The Marginal Costs and Benefits of Redistributing Income and the Willingness to Pay for Status

The effect of status on aggregate welfare is ambiguous for marginal reforms that redistribute income. If average consumption falls, the change in relative consumption increases household utility but reinforces the decrease in household labor supply, raising welfare cost. For parameterizations of the model developed here, reforms which lower average consumption increase aggregate welfare. Numerical calculations show that status increases marginal welfare cost and marginal net benefit for a demogrant reform. Redistributing to high income households may increase aggregate welfare depending on the definition of average consumption and if the willingness to pay for status increases with income.     

Soviet theories of economic demography: a survey

At this time Soviet demographic scientists maintain the position that population problems may in fact exist temporarily under socialism but that the planning principle will allow society to resolve population problems, through the use of the administrative, moral, and economic levers (subsidies, government policies, propaganda, education) emphasized by Urlanis (1974) and others. For planners to deal effectively with population management, the determinants of fertility and labor force participation must be established. The foundations of Soviet theories of human capital and fertility were laid by several writers. For the sake of simplicity, these are referred to as the Urlanis-Strumilin model, named after 2 pioneer researchers in Soviet demography and manpower economics. The formulations are based upon the writings of Strumlin (1964) and Urlanis (1974), supplemented by writings of numerous other Soviet researchers. Although their models avoid neoclassical terms such as marginal utility and income and price elasticities, they clearly employ these concepts. The Urlanis-Strumilin model, reduced to its basic elements, is a direct household utility maximizing model. The husband and wife, the household decision makers, must select optimal levels of child "quantity," child "quality," leisure, their own human capital (further education and training), and other goods. The Soviet theory recognizes that an increase in household income will increase relatively the demands for income elastic goods. The model postulates that the demand for child quality is inversely related to the price of children. The price of children is the opportunity cost of children, the major element of which is the income foregone by the mother in the course of childbearing and childrearing. The child quantity demand schedule has elastic and inelastic portions. The marginal utility of the 1st child is great. The marginal utilities of higher order children decline substantially. Families with at least 1 child can make substitutions between having more children and raising the quality of children already born. The question is what does the model predict will happen to fertility with economic development. The positive income effect will be limited as increased income is channelled into child quality and other superior goods rather than child quantity. The Urlanis-Strumilin model of labor supply assumes that the household allocates its time among market employment, household production. The model shows that the effect of children on female labor supply is not ambiguous. The presence of young children raises the value of home services and lowers long run market wages, thereby reducing female market labor supply. According to the model, the socialist state can manipulate labor supplies through several channels. It can reduce the value of home services by providing market substitutes. Soviet writers recognize the linkages between labor supply and fertility without formalizing the simultaneous relationship. The comparative statics of the Soviet model are essentially the same as those of the neoclassical model: an increase in "costs" of children will have, at best, a small positive impact on fertility.     

Household tax evasion

Household members share public goods and make intra-household transfers. We show how these features of the household interact with the tax evasion decision, and identify the dimensions in which household evasion differs from individual evasion. In the model we present two members of a household choose how much to contribute to a household public good and how much self-employment income to evade. We are interested in how different evasion possibilities interact with the contribution decisions to the household public good and the role of income transfers within the household. We show the household evasion decision differs from the individual decision because it affects the outcome of the household contribution game. When household members are taxed as individuals neutrality applies when choices are not constrained. If the evasion level of one household member is constrained then an income transfer can generate a Pareto improvement. When the household members are jointly taxed there is a couple constraint on strategies and corner solutions can emerge.     

