The bank capital channel and bank profits

This paper develops a microeconomic model of banking to highlight an endogenous loan creation process that emerges from bank profits via the capital accumulation of retained earnings and uses a simple bank capital‐loan multiplier to illustrate constraints on lending. The study also analyzes how sufficient net interest margins are important for banks to maintain lending portfolios and avoid financial fragility. The model offers support to bank capital channel (BKC) economists by illustrating how changes in interest rates may influence bank lending through the bank's internal capital accumulation growth rate and on a bank's portfolio choices.     

Bank CEO careers after bailouts: The effects of management turnover on bank risk

We study whether bank bailouts affect CEO turnover and its subsequent impact on bank risk. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that TARP funds temporarily decreased the likelihood of bank CEO turnover during the crisis (2008–2010) but significantly increased CEO changes afterwards. Our results show that replacing TARP CEOs reduced individual bank's risk as well as the bank's contributions to the systemic risk. Finally, we find that TARP CEO turnover was mainly driven by a decrease in the bank's political capital. Overall we provide evidence that bank bailouts have important implications for banks’ risk-taking and systemic risk, insofar as bailouts affect bank CEO turnover.     

On the determinants of bank interest margins under credit and interest rate risks

This paper explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on a simple firm-theoretical model under multiple sources of uncertainty and risk aversion. The model demonstrates how cost, regulation, credit risk and interest rate risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We find that the bank interest margin is positively related to the bank's market power, to the operating costs, to the degree of credit risk, and to the degree of interest rate risk. An increase in the bank's equity capital has a negative effect on the spread when the bank faces little interest rate risk. The effect of rising interbank market rate on the spread is ambiguous and depends on the net position of the bank in the interbank market. Our findings provide alternative explanations for the empirical evidence concerning bank spread behavior.     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Environmental reputation and bank liquidity: Evidence from climate transition

This study empirically investigates how a bank's nonfinancial signals of environmental reputation affect its deposits and credit provision in US counties with severe climate transition risks. We find that banks with higher reputational risks associated with environmental issues tend to experience declining deposits in counties exposed to severe climate change risks. Banks with a poor environmental reputation also reduce mortgage origination in such counties and diminish liquidity creation if they have high deposit shares in counties sensitive to climate transition. This study suggests that a bank's reputation regarding environmental, social and governance practices is an important underlying cause of bank liquidity in areas sensitive to climate change.     

Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation*

Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting the risks associated with illiquidity. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort (LOLR). But instead of focusing narrowly on bank funding risks when designing liquidity requirements, regulators should consider tradeoffs among capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and LOLR policies for achieving the broader prudential goal of limiting bank default risk. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five “frictions” are identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) the adverse‐selection costs of raising equity (which favors the use of cash); (2) the opportunity cost of forgone abnormal profits (or “quasi rents”) from lending (which favors the use of capital); (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash); (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash); and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). When viewed from the perspective of achieving the main prudential goal of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. And thus the optimal regulatory policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.     

Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation

This paper reviews academic studies of bank capital regulation in an effort to evaluate the intellectual foundation for the imposition of the Basel I and Basel II systems of risk-based capital requirements. The theoretical literature yields general agreement about the immediate effects of capital requirements on bank lending and loan rates and the longer-term impacts on bank ratios of equity to total or risk-adjusted assets. This literature produces highly mixed predictions, however, regarding the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking system as a whole. Thus, the intellectual foundation for the present capital-regulation regime is not particularly strong. The mixed conclusions in the academic literature on banking certainly do not provide unqualified support for moving to an even more stringent and costly system of capital requirements. These widely ambiguous results do suggest, however, that assessing the implications of capital regulation for balance-sheet risk and monitoring effort in diverse banking systems is an important agenda for future theoretical research in the banking area.     

Minimum capital requirements,bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.     

TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply

This paper investigates the determinants of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds distribution to banks and the stimulus effect of TARP investments on credit supply in the economy. Using banks’ political and regulatory connections as instruments, this paper finds that TARP investments increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios. This increase is found in all major types of loans and can be translated into $404 billion of additional loans for all TARP banks. On average, TARP banks employed about one-third of their TARP capital to support new loans and kept the rest to strengthen their balance sheets. Furthermore, there is little evidence that loans made by TARP banks had lower quality than those by non-TARP banks. In sum, this paper shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP on credit supply during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

The impact of loan prepayment risk and deposit withdrawal risk on the optimal intermediation margin

Numerous studies have analyzed how a bank's intermediation margin varies with respect to such factors as credit quality, funding risk, bank capital, deposit insurance and other factors. However, these studies ignore the potential that loans tend to prepay if interest rates decline and deposits tend to be withdrawn if interest rates rise. Taking this very fundamental fact into account, we derive optimal loan rates and deposit rates when the bank is subject to loan prepayments and deposit withdrawals. Among other things, we find that greater volatility of interest rates tends to increase the margin. The strength of the correlation between the level of interest rates and the propensity to prepay loans (withdraw deposits) also plays an interesting role.     

