Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital for Property-Liability Insurers

This article presents new evidence on the cost of equity capital by line of insurance for the property‐liability insurance industry. To do so we obtain firm beta estimates and then use the full‐information industry beta (FIB) methodology to decompose the cost of capital by line. We obtain full‐information beta estimates using the standard one‐factor capital asset pricing model and extend the FIB methodology to incorporate the Fama–French three‐factor cost of capital model. The analysis suggests the cost of capital for insurers using the Fama–French model is significantly higher than the estimates based upon the CAPM. In addition, we find evidence of significant differences in the cost of equity capital across lines.     

Estimating the Cost of Equity for Property-Liability Insurance Companies

Due to the highly skewed and heavy‐tailed distributions associated with the insurance claims process, we evaluate the Rubinstein‐Leland (RL) model for its ability to improve the cost of equity estimates of insurance companies because of its distribution‐free feature. Our analyses show that there is as large as a 94‐basis‐point difference in the estimated cost of insurance equity between the RL model and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for the sample of property‐liability insurers with more severe departures from normality. In addition, consistent with our hypotheses, significant differences in the market risk estimates are found for insurers with return distributions that are asymmetrically distributed, and for small insurers. Third, we find significant performance improvements from using the RL model by showing smaller values of excess return of the expected return of the portfolio to the model return for a portfolio of insurers with returns that are more skewed and for a portfolio of small insurers. Finally, our panel data analysis shows the differences in the market risk estimates are significantly influenced by firm size, degree of leverage, and degree of asymmetry. The implication is that insurers should use the RL model rather than the CAPM to estimate its cost of capital if the insurer is small (assets size is less than $2,291 million), and/or its returns are not symmetrical (the value of skewness is greater than 0.509 or less than ?0.509).     

Do Publicly Traded Property–Casualty Insurers Cater to the Stock Market?

This article examines the catering theory in the insurance industry. We investigate whether managers of publicly traded insurers pursue a growth strategy catering to the stock market's preference. Two hypotheses are tested in this study: (1) an insurer will devote more efforts to increasing premium growth when the stock market places greater values on growth, and (2) this catering effect will be more pronounced at firms where managers have greater incentives to maximize short‐term stock prices. We find evidence supporting both hypotheses. Our study discovers a new channel through which the stock market and executive compensation affect insurance companies’ business strategies and the insurance market. The implication of the interplay between insurers and the stock market is significant and deserves future research.     

Die Risikoübernahme von Versicherungsunternehmen: Eine empirische Analyse für Deutschland und Großbritannien

In this paper we analyze the risk resulting from an insurer’s investment policy. For this a hypothetical asset return rate is defined, based on which the German and British insurance market is analyzed. The study design allows an investigation of the investment risk in different countries or for different lines of business. The aim of the analysis is to detect general market trends in the investment policy and an analysis of effects of important changes over time on the investment risk of insurers. The questions analyzed in this paper are also of particular relevance beyond the background of current reform proposal for insurance regulation in Europe in the field of risk management and capital adequacy (Solvency II).     

Effects of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

Using a sample of property–liability insurers over the period 1995–2004, we develop and test a model that explains performance as a function of line‐of‐business diversification and other correlates. Our results indicate that undiversified insurers consistently outperform diversified insurers. In terms of accounting performance, we find a diversification penalty of at least 1 percent of return on assets or 2 percent of return on equity. These findings are robust to corrections for potential endogeneity bias, alternative risk measures, alternative diversification measures, and an alternative estimation technique. Using a market‐based performance measure (Tobin's Q) we find that the market applies a significant discount to diversified insurers. The existence of a diversification penalty (and diversification discount) provides strong support for the strategic focus hypothesis. We also find that insurance groups underperform unaffiliated insurers and that stock insurers outperform mutuals.     

Accounting data and asset valuation: Theory

Firms and divisions which are not traded on organized exchanges are often valued without the benefit of market data. Accounting data is used instead. One suggested approach is to use accounting beta as a proxy for market return beta. In the context of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, we provide a theoretical justification for such a procedure. Our results provide a set of sufficient conditions so that return betas and accounting betas are equal. Our results also suggest a general methodology for evaluating projects and untraded firms using accounting data. The method underlying the derivation here is very general and can be applied in deriving testable restrictions between fundamentals, broader in context than that of accounting variables.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.     

