浅析券商融资途径及结构

我国券商需要解决与国外券商两个方面的差距：一是解决长期资本不足和长期资本结构问题；二是拓宽现有短期融资通道。为此，可以通过发行金融债券来拓宽长期资本融通途径，可以通过银行间拆借、证券回购融资、融资租凭等形式增加短期融资通道。     

中小企业融资难的内因、外因及对策

本文通过挖掘造成中小企业融资困境的内部、外部因素,从加强中小企业自我强化内在管理、改革相对落后的金融体制、加强资本市场的建设与完善等方面提出了解决中小企业融资难的措施。     

Optimal Entrepreneurial Financial Contracting

This paper studies the optimal financing (capital structure) of entrepreneurial activity in the context of risk-aversion by incorporating the deadweight costs of bankruptcy and taxes. Unlike the extreme debt ratio (corner solution) predicted by scholars using linear models, this paper provides unique interior results for risk-free as well as risky debt, irrespective of corporate taxes. The paper also shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of debt, and the pareto-optimality of one over the other. The important findings of this paper are: (i) the existence of an equilibrium, where the borrowing interest rate is greater than the lending rate, despite the violation of Fisher separation theorem (1930); (ii) wealth plays a critical role in determining the debt ratio and the equilibrium risk-free rate of interest, complementing the De Meza and Webb (1987 and 1999) studies; (iii) an explanation for the preferred stock and income bond puzzles, extending Fooladi et al. (1991) and McConnell and Schlarbaum (1991).     

Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting

We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derivelong-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities,capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate andlimits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividendpolicy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equityratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms areindependent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severityof the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cashflows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakeshidden effort, or can control cash flow risk.     

Debt Financing and Earnings Management: An Internal Capital Market Perspective

This paper investigates the role internal capital markets play in mitigating earnings management of group firms. We predict that the funding advantages of internal capital markets from business affiliates obscure solvency problems resulting from higher leverage for individual firms within a group, which in turn mitigates their incentives for earnings management. Using Taiwanese firms as a sample, we provide evidence that is consistent with such a prediction. In particular, we show that higher group profitability reduces its member firms’ sensitivity of earnings management to debt levels. Among business groups, earnings management in pyramidal groups is less sensitive to debt levels. We also find that the debt‐abnormal accrual curve becomes smoother as group profitability increases when considering the non‐monotonic relationship between firm leverage and earnings management.     

Internal versus External Equity Funding Sources and Earnings Response Coefficients

Because of transactions costs andinvestor/manager information asymmetries, internallygenerated funds should be less costly than fundsraised by issuing common shares. This suggests thatas firms use more internal funds relative toexternal equity, their costs of equity capital willfall and the rate the market uses to discountunexpected earnings of such firms will be lower. Wehypothesize that (1) firms having a higherproportion of internal to external equitywill have larger earnings response coefficients, and(2) this effect will be magnified for high growthfirms since the disparity between inside informationand publicly available information about high growthfirms' investment opportunities is greatest. Wefind support for both hypotheses using pooled andannual cross-sectional regressions after controllingfor other determinants of ERCs. The results arealso generally robust to alternative measures of themix of equity funding sources and of unexpectedearnings and to consideration of other factorsaffecting the mix of equity capital.     

External Financing and Liquidity

We explain the observed negative relation between market value of firms and their fund raising activities. Ours is not a signalling model. The firm's objective is to maximize the present value of its income. Considerations of cash availability (liquidity) and unfolding of uncertainty drive our model. Income from operations is an important source of liquidity. Low earnings are associated with low liquidity. Whether earnings are low or not is known to some extent in advance of the realization itself. External financing is pursued in anticipation of the earnings' realization in order to maintain a desired level of liquidity. Therefore, anticipated low earnings are associated with a high level of external financing. Of course, an anticipation of low earnings is also accompanied by a decrease in the firm's value. The empiricist who looks at time series of a firm's value and of its dividend/external financing announcements would then record positive correlation between value and cash distributions and negative correlation between value and external financing.     

基于报童模型的供应链企业内外部融资研究

近年来,第三方物流从最初仅提供物流服务的"传统角色",过渡到既提供物流服务又提供金融服务的"代理角色"和"控制角色".代理角色和控制角色的出现推动了人们对外部与内部两种融资方式的认知.本文在国内外相关领域的研究基础上,通过介绍第三方物流在供应链企业融资中扮演的角色和供应链融资风险等理论,从融资企业的收益和最优订货量的角度,运用无风险和存在风险的资金约束报童模型分析供应链企业的内外部融资.本文的研究结论对于那些资本规模小、偿债能力差、信用评级低的供应链内中小型企业有着一定的借鉴和参考价值.     

