A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment

Summary. We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the undercutting firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria are payoff dominated by unemployment equilibria, and the arguments are robust to decreasing returns.Received: 21 May 2001, Revised: 15 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D43, E24.Correspondence to: Leo KaasWe thank an anonymous referee, Woojin Lee, Klaus Ritzberger and seminar participants in Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Prague, Vienna, and Warwick for helpful comments. Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) under grant L138251030 and from the Manchester School Visiting Fellowship Scheme is gratefully acknowledged.     

Redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment

We study optimal redistribution policy in an economy with three types of unemployed persons: those unable to work, the voluntarily unemployed, and the involuntarily unemployed. Both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous. Voluntary unemployment arises because individuals have different preferences, while involuntary unemployment results from frictions in the labour market or from an efficiency wage. We consider the employment policies of a well-informed government when it can and cannot commit to its policies. The model is simple, yet rich enough to reflect real-world policies, including transfers to the disabled, welfare for non-working employables, unemployment insurance, employment subsidies, and taxes on workers and firms.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Lucas on involuntary unemployment

The aim of this paper is to examine critically Lucas' argumentsagainst Keynes's General Theory and in particular against Keynes'sconcept of involuntary unemployment. It comprises two main parts.In the first part of the paper, the author questions Lucas'sclaim that Keynes betrayed the equilibrium discipline by freeinghimself from the postulates of optimising behaviour and marketclearing. In the second part, Lucas’ three arguments againstthe involuntary unemployment concept are discussed—first,that there is no rationale for drawing a distinction betweentwo sorts of unemployment; second, that every economic outcomefeatures the voluntary and the involuntary jointly; and third,that alternatives to unemployment are always present.     

Economic growth,structural change,and search unemployment

Economic growth is driven by structural change. Structural change does not come without a cost. The most evident social cost of structural change is high and persistent unemployment. This paper develops a model with an endogenously expanding service sector, where the constant flow of workers in and out of employment leads to structural unemployment. The main finding is that the level of unemployment is different between the initial period and the long-run equilibrium growth path, and that along the transition path, the level of unemployment will overshoot its equilibrium level, which can explain the long-run pattern of unemployment in most industrialized countries.      

Long-term unemployment and labour force participation: a decomposition of unemployment to test for the discouragement and added worker hypotheses

We sharpen tests for ‘discouragement’ and ‘added worker’ effects by splitting the explanatory variable – the unemployment rate – into a short-term component and a long-term component. While short-term unemployment (STU) might not result in additional workers on a large scale, long-term unemployment (LTU) reduces household income more, increasing the need for additional income. On the other hand, it may discourage older workers for psychological and sociological reasons. Applying our model to the German labour market, these hypotheses could be confirmed. Even for men, about whom only a few empirical studies on this issue are available, distinguishing between STU and LTU reveals added worker as well as discouragement effects.     

不完全劳动市场、政府干预与失业率

本文针对我国不完全的劳动市场,建立了一个短视一搜寻模型,目的是要说明,第一,虽然政府直接干预下的就业率高于无政府干预的劳动市场的均衡就业率,但是后者的社会总福利水平高于前者,而且,无政府干预情形下失业者的福利水平不会低于政府干预时在低工资岗位上的就业者的福利水平.这说明政府直接干预劳动市场虽然有可能降低失业率,但可能导致整个社会福利损失,也不利于提高低收入人群的福利水平.第二,我国现行的社会保障制度、户籍制度以及地方保护政策妨碍城乡劳动力自由流动,造成城市居民一般占据了工资较高的岗位,农村居民一般只能找到工资较低的岗位.这种匹配过程达到的劳动市场均衡,虽然有可能最大限度降低城镇失业率,但不是使得全国总失业率最低的均衡.     

A Schumpeterian model of equilibrium unemployment and labor turnover

This paper constructs a general equilibrium model of equilibrium unemployment by combining an endogenous growth model with a variant of equilibrium search theory. The analysis offers two explanations for the causes of widening wage gap between skilled and less-skilled labor, and rising unemployment rate among the less skilled: technological change in the form of an increase in the size of innovations or skilled labor saving technological change in R&D activity. In addition, the model identifies two distinct effects of faster technological progress on the aggregate unemployment rate. First, it increases the rate of labor turnover and therefore increases the aggregate unemployment rate – the creative destruction effect. Second, it creates R&D jobs, which offer workers complete job security, and consequently reduces the aggregate unemployment rate – the resource reallocation effect.     

Comment: Lucas on involuntary unemployment

Keynes distinguishes three concepts: voluntary, frictional and(Keynesian) involuntary unemployment. Frictional unemploymentis a Classical form of involuntary unemployment (not voluntary,as Lucas suggests), and reflects the Marshallian, rather thanWalrasian, treatment of time and equilibrium. Lucas contradictsboth Keynes and Pigou in asserting that there are always immediatevacancies for unskilled labour, and abstracts from the veryproblem that Keynes seeks to address. If voluntary unemploymentis re-defined appropriately, as De Vroey helpfully suggestselsewhere, the prefix ‘involuntary’ is dispensable,not because all unemployment is voluntary, as Lucas would haveit, but because it is all involuntary.     

