ECONOMIC FREEDOM VERSUS POLITICAL FREEDOM: CROSS‐COUNTRY INFLUENCES ON CORRUPTION*

Using a well‐known index of corruption, this paper examines the determinants of corruption for a large sample of countries. Specifically, the present study brings empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether economic freedom or political freedom serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity. In particular, does greater economic freedom or greater political freedom yield a more ‘clean’ society? Our results show that greater economic freedom seems to matter more in this regard. Examining different components of economic freedom, we find that not all these components are equally effective in reducing corruption. For instance, monetary policy seems to have a stronger influence on the level of corrupt activity in a country than fiscal policy. Robustness of these findings is checked and policy implications are discussed.     

The impact of liberalization on bureaucratic corruption

Liberalization increases the number of goods available for consumption within a country. Since bureaucrats value variety, this raises the marginal utility of accepting a bribe. This “benefit effect” is counteracted by an increasing “cost effect” from corruption deterrence activities that arise due to greater international pressure to curb corruption. The interaction of these two effects can lead to a non-monotonic relation between liberalization and corruption. Moreover, pre-commitment to deterrence activities is shown to be more effective in controlling corruption. Empirical evidence supports the existence of a non-monotonic relation between economic openness and corruption among developing countries.     

Exploring the Links Between Corruption and Growth

This paper models the transmission channels through which corruption indirectly affects growth. Results suggest that corruption hinders growth through its adverse effects on investment, human capital, and political instability, while fostering growth by reducing government consumption and, less robustly, increasing trade openness. Overall, a total negative effect of corruption on growth is estimated from these channels. These effects are found to be robust to modifications in model specification, sample coverage, and estimation techniques as well as tests for model exhaustiveness. The negative effect of corruption on growth is found to diminish in economies with low governance levels or a high degree of regulation. No one‐size‐fits‐all policy response appears supportable.     

政治关系“力量”与民营企业价值研究:腐败的调节效应

从社会网络理论的强弱关系视角对2012-2014年福布斯中国富豪榜的企业家及其企业进行了政治关系的度量,检验了腐败是否会调节政治关系"力量"对企业价值的影响。研究发现,企业家本身所具有的政治关系对企业价值具有明显的正向影响作用,关系的"力量"越强,对企业价值的正向影响就越大;与此同时,腐败的出现会强化政治关系"力量"对民营企业价值的影响。通过分组验证发现,这种"力量"在腐败程度较高环境下更易对企业价值产生正向影响,但在腐败程度较低的环境中,政治关系对民营企业价值的影响很多时候并不显著。     

POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS

This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.     

Financial Liberalization and Institutional Development

This study empirically analyzes the effects of de jure financial openness on institutional quality as captured by indicators on investment risk, corruption level, impartiality of judiciary system, and the effectiveness of bureaucracy. We show that a higher degree of financial openness improves institutional quality mainly by reducing investment risks. We also study the effect of a single liberalization reform. Again, we find evidence for the beneficial impact of financial liberalization with the exception of corruption. We additionally show that the benign consequences of financial opening for the institutional development are even larger if financial liberalization is supported by simultaneous political liberalization, while financial deregulation in former socialist countries tends to worsen institutional quality.     

Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review,Judicial Independence and the Size of Government

The study investigates how judicial review of policy and judicial independence affect the relative size of government. Judicial oversight of policy is the authority of courts to check the legality of policy measures and annul measures which are incompatible with the constitution or are enacted without following the procedures laid down by the law. Using a model of constitutional political economy, where policy making is subject to judicial oversight, it is predicted that the relative size of the public sector decreases as judicial review and judicial independence increase. The theoretical predictions are tested in an international cross section sample of 52 countries. Controlling for the effects of real income, age dependency, openness of the economy, the legal origins of a country and other socio-political variables the results show that the checks and balances provided by the judiciary lead to a smaller relative size of taxes in the economy.JEL Classifications: D70, D72, D74, D78, H30, K41.     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.     

Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government

How well any government functions hinges on how good citizensare at making their politicians accountable for their actions.Political control of public officials depends on two factors.First, free and regular elections allow citizens to disciplinepoliticians—the credible threat of losing office in thenext period compels policy makers to respond to the voters'interests. Second, and equally important, the degree of citizeninformation curbs the opportunities politicians may have toengage in political corruption and management. The presenceof a well-informed electorate in a democratic setting explainsbetween one-half and two-thirds of the variance in the levelsof governmental performance and corruption.     

Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption

Using a theoretical model of repeated political competition among two career politicians, I study the incentives of both the corrupt and clean politicians not to adopt a fully effective reform targeting political corruption. In the setup I study, each politician can credibly adopt the reform as part of his policy platform in the elections. Yet, when the level of political corruption is high, neither politician does so in a Nash Equilibrium. Intuitively, political corruption changes the zero-sum nature of political competition: the reform eliminates the illegal rents of the corrupt candidate and the competitive advantage of the clean candidate.     