Authors’ Reply: Forecasting Social Security Actuarial Assumptions - Discussion by John A. Beekman; Cecil J. Nesbitt; Krzysztof M. Ostaszewski; Gregory Savord; Richard S. Foster,October 1997

Abstract

This study provides an economic analysis of life insurance company expenses and develops a methodology for the construction of benchmark expense factors. These benchmarks can facilitate the pricing of new business, cost control within companies, and expense comparisons among companies. We derive the expense factors by estimating a cost function wherein total general expenses are modeled as a function of input prices and physical outputs, and the physical outputs are proxies for the cost drivers of the different lines of business. This methodology has two important advantages: first, the derived expense factors are independent of the methods that insurers use in allocating total expenses across lines of business. Second, the estimated cost function explicitly accounts for different degrees of economies of scale and consequently in the present value of marginal expenses across insurers. Hence, this study demonstrates that economies of scale and, in turn, size must be considered when constructing an expense table.     

Market Risk,Interest Rate Risk,and Interdependencies in Insurer Stock Returns: A System‐GARCH Model

We examine market risk, interest rate risk, and interdependencies in returns and return volatilities across three insurer segments within a System‐GARCH framework. Three main results are obtained: market risk is greatest for accident and health (A&H) insurers, followed by life (Life) and property and casualty (P&C) insurers; interest rate sensitivity is negative and greatest for Life insurers; and interdependencies in returns are significant with the magnitude being strongest between P&C and A&H insurers. The implication is that greatest diversification benefits arise between Life and the other segments of the insurance industry. Market risk and interest rate risk for diversified firms are smaller than those for nondiversified firms for both product and geographic diversification.     

The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries

This article analyzes the economic functions of independent insurance intermediaries (brokers and independent agents), focusing on the commercial property–casualty insurance market. The article investigates the functions performed by intermediaries, the competitiveness of the market, the compensation arrangements for intermediaries, and the process by which policies are placed with insurers. Insurance intermediaries are essentially market makers who match the insurance needs of policyholders with insurers who have the capability of meeting those needs. Intermediary compensation comprises premium‐based commissions, expressed as a percentage of the premium paid, and contingent commissions based on the profitability, persistency, and/or volume of the business placed with the insurer. Empirical evidence is provided that premium‐based and contingent commissions are passed on to policyholders in the premium. However, contingent commissions can enhance competitive bidding by aligning the insurer's and the intermediary's interests. This alignment of interests gives insurers more confidence in the selection of risks and thus helps to break the “winner's curse” and encourages insurers to bid more aggressively. Independent intermediaries also help markets operate more efficiently by reducing the information asymmetries between insurers and buyers that can cause adverse selection.     

保险公司偿付能力风险信息对称性与市场供求

保险公司偿付能力充足性是保险监管的内容之一,但是这一信息却往往不被投保人所获知,造成保险供给(保险公司)和保险需求(投保人)两方信息的不对称.本文以保险公司存在偿付能力风险为基本假定,以累积性预期理论和风险调整资本收益率构建保险需求和供给模型,分析在信息对称条件下和信息不对称条件下保险需求的变化及其对保险供给和保险公司...     

Solvency, Capital Allocation, and Fair Rate of Return in Insurance

In this article, we consider the links between solvency, capital allocation, and fair rate of return in insurance. A method to allocate capital in insurance to lines of business is developed based on an economic definition of solvency and the market value of the insurer balance sheet. Solvency, and its financial impact, is determined by the value of the insolvency exchange option. The allocation of capital is determined using a complete markets’ arbitrage‐free model and, as a result, has desirable properties, such as the allocated capital “adds up” and is consistent with the economic value of the balance sheet assets and liabilities. A single‐period discrete‐state model example is used to illustrate the results. The impact of adding lines of business is briefly considered.     

Financial Distress in Australian General Insurers

We develop and test a statistical model to identify Australian general insurers experiencing financial distress over the 1999–2001 period. Using a logit model and two measures of financial distress we are able to predict, with reasonable confidence, the insurers more likely to be distressed. They are generally small and have low return on assets and cession ratios. Relative to holdings of liquid assets they have high levels of property and reinsurance assets, and low levels of equity holdings. They also write more overseas business, and less motor insurance and long‐tailed insurance lines, relative to fire and household insurance.     

Stock Market Reactions and Information Transfer Due to Financial Instability in the Life Insurance Industry

ABSTRACT: This study examines the stock market reactions and information transfer effects due to financial instability for four life insurance companies that eventually failed or were taken over by regulators. The four companies were First Executive Corporation, First Capital Holdings Corporation, Monarch Capital Corporation, and Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company. In general, significant negative capital market responses were found after a company released an announcement regarding financial instability. Information transfer effects of a negative announcement by one insurer were not found to have a significant impact on the other insurers. This study complements past studies of contagion effects within the insurance industry.     

