Social identity and perceived income adequacy

Economists are increasingly interested in subjective well‐being, but the economic literature on perceptions of income adequacy, which is one of the factors that shape subjective well‐being, is little. Our paper fills this lacuna. We utilize nationally representative data on perceptions of amounts considered as remunerative earnings from self‐employment in India and examine how these are earnings shaped by social identity, namely, caste. We also investigate if institutional change such as the introduction of an employment guarantee scheme alters these perceptions. Finally, we examine the relationship between caste identity and actual earnings. We find that caste identity does shape both perceptions of income adequacy and actual earnings: lower‐ranked groups perceive lower amounts as being remunerative and also earn lower amounts. Further, the employment guarantee scheme alters self‐perceptions differentially for different caste groups, but in more nuanced ways than our ex‐ante beliefs.     

When Are Investors Rational?

Taking our cue from certain recent advances in experimental psychology, the authors propose a plausible theory of conflict between rationality and inherent behavioral biases of investors. In this theory no investor is fully rational or fully behavioral at all times. An investor faces a continuum between behavioral and rational positions. A movement toward rationality is a choice; it is costly to be fully rational which requires serious mental calculations. On the other hand, there could be some benefits to rationality in special circumstances that compensate for the costs. Using a unique and extensive investor-level database, the authors show that the degree of nonrationality decreases as rational behavior becomes more attractive. In the empirical setting, the proxy for rational behavior is investor's use of private predisclosure information during earnings announcement periods, while the disposition effect they display serves as an estimate of their behavioral bias. The paper contributes to the existing literature in several dimensions.     

Rational Poverty or Poor Rationality? The Take‐up of Social Assistance Benefits

In several countries social assistance dependence has been increasing since the 1980s. After surveying the theoretical and empirical take-up literature, this study presents estimates of recent rates of non take-up of social assistance benefits. Once methodological shortcomings of prior estimations are corrected, the results show that take-up has fallen recently and thus cannot explain the rising welfare receipt. Following theoretical predictions, the probability that a rational individual takes up social assistance increases with the expected benefit amount and duration, and falls with application cost and stigma. More than half of all households eligible for transfers under the German social assistance program did not claim their benefits.     

Economic Backwardness and Social Tension*

We propose that relative economic backwardness contributes to the build‐up of social tension and non‐violent and violent conflict. We test our hypothesis using data on organized mass movements and armed civil conflict. The findings show that greater economic backwardness is consistently linked to a higher probability of onset of violent and especially non‐violent forms of civil unrest. We provide evidence that the relationship is causal in instrumental variables estimations using new instruments, including mailing speeds and telegram charges around 1900. The magnitude of the effect of backwardness on social tension increases in the two‐stage least‐squares estimations.     

微型金融机构双重目标的冲突与治理:研究进展述评

微型金融机构要同时实现财务可持续(财务目标)与减缓贫困(社会目标)两大目标,然而,这两个目标间的冲突问题却长期困扰着其发展。本文系统整理了国内外有关微型金融机构双重目标冲突与治理领域的理论与实证文献,研究发现对微型金融机构双重目标是否冲突在理论和实证研究中均存在争议。伴随着微型金融商业化,目标偏离已成为双重目标冲突的新表现,但通过实施社会绩效管理,微型金融机构可以有效地降低双重目标间的冲突。虽然我国农村金融机构双重目标冲突问题已经显现,但相关研究并不多。因此,我国未来的研究应该集中在界定农村金融机构双重目标含义、构建评估体系、制定报告标准、探索双重目标约束下的可持续发展机制等方面。     

Take‐Up of Social Assistance Benefits: The Case of the French Homeless

A considerable number of studies have been conducted to measure and analyze the phenomenon of the non‐take‐up of social assistance. However, the homeless portion of this population has long remained outside the scope of this research, so that little is known about their non‐take‐up behavior. In this paper, we focus on this population using a French national survey and we derive measures for the non‐take‐up of French basic income support. Our findings indicate that there is a substantial rate of non‐take‐up among the homeless, but that this rate is lower than that for the general population: approximately 18% of eligible homeless persons do not claim benefits compared to 35% of the general population. Using a large set of variables, we investigate the determinants of non‐take‐up. We show that although some of these determinants are shared with the general population, as identified in the literature, the homeless population exhibits some particularities. Furthermore, our results also suggest that the poorest of the homeless have a larger non‐take‐up rate than other homeless.     

Heterogeneity in entrepreneurship in developing countries: Risk,credit, and migration and the entrepreneurial propensity of youth and women

Promoting youth and female entrepreneurship is crucial to inclusive growth and the future economic and social prospects of developing countries. Evidence tends to suggest that young and female entrepreneurs are in a minority, and the extent and generating mechanisms of this outcome tend to be country‐specific. This collection of papers brings together recent empirical contributions exploring key drivers of this heterogeneity entrepreneurial propensity of youth and female in the context of a group of countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, paying special attention to the role of and issues relating to access to credit, attitudes to risk, and migratory status. A common thread in all the papers is the effective role of risk, uncertainty, and asymmetric information in the determination of entrepreneurship and in the demand for and allocation of credit when potential entrepreneurs are from specific groups, that is, women, indigenous women, women and youth in conflict and post‐conflict situations, and migrant youth. Based on these results, the papers explore various challenges in the implementation of public policies designed to promote entrepreneurship within these specific segments of the population.     