Are regulatory capital adequacy ratios good indicators of bank failure? Evidence from US banks

Motivated by massive bank failures during the financial crisis, this paper examines whether capital adequacy ratios required by regulators are associated with bank failure. It investigates whether the association is affected by the bank's proximity to the minimum required capital ratios. If results show a significant association between regulatory capital and failure of banks falling below the minimum capital ratios, then the ratios are set at an adequate level. Examining a sample of 560 US bank holding companies for the period 2003–2009, results reveal that the association between the core (Tier 1) capital ratio and bank failure becomes significant only if the bank holding company has a Tier 1 capital ratio of less than 6%. This is the level below which US bank regulators do not regard banks as being well capitalized. During the financial crisis period of 2007–2009, there is a significant association only when the criterion is set at or above 8%. Market-based probability of default is more significantly associated with failure relative to Tier 1 capital ratio. The findings of this paper are relevant to regulatory policy discussions and Basel III deliberations on capital adequacy at times of financial turmoil.     

The non-monotonic impact of bank size on their default swap spreads: Cross-country evidence

This paper studies the drivers of bank's credit default swap (CDS) spread, taken as a measure of credit risk, by considering the impact of housing market along with a number of bank level determinants, such as regulatory capital, leverage, size, liquidity, asset quality and operations income ratio. We build upon a unique dataset consisting of 115 banks (during pre- and post-crisis periods) headquartered in 30 countries from both developed and emerging countries. Results suggest that CDS spread is driven by asset quality, liquidity and operations income ratio, while bank size is found to have a non-monotonic impact on CDS spread. If the bank is small, an increase in size reduces the average credit risk. If the bank is large enough, an increase in size raises the latter. From our results we derive the level of bank size that minimizes the CDS spreads. Financial institutions growing beyond this threshold are subject to higher credit risk, implying that smaller and medium sized banks are safer than large banks. When considering the estimates in the periods before and after the 2007 crisis, we further find a different extreme point of bank size in the former (approximately 1642 billion Euros) relative to a significantly lower level of optimal bank size (around 70 billion) in the post-crisis period, implying too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save in the pre-crisis regime.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management

This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.     

Banking and commerce: A liquidity approach

This paper looks at the advantages and disadvantages of mixing banking and commerce, using the “liquidity” approach to financial intermediation. Bringing a nonfinancial firm into a banking conglomerate may be advantageous because it makes it easier for the bank to dispose of assets seized in a loan default. The conglomerate's internal market increases the liquidity of such assets and improves the bank's ability to perform financial intermediation. More generally, owning a nonfinancial firm may act either as a substitute or a complement to commercial lending. In some cases, a bank will voluntarily refrain from making loans, choosing to become a non-bank bank in an unregulated environment.     

Bank capital and equity investment regulations

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability.     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

Contingent Capital vs. Contingent Reverse Convertibles for Banks and Insurance Companies

During the credit and liquidity crisis in 2007 and 2008, banks found themselves largely unable to raise significant new equity quickly from parties other than sovereign wealth funds and governments. Some banks have thus recently begun to consider contingent capital as a means of pre‐arranging recapitalizations for future crises. Contingent capital is a type of put option that entitles a company to issue new securities on pre‐negotiated terms, often following the occurrence of one or more risk‐based triggering events. This article compares the economic merits of a new security—a “contingent reverse convertible” or CRC—against more traditional forms of contingent capital. In November 2009, Lloyds Banking Group plc issued “Enhanced Capital Notes”—subordinated debt that converts into common stock if Lloyds's core regulatory capital falls below 5% of its regulatory risk‐weigh ted assets. This CRC is not strictly speaking a form of contingent capital, but it does give banks the potential to recapitalize themselves quickly in the face of a crisis without having to turn to governments and taxpayers. One important limitation of CRCs is that because they do not generate new cash for a bank at the time of conversion, they are unlikely to stop a liquidity crisis once it has begun. More traditional contingent capital facilities, by contrast, do put cash in the hands of the issuer at the time the facility is drawn. But even for those inclined to use CRCs, it may be unrealistic to expect many other institutions to imitate the structure of the Lloyds offering. Persuading existing investors to take a more subordinated position in a bank's capital structure and write a put option to the bank on its own stock will be neither cheap nor easy. For this reason, the more traditional solutions used to date may have more success with banks, though arriving at a price that helps issuers and satisfies investors will be a challenge for those structures as well.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

Optimal allotment policy in central bank open market operations1

This article derives a central bank's optimal liquidity supply towards a money market with an unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect of liquidity on market rates is not too small, and the monetary authority is concerned with both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal allotment policy may entail a ‘discontinuous’ reaction to initial conditions. In particular, the model predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central bank will not bail out the banking system. An estimation of the liquidity effect for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have contributed to the Eurosystem's tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the period June 2000 through March 2004.