The Use of Dynamic Financial Analysis to Determine Whether an Optimal Growth Rate Exists for a Property-Liability Insurer

Prior research on the aging phenomenon has demonstrated that new business for property‐liability (P‐L) insurers generates high loss ratios that gradually decline as a book of business goes through successive renewal cycles. Although the experience on new business is initially unprofitable, the renewal book of business eventually becomes profitable over time. Within this context, insurers need to manage their exposure growth in order to maximize long run profitability. Dynamic financial analysis (DFA), a relatively new tool for P‐L insurers, utilizes Monte Carlo simulation to generate the overall financial results for an insurer under a large number of scenarios. This article uses a publicly available DFA model—along with the estimated market value of an insurer, based on 1990–2001 data for stock P‐L insurers and underlying financial variables—to determine optimal growth rates of a P‐L insurer based on mean–variance analysis, stochastic dominance, and constraints on leverage.     

The Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies: The Role of Heterogeneous Risks and Guaranty Funds

We examine a market with observably heterogeneous risks and a government sponsored guaranty fund and consider whether it is optimal to form a single insurer or separate insurers for each consumer type. Given the economic environment, pooling never dominates the formation of separate insurance companies. This result provides an incentive for the phenomenon of insurance fleets.     

Financial Intermediary Versus Production Approach to Efficiency of Marketing Distribution Systems and Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies

An examination of the efficiency of the marketing distribution channel and organizational structure for insurance companies is presented from a framework that views the insurer as a financial intermediary rather than as a “production entity” which produces “value added” through loss payments. Within this financial intermediary approach, solvency can be a primary concern for regulators of insurance companies, claims‐paying ability can be a primary concern for policyholders, and return on investment can be a primary concern for investors. These three variables (solvency, financial return, and claims‐paying ability) are considered as outputs of the insurance firm. The financial intermediary approach acknowledges that interests potentially conflict, and the strategic decision makers for the firm must balance one concern versus another when managing the insurance company. Accordingly, we investigate the efficiency of insurance companies using data envelopment analysis (DEA) having as insurer output an appropriately selected (for the firm under investigation) combination of solvency, claims‐paying ability, and return on investment as outputs. These efficiency evaluations are further examined to study stock versus mutual form of organizational structure and agency versus direct marketing arrangements, which are examined separately and in combination. Comparisons with the “value‐added” or “production” approach to insurer efficiency are presented. A new DEA approach and interpretation is also presented.     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

Funding conditions and insurance stock returns: Do insurance stocks really benefit from rising interest rate regimes?

We examine funding conditions and U.S. insurance company stock returns. Although constrained funding conditions, signaled by restrictive Federal Reserve monetary policy, correspond with increases in the future payouts of fixed‐income securities held by insurance firms and potentially provide value through the liability side of insurer balance sheets, they also decrease the values of securities currently held in insurer portfolios. Prior research finds that restrictive policy has a negative effect on equity returns in general. Our results suggest the negative impacts of constrained funding environments outweigh the potential positives, as insurance company stock returns are significantly lower during periods of constrained funding. This effect varies within a given funding state and also across insurer type. The effect is strongest during the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment and for life and health insurers—insurer types with longer portfolio durations. For property and liability (P&L) insurers, lower stock return performance only exists in the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment. In the subsequent months, P&L insurers actually have higher stock returns during constrained periods, consistent with their typically shorter duration asset portfolios, which are more quickly rolled over into new higher‐yielding securities.     

Financial Statements Insurance

The fact that auditors are paid by the companies they audit creates an inherent conflict of interest. We analyze how the provision of financial statements insurance could eliminate this conflict of interest and properly align the incentives of auditors with those of shareholders. We first show that when the benefits to obtaining funding are sufficiently large, the existing legal and regulatory regime governing financial reporting (and auditing) results in low quality financial statements. Consequently, the financial statements of firms are misleading and firms that yield a low rate‐of‐return (low fundamental value) are over‐funded relative to firms characterized by a high rate‐of‐return (high fundamental value). We present a mechanism whereby companies would purchase financial statements insurance that provides coverage to investors against losses suffered as a result of misrepresentation in financial reports. The insurance premia that companies pay for the coverage would be publicized. The insurers appoint and pay the auditors who attest to the accuracy of the financial statements of the prospective insurance clients. For a given level of coverage firms announcing lower premia would distinguish themselves in the eyes of the investors as companies with higher quality financial statements relative to those with higher premia. Every company would be eager to pay lower premia (for a given level of coverage) resulting in a flight to high audit quality. As a result, when financial statements insurance is available and the insurer hires the auditor, capital is provided to the most efficient firms.