Impact of demand uncertainty on supply chain cooperation of single-period products

Cooperation is an approach of improving competitive advantages of a supply chain. A two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer for a single-period product is studied, and retail-market demand uncertainty is described by coefficient of variation. We develop a cooperation mechanism to address the cooperation and its implementation between the manufacturer and the retailer, two market situations are considered: (i) the wholesale price and the order quantity are decision variables, (ii) the wholesale and the retail prices as well as the order quantity are decision variables. In both market situations, our research shows that: (1) the cooperation mechanism can improve the overall channel profits and the supply chain members’ allocated profits, (2) the described cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty: it can be implemented if, and only if, the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small and coefficient of variation of retail-market demand does not exceed an upper bound. Impacts of retail-market demand uncertainty on wholesale price, order quantity and/or retail price have also been investigated through analytical and numerical analyses. Although our research is based on the assumption that the manufacturer dominates the supply chain in the non-cooperative situation, which is not the case for most retailer-driven supply chains, this research is still significant on providing guidelines for practitioners in current China mid-level car market that is similar to situations described in the paper.     

VMCI 下基于批发价决策权转移的供应链效率改进研究

本文在VMCI 模式下，考虑销售努力水平对市场需求的影响，研究批发价决策权由供应商转移至零售商的两级供应链效率改进问题。假定零售商决策批发价和销售努力水平，供应商决策寄售量，建立了零售商主导的Stackelberg 博弈模型，证明了集中决策下的最优解和分散决策下的均衡解均存在且唯一，集中决策下的寄售因子大于分散决策下的对应值。随后，引入收入共享与销售努力成本共担契约，论证了系统中寄售因子保持不变、批发价降低，且当契约参数满足一定条件时，可实现帕累托改进，实现供应链的效率改进。最后，分析了契约参数对于系统决策变量及利润的影响。     

零售商的风险规避特性和公平偏好对绿色供应链运作的影响

针对市场需求的不确定性，本文通过建立风险规避型零售商与风险中性供应商的Stackelberg博弈模型，供应商为主导者，综合考虑零售商风险规避特性和公平偏好心理对该供应链运作产生的影响。研究发现，当风险规避型零售商不具有公平意识时，零售商的风险规避程度与供应商的批发价、绿色创新投入水平以及供应商和供应链整体的效用正相关；供应商的绿色成本系数的大小可影响风险规避程度对产品售价以及零售商效用的影响。当风险规避型零售商具有公平偏好时，零售商的公平偏好负向影响产品售价、批发价以及供应商绿色投入水平和供应商效用；零售商公平偏好对零售商以及供应链效用产生的影响受到零售商风险规避程度的影响。     

Distribution contracts to support optimal inventory holdings under demand uncertainty

When suppliers produce products for which demand is uncertain, they face a problem of inducing downstream distributors to stock inventory levels that the suppliers prefer. This paper considers a wide array of alternative supply contracts, each of which consists of a mixture of constant per-unit wholesale prices, buy-back arrangements, and post sale payments contingent on sales made, such as revenue sharing or buybacks. We show that linear supply contracts specifying any combination of two of these three instruments can implement the vertical integrated outcome for a monopoly, thereby generating the supplier's preferred inventory configuration and price distribution. We extend our results to differentiated product oligopoly, demonstrating that each supplier obtains its preferred inventory configuration and price distribution, given the choices of its rival. Distributors choose optimal inventories from the suppliers' standpoint, even if suppliers do not know the distribution of demand uncertainty, and, given the perfect competition among distributors, all profits in the supply chain are captured by suppliers. Thus, suppliers are able to deal with demand uncertainty with remarkably little information about demand, and without the need to control dealer actions in detail. In particular, suppliers need not specify either dealer inventories or resale prices, but instead encourage distributors to order based on information in their possession and to set prices that generate desirable resale price dispersion.     

National brand's local advertising and wholesale-price incentive under prior versus no prior information

We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.     

Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contract

This paper develops a model to study channel coordination and risk sharing in a retailer-led supply chain. Such chains are characterized by a dominant retailer who aims to coordinate the upstream production quantity. We investigate a coordinating contract based on an option with two parameters. An option price is paid by the retailer for each additional unit of product reserved beyond the initial order. An exercise price serves as the unit purchasing price when the retailer sets a second order if realized demand is more than the initial order. A successful coordination needs two conditions. One condition is to maintain a negative correlation between exercise price and option price. Particularly, we draw the functional form. The other is that the firm commitment must be lower than the optimal production quantity in a centralized system. In a risk sharing mechanism, we prove that such a contract brings benefit to each party.     

