Capital Accumulation and Fiscal Policy in an OLG Model with Family Altruism

The idea of family altruism is that parents care only about their children's income and not about the use of this income made by the children. First, we establish dynamical properties which place the OLG model with family altruism halfway between the model with pure life‐cyclers ( Diamond 1965 ; American Economic Review 55, 1126–1150) and the one with dynastic altruism ( Barro 1974 ; Journal of Political Economy 82, 1095–1117). Then, we show that this concept leads to interesting fiscal policy conclusions less clear‐cut and more realistic than those obtained with the two previous standard OLG models: a pay‐as‐you‐go social security is neutral but not a public debt.     

The Theory of Differential Overqualification: Does it Work?

The theory of differential overqualification, developed by Robert Frank (1978),claims that married women in smaller labour markets have a higher risk of workingin jobs for which they are overqualified. This stems from the problem of dual jobsearch for couples which is much more difficult to optimize than single job search.Here, for several reasons husbands tend to first optimize their individual job search.Their wives are `tied movers' or `tied stayers' in the sense that their job search isundertaken under the condition that the job search of their husbands is optimized.This leads especially in smaller labour markets to a higher risk of a mismatchbetween formal qualifications and job requirements. The only specific empiricaltest of this theory, until now, has been performed by McGoldrick and Robst (1996) . Their results, using US data, do not support the theory. Using Germanpanel data (GSOEP), we also test the theory of differential overqualification.Unlike previous studies we control for commuting distances and our own resultsprovide some mixed support for the differential overqualification hypothesis.     

The individual and the market: Paul Samuelson on (homothetic) Santa Claus economics

Paul Samuelson often used the term “Santa Claus economics” for mathematical models with empirically unrealistic assumptions. I focus on one particular member of the Santa Claus family that Samuelson was very sceptical about: homothetic general equilibrium models (where all agents have identical homothetic preferences). I argue that Samuelson's concerns about these models provide insights into how he viewed the relationship between the individual and the market, a relationship that has implications for not only his economic theorising, but also his broader political–economic vision. His criticisms are also relevant to some ongoing debates within contemporary economic theory.     

What is macroeconomic causality?

The paper aims to develop an adequate account of macroeconomic causality. It discusses the definition that is central to Woodward’s interventionist account and the definitions that can be extracted from Hoover’s remarks on privileged parameterization and from the potential outcome approach that Angrist and Kuersteiner have introduced into macroeconomics more recently. The definition to be defended can be regarded as the gist that is common to all three definitions when they are relieved of overly restrictive conditions. It says (roughly) that X causes Y if and only if there is a possible intervention on X that changes Y, where X and Y stand for macroeconomic aggregates, where an intervention is understood as a manipulation of an intervention variable I that satisfies conditions requiring that I be a cause of X, and that there be no confounders of X and Y, and where an intervention variable is either a variable or a parameter.     

Reading Sraffa's Indices – a note *

Piero Sraffa took thirteen years to publish the General Indexto The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo.The Index is compared to others and is shown to be exceptional in that it leads the way to specific interpretations of Ricardo's life and theory. The choice of entries referring to theory is based on Ricardo's own concepts and carefully avoids neoricardian, Marxian and neoclassical terms. Examples discussed concern ‘comparative advantage’ and ‘value’ The entries referring to Ricardo's life are proof of Sraffa's broad historical interests and focus on certain characteristics of Ricardo.     

DOES TEACHER‐FAMILY EXPERIENCE AFFECT TEST SCORES?

Since families play a pivotal role in elementary schools, student learning may be influenced by how well the teacher knows a family and how well the parents know the teacher. We test this hypothesis by evaluating whether assignment to a teacher who has previously taught an older sibling affects test scores. We refer to teachers who have previously taught the older sibling as having “teacher‐family experience” when teaching the younger sibling. Using a novel data set that includes administrative data on students and teachers matched to family identifiers, we find that when the older sibling's teacher is teaching in the younger sibling's grade, 40% of younger siblings are assigned their older sibling teachers. We find that teacher‐family experience does not have any significant effects on test scores and we can statistically rule out small effects. (JEL I20)     

Rhetoric and logic in Smith's Description of the Division of Labor

Abstract

This article analyses the first chapter of the Wealth of Nations, where the division of labour is defined and its effects described. It first shows the rhetoric and logical effects that are used to win the reader's goodwill. Then it reviews nineteenth century debates on the validity of the theory. Finally, it cites three real cases, where the division of labour does not increase the productive power of labour. In conclusion, it suggests that the theory on division of labour appears to require some adjustment, while acknowledging that some of the facts underlying arguments in its support are naturally true.     