Managing judges mathematically: an empirical study of the medical malpractice litigations in Shanghai

The post-Mao China has been increasingly managed mathematically, not the least in its judicial system. In this paper, I looked into some of the mathematical indicators used to judge the performance of judges in this nation, and ascertained their effects on the judicial decisions on medical malpractices in Shanghai. The findings of this paper support the previous study that qualitatively identified the judicial responses to such a quantified evaluation system. Underlying the effect of performance indicators is the Chinese judiciary’s bending toward populist pressure. Essentially, therefore, this paper serves to place in perspective the judicial populism well documented in the latest literature on Chinese judiciary. At the same time, however, my study also endorses the theory on courts’ reluctance to exercise discretion in a hierarchical judicial system. Thus, as hinted by the data, the actual behaviors of Chinese judges might be complex under a combination of institutional constraints embodying policy preferences of political leaders as well as structural characteristics of the judiciary.     

Education,Rent seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Empirical evidence suggests that natural resources breed corruption and reduce educational attainments, dampening economic growth. The theoretical literature has treated these two channels separately, with natural resources affecting growth either through human capital or corruption. In this article, we argue that education and corruption are jointly determined and depend on the endowment of natural resources. Natural resources affect the incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affect growth. Whether natural resources stimulate growth or induce a poverty‐trap crucially depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, as well as on the cost of political participation. For lower inequality and higher cost of political participation, a high‐growth and a poverty‐trap equilibrium coexist even with abundant natural resources.     

Economic Reform and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data

The notion that economic reform can reduce corruption remains prevalent in the policy agenda of international financial institutions, especially of the World Bank. Economic reforms have, therefore, been carried out throughout various parts of the world to improve the performance of the economies. Using data from 94 low‐ and middle‐income nations for the period 1996–2015, this study employs static and dynamic panel analysis to examine whether economic reform undertaken in accordance with the World Bank's reform programs negatively affects corruption. Our findings suggest that enhancing government effectiveness (i.e. independence of civil service from political pressure, provision of quality public services, effective policy formulation and the government's commitment to such policies) and improving public rights and civil liberties could be some of the most promising policies in terms of fighting corruption. The role of economic development and growth in real per capita income is also found to be significant in some of the specifications. However, the assertion that economic reform can reduce corruption is rejected in all the specifications. We rather find evidence that economic reforms negatively affect the ability of democracy to fight corruption, although on a slim margin. The central theme of the implications of our findings is that in combating corruption, social, institutional and legal means are far more important than economic means. The finding thus is compatible with the World Bank's effort in the later years to introduce governance and democracy as effective tool against corruption.     

Election cycles in mining licensing: theory and evidence from Albania

Most of the literature on political business and budgetary cycles (PBBC) has focused on fiscal and monetary policy variables in advanced-country contexts. We extend this literature by investigating political cycle effects in a non-monetary, non-fiscal policy regime (the allocation of mining licences) in a transition country context. We propose a model of mining licensing that allows for corruption and for both supply and demand effects to determine the outcome. We then estimate this model using time-series data from post-communist Albania. Relying on a dynamic Poisson model, we find evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects. Based on our theory, we suggest a corruption interpretation of political cycles in non-fiscal/non-monetary variables. This interpretation, we suggest, may be more applicable to the context of developing and transition countries. Our study raises important questions about the unintended (and often pernicious) effects of transition politics on economic regulation and economic performance in post-socialist economies.     

The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non‐linear Hypothesis

This study advances the literature on the effect of decentralization on corruption by proposing a theoretical motivation for the hypothesis that the corruption‐minimizing decentralization arrangement prescribes intermediate decentralization degrees: a ‘middle’ decision‐making power of local governors may mitigate the tradeoff between the rent‐seeking incentive for local politicians and the effectiveness of their voters’ monitoring. The estimation of a non‐linear empirical model strongly confirms that a decentralization degree between 15% and 21% minimizes corruption even through different estimation procedures, introduction of control variables and the use of internal and external IV and of alternative decentralization and corruption measurements.     

The political economy of corruption and the role of economic opportunities1

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. We argue that the missing political support for anti‐corruption policies is due to a lack of economic and financial reforms. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that this, together with the lack of economic opportunities, makes anti‐corruption policies less likely. Compared to a reformed economy, more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, rents from corruption are distributed differently. Economic liberalization increases the support for anti‐corruption measures. The additional effect of financial liberalization is ambiguous.     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

RESOURCE CURSE,POLITICAL ENTRY,AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS

A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”