Child participation,nature of work,and fertility demand: a theoretical analysis

A model of utility maximization with home production of children and standard of living is used to analyze the fertility behavior of a subsistence farming household in an agricultural lesser developed country. Assuming children as both consumer and producer goods, and assuming a prestige cost of their participation in labor force, the author derived alternative levels of fertility demand. The following different conditions of child participation were identified depending upon the size of the prestige cost and the resultant net gain from child work: (1) participation in wage-labor, if marginal child income from the family farm is less than marginal wage income; (2) participation in family farm works only, if the larger wage income is neutralized by a higher prestige cost, implying a lower child contribution; (3) participation in family farm works only, if its marginal child income is greater than wage income, thus providing the largest child contribution; and (4) no participation in labor force at all, implied by a very high prestige cost and resulting in no child contribution. The household demands a larger number of children under conditions (1) and (3) than under conditions (2) and (4). The results are then used to draw inferences regarding fertility behavior across different landholding households. It appears that landholding reduces fertility initially, increases it at the intermediate levels, and then decreases it when the household becomes a non-cultivating rental income earner. The nonmonotonic landholding-fertility relationship explains the contradictory empirical evidence which exists in the literature while also suggesting important implications for fertility regulation policy.     

Household Demand, Network Externality Effects and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

This paper examines the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination when network externality effects are present in the consumption of a durable good. We conduct our study in two settings. In a model with two household types, utilities are dependent on the cumulative proportion of households that have purchased the durable good. Next, in a model with a continuum of household types, we extend the analysis to the case where households consume both a durable good and a stream of non-durable goods. We show that in both settings, the presence of network externalities facilitates a sales strategy with intertemporal price discrimination.     

Consumption and fiscal policy

This paper uses the life-cycle approach to derive an equilibrium intratemporal efficiency condition which relates the marginal utility of consumption of nondurable goods and services to the marginal utility of consumption of services from durable goods. Given this condition and the assumption that marginal utilities are affected by the level of public spending, a long-run relationship between components of private consumption and public expenditure is then postulated. The application of cointegration analysis to UK data supports the existence and uniqueness of such a long-run relationship, and estimates based on the error correction approach produce results which suggest that (i) a change in public spending has different effects on components of private consumption in the short-run, and (ii) the entire burden of long-run substitution falls on nondurable consumption.     

CONSUMPTION (IN)EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT

Consumption may be inefficient when a household cannot choose the optimal bundle of goods at a minimum cost. After discussing alternative approaches, this paper proposes the use of money metric indirect utility function motivated by Feenstra and Varian in measuring consumption inefficiency. Then, Bamoul–Tobin transactions demand for money model is extended to show how household ability to manage its income, expenditure and financial accounts may affect consumption inefficiency. Results of the stochastic cost frontier approach, which is employed in estimation and the prediction of the European Union household consumption inefficiency, suggest that household expenditure performance is partly explained by the changes in the consumption efficiency and the efficiency is not independent of financial account management.     

中国居民收入差距对消费倾向变动趋势的影响

本文以消费的边际效用递减规律为基础,探讨了居民收入差距和消费倾向间可能的关系,并对中国居民消费倾向变动趋势进行解释.本文分析表明,收入差距对消费倾向可能的影响和经济发展水平有关系,当经济发展到一定程度时,居民收入差距在一定的范围内变化不会影响消费倾向的变化,但超过一定范围后,随着收入差距变大,消费倾向变低.我们认为过大的居民收入差距是造成近年来消费倾向变低的重要原因.     

Electricity Tariff Changes and Consumer Sentiment on Household Consumption Expenditure in Malaysia

Purpose

This study investigates the impact of the current electricity tariff, represented by optimized tariff calculation, on Malaysian household’s consumption across different levels of income.

Design/methodology/approach

The input-output (IO) model has vastly been used in many energy economics literature that presented the matrix of production between various sectors in an economy. This study aggregated the 124 subsectors in IO Price Table 2015 into 12 groups of consumption of goods and services based on Household Expenditure Survey 2019 (HES 2019) to meet the study’ objectives.

Findings

This study found that in all simulations, high-income earners would be highly affected by the tariff changes. The lower the increment level in electricity tariff rate, the lower the magnitude would be on the changes of household expenditure level.

Research limitations/implications

Optimization in electricity tariff consumptions can pattern the Malaysian household’s consumption across different levels of income efficiently.

Practical implications

Useful to all consumer in the Malaysia economic business sector to predict their energy consumption up to optimum level.

