Capital Controls and the International Transmission of U.S. Money Shocks

We assess whether capital controls effectively insulate countries from U.S. monetary shocks, examining a large range of country experiences in a unified estimation framework. We estimate the effect of identified U.S. monetary shocks on the exchange rate and foreign country interest rates, and test whether countries with less open capital accounts exhibit systematically smaller responses. We find essentially no evidence of this. Other country factors such as the exchange rate regime or degree of dollarization explain more of the cross-country differences in responses. The significant differences in responses we do find are more pronounced at short horizons.     

Hot Money and Quantitative Easing: The Spillover Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy on the Chinese Economy

We develop a factor‐augmented vector autoregression (FA‐VAR) model to estimate the effects that unanticipated changes in U.S. monetary policy and economic policy uncertainty have on the Chinese housing, equity, and loan markets. We find the decline in the U.S. policy rate since the Great Recession has led to a significant increase in Chinese housing investment. One possible reason for this effect is the substantial increase in the inflow of “hot money” into China. The responses of Chinese variables to U.S. shocks at the zero lower bound are different from those responses in normal times.     

Macroeconomic Implications of “Deep Habits” in Banking

Recent empirical evidence shows that price‐cost margins in the market for bank credit are countercyclical in the U.S. economy and that this cyclical behavior can be explained in part from the fact that switching banks is costly for customers (i.e., from a borrower hold‐up effect). Our goal, in this paper, is to study the “financial accelerator” role of these countercyclical margins as a propagation mechanism of macroeconomic shocks. To do so, we apply the “deep habits” framework in Ravn, Schmitt‐Grohé, and Uribe (2006) to financial markets to model this hold‐up effect within a monopolistically competitive banking industry. We are able to reproduce the pattern of price‐cost margins observed in the data, and to show that the real effects of aggregate total factor productivity shocks are larger the stronger the friction implied by borrower hold‐up. Also, output, investment, and employment all become more volatile than in a standard model with constant margins in credit markets. An empirical contribution of our work is to provide structural estimates of the deep habits parameters for financial markets.     

Financial development and the instability of open economies

This paper introduces a framework for analyzing the role of financial factors as a source of instability in small open economies. Our basic model is a dynamic open economy model with a tradeable good produced with capital and a country-specific factor. We also assume that firms face credit constraints, with the constraint being tighter at a lower level of financial development. A basic implication of this model is that economies at an intermediate level of financial development are more unstable than either very developed or very underdeveloped economies. This is true both in the sense that temporary shocks have large and persistent effects and also in the sense that these economies can exhibit cycles. Thus, countries that are going through a phase of financial development may become more unstable in the short run. Similarly, full capital account liberalization may destabilize the economy in economies at an intermediate level of financial development: phases of growth with capital inflows are followed by collapse with capital outflows. On the other hand, foreign direct investment does not destabilize.     

Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates

We find that in a sample of emerging economies business cycles are more volatile than in developed ones, real interest rates are countercyclical and lead the cycle, consumption is more volatile than output and net exports are strongly countercyclical. We present a model of a small open economy, where the real interest rate is decomposed in an international rate and a country risk component. Country risk is affected by fundamental shocks but, through the presence of working capital, also amplifies the effects of those shocks. The model generates business cycles consistent with Argentine data. Eliminating country risk lowers Argentine output volatility by 27% while stabilizing international rates lowers it by less than 3%.     

Evidence on the Relationship between Housing and Consumption in the United States: A State‐Level Analysis

We estimate the dynamic effects of U.S. housing market shocks on state‐level spending and home prices from a dynamic common factor model, and identify housing demand and supply shocks using a sign‐restrictions approach. While state‐level spending and house prices gradually respond positively and persistently to aggregate housing demand shocks, there is significant variation across states in the magnitude of these responses. Cross‐state regressions of the estimated responses on an index of mortgage market development suggest that spending in states with greater opportunities for home equity borrowing is more sensitive to housing demand shocks than in states with fewer opportunities, which is consistent with the prominence of a “collateral” channel over a “wealth” channel in explaining the link between housing and the overall economy.     

News and Business Cycles in Open Economies

We study the effects of news about future total factor productivity (TFP) in a small open economy. We show that an open‐economy version of the neoclassical model produces a recession in response to good news about future TFP. We propose an open‐economy model that generates comovement in response to TFP news. The key elements of our model are a weak short‐run wealth effect on the labor supply and adjustment costs to labor and investment. We show that our model also generates comovement in response to news about future investment‐specific technical change and to “sudden stops.”     