Downstream Vertical Foreclosure and Upstream Innovation

I examine a link between downstream foreclosure and upstream innovation. The crucial ingredient of the model is the presence of dynamic economies of scale upstream in the form of competition in R&D. The reason an upstream supplier has a captive buyer is to force rival suppliers to incur the disadvantages of low-scale production and discourage them from innovating. The downstream buyer is offered favorable terms and is “convinced” to sign an exclusive supply contract and accept captivity. In this context, downstream foreclosure may reduce consumer welfare.     

Which one is more valuable in coordinating the online and offline distribution? Service support or online price coordination

Nowadays effective mechanisms to coordinate the online and offline distribution become increasingly important in the business market. In this research, we first propose two mechanisms (i.e. the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination) for the manufacturer and the retailer to employ. Our results show that the online price coordination does help coordinate the online and offline distribution and bring higher profits to the manufacturer-retailer supply chain and thus both the manufacturer and the retailer, while the offline service to the retailer does not; comparing to the offline service to the retailer, the online price coordination is a better strategy to be utilized to alleviate the online to offline competition. Furthermore, we investigate if a novel coordination mechanism, which combines the offline service to the retailer with the online price coordination, can help coordinate the online and offline distribution better and becomes the optimal coordination mechanism. Surprisingly, our results show that compared to both the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination, this combination coordination mechanism does show a dominant competitive advantage to bring highest profits to all parties.     

The effect of competition on pricing and product positioning: Evidence from wholesale club entry

This paper empirically examines incumbents’ reactions to market entry along price and non-price dimensions in the example of wholesale warehouse entry into grocery retail markets. Leveraging a detailed retail panel spanning 2001–2011 and a novel dataset documenting opening and closing dates and locations of all Costco warehouse clubs, we classify incumbent retailers’ strategic responses (e.g., pricing, assortment) by the storability of product categories, controlling for persistent systematic differences across retailer–product combinations. We find that retailers are substantially affected by increased competition from wholesale club warehouse openings and in response increase the variability of their prices, consistent with adoption of the Hi–Lo pricing strategy. In addition, incumbent retailers’ strategic responses differ significantly across storability levels: They are more likely to increase prices and reduce assortments for highly storable products and decrease prices and increase assortments for less storable products. We extend our analysis by exploiting the spatial variations in our data and analyzing divergent market effects across geographical areas. We find significant geospatial differences in these strategic responses.     

基于连锁零售企业退货管理的供应链协调机制研究

在对连锁零售企业退货物流网络结构进行分析的基础上,建立了与价格相关的随机需求下存在顾客退货和允许库存结转的单一供应商、单一连锁零售企业、单一产品的供应链模型。根据供应链一体化模式下得到的相关决策变量的一阶条件,论证基于回馈和惩罚的批发价格契约能够实现供应链的协调。研究表明,在给定回馈和惩罚因子的前提下,供应商可以通过调整目标订购数量来实现供应链整体利润的任意分配,并且当目标订购数量和回馈惩罚因子满足一定条件时,供应链的协调才是有效的,从而为连锁零售企业的退货物流管理提供了重要的理论依据。     

One‐Stop Shopping Behavior,Buyer Power and Upstream Merger Incentives

We analyze how consumer preferences for one‐stop shopping affect the (Nash) bargaining relationships between a retailer and its suppliers. One‐stop shopping preferences create ‘demand complementarities’ among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing effects on upstream merger incentives: first a standard double mark‐up problem and second a bargaining effect. The former creates merger incentives while the later induces suppliers to bargain separately. When buyer power becomes large enough, then suppliers stay separated which raises final good prices. We also show that our result can be obtained when wholesale prices are determined in a non‐cooperative game and under two‐part tariffs.     

产品设计作为竞争策略的PRO 供应链生产决策研究

对于大多数无力自建WEEE 回收体系的生产企业选择加入PRO 是明智的选择。本文基于行业PRO 运作模式，构建了由两制造商和回收商联盟组成的供应链模型，将与市场增长挂钩的产品设计作为其中一制造商的竞争策略，研究了产品设计和回收双责任要求下供应链各主体的生产决策问题。研究发现：（1）当产品设计成本较低和市场增量较高时，以产品设计作为竞争策略的在位制造商可以淘汰竞争制造商；（2）当产品设计成本低于市场增量时，在位制造商的生产决策优于竞争制造商。一定条件下，竞争制造商存在“搭便车”行为；（3）产品设计降低了处理成本，但损害了回收商经济效益，回收商抵制过度产品设计，并通过转移价格实现供应链主体的利润配置。当经济驱动下回收商自愿回收时，更高的政府回收率会导致整个供应链经济效益变好；（4）存在一个三方共赢局面使三者经济效益都更优，存在一个双赢局面使回收商和在位制造商更优。     