Experiment-inspired comments on John Roemer’s theory of cooperation

Abstract

We report on a nonsocial experiment where we find that all participants choose the dominant strategy in the experimental payoff, and compare it with the payoff-isomorphic, but social, Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment presented in a recent paper by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre where 28% choose cooperation instead of the dominant strategy. The contrast reinforces Roemer’s emphasis on human cooperation. Next, we argue that Roemer’s Simple Kantian Equilibrium works well as a theory of cooperation under the assumption of monotonicity (positive or negative externalities), but not when efficient cooperation requires the division of labor by coordinating dissimilar tasks.     

Social norms and the fertility transition

This paper provides a norm-based explanation for two features of the fertility transition that have been observed in many different settings: the slow response to external interventions and the wide variation in the response to the same intervention. Most societies have traditionally put norms into place to regulate fertility. When the economic environment changes, individuals gradually learn through their social interactions about the new reproductive equilibrium that will emerge in their community. This characterization of the fertility transition as a process of changing social norms is applied to rural Bangladesh, where norms are organized at the level of the religious group and interactions rarely cross religious boundaries. Consistent with the view that changing social norms are driving changes in reproductive behavior in these communities, we find that the individual's contraception decision responds strongly to changes in contraceptive prevalence in her own religious group within the village whereas cross-religion effects are entirely absent. Local changes in reproductive behavior occur independently across religious groups despite the fact that all individuals in the village have access to the same family planning inputs.     

CAN SECRET INTERVENTION BE COMPATIBLE WITH A NON‐PROFITMAKING CENTRAL BANK AND A FUNDAMENTAL‐CONSISTENT TARGET?

The coexistence of secret intervention operations and “the signaling channel” (Mussa. The Role of Official Intervention, 1981) seems confusing. Vitale ( Journal of International Economics, 49, 1999, 245–267) resolves this puzzle by employing an asymmetric information framework and an assumption of a fundamental‐inconsistent target for the exchange rate. Ferré and Manzano ( International Journal of Finance and Economics, 14, 2009, 378–393) follow Vitale's microstructure framework and argue that the central banks' profitability motivation offers a rationale for their secret intervention even under a target consistent with the fundamentals. However, that the authority uses its superior information to obtain speculative profits through secret intervention in the market is not a typical goal for central banks. To theoretically explain the opaqueness in non‐profitmaking central banks' exchange rate policies, we employ a model of a central bank's optimization by considering that no bank really knows the exact fundamental rate and they take into account the possible bad consequences of announcing the intervention. We also show that, in passing the bank's private information to market participants, a bank's announcement of the intervention size is equivalent to revealing its target rate. (JEL E58, F39)     

Factor-price equalization under joint and nonjoint production

We investigate how joint production affects the likelihood of factor price equalization (FPE) through trade. Following up on recent contributions by Samuelson (1992) and Jones (1992), we propose to take the relative size of the FPE region of endowment distributions to measure this likelihood, and we show that it mayincrease even if joint production leads to adecrease of the number of basic production processes, and it maydecrease even if the number of basic production processes operated in equilibrium isthe same as under nonjoint production. A 2×2×2 example is analyzed in more detail. Moreover, we show that the argument of Jones (1992) can be reinterpreted in a more applied direction by considering the effects of switching from a regime where only intermediate products are traded to a regime where all products are traded. The paper shows that the likelihood of FPE may decrease by integrating product markets in this way. Still more surprising is the fact that integration may even destroy FPE.     

The Concept of Trust and the Political Economy of John Maynard Keynes,Illustrated Using Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Democratic Dilemma in Europe

Trust is an issue to which Keynesians and post-Keynesians have paid relatively little attention. However, properly understood it is an aspect of almost all activity, including key elements of socio-economic reality. Without trust, market exchange is at the very least problematic, if not impossible. Moreover, trust is intrinsic to a variety of issues with which Keynes, and subsequent Keynesianism have been concerned. In this paper we provide a general social theory conceptualisation of trust and then set out some of the areas where this concept resonates with the work of Keynes in terms of the role of conventions. Conventions quintessentially involve trust and that trust can be unstable, can be withdrawn and can require rebuilding. We illustrate this with reference to central bank policy and the Bank of England's introduction of Forward Guidance. Exploring the problem of trust in the context of banking also highlights a challenge for the continued relevance of Keynes' work. We now live in a neoliberal world and this provides a quite different context for state intervention than was previously the case. Keynes' work is now an argument for the alternative, and as such it requires more than a technical economic argument, it must also address the problem of trust in state policy-makers. We briefly illustrate the challenge this poses with reference to Europe.     

CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKET: AN EXAMINATION OF NHS FOUNDATION TRUST CLASSIFICATION IN THE UK

ABSTRACT: In this paper we argue that national accounting categories provide an inadequate basis for evaluating differences between public and private sector services. This is because accounting categories rely on economic concepts such as market price but do not take account of substantive public policy goals such as universality. The argument has important consequences for the structures and systems of delivery especially where nonprofit providers and social enterprise models are substituted for public bodies formerly integrated into the government's delivery system. Using an example taken from the UK's National Health Service, we show that the mechanisms for ensuring universality through redistribution are not sufficiently taken into account for classification purposes.     

The Gender Gap

The author explains the “gender gap” as a Nash equilibrium of a game with incomplete information about women's work at home and in the marketplace. Expectations about women's lower wages leads to the overutilization of women in the household, and this, in turn, leads to lower productivity and lower wages for women in the marketplace. The situation is rational but generally Pareto inferior. With logistic learning by doing, at high levels of skill there is a Pareto‐superior equilibrium, where men and women share efforts equally at home and receive the same pay in the marketplace, firms enhance their profits, and there is more welfare at home. Inequity at home breeds inequity in the marketplace and, reciprocally, inequity in the marketplace leads to inequity at home, causing a persistent gender gap. Appropriate contracts may be needed to implement the superior solution, since generally governments do not intervene in family matters.     

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.     

Socialism after Hayek: A Post Keynesian Contribution to Burczak's Theory of Social Justice

The paper presents a brief overview of the basic premise of the Burczak's Socialism after Hayek, and shows that Burczak's “applied epistemological postmodernism” presents a unique unifying ground for heterodox economics, breaking down traditional barriers between right and left. This new approach allows us to revisit the Marx-Keynes-Hayek debates in a more constructive way for a unified theory of social justice. However, we argue that Burczak's system does not automatically guarantee full employment, so it cannot be considered an ideal theory of social justice. A Post Keynesian contribution is presented in the form of the Employer of Last Resort (ELR) program which we argue is compatible and complementary to Burczak's theory of social justice. Finally, we argue that an adequate system design of the magnitude proposed here must be infomed by the principles of institutional adjustment as outlined by J. Fagg Foster.     

Vanity and the love of system in Theory of Moral Sentiments

Abstract

Some recent writing on Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments has emphasised the importance of vanity as one of the most important human motivations. This reading leads to a new version of Das Adam Smith Problem, but this is unwarranted. Such a reading tends to conceal the significance that Smith gave to the love of system, which motivates the actions of the philosopher, the man of state, and above all the entrepreneur. This paper shows, by contrast, that by using this conception we can relate Theory of Moral Sentiments to Wealth of Nations, and reject the idea that these works are based upon contradictory assumptions.     

A Humean theory of choice of which rationality may be one consequence

For the reader who considers economic theory of choice as a special case of a more general theory of action, Hume's discussion of the determinants of action in the Treatise of Human Nature (1739?–?40), in the Enquiry on Human Understanding (1748) and in the Dissertation on Passions (1757) deserves attention. However, according to some modern commentators, Hume does not seem to have given any evidence that would favour what nowadays we would consider as the kind of rationality involved in modern theories of rational choice. On the contrary, this paper arrives at the conclusion that consistency between preferences and choice, like the usual properties of completeness and transitivity, may be considered as outcomes of a mental process, described by means of a decision algorithm that aims to represent Hume's theory of choice.     

The impact of Fisher's Purchasing Power of Money in the German Language Area

Abstract

The paper focuses on the reception of Fisher's Purchasing Power of Money in the German language area. Despite widespread hostility of German economists to quantity theory, it was Germany where Wicksell's Interest and Prices was published in 1898, and the first foreign language translation of Fisher's book appeared in 1916. The hyperinflation in the early 1920s contributed to a greater interest in Fisher's approach. Among those economists who took the equation of exchange not only as a heuristic device, but also made some notable contributions themselves were Schumpeter, Marschak and Neisser.