中央银行独立性与货币、金融稳定政策协调

当今,金融危机给经济发展带来了极大的危害,为此,金融稳定是当务之急.审视中国的金融现状,我们必须加强金融体系各组成部分内部及其相互之问的有效风险配置、资源配置等核心功能,将中央银行独立性、货币稳定政策及金融稳定政策纳入统一框架之下,有效协调货币、金融稳定政策,提高金融机构风险管理水平.     

产权、金融稳定政策与中央银行独立性

This paper builds a micro-behavior model of central bank and financial institutions from the perspective of property-rights. By analyzing the theoretical model and the practice, we conclude that, in the framework of the present financial stabilization policies in China, the central bank’s functions of monetary policy and financial stabilization are enslaved to financial institutions. Thus, central bank independence has been damaged because of the actual property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions. The policy implication is to cut off the property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions. __________ Translated from Caijing wenti yanjiu 财经问题研究 (Research on Finanical and Economic Issues), 2007, (6): 3–9     

信息约束博弈、中央银行独立性与货币、金融稳定政策

以中国金融制度现况为基础,通过构建中央银行-政府-金融机构-居民四部门的博弈模型,将中央银行宏观独立性、微观独立性、货币稳定政策及金融稳定政策纳入统一框架之下。信息约束使中央银行与虚增流动风险、极力游说的金融机构博弈时微观独立性受挫,货币稳定屈服于金融体系稳定;与偏好经济增长和通货膨胀的强势政府博弈时货币与金融双稳定政策屈服于增长政策,进一步加剧通货膨胀风险;居民则被动地为通货膨胀、流动性风险买单。十多年来的货币金融政策操作实践为此提供了佐证,因此,重新设计保证中央银行宏微观独立性的机制尤为重要。     

中央银行独立性与货币政策有效性

货币本位制的确立和二战后各国经济的发展,使得货币政策的重要性日益增强,相应地中央银行独立性问题也引起了广泛的争论。这是因为各国经济发展的实践表明,中央银行能否有效地制定和执行货币政策,保持货币稳定,在很大程度上取决于中央银行的独立性。     

非均衡博弈、央行的微观独立性与最优金融稳定政策

本文从当前金融稳定理论发展和中国金融稳定操作现实出发,构建了中央银行-金融机构-居民部门的非均衡博弈模型,试图寻找最优金融稳定规则。本文的基本结论如下:第一,在当前的金融稳定政策框架下,中央银行的货币与稳定政策组合存在多重均衡的可能;第二,基于中央银行和金融机构对于流动性的信息的不对称,金融机构具有隐藏信息和游说央行的负面激励;第三,中央银行出于对未来支付体系稳定的考虑,在与金融机构的博弈中处于被动地位,金融稳定和货币政策均因此而丧失独立性;第四,居民不具备真正的博弈参与权,而只是博弈结果的承担者,其结果是承担真实或隐性的通货膨胀税;第五,根据以上博弈分析,建立最优金融稳定政策必须在微观机制和宏观机制上实施重新设计,包括金融稳定政策的“最后”性、中央银行的监督权赋予和保持距离型制度安排、金融稳定内含于货币政策,以及稳定与改革的分离和成本的重新界定。     

浅论我国中央银行独立性

在世界金融危机的大背景下,研究我国中央银行的独立性具有重要的现实意义.本文从中央银行独立性的基本理论出发,重点分析了我国中央银行独立性的现状,并对如何完善中央银行独立性提出了建议.     

论中央银行的独立性

中央银行是以实现整个经济为特定目标而非利润最大化的、负责货币政策的政府机构。中央银行的独立性可以表现为两种形式：形式上的独立性与实质上的独立性。美联储可以放弃形式上的独立性成为政府的一部分,但保留实质上的独立性,使其能够置身于党派政治之外。     

透明度、决策博弈与中央银行独立性

随着决策信息需求的增加,公众对货币政策委员会决策透明度的要求也在增加。传统的对中央银行独立性的研究要么只关注透明度原则,要么只关注规则问题。本文将二者结合起来,从博弈视角分析发现,货币政策委员会决策透明度提高并不意味着决策的有效性增加,决策的效果与投票规则相关,保密投票机制可能对应着更高的决策效率。本文通过对美国、日本和中国的比较分析可以看出,中国与美国和日本中央银行独立性之间的差距更多地体现在委员的构成和产生上。因此,提高中国人民银行独立性的当务之急是建立有效的决策机制、强化委员的代表性、协调各方利益以及减少博弈冲突。     

Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence

This paper uses results of a questionnaire survey to look at how central bankers inthe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia view various criteria of centralbank independence and compares their responses with central bankers in industrialcountries. Central bankers from both groups agree very strongly on the importanceof two pillars of central bank independence: goal independence and freedom toimplement these goals, together with a system of how credit is granted by a centralbank to a government that gives the central bank powers to determine terms andlimits the extent of such credit. Based on the responses, the paper also identifiessome weaknesses of the most frequently used indices of central bank independenceand makes recommendations on how to improve them.     

监管独立与金融稳定

本文首先对监管独立和金融稳定的关系加以分析,然后从理论上分析实现监管独立的四个基础条件,并以英国金融服务监管局的FSA为例,分析这四个基础条件在实践中的体现。     

Self-fulfilling Currency Crises and Central Bank Independence

We develop a model of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement derived from the Barro–Gordon model of rules versus discretion. It is shown that the fixed peg is vulnerable to self-fulfilling currency crises in which the unemployment rate increases, the credibility of the rule decreases, but, paradoxically, the reputation of the policy-maker improves. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not prevent this type of crisis from arising, and can even make it more costly.
JEL Classification: F 3; F 4     

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.     

中央银行独立性、责任性与通货膨胀目标制

近年来不少学者提出,我国货币政策应转向通货膨胀目标制。我国现行的政策实际上正是一种隐性的通货膨胀目标制,20世纪90年代以来所发生的几次通货膨胀偏倚很大程度上是由于央行的独立性不够。鉴于通货膨胀目标制并不能解决当前我国货币政策调控中的问题并可能带来更多的问题,今后货币政策改革应坚持由直接调控向间接调控、由数量型调控向价格型调控的转变思路,在提高央行独立性的同时,增强其责任性并提高货币政策的透明度。     

Budget Deficits and Inflation: The Roles of Central Bank Independence and Financial Market Development

This article investigates the relationship between budget deficits and inflation with the view that the nature of this relationship depends on the characteristics of monetary and financial institutions. The main hypothesis is that budget deficits are especially inflationary when both the central bank is not independent and the financial market is not developed enough to contain inflationary expectations. The empirical analysis using a panel data that comprises 54 developed and less developed countries, with one to two decades of observations for each, supports this hypothesis. The findings are also robust to subsets of the sample. (JEL E58 , H62 )     

Central Bank Independence, Inflation Variability, and the Revenue Smoothing Hypothesis

This paper examines the revenue-smoothing hypothesis, which posits that an optimizing government will adjust both taxes and inflation to meet shocks to government spending. Our contribution is to examine this through the lens of a new methodology that relates both the first and second moments of inflation rates to central bank independence (CBI) measures. Unlike existing least-squares-based CBI papers, this study uses a maximum likelihood framework that facilitates the direct inclusion of CBI parameters in the residual covariance matrix. This new approach allows for a more intensive use of information contained in the CBI indexes and the estimates obtained are better reflective of CBI influences. Our results provide stronger evidence confirming the revenue-smoothing hypothesis, in particular for those countries with more independent central banks.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.