On graduation from fiscal procyclicality

In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical fiscal policy. In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical fiscal policy, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. We then focus on the role played by the quality of institutions, which appears to be a key determinant of a country’s ability to graduate. We show that, even after controlling for the endogeneity of institutions and other determinants of fiscal procyclicality, there is a causal link running from stronger institutions to less procyclical or more countercyclical fiscal policy.     

The Underlying Link between Fiscal Policy Patterns and International Reserves

This paper extends the model in Aizenman and Marion (2004 ) to study the underlying link and interaction between fiscal policy patterns and international reserves in developing countries. It shows that because of conditional access to international credit markets, the immediate impact of an adverse shock on an emerging economy is a lower level of international reserves and a procyclical fiscal policy. However, facing the uncertainty of future shocks, the authorities in this economy then have a strong incentive to hoard more precautionary reserves if possible. If the economy successfully accumulates more reserves, it can have a lower tax rate in the second period and its fiscal policy would be more countercyclical. The model's predictions are consistent with new empirical findings.     

Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in the Euro Area?

We test the relationship between the cyclically adjusted primary balance and alternative indicators of cyclical conditions for the euro area and 18 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. A countercyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy is found during bad times after 1999 in the euro area as a whole and in a few member countries only (France, Ireland and The Netherlands). It is also associated with high public deficits or low public debts. There is no significant case of procyclical fiscal policy after 1999, neither in good times nor in bad times.     

Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality

Recent research has demonstrated that while government expenditures are countercyclical in most industrialized countries, they tend to be procyclical in developing countries. We develop a dynamic political-economy model to explain this phenomenon. In the model, public expenditures provide insurance to uninsured households, and optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical. The introduction of a political friction, in which successive governments disagree on the desired distribution of public spending, can lead to procyclical fiscal policies. Numerical simulations of the model allow us to compare quantitatively the relative role of common explanations for fiscal procyclicality. We conclude that political distortions in the fiscal process can explain fiscal procyclicality better than other common explanations, such as borrowing constraints and macroeconomic volatility.     

International Reserves and Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associated with higher (lower) international reserve holdings in economic downturns. The relationship is stronger when the countries with low political risk rely heavily on external financing. For developing countries with high political risk, the link between reserves holdings and fiscal policy pattern is not clear-cut.     

Macroeconomic stabilization in developing economies: Are optimal policies procyclical?

Many empirical studies provide evidence that macroeconomic policies as well as capital flows exhibit procyclical characteristics in developing economies. In particular Kaminsky et al. [2004. When it rains, it pours: Procyclical capital flows and macroeconomic policies. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press] demonstrate that a large group of middle-income countries run contractionary policies and experience capital flight during times of recession. This paper investigates the role of international financial markets in explaining these macroeconomic policy and capital flow characteristics. An optimal fiscal and monetary policy problem is formulated and solved for a small-open economy that faces a country-specific interest rate spread in international financial markets. It is found that, in the presence of the country spread, optimal fiscal and monetary policies as well as capital flows are procyclical under a reasonable parametrization. Optimal policies and capital flows turn countercyclical in the absence of the country spread. This pattern is robust to a range of alternative model specifications.     

Fiscal policy and default risk in emerging markets

Emerging market economies typically exhibit a procyclical fiscal policy: public expenditures rise (fall) in economic expansions (recessions), whereas tax rates rise (fall) in bad (good) times. Additionally, the business cycle of these economies is characterized by countercyclical default risk. In this paper we develop a quantitative dynamic stochastic small open economy model with incomplete markets, endogenous fiscal policy and sovereign default where public expenditures and tax rates are optimally procyclical. The model also accounts for the dynamics of other key macroeconomic variables in emerging economies.     