Capital inflows and asset prices: Evidence from emerging Asia

The withdrawal of foreign capital from emerging countries at the height of the recent financial crisis and its quick return sparked a debate about the impact of capital flow surges on asset markets. This paper addresses the response of property prices to an inflow of foreign capital. For that purpose we estimate a panel VAR on a set of Asian emerging market economies, for which the waves of inflows were particularly pronounced, and identify capital inflow shocks based on sign restrictions. Our results suggest that capital inflow shocks have a significant effect on the appreciation of house prices and equity prices. Capital inflow shocks account for – roughly – twice the portion of overall house price changes they explain in OECD countries. We also address cross-country differences in the house price responses to shocks, which are most likely due to differences in the monetary policy response to capital inflows.     

External constraints and endogenous growth: Why didn't some countries benefit from capital flows?

Empirical evidence on the growth benefits of capital inflows is mixed. The growth benefits accruing from capital inflows also appear to be larger for high savings countries. We explain this phenomenon using an OLG model of endogenous growth in open economies with borrowing constraints that can generate both positive and negative growth effects of capital inflows. The amount an economy can borrow is restricted by an endogenous enforcement constraint. In our setting, with physical capital and a pay-as-you-go pensions system, the steady state is unique. However, it can either be constrained or unconstrained. In a constrained economy, opening up to equity and FDI inflows can be bad for growth because it makes the domestic interest rate too low, which endogenously tightens borrowing constraints. Agents decrease savings and investment in productivity-enhancing activities resulting in lower growth. Results are reversed in an unconstrained economy. We also provide a quantitative analysis of these constraints and some policy implications.     

The Federal Reserve,the Emerging Markets,and Capital Controls: A High‐Frequency Empirical Investigation

In this paper, I use weekly data from seven emerging nations—four in Latin America and three in Asia—to investigate the extent to which changes in Fed policy interest rates have been transmitted into domestic short‐term interest rates during the 2000s. The results suggest that there is indeed an interest rates “pass‐through” from the Fed to emerging markets. However, the extent of transmission of interest rate shocks is different—in terms of impact, steady state effect, and dynamics—in Latin America and Asia. The results also indicate that capital controls are not an effective tool for isolating emerging countries from global interest rate disturbances. Changes in the slope of the U.S. yield curve, including changes generated by a “twist” policy, affect domestic interest rates in emerging countries. I also provide a detailed case study for Chile.     

Global Banks,Financial Shocks,and International Business Cycles: Evidence from an Estimated Model

This paper estimates a two‐country model with a global bank, using U.S. and euro area (EA) data. Empirically, a model version with a bank capital requirement outperforms a structure without such a constraint. A loan loss originating in one country triggers a global output reduction. Banking shocks matter more for EA macro variables than for U.S. real activity. Banking shocks account for about 2–5% of the unconditional variance of U.S. GDP and for 3–14% of the variance of EA GDP. During the 2007–09 recession, banking shocks accounted for about 15% of the fall in U.S. and EA GDP, and for more than a third of the fall in EA investment and employment.     

The Empirics of International Monetary Transmission: Identification and the Impossible Trinity

The transmission of monetary policy across borders is central to many open economy models. Research has tried to evaluate the “impossible trinity” through estimating international interest rate linkages under alternative exchange rate regimes using realized base country interest rates. Such interest rates include anticipated and endogenous elements, which need not propagate internationally. We compare international interest rate responses under pegged and non‐pegged regimes to identified, unanticipated, and exogenous U.S. interest rate changes and realized U.S. interest rate changes. We find important differences in estimated transmission from the two sets of measures—identified interest rate changes demonstrate a greater concordance with the impossible trinity than realized rate changes.     

美国货币政策溢出效应、中国资产价格波动与资本账户管理

本文以2016年美国加息事件为背景,研究美国货币政策对中国资本流动、资产价格和宏观经济的影响。基于小国开放动态随机一般均衡模型,本文梳理了美国货币政策溢出效应的具体传导渠道,发现国外利率升高后,资本流动具有外部性,导致国内资产价格下跌,其通过金融加速器进一步使国内投资下降、资产价格进一步下跌,从而使得国内资产预期回报进一步下降,加剧资本外流。基于政策和福利分析,本文发现资本账户管理可以有效缓解国外利率冲击对经济波动的影响,同时会提高货币政策的独立性,但也会影响国民财富的最优配置。因此,最优的资本账户管理应同时兼顾宏观审慎和效率两个方面。     

The run-up to the global financial crisis: A longer historical view of financial liberalization,capital inflows,and asset bubbles

Using forecast error and sensitivity analyses with a vector error correction model for the US economy, we find that the specific exogenous shocks that contributed to the run-up to the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 vary across the three time periods (1980–1988; 1989–1997; and 1998–2006) that are known for distinctive historical events. Deregulation in the 1980s and capital inflows in the early and mid-1990s triggered by the collapse of the European exchange rate mechanism contributed significantly to changes in real house prices. However, capital inflows after the Asian financial crises in 1997 were driven in large part by rising asset prices. Thus, there were interesting changes in the nature of exogenous shocks and directions of causality through the three sub-periods. These results are robust even after controlling for the exogenous global factors partly determining short-run changes in capital flows, asset prices, and per capita real GDP. We conclude that all of the short run changes in response to financial deregulation starting in the 1980s, surges in capital inflows in the early 1990s, and people's expectation of ever-rising asset prices in the late 1990s and early 2000s culminated in the crisis of 2007–2009.     