Strong,bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.     

Heterogeneous preferences and in-kind redistribution: Theory and evidence

This paper examines the impact of social heterogeneity on in-kind redistribution. We contribute to the previous literature in two ways: we consider (i) the provision of several public goods and (ii) agents different not only in income, but also in their preferences over the various goods provided by the public sector. In this setting, both the distribution and size of goods provision depend on the heterogeneity of preferences. Our main result is that preference heterogeneity tends to decrease in-kind redistribution, while income inequality tends to increase it. An empirical investigation based on United States Census Bureau data confirms these theoretical findings.     

A theory of natural addiction

Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an in-depth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their effects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unconventional behavioral assumptions employed by theories of rational addiction, including adjacent complementarity and the importance of cues, attention, and self-control in determining the behavior of addicts. We offer evidence for the special case of the opiates that “harmful” addiction is the manifestation of a mismatch between behavioral algorithms encoded in the human genome and the expanded menu of choices faced by consumers in the modern world.     

Super‐Majorites,One‐Dimensional Policies,and Social Surplus

In the setting of a one‐dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent‐shaped. When the utilities are strictly concave, the surplus maximizing rule is a strict supermajority.     

The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe

The economics literature usually assumes order in terms of a Weberian state with monopoly over the means of violence. In this paper, we study historical situations in which such an order is absent and violent conflict namely duel of honor is an institution. Anarchy or the absence of state rules in managing violence does not imply the absence of private rules and arrangements (such as codes of dueling). Our focus is on the possible ways that a Weberian order can emerge from anarchy. We endeavor to capture this transition by introducing a computational model in which a simulated agent represents a social individual who considers both economic and political factors and interacts with other individuals as well as institutions to make a decision. We then use the trajectory of dueling in England, France, and Germany to validate our approach. The paper demonstrates how a complex, aggregative historical process over three centuries may be consistently explained on the basis of rational choices among heterogeneous agents conditioned by their group identity and State authority.     

Externalities,Productivity and Sustained Growth

This paper shows that the existence of endogenous growth, in the closed‐form solution, in a single sector economy with a convex technology in an overlapping generations (OLG) framework, which attempts to fill the current gap in endogenous growth theory. It finds there is an unbounded growth when trade, in the form of knowledge spillover, affects labor productivity through the formation of human capital with self‐education that is not an independent sector but builds the human capital here. This conclusion holds even though there is the “limited income” expressed as the “non‐increasing wage/investment ratio” for each generation. Moreover, it shows the convergence of growth rates for each country, which is unique and constant, while the growth rate per capita negatively relates with each country's population growth rate. Also, there is no “poverty trap” with the introduction of externalities that is different from existing literature.     

Like Father,Like Son: Inheriting and Bequeathing

This paper incorporates indirect reciprocal behavior in the context of bequeathing decisions into an otherwise standard OLG model. We provide conditions for the existence of a unique steady state with operative bequests. Contrary to standard OLG models, we show that taking into account such behavioral interactions allows one to rationalize both an increasing and U‐shaped pattern of the inheritance to GDP ratio over time, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Moreover, the model predicts a nonlinear (U‐shaped) relationship between the size of an unfunded social security program and the long‐run stock of per capita capital, which in turn provides a novel explanation of the inconclusive empirical findings on the relationship between social security, savings and long‐run growth. Ricardian equivalence is shown to hold in a special case of the model     

Social interaction and volunteer satisfaction: an exploratory study in primary healthcare

This research investigates the relationship between social interaction amongst volunteers working for non-profit organizations and their satisfaction with what they are doing. Drawing on the literature on social capital, we apply social network theories so as to represent various kinds of interaction. We then specify a CATREG model to pick up the effects of goal-specific social capital on volunteer satisfaction. We test our hypotheses on a population of 100 volunteers in a non-profit organization. The empirical evidence we collect reports that benefits of co-working relationships, like the opportunity to acquire competences or the involvement in decision making, affect levels of satisfaction more than any outcomes of solidarity interaction.     

Racial Harassment,Ethnic Concentration,and Economic Conditions*

In this paper, we analyse the association between the spatial concentration of ethnic minorities and racial harassment. Ethnic concentration relates to racial harassment through at least three channels: hostility in the attitudes of majority individuals that finds expression in harassment behaviour, the probability that minority individuals meet majority individuals, and the cost of expressing hostility aggressively. Thus, harassment cannot simply be modelled as a stronger form of hostility. Using unique data for Britain, we show that, in areas of higher local ethnic concentration, experience of harassment is lower, even though hostility on the side of the majority population is not.     

Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threat—groups or individuals—and the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one׳s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive—reciprocity—is ruled out by the data.     

DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT,POPULATION AGEING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA: A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Abstract. Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and a given ageing profile of the population to forecast the growth path of China's economy during the twenty‐first century, this study finds that: population ageing leads to declining economic growth as labour supply shrinks and the rate of physical capital formation declines; households’ material living standards improve, albeit at a declining rate; falling domestic investment partially offsets declining national savings; and the resulting saving‐investment surplus generates a current account surplus and capital outflows. Finally, the main force that can sustain China's economic growth against the backdrop of population ageing is productivity improvement.     

VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two‐party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self‐interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.