This time truly is different: The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy during the Covid-19 crisis

Fiscal policy was more countercyclical during the Covid-19 crisis than in previous (crisis) episodes. This paper presents empirical evidence in favour of a “this time truly is different” moment based on analysing the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy for 28 advanced economies over 1995–2021. Discretionary fiscal policy during the Covid-19 crisis (2020–2021) did more to counteract the downturn – especially in the Eurozone –, as we do not find comparable evidence for countercyclicality during the financial crisis or Euro crisis. Automatic fiscal stabilisers, the non-discretionary domain of fiscal policy, significantly contributed to countercyclical stabilisation during the pandemic.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SEVEN FEDERATIONS

Although fiscal policies of central governments sometimes provide modest insurance against regional income shocks, this paper shows that procyclical fiscal policy among provincial governments can easily overwhelm these stabilizing effects. We examine the cyclicality of budget items among provincial governments in seven federations, showing that own-source taxes are generally highly procyclical, and contrary to common wisdom, revenue sharing and discretionary transfers are either acyclical or procyclical. Constituent governments are thus left alone to smooth their own shocks, and we document the extent to which various restraints on borrowing and saving undermine their ability to do so. The resulting procyclicality of provincial fiscal policy is likely to have important implications in a world where demands for countercyclical fiscal policy are increasing but considerable fiscal responsibilities are being devolved to subnational governments.     

Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles

While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains.     

Flexible fiscal rules and countercyclical fiscal policy

This paper assesses the impact of different types of flexible fiscal rules on the procyclicality of fiscal policy with propensity scores-matching techniques, thus mitigating traditional self-selection problems. It finds that not all fiscal rules have the same impact: the design matters. Specifically, investment-friendly rules reduce the procyclicality of both overall and investment spending. The effect appears stronger in bad times and when the rule is enacted at the national level. The introduction of escape clauses in fiscal rules does not seem to affect the cyclical stance of public spending. The inclusion of cyclical adjustment features in spending rules yields broadly similar results. The results are mixed for cyclically-adjusted budget balance rules: enacting the latter is associated with countercyclical movements in overall spending, but with procyclical changes in investment spending. Structural factors, such as past debt, the level of development, the volatility of terms of trade, natural resources endowment, government stability, and the legal enforcement and monitoring arrangements backing the rule also influence the link between fiscal rules and countercyclicality. The results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications.     

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS: PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC FLOWS IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Empirically, net capital inflows are procyclical in developed countries and countercyclical in developing countries. Private inflows are procyclical and public inflows are countercyclical in both groups of countries. The dominance of private (public) inflows in developed (developing) countries drives the difference in net inflows. We rationalize these patterns using a two-sector model of a small open economy facing borrowing constraints. Private agents overborrow because of the pecuniary externality arising from these constraints. The government saves to reduce aggregate debt, making the economy resilient to adverse shocks. Differences in borrowing constraints and shock processes across countries explain the empirical patterns of capital inflows.     

Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries

Based on a sample of 56 countries, we show that fiscal policy in the G7 countries appears to be acyclical while fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical (i.e., fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times). To explain this puzzle, we develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public spending. Given this distortion, a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base–as is the case for developing countries–will find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy.     

Debt sustainability in emerging market countries: Some policy guidelines from a fan-chart approach

This paper uses a probabilistic approach to simulate the medium-term public debt trajectories of several major emerging market countries. We extend the standard debt sustainability analysis framework so as to more faithfully reproduce these countries’ economic reality in two aspects. First, we allow them to differ in the cyclical stance of their fiscal policy and in their degree of fiscal responsiveness to debt. Second, we explicitly integrate the specific risk premium paid by each country when borrowing in foreign currency. It allows us to evaluate the impact of alternative policies that the government may consider to improve sustainability. The results lead to three policy recommendations: i) a country should consider decreasing its exposure to currency risk only in extreme cases (like Argentina); ii) on the contrary, greater fiscal responsiveness (i.e. stronger fiscal tightening whenever there is a debt increase) could enhance sustainability to a much greater extent; iii) countries with low responsiveness to debt or a poor fiscal consolidation track record should be cautious with countercyclical fiscal policies, as they may trigger an unsustainable debt trajectory in the trough of the economic cycle.     

Can a comparative capitalism approach explain fiscal policy activism?