The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance*

In a 40‐plus year career notable for path‐breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co‐author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories:

• ? Work on “debt overhang” and the financial “pecking order” that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent “mandatory” infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury.
• ? Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the “second‐order” effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the “option‐like” character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing “growth” assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance.
• ? Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost‐of‐capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate‐setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries.

     

Measuring the effects of dollar appreciation on Asia: A FAVAR approach

Exchange rate shocks have mixed effects on economic activity in both theory and empirical VAR models. In this paper, we extend the empirical literature by considering the implications of a positive shock to the U.S. dollar in a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model for the U.S. and three large Asian economies: Korea, Japan and China. The FAVAR framework allows us to represent a country’s aggregate economic activity by a latent factor, generated from a broad set of underlying observable economic indicators. To control for global conditions, we also include in the FAVAR a “global conditions index,” which is another latent factor generated from the economic indicators of major trading partners. We find that a dollar appreciation shock reduces economic activity and inflation not only for the U.S. economy, but also for all three Asian economies. This result, which is robust to a number of alternative specifications, suggests that in spite of their disparate economic structures and policy regimes, the dollar appreciation shock affects the Asian economies primarily through its impact on U.S. aggregate demand; and this demand channel dominates the expenditure-switching channel that affects a country’s export competitiveness.     

Capital flows to emerging market economies: A brave new world?

We examine the determinants of net private capital inflows to emerging market economies (EMEs) since 2002. Our main findings are: First, growth and interest rate differentials between EMEs and advanced economies and global risk appetite are statistically and economically important determinants of net private capital inflows. Second, there have been significant changes in the behavior of net inflows from the period before the recent global financial crisis to the post-crisis period, especially for portfolio inflows, partly explained by the greater sensitivity of such flows to interest rate differentials since the crisis. Third, capital controls introduced in recent years do appear to have discouraged both total and portfolio net inflows. Finally, we find positive effects of unconventional U.S. monetary policy on EME inflows, especially portfolio inflows. Even so, U.S. unconventional policy is one among several important factors influencing flows.     

How sensitive are consumer expenditures to retail energy prices?

There is growing evidence that the primary effect of energy price shocks on the U.S. economy involves a reduction in consumer spending. We quantify the direct effect on real consumption of unanticipated changes in discretionary income, shifts in precautionary savings, and changes in the operating cost of energy-using durables. The possibility of asymmetries in the response of real consumption to energy price shocks is also considered. We demonstrate that linear models are consistent with the symmetric behavior of real consumption in 1979 (when energy prices increased sharply) and in 1986 (when they fell sharply). It is shown that historically energy price shocks have been an important factor in explaining U.S. real consumption growth, but by no means the dominant factor.     

The effect of TARP on the propagation of real estate shocks: Evidence from geographically diversified banks

This study examines the effect of TARP on the propagation of real estate shocks via geographically diversified banks in the U.S. I find that TARP money provided for banks exposed to distressed areas (i.e., “affected” banks) was positively associated with small business loan originations in “non-distressed” areas (i.e., counties with smaller real estate shocks), mitigating the shock transmission. In addition, the bailout funds facilitated “affected” banks’ faster return to their pre-crisis level of franchise value. Overall, the marginal benefit of TARP funds seems to have been greater for “affected” TARP banks. I conclude that this policy helped “affected” banks cleanse/strengthen their balance sheets and recapitalize, which paved the way for increased lending.     

External shocks, U.S. monetary policy and macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets

Estimated structural VARs show that external shocks are an important source of macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets. Furthermore, U.S. monetary policy shocks affect interest rates and the exchange rate in a typical emerging market quickly and strongly. The price level and real output in a typical emerging market respond to U.S. monetary policy shocks by more than the price level and real output in the U.S. itself. These findings are consistent with the idea that “when the U.S. sneezes, emerging markets catch a cold.” At the same time, U.S. monetary policy shocks are not important for emerging markets relative to other kinds of external shocks.