Social implications

The study’s findings can benefit the society in optimiza their electricity consumption since everyone requires the energy for basic needs in their life.

     

Generalizing the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem: A Tale of Two Matrices

Past attempts to generalize the Stolper–Samuelson theorem have used a matrix of real income terms which are sufficient but not necessary to define a change in utility. One can define a second matrix of terms which are necessary and sufficient for a change in indirect utility. Using this matrix, the paper extends the Stolper–Samuelson theorem to a model of any dimensions and to households which have diversified ownership of factors. The theorem states that there is a positive and a negative element in every row and every column of the matrix showing household responses to changes in goods prices.     

ILLEGAL DISPOSAL AND WASTE COLLECTION FREQUENCY

A model of household refuse production is presented in which the implications of the presence of dumping incentives for the public choice of garbage collection frequency under a user fee system are analysed. Insofar as governments wishing to balance their waste collection service budgets can set the marginal benefit of collecting garbage equal to its marginal cost, no externality arises through pick‐up frequency. However, when the expected punishment for dumping is zero or independent of its extent, the public provision of refuse collection frequency turns out to be negatively affected by the amount of garbage that individuals dump and, therefore, intervention in the management of household waste is required. The optimal policy is found to consist of taxes on consumption goods and subsidies for curbside (or legal) disposal and recycling that are directly linked to collection costs.     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

Household behavior and individual autonomy: an extended Lindahl mechanism

We present a comprehensive model of household economic decision covering both full cooperation and noncooperation as well as semi-cooperative cases, varying with income distribution and a parameter vector $\theta $ representing degrees of individual autonomy with respect to the public goods. In this model, the concept of “household $\theta $ -equilibrium” is introduced through the reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium for Nash implementation and its extension to semi-cooperation. Existence is proved and some generic properties derived. An example is given to illustrate. An important benefit of this approach is to allow for a compact and unified investigation of the testable (local) restrictions of household demand. A particular decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is derived and the testability of the various models discussed.     

Public-good valuation and intra-family allocation

I derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measured alternatively by household member i’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of the household, WTP _i (H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members, WTP(C). Households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient Nash bargains over private and common household goods. WTP _i (H) is then defined by trade-offs between the public good and the household good, and WTP(C) by trade-offs of between the public good and private goods. WTP _i (H) is found to be higher (lower) than WTP(C) when member i has a relatively high (low) marginal valuation of the public good, but tends on average to equal WTP(C). As a consequence, individuals tend to represent households correctly on average when questioned about the household’s WTP for a public good, even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully. Adding all members’ WTP answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting. Pure and paternalistic altruism (the latter attached to consumption of the public good) move each member’s WTP on behalf of the household closer to the true sum of individual WTP, but only paternalistic altruism raises this sum.      

Efficiency and group size in the voluntary provision of public goods with threshold preference

What is the optimal group size in the voluntary provision of public goods in a purely altruistic economy? The popular consensus on this fundamental question is that the free-rider problem worsens as the group size increases. This study provides a counterexample of the consensus by featuring plausible threshold preferences for certain typical public goods. Under these preferences, marginal utility hardly diminishes below a threshold level, but declines significantly in close proximity to the threshold and nearly drops to zero above the threshold. We find that threshold preferences significantly reduce inefficiency. We also show that if marginal costs increase, then the threshold preferences lead to a partly positive relationship between efficiency and group size, which allows us to detect the locally efficient group size. Moreover, the locally efficient group size is proportional to the slope of the marginal costs as well as the threshold of marginal utility.     

