IS-LM stability and economic policy effectiveness: A note

Accepting the findings of Weber (1970) and Yarrow (1975), Cebula finds that conventional fiscal policy has its usual positive effect on the level of income while monetary policy has a negative impact. This paper shows that if a budget constraint of the specific, simplified form G ? T = ΔM is added to the model, the results differ from Cebula's.     

Clusters and comparative advantage: Implications for industrial policy

Cases of industrial agglomeration or “clusters” arise in the presence of industry-specific and local externalities, also called Marshallian externalities. The standard argument is that such externalities may justify a policy of infant-industry protection to allow and encourage clusters to emerge. In this paper I explore this carefully, and show that different policy implications emerge under a more realistic modeling of clusters. In particular, rather than distorting prices to promote clusters in “advanced sectors” that may exhibit strong clustering possibilities, countries should focus instead on promoting clustering in current sectors, which have revealed to have the strongest comparative advantage. Import substitution is not a proper way to achieve this.     

Appropriate technology assessment: A note on policy considerations

This paper summarizes various positions on appropriate technology and its relation to technological dependence, and certain contradictions within the concept are pointed out. An alternative approach to policy questions in appropriate technology assessment and independence is then proposed using a framework involving three economic sectors—the consumer goods sector, capital goods sector, and technological change sector.     

更加严格的环境政策能否使得污染度较小的产品具有比较优势？

一、概述贸易自由化对环境的影响在今天是一个有广泛争论的议题。贸易在最近几十年间的飞速增长,导致了各种对生产专业化的提高可能会对环境产生有害的影响的担心,尤其是对发展中国家,这些国家对环境保护所做的努力充其量不过是微不足道的。贸易与环境这一议题已产生了许多的研     

Comparative advantage and strategic specialization

This paper shows that a strong comparative advantage is necessary for free trade and specialization in a 2 × 2 symmetric Ricardian model to be achieved in a Nash equilibrium. Governments strategically control labor distribution across industries, and representative agents maximize Cobb–Douglas utilities. A Nash equilibrium with complete specialization is achieved if and only if relative productivity exceeds a key value of 3, which is considered a very large number based on previous empirical studies. This paper also introduces a two‐stage game where each government chooses labor distribution first and then tariffs. In this two‐stage game, complete specialization is never achieved for any relative productivity level. Finally, by generalizing the Cobb–Douglas model into constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences, I show that if immiserizing growth effects exist, complete specialization could not be achieved for any level of relative productivity.     

A note on non-uniqueness and the role of policy

In general, models embodying rational expectations must have unstable roots in order that a unique non-explosive solution exists. Peel 1981 has identified a role for the authorities in ensuring uniqueness by judicious choice of their feedback policy parameter to influence the eigenvalues of the model. This may mean, however, a loss of degree of freedom in stabilizing the economy if the stability condition acts as a binding constraint on the policy parameter. This paper offers an alternative way in which the authorities can formulate policy and determine a well-defined solution but which leaves stabilization policy unconstrained.     

General equilibrium effects of environmental policy: A CGE-modeling approach

Estimation of emission control cost functions is often carried out in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e., under the assumption that emission control measures have negligible effects on input and output prices. In this paper a computable general equilibrium model is used for simulation of the impact on factor prices and resource allocation of reductions of SO _infx ^sup- , NO _infx ^su- and CO₂-emissions. Thus the model includes markets for tradable emission permits, and the equilibrium prices of permits reflect the marginal costs of emission control. The results suggest that major emission reductions are likely to have general equilibrium effects, and thus that emission control cost functions that fail to take these effects into account may give a distorted picture of the economic impact of emission control.     

International transmission of environmental policy: A New Keynesian perspective

In this paper we examine the international transmission of environmental policy using a New Keynesian model of the global economy. We first consider the case in which the quality of the environment affects utility, but not productivity. This allows us to look at the trade-off between environmental quality and output. We then consider the case in which the quality of the environment increases productivity but does not affect utility. Our main results show that in both cases a unilateral implementation of a more stringent environmental policy by the domestic country raises foreign welfare under a benchmark parameterization. Our modeling strategy allows an analysis of how nominal rigidities interact with the implementation of environmental reforms, by allowing the domestic country to shift, through exchange rate depreciation, parts of the costs of more stringent environmental policies to the foreign one.     

Fiscal policy in an endogenous-growth model with public investment: A note

This note extends the basic endogenous-growth model by Barro [Journal of Political Economy (1990) 98: S103–S125]. It is supposed that the government pays lump-sum transfers to the representative household or levies a lump-sum tax, besides financing public investment. Growth and welfare effects of fiscal policy are studied for the competitive economy and the growth rate of the social optimum is compared with the one of the competitive economy.     

A note concerning a credit rule for monetary policy

A technique introduced by Friedman is used to analyze the ability of the Federal Reserve to control the money supply. We find that the necessary conditions for control are so restrictive that a constant growth rate for the money stock may not be achievable. We suggest, therefore, a steady growth rate for Federal Reserve Credit.     

Green consumers and environmental policy

The present paper examines how improvements in consumers' environmental awareness influence the choice between output and emission taxes, within a framework of imperfect competition and endogenous choice of abatement level. We first show that in the absence of policy intervention, there exists a level of environmental awareness beyond which welfare is decreasing as market imperfections become more prominent relative to environmental concerns. We also confirm that both output and emission taxes are welfare superior to the free-market case. What is surprising, however, is that the welfare performance of an optimally chosen emissions tax is monotonically decreasing in consumers' environmental sensitivity, while the opposite is true for an output tax up to a certain level. At low levels of consumers' environmental awareness an emissions tax is welfare superior, but eventually, there is a level of environmental awareness beyond which an output-tax welfare dominates an emissions tax. Therefore, an emissions tax is better suited to societies that have not yet developed high levels of environmental awareness, while societies characterized by high levels of environmental awareness should prefer an output tax.     