This study investigates the implications of models of capitalism for the responsiveness of countries’ fiscal policies during business cycles using new data for member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and China. We expand the literature by adding the category of East Asian nonliberal capitalism to the established distinction of liberal market economies and nonliberal coordinated market economies. These three differ substantially not just in their fiscal policies, but also in monetary policies, degree of financial market orientation, exchange rate regime, and labor market organization. As in previous studies, we find that governments of liberal economies adopt more countercyclical fiscal policies. Departing from existing studies, however, among the nonliberal models of capitalism, (East Asian) state-led models have more countercyclical fiscal policies than (European) coordinated market economies, perhaps as countercyclical as liberal economies, both historically and during the 2007–9 crisis. This is due to less independent central banks, managed float of exchange rates, and limited financial market orientation and financial openness in East Asia, which allow for more active fiscal policy. Among political factors, left-of-center governments, fractionalized party systems, and election years are associated weakly with countercyclical fiscal policy, as expected. Labor market coordination and welfare generosity have unclear roles in regard to fiscal policy, a topic for future research.     

Some Fiscal Implications of Monetary Policy

We study the implications of alternative monetary targeting procedures for real interest rates and economic activity. We find that countercyclical monetary policy rules lead to higher real interest rates, higher average tax rates, lower output but lower variability of tax rates and consumption relative to procyclical rules. For a country with a high level of public debt (e.g. Italy), the adoption of a countercyclical procedure such as interest rate pegging may conceivably raise public debt servicing costs by more than half a percentage point of GNP. Our analysis suggests that the current debate on the targeting procedures of the European Central Bank ought to be broadened to include a discussion of the fiscal implications of monetary policy.     

The Interplay of Wage and Exchange Rate Policies in Singapore: A Case of Collective Bargaining in Macroeconomic Management

This article analyzes an optimization model of the policy game between Singapore's National Wage Council and the Monetary Authority of Singapore and further simulates the model over policy rules (Nash game versus non-Nash game), economic scenarios, and the game players' preference and bargaining power. The results indicate that the exchange rate appreciation and wage growth act as substitutes under the Nash rule of policy responses, whereas they act as complements under the non-Nash rule. Under the Nash rule, the exchange rate appreciation tends to be procyclical and wage growth countercyclical; union workers' bargaining power relative to employers' strengthens the procyclical appreciation uniformly but reinforces the countercyclical wage growth only when the economy undergoes a downturn. Both the Nash and non-Nash rules call for more moderate appreciation and more flexible wage adjustments than their actual movements. (JEL E64 , E61 , F41 )     

The cyclical behaviour of prices in the U.K.: Some structural time series evidence

The cyclical behaviour of prices in the U.K. is investigated using a sample of annual observations covering the period 1886–1993. A structural time series model relating consumer prices to output is estimated over four sub-periods. The results indicate that prices were procyclical in the inter-war period, countercyclical in the post-1973 period and acyclical otherwise. The proposition that the cyclical behaviour of prices is determined by the dominance of supply or demand shocks alone is disputed on the basis of empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning. It is concluded that the cyclical behaviour of prices cannot be explained just by analysing time series on output and prices and that due attention should be paid to the institutional and policy changes occurring during the period under study. It is demonstrated that the empirical results are consistent with the events experienced by the U.K. economy in the most recent period. First version received: November 1998/final version accepted: October 1999     

The political economy of fiscal procyclicality

It is well-recognized that fiscal spending in developing countries tends to display significant procyclicality (increased spending during expansions and vice versa), in contravention of rational stabilization policy. Theoretical explanations have relied on either financial access or political-economic factors to justify this phenomenon. In this paper, we model the fiscal-output relationship as a dcc-garch process, and inquire whether debt or political economy constraints play a comparatively more important role in conditioning this correlation. Our evidence favors a positive effect from political economy, with weaker and more mixed results pertaining to financial access. Somewhat surprisingly, we also find that politics-induced procyclicality appears to be driven by advanced economies, and fiscal rules exacerbate procyclical tendencies.     

On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe

Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle.