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This paper presents an information-theoretic model of IPO pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the IPO and the secondary market, have private information about their firm's prospects, and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm. High-value firms, knowing they are going to pool with low-value firms, induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing, which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information. The information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity, giving a higher expected stock price for high-value firms.  相似文献   

3.
Financial executives of firms engaged in forward contracting have raised concerns that mandated disclosure of those contracts would reveal proprietary information to rival firms. This paper considers the basis for those concerns in the framework of a duopoly in which one privately informed producer enters the forward market prior to production. In choosing its forward position, the firm considers the effects of that position on the forward price and second stage product market competition with its rival. Two regimes are considered: mandated disclosure and no disclosure. Under the former, the contracting firm faces a tension between exploiting its information advantage in the forward market and attempting to influence the production decision of its rival. On average, in equilibrium, the contracting firm gains a first-mover advantage, but at the cost of revealing its private information to its rival and extracting less expected gains from uninformed forward market participants. In contrast, with no disclosure, the contracting firm cannot influence rival firm beliefs, but extracts more expected gains from its private information in both the forward and product markets. On balance, the contracting firm prefers no disclosure. Moreover, parameterizations exist such that the rival also prefers that regime. These findings explain the opposition of respondents to draft proposals of Statement of Financial Standards No. 133.  相似文献   

4.
Optimal Disclosure Policy in Oligopoly Markets   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two-period oligopoly model. An incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period, and then competes against an entrant in the second period. Two main results are derived. First, it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre-committing to disclose both the demand and cost information. By disclosing full information, the incumbent nullifies its self-defeating intertemporal incentives, which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand, its cost efficiency, or both. In addition, the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure, which benefits the incumbent ex ante. Second, the paper shows that the incumbent's full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint. In particular, the correlation between the firms' production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency.  相似文献   

5.
In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.  相似文献   

6.
This paper examines the profits of revenue, earnings, and price momentum strategies in an attempt to understand investor reactions when facing multiple information of firm performance in various scenarios. We first offer evidence that there is no dominating momentum strategy among the revenue, earnings, and price momentums, suggesting that revenue surprises, earnings surprises, and prior returns each carry some exclusive unpriced information content. We next show that the profits of momentum driven by firm fundamental performance information (revenue or earnings) depend upon the accompanying firm market performance information (price), and vice versa. The robust monotonicity in multivariate momentum returns is consistent with the argument that the market does not only underestimate the individual information but also the joint implications of multiple information on firm performance, particularly when they point in the same direction. A three-way combined momentum strategy may offer monthly return as high as 1.44%. The information conveyed by revenue surprises and earnings surprises combined account for about 19% of price momentum effects, which finding adds to the large literature on tracing the sources of price momentum.  相似文献   

7.
This paper provides new empirical evidence that incorporating past stock returns from different time horizons can enhance the ability of firm fundamentals to better explain stock price movements but this benefit dissipates under uncertainty. We apply both OLS and state-space modeling to US firms' stock price movements over the period from 1999 to 2012 to compare the roles of the two main types of information typically used by equity investors. Empirical results reveal the importance of firm fundamentals over longer term horizons for particularly, small-cap stocks with greater information uncertainty. Furthermore, when market uncertainty is high, fundamentals unambiguously dominate in driving stock price movements of smaller sized firms indicating that uncertainty at the firm and market level both create attention bias on firm fundamentals.  相似文献   

8.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》1999,23(11):1579-1603
There is a large body of theoretical work that shows that information problems in the capital market have important effects on both the financial structure and the investment policy of the firm. These information problems arise when debt and equity are diffusely held and no individual investor has an incentive to monitor the firm. We test the hypothesis that banks can compensate for capital market imperfections due to asymmetric information. We find that the neoclassical investment model cannot be rejected for a sample of Spanish firms with a close bank relationship while it is rejected for the subsample made up of the remaining firms. An augmented model incorporating borrowing constraints yields the opposite results. These results suggest that banks may play a role in alleviating capital market imperfections in Spain.  相似文献   

9.
This paper examines the relative information content of earnings and cash flows for security returns using a methodology incorporating contextual factors which may affect earnings and cash flow response coefficients. For our UK dataset, we provide evidence that the earnings coefficient is related to earnings permanence, growth and firm size and that the cash flow coefficient may be related to growth. Although our results emphasise the value relevance of earnings, they also suggest that both contemporaneous and prior period cash flow are positively related to security returns and that market-to-book and market value of equity have predictive power for returns.  相似文献   

10.
This paper presents the results of empirical tests on a necessary condition for the diversification service hypothesis: market recognition of the multinationality of a firm and the existence of international factors. Employing both a two- factor international market model and residual analyses, this study examines whether the US stock market considers the multinationality of a firm and inter- national events which are expected to affect the price of MNCs' stock. The residual analysis is conducted over a period which includes both fixed and floating exchange rates. Results from both analyses support the hypothesis that the US stock market does recognize the multinationality of a firm.  相似文献   

