of the model is compared with that of several alternatives.     

Do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field?

In this paper, we study the correlation between cheating in the lab and cheating in the field. We conduct a laboratory experiment using a variant of the Mind game (Jiang, 2013). Payoffs above a certain threshold are indicative of cheating behavior. Subjects are paid their earnings by bank transfer. A fraction of the subjects is deliberately paid more than their earnings. We send subjects a reminder e-mail stating their earnings and asking them if they have received their payment. We find a significant correlation of 0.31 between cheating in the lab and in the field. Subjects with higher payoffs in the Mind game are also less likely to report the overpayment. Our results speak to the lab-field generalizability of cheating behavior.     

Institutions, motivations and public goods: An experimental test of motivational crowding

Contributions to public goods can be motivated by intrinsic factors such as warm glow altruism and fairness, as well as extrinsic incentives such as sanctions and payments. However, psychological studies suggest that formal extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivations. In an experimental study of individual contributions to a public good we find that suasion crowded in voluntary contributions, while an extrinsic incentive in the form of a regulation led to crowding out. This has implications for the design of public policy where ranges of motivations are present.     

Motivation crowding‐out and green‐paradox‐like outcomes

We analyze the effectiveness of environmental policy in a framework in which households’ utility is determined by both private and social components, representing their extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to undertake green actions, respectively. Environmental policy, in the form of a subsidy aiming to incentivize the adoption of a green technology, on the one hand, directly increases households’ extrinsic motivation, while, on the other hand, indirectly decreases their intrinsic motivation. We show that, provided that the indirect effect dominates, the policy leads to crowding‐out of intrinsic motivation which ultimately undermines the effectiveness of the policy itself. Specifically, despite its positive effect on environmental outcomes in the short run, the policy will lead to a deterioration in long‐run environmental outcomes, giving rise to a reverse green‐paradox‐like outcome. Moreover, even in the case in which the direct effect dominates, provided that the indirect effect is large enough, the policy will generate a deterioration in short‐run environmental outcomes. These results clearly suggest that the optimal design of environmental policy is particularly complicated since it requires to take into account also its effects on intrinsic motivation.