Optimal Contracting and Insider Trading Restrictions

Restrictions on trading by insider agents are analyzed using an optimal contracting framework. Prohibition of insider trading is shown to be Pareto preferred if, and only if, a revelation or moral hazard problem exists. If prohibition of insider trading is valuable, then trade registration with a delay is shown to be as valuable as complete prohibition. Short selling restrictions, however, are generally of less value than complete prohibition. Finally, regulation of insider agent trading by governmental institutions and/or professional associations is discussed.     

Managerial Ability and External Financing

Asia-Pacific Financial Markets - This research examines the link between managerial ability and firms’ external financing. Our findings show that firms with more able managers tend to...     

An Algorithmic Approach to Optimal Asset Liquidation Problems

This paper examines discrete-time optimal control problems arising in the context of optimal asset liquidation using recently published algorithms and code. We address these questions within a realistic framework, assuming that the order placement decisions must be adapted dynamically. Furthermore, we show how a duality-based technique can be used to assess the quality of our numerical solution.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Interface Between Internal and External Auditors

Professional standards place specific responsibilities on auditors for the discovery of material mis-statements in reports of corporate financial performance. Certain factors have been shown to increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. One warning sign is the potentially pervasive effect of a weak internal control environment consistent with a weak internal audit group. This study investigates the impact of internal audit department quality differences on auditors ‘willingness to place reliance on the work performed by internal auditors. The study also gives consideration to auditors’ recent experiences with material errors and irregularities and examines the influence of two previously untested individual auditor differences on audit judgment decisions: (1) conflict management style and (2) perception of internal/external auditor communication barriers. The results indicate that auditors attend to internal audit department quality differences and that individual auditor differences exhibit significant influence over auditor judgments. Implications for audit practice are considered and directions for future research are suggested.     

Cross-Subsidies, External Financing Constraints, and the Contribution of the Internal Capital Market to Firm Value

We examine the link between the excess value of a diversifiedfirm and the value of its internal capital market. Subsidiesto small financially constrained segments with good relativeinvestment opportunities significantly increase excess value,while transfers of resources from segments with good relativeinvestment opportunities significantly decrease excess value.Of interest is that subsidies to small financially constrainedsegments with poor relative investment opportunities also significantlyincrease excess value. However, there is little evidence thatthis result depends on the diversity of a firm's investmentopportunities. We conclude that financing constraints drivethe relationship between the internal capital market and firmvalue.     

External Financing,Growth and Stock Returns

In this paper we investigate the relation of the value/growth anomaly with the anomaly on corporate financing activities. We confirm and expand earlier results that value/growth and external financing indicators are, to some degree, related predictors of stock returns in the cross section. We show that external financing indicators are incrementally informative since they pick up stock returns associated with earnings quality. Portfolios that combine information from both these indicators generate significantly higher returns than portfolios containing each individual indicator. More importantly, our analysis strongly suggests that the external financing anomaly is, to some extent, distinct from the value/growth anomaly, in that it may also reflect investors’ misunderstanding of the effects of opportunistic earnings management.     

高管过度自信与现金股利相关性研究——基于融资约束的视角

〗以股改后2007~2011年A股上市公司为样本,考察融资约束对高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系的影响。结果发现：高管过度自信与上市公司现金股利支付之间具有负相关关系,但这种负向关系只有在非国有上市公司较为显著。进一步研究表明,高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系在不同股权性质下存在差异的主要原因来自于外源融资约束的影响,较强的外源融资约束加剧了高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应,而外源融资环境的改善可以在一定程度上抑制高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应。     

An Examination of Substitution among Monitoring Devices: The Case of Internal and External Audit Expenditures

Much of the agency literature assumes that various monitoring devices are partial substitutes in reducing total agency costs. In particular, internal and external auditing often are characterized as monitoring devices that should be partial substitutes. We argue that reliable evidence of this relation is lacking because prior studies using cross-sectional archival data have not carefully considered the implications of microeconomic theory of substitution for the models estimated. Our analysis leads to a reexamination of the relation using time-series data. We find no evidence that systematic substitution of internal for external auditing (or vice versa) occurred during the period 1989–1993. Further analysis indicates that the relative prices of internal and external auditing inputs did not change during the period. Therefore a necessary condition for substitution to occur did not exist. Although we do not detect substitution with our sample, the analysis and methodology we develop contribute to the literature by enhancing researchers understanding of substitution among monitoring methods.     

Methods of Payment in Asset Sales: Contracting with Equity versus Cash

We analyze intercorporate asset sales where equity is the means of payment, and compare the results to cash asset sales. Equity deals are value‐enhancing for both buyers, 10%, and sellers, 3%, while cash sales generate seller returns of 1.9% and buyer returns that are not significant. Combined wealth gains are large for equity deals, but modest for cash deals. Equity‐based asset sales are not a precursor to consolidations between buyers and sellers, and do not affect buyer openness to the takeover market. We conclude that the use of buyer equity conveys favorable information about the value of assets and buyers.