11.
This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain about their client firms. In the model, rating agencies seek to maximize their reputation and protect their market power. They observe public information and obtain either precise or noisy private information about a firm. Reputational concerns dictate that a rating reflects private information when it is precise. However, when private information is noisy, two situations arise. In a monopoly, the rating agency may ignore private information and issue a rating that conforms to public information. Under some conditions, it may even become cautious and issue bad ratings ignoring both types of information. With competition, however, it has incentives to contradict public information as a way to pretend that it holds precise private information. Moreover, it may become more likely to issue good ratings in an attempt to protect market power.  相似文献   

12.
This study uses a cumulative sum technique to determine the point at which the stock market first perceives that a firm may file for bankruptcy. The study then attempts to identify information, whether from financial statements or from other sources, that may have influenced the market in its reassessment of the firm's prospects. The results indicate that the switching point of the mean and variance of stock returns appears to be related both to financial statement information (as measured by changes in bankruptcy model probability assessments) and the release of unfavorable news in the Wall Street Journal.  相似文献   

13.
以1998~2008年间同时在A股和H股上市的公司及按行业、规模和年度选择配对的仅在A股市场上市的公司为样本,构建计量模型对海外上市对公司价值的影响进行实证检验。结果表明,一方面,国内企业海外上市降低了市场分割程度,但公司价值并未增加,另一方面,海外上市增强了投资者法律保护和信息披露质量,促进了公司价值上升。  相似文献   

14.
When capital market investors and firm insiders possess the same information about a company's prospects, its liabilities will be priced in a way that makes the firm indifferent to the composition of its financial liabilities (at least under certain, well-known circumstances). However, if firm insiders are systematically better informed than outside investors, they will choose to issue those types of securities that the market appears to overvalue most. Knowing this, rational investors will try to infer the insiders' information from the firm's financial structure. This paper evaluates the extent to which a firm's choice of risky debt maturity can signal insiders' information about firm quality. If financial market transactions are costless, a firm's financial structure cannot provide a valid signal. With positive transaction costs, however, high-quality firms can sometimes effectively signal their true quality to the market. The existence of a signalling equilibrium is shown to depend on the (exogenous) distribution of firms' quality and the magnitude of underwriting costs for corporate debt.  相似文献   

15.
This study uses a unique credit default swap (CDS) transaction data set of insurers to examine the effects of CDS usage on the risk profile and firm value of US insurance companies for the period 2001‐2009. Applying a Heckman two‐stage model to adjust for the potential endogeneity of CDS usage with respect to firm risk and firm value, we find consistent evidence that the utilization of CDS for income generation purposes is associated with greater market risk, deterioration of financial performance, and lower firm value, for both Life and Property/Casualty insurers.  相似文献   

16.
This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.  相似文献   

17.
We examine how information problems between the firm and the investor affect the value of an internal capital market. While the extant literature finds that, on average, the diversified firm's access to an internal capital market is positively related to firm value, this paper finds that the results hold only for firms which face low levels of information problems. Firms facing the high levels of information problems realize no value from internal capital market access, consistent with the Jensen Free Cash Flow hypothesis. When information problems are large, agency costs dominate any savings that result from using an internal capital market to avoid selling under-priced securities in the external capital markets.  相似文献   

18.
We examine the corporate governance roles of information quality and the takeover market with asymmetric information regarding the value of the target firm. Increasing information quality improves the takeover efficiency however, a highly efficient takeover market also discourages the manager from exerting effort. We find that perfect information quality is not optimal for either current shareholders’ expected payoff maximization or expected firm value maximization. Furthermore, current shareholders prefer a lower level of information quality than the level that maximizes expected firm value, because of a misalignment between current shareholders’ value and total firm value. We also analyze the impact of antitakeover laws, and find that the passage of antitakeover laws may induce current shareholders to choose a higher level of information quality and thus increase expected firm value.  相似文献   

19.
This paper examines “leverage” and volatility feedback effects at the firm level by considering both market and firm level effects, using 242 individual firm stock data in the US market. We adopt a panel vector autoregressive framework which allows us to control simultaneously for common business cycle effects, unobserved cross correlation effects in return and volatility via industry effects, and heterogeneity across firms. Our results suggest that volatility feedback effects at the firm level are present due to both market and firm effects, though the market volatility feedback effect is stronger than the corresponding firm level effect. We also find that the leverage effect at the firm level is persistent, significant and negative, while the effect of market return on firm volatility is persistent, significant and positive. The presence of these effects is further explored through the responses of the model's variables to market-wide return and volatility shocks.  相似文献   

20.
We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.  相似文献   

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