Effects of Changes in Household Size,Consumer Taste & Preferences on Demand Pattern in India

Current research in applied demand analysis has been addressing the twin issues of degree of non-linearity or curvature of the Engel curves and the ability to capture price effects appropriately by the demand system. Further, in addition to income and prices, the role of demographic variables like household size, composition and dynamic aspects like consumer taste & preferences are also being ’ emphasized in recent literature. Continuous efforts are being made to modify the existing models and propose new ones to incorporate the above developments. The purpose of this study is to re-examine the usefulness of the popular linear expenditure system vis-à-vis the two other flexible models viz. Nasse expenditure system, a generalization of the linear expenditure system itself, and the almost ideal demand system in the above context for India.The empirical results indicate wide variation in marginal budget shares and demand elasticities across income groups, rural-urban sectors and alternative models. The household size and consumer taste & preferences are found to be statistically significant. The results confirm the earlier findings that there are significant changes in consumer tastes away from cereals and pulses in favor of other food and nonfood commodities. The results also show that flexible models, which are theoretically superior, gave unacceptable positive price responses for some commodities and violated second order conditions of utility maximization. It is found that some ad-hoc separability restrictions are needed, thereby limiting the flexibility of the model, to get negative own-price responses in these models. But, second order conditions are still violated. The tests of nested hypotheses also confirm the need for inclusion of household size, consumer taste, income group and rural-urban dummies along with their interaction variables in the demand system.

     

The impact of artificial intelligence on economic growth and welfare

Focusing on the self-accumulation ability and the nonrival characteristic of artificial intelligence (AI), this paper develops a three-sector endogenous growth model and investigates the impact of the development of AI along the transitional dynamics path and the balanced growth path. The development of AI can increase economic growth along the transitional dynamics path, and can increase household short-run utility if an increase in the accumulation of AI is due to the rising productivity in the goods or AI sector, but can be detrimental to household short-run utility if an increase in the accumulation of AI is because firms use more AI to replace human labor. In addition, the development of AI is not necessarily beneficial to household welfare in the long run. The main results are unaffected when considering the case where AI can improve the accumulation of human capital, the traditional research and development model, and different kinds of physical capital.     

Tariff pass-through and the distributional effects of trade liberalization

This paper estimates the distribution of welfare gains due to the trade reforms in India by simultaneously considering the effect on prices of tradable goods and wages. The cost of consumption for each household is affected by the domestic price changes, while wage incomes adjust to these price changes in equilibrium. Three rounds of the Indian Employment and Consumption Surveys are used for the analysis. The price transmission mechanisms are estimated for both rural and urban areas to understand the extent to which the trade reforms are able to affect the domestic prices. In order to assess the distributional effects, a series of nonparametric local linear regressions are estimated. The findings show that households at all per capita expenditure levels had experienced gains as a result of the trade liberalization, while the average effect was generally pro-poor and varied significantly across the per capita expenditure spectrum.     

Tests of Income Pooling in Household Decisions

Using the Progresa data from Mexico, we investigate intrahousehold decision making using a variety of outcomes. We exploit both the experimental nature and the (short) panel dimension of the data to measure the impact of exogenous changes in the intrahousehold distribution of resources on household decisions. We test for global pooling of resources within households, which would correspond to the unitary model of household decision making. We also exploit a set of questions about power and the decision making process in the household to investigate aspects of strategic interactions between household members. Our findings confirm previous rejections of income pooling. We also cannot reject that the wife's relative income share is a significant determinant of the wife's decision making power in the household, with a higher share of income associated with more decision making power. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, D13, H31.     

Endogenous gender power,household labor supply and the demographic transition

We present a microeconomic model of the household in which there exists no difference in spousal preferences but childrearing is more time costly for women. Bargaining between the wife and the husband forms the basis of household decisions. Marital bargaining power is determined according to the incomes of the spouses, which in turn help to determine their reservation utility levels outside the marriage. The endogeneity of bargaining power introduces a non-cooperative element to the couples' decision-making problem because both the husbands and the wives take into account how their pre-marital education decisions affect their marital power and the share they extract from household resources in the future. The model predicts that wives invest more than is Pareto efficient in their education in order to increase their bargaining power in marriage. As a consequence, couples have fewer children and consume more when exogenous structural changes lead women to invest more in education. A corollary of the model is that empowering women directly through social reforms such as a lower gender wage gap leads to lower fertility and higher spousal consumption and leisure.