基于促销行为的供应链牛鞭效应分析

供应链中的牛鞭效应起源于管理者追求利润最大化的理性决策,价格波动是产生牛鞭效应的主要原因之一,而价格波动常常是由零售商周期性地采取一些特殊促销行为引起的.本文通过考虑在动态需求环境下,存在一个包含有一个供应商与一个零售商的简单供应链,当下游零售商有促销行为时与无促销行为时进行定量分析比较,并分析基于促销行为的零售商收益大于库存成本时的牛鞭效应,结果表明,零售商的促销行为很大程度上加剧了牛鞭效应,只有当产品价格比较稳定时,才能尽量避免和减少牛鞭效应.     

Auctions for Split-Award Contracts

The buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. He uses a sequential second-price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole-source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. When entry is endogenous, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price.     

Supply contract with options

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of an option contract for two companies of a supply chain: retailer and supplier. With an option contract the retailer orders a quantity of units and has the right to modify his order if necessary. A model to calculate the performance of an option contract in terms of contract value for the two companies engaged is presented. The two considered cases are multiple suppliers and one retailer, and one supplier and one retailer. The performance improvement obtained using this kind of contract is compared by simulation.     

传统品牌与网货品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价研究

基于传统制造商品牌的双渠道供应链，引入网货品牌的网络直销渠道，构建了两个品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价模型。并考虑了两条网络渠道的双重搭便车行为，通过Nash博弈得到供应链成员在分散和集中式决策下的均衡策略。研究表明各博弈方的最优定价和利润是关于渠道间及品牌间交叉价格弹性系数的增函数，且渠道竞争的影响显著于品牌竞争；两个制造商的搭便车行为与自身的最优定价和利润呈正相关，但它们的相互影响取决于直接价格弹性系数；搭便车行为对零售商是不利的。最后采用价格加成契约来协调多渠道供应链，以弥补分散决策下双重边际效应带来的损失。     

Buyer power through the differentiation of suppliers

This paper argues that rival retailers may choose to differentiate their supplying producers, even at the expense of downgrading the quality of the product offered to consumers, to improve their buyer power. We show that, through the differentiation of suppliers, a retailer may obtain a larger slice of a smaller pie, i.e, smaller bilateral joint profits. Thus, the “only” purpose of differentiation is to gain increasing buyer power. This result may hold (i) when retailers compete in the final market or (ii) when retailers are active in separate markets. The differentiation of suppliers, which results from a buyer power motive, may be harmful for consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Customer and retailer rebates under risk aversion

In a supply chain setting, we analyze a manufacturer's customer and retailer rebates, which are sales incentives offered to the end buyers and retailers, respectively. The performance of both rebates is influenced by the retailer's objective and response to the promotion due to his intermediary position in the channel. Earlier studies investigating rebates in distribution channels have traditionally assumed that the retailer is risk neutral with the objective of maximizing expected profits. In our paper, we consider a risk-averse retailer. We formally model risk aversion by adopting the Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) decision criterion. Using a stochastic and (effective) price dependent demand, we analyze the manufacturer's rebate amount decisions and the retailer's joint inventory and pricing decisions in a game theoretical framework. We provide several structural properties of the objective functions and show monotonicity of the retailer's decisions in the degree of risk aversion. For the case of retailer rebates, we characterize the unique equilibrium, and for the case of customer rebates, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. Using numerical examples, we provide further insights on the impact of risk aversion. For example, given an exogenous wholesale price, we observe a threshold value on the retailer's risk-aversion parameter below (above) which the manufacturer is better off with retailer rebates (customer rebates); implying that the manufacturer's preferred rebate type can be different depending on whether the retailer is risk neutral or sufficiently risk averse.     

Price Spikes in Energy Markets: “Business by Usual Methods” or Strategic Withholding?

There is considerable controversy whether price spikes in energy markets represent demand shifts in the presence of inelastic supply or strategic withholding by suppliers. This paper sets out a new method for distinguishing the two possible explanations, namely, determining whether supply shifts to the left during periods of high demand. Such behavior would be inconsistent with ordinary profit-maximization, that is, “business by usual methods.” This approach is applied to a period of unusually high prices in the New York wholesale electricity market in 2001. There is evidence of strategic withholding for one brief period.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.