A note on the optimal choice of monetary and fiscal policy

This paper studies the instrument-target problem associated with a simple macroeconomic model with conditions of uncertainty. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that if a model is linear with nonstochastic coefficients and with additive disturbances and if the policy objective is to maximize the expected value of the quadratic loss function, then it is the choice of endogenous variables that alters the expected loss value. This contrasts with the findings of Poole, Sargent, Turnovsky, et al., in which the expected losses are compared for different instruments while endogenous variables are changed at the same time. Thus, if basic model specifications are unchanged, an important cause for different expected losses under different policy instruments is seen to lie in the choice of endogenous variables.     

Efficient decentralized fiscal and environmental policy: A dual purpose Henry George tax

One consequence of decentralized responsibility to set tax policy and environmental standards is that local governments might try to attract industry and jobs by underproviding local public goods with lower taxes or lax environmental standards or both. But if local authorities exploit fixed property site (i.e., land) taxation to fund local public goods, affect firm migration, and internalize potential local emission rents, herein we find decentralized efficiency is supported. This result reflects a dual form of the classic Henry George theorem previously overlooked.     

Sraffa numeraire and reswitching: A note A note

The paper demonstrates that changing the numeraire from Hicks' to Sraffa's does not affect the location and, a fortiori, the number of switch points between two given techniques. This negates some recent claims to the contrary, and supports the earlier general position that the choice of numeraire has no bearing on reswitching, even though it does have a bearing on capital reversal. In the process the paper shows that the rate of growth of the economy and the marginal propensity to save also do not affect the switch points, which may thus be regarded as depending essentially on technical factors alone.     

Models in evolutionary economics and environmental policy: Towards an evolutionary environmental economics

In this paper we review evolutionary economic modelling in relation to environmental policy. We discuss three areas in which evolutionary economic models have a particularly high added value for environmental policy-making: the double externality problem, technological transitions and consumer demand. We explore the possibilities to apply evolutionary economic models in environmental policy assessment, including the opportunities for making policy-making endogenous to environmental innovation. We end with a critical discussion of the challenges that remain.     

Theories of the firm, competitive advantage and government policy

To improve the effectiveness of government policy, it is necessay to develop a good picture of what a firms in a knowledge-intensive economy is and does. In this paper, we have drawn on the recent surge of books and articles on the resource- and knowledge-based theories of the firm and their implications for competitive advantage. We would like to contribute to that discussion summarizing that debate and exploring the implications for government policy. In new theories of the firm, emphasis is placed on the crucial importance of knowledge, a production factor which is not easily imitated. Exampb of government policy which are based on these new inskhts are the recognition of the importance of demanding clients, the emphasis on the unique potential of the local business environment and the stimulation of transfer of knowledge between firms and networks instead of subsidizing project for knowledge development in isolated firms. A more realistic view of business behaviour will improve the effectiveness of policy, thereby generally improving the competitive position of firms.     

Dynamic comparative advantage: Some implications for trade policy in North America

This paper explores the implications of changing North American trade policies for dynamic comparative advantage and shows, with examples from the energy and high-technology sectors, how a new policy based on interdependence might work. Newly industrializing countries such as Mexico should aim to break into industries with progressively higher technological and value-added components, such as computer manufacturing—industries that are entering a period of expanded demand and going beyond the period of greatest capital intensity. Although few Mexican firms might be expected to enter such oligopolistic markets alone (at least in the short run), they could combine forces with established enterprises abroad in order to permit gradual market penetration. The examples in the paper illustrate the need for a stable macroeconomic framework for policymaking that includes exchange rates, investment incentives, relative price behavior, taxes, intellectual property rights, labor and environmental regulations, capital market policies, harmonization of standards, and other measures. There is also a need for policies that anticipate the potential private and social returns of activities that might be overlooked in a static framework.     

Partial cross-ownership and strategic environmental policy

This paper analyzes the effect of passive investment in rival firms on the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes. We consider two firms located in different countries, with each firm owning the same percentage of the stock of its rival. We show that bilateral partial cross-ownership affects the taxes set by the countries in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. When the stake that one firm has in its rival is great enough and environmental spillovers are low enough, cooperative taxes are lower than non-cooperative taxes. For the remaining values of parameters the opposite result is obtained.     

Transaction costs and environmental policy design

This article synthesizes the growing empirical literature on transaction costs to identify pragmatic design recommendations for environmental and natural resource policies. The New Institutional Economics literature recognizes that appropriate policy choice and design will be a function of the specific characteristics of the problem. The physical and institutional determinants of both transaction costs and abatement costs should be considered in the policy design process due to potential interactions between them. Analysts also need to incorporate the extent to which the technologies, institutional environment, governance structures, or policy designs can be changed; some factors can only be adjusted to or “designed around” while others can be designed differently. This framework highlights the importance of property rights since transaction costs will be incurred to obtain or retain property rights and since the rights assignment may affect both the magnitudes and distribution of costs. Another implication is that education and extension programs or use of behavioral economics concepts to affect choices can be cost-effective in some circumstances. Policy design should take advantage of economies of scale and foster technical change. Appropriate sequencing of policy instruments may decrease transaction costs, particularly if there is potential for technical change.