Heterogeneous determinants of local unemployment in Poland

We identify determinants of large disparities in local unemployment rates across Poland. Using an extensive panel data-set on the NUTS-4 level (i.e. the poviats level, or districts or counties level) we examine a wide range of determinants of local unemployment. Our research examines two groups of the determinants: one related to equilibrium theory and the other related to disequilibrium theory of local unemployment. We find that demographics, education and sectoral employment composition exert a stronger impact over rates of local unemployment than various demand factors. The impact of the determinants, while robust for outliers, is not homogeneous across Polish regions. In particular, in the most depressed local labour markets, skill improvement programmes do not appear to work and unemployment rates are relatively less responsive to investment. Our research suggests that there is no easy cure for local unemployment in Poland, but a few policies have the potential to slightly reduce existing disparities.     

Excess supply equilibria

This paper addresses a fundamental problem in economic theory: How can there be equilibria of the economic system where some commodity is in excess supply, yet that commodity's relative price shows no tendency to fall? Of course, the principal example of such a phenomenon is an economy experiencing a prolonged period of involuntary unemployment of the labor force during which there is no significant change in the real wage.In the following pages, I shall describe a two-commodity, general equilibrium model that has a continuum of unemployment equilibria, one for any given unemployment rate. The important feature of this model is that workers establish their wage rates in an attempt to maximize expected utility. The information upon which these wage setting decisions are based is provided by actual labor market transactions.Despite the voluntary nature of the wage setting decision, I shall argue that each equilibrium of this economy exhibits involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense. For there will always be another equilibrium with a lower real wage, a higher level of employment, and at which (at least when workers are risk neutral) each worker achieves a higher level of expected utility.     

Stick,Carrot and Skill Acquisition*

We evaluate the impact of specially designed youth unemployment programmes (YUPs), intended to provide young unemployed unskilled workers with skills. If unemployment among skilled workers is lower than among unskilled workers, YUPs imply that unemployment falls. However, YUPs potentially crowd out ordinary training. We set up an equilibrium matching model with endogenous skill choice and examine the impact of an increase in programme participation. We derive a condition for crowding out of ordinary training, as well as a condition for an increase in the skilled labour force and thereby reduced unemployment. The impact of YUPs on welfare and wage dispersion is also considered.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION*

This article develops a model that incorporates workers' fair wage preferences into a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms. In a setting where the wage considered to be fair by workers depends on the productivity of the firm they are working in, we study the determinants of profits, involuntary unemployment and within‐group wage inequality. We use this model to investigate the effects of globalization, thereby pointing to distributional conflicts that have so far not been accounted for: a simultaneous increase of average profits and involuntary unemployment as well as a surge in within‐group wage inequality.     

Optimal speed of transition with a shrinking labour force and under uncertainty*

In the 1990s – during the restructuring of large state enterprises – Central European economies experienced high unemployment. Social policy expenditures, particularly targeted to the non‐employed, grew faster than expected due to the need to finance the out‐of‐the‐labour categories. In 1992, after the Passive Labour Market Policies’ reforms, the pace of transition decelerated. Unemployment dynamics, speed of transition and non‐employment policies are modelled based on the assumption that the labour force is shrinking over time. Dismissed workers have the opportunity to choose an outside‐option alternative to labour force participation. Individual uncertainty is assumed in a first phase of transition, while aggregate uncertainty – generating opposition to restructuring – is modelled in a second phase. The model predicts a slowdown in the speed of transition.     

Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium*

In this paper we introduce a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative analysis identifies externalities associated with firm‐provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.     

International Capital Mobility in the Presence of Unemployment Insurance

The paper develops a general–equilibrium model with layoff unemployment to examine the effect of different unemployment insurance policies on international capital mobility. Conditions are derived under which capital will flow to the high–benefit country. Incentives for international capital movements are unaffected by how the burden of financing unemployment benefits is distributed between workers and firms. It is shown that capital outflows might have positive welfare effects for workers. This contrasts with results from standard models of international factor movements.     

Bidding for Labor

We present a competing-auction theory of the labor market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction mechanism also generates equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers and constrained-efficient entry of vacancies in large economies. In a dynamic version of the model, we generate implied numerical values for equilibrium unemployment and wage dispersion. The theory makes the novel prediction that wage dispersion is a decreasing function of the discount factor and labor market tightness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E24, J31, J41, J64, D44.     

Redistributing Gains from Globalisation*

This paper analyses the effects of redistribution in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms in which a fair‐wage effort mechanism leads to firm‐specific wage payments and involuntary unemployment. The redistribution scheme is financed by profit taxes and gives the same absolute lump‐sum transfer to all workers. International trade increases aggregate income and income inequality, ceteris paribus. If, however, trade is accompanied by a suitably chosen increase in the profit tax rate, it is possible to achieve higher aggregate income and a more equal income distribution than in autarky, provided that the share of exporters is sufficiently high.     

Patinkin as a reader of Keynes’ General Theory: Are wage cuts a good remedy to unemployment?1

Abstract

This paper analyses Patinkin's appraisal of Keynes’ concept of involuntary unemployment while focusing on his reading of the General Theory Chapter 19. On several critical issues, Patinkin departs from Keynes’ original matters of concerns. He leans against an individual criterion for unemployment and implicitly endorses Wicksell's understanding of voluntary unemployment as chosen leisure. His appraisal of involuntary unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon ultimately relies on nominal rigidities and assumes the existence of a competitive adjustment process. On all these three critical points, Patinkin departs from Keynes but also initiates the contemporary New Keynesian programme that went even further from Keynes.