Foreign aid and government fiscal behaviour in low-income South Asian countries

The major purpose of this study was to analyse the relationship between foreign aid and government fiscal behaviour using a pooled sample of three low-income South Asian countries: Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. A simultaneous equation system was developed and estimated using nonlinear three-stage least squares procedure. The results confirm the hypothesis that foreign aid affects both the expenditure and the revenue side of the recipient government budgets. Both grants and loans are used for consumption as well as for investment purposes. However, grants leak into consumption more than loans. Thus, if the purpose of aid is to generate investment, it is more helpful if donors extend loans to the developing countries than by giving grants. The results also indicate that both grants and loans increase the taxation effort. Multilateral aid actually pulls resources out of consumption and places them into investment projects. Thus the results confirm the assertion that a shift from bilateral to multilateral aid will induce a greater increase in investment. This could stem from better economic performance resulting from high-conditionality lending associated with aid from the major multilateral agencies.     

What Determines Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence From Time Series Data

This paper models the allocation of bilateral foreign development aid to developing countries. A simple theoretical framework is developed, in which aid is treated as a private good of a donor country bureaucratic group responsible for bilateral aid allocation. This model is applied to time series data for ten principal recipients of bilateral official development assistance. Features of this application are that it caters for the joint determination of aid allocations and for donor allocation behavior to differ among individual recipient countries. Results indicate that both recipient need and donor interest variables determine the amount of foreign aid to developing countries, and that donor allocation behavior often differs markedly among recipients.     

Does German Development Aid Promote German Exports?

Abstract. This paper uses a static and dynamic gravity model of trade to investigate the link between German development aid and exports from Germany to the recipient countries. The findings indicate that, in the long run, German aid is associated with an increase in exports of goods that is larger than the aid flow, with a point estimate of 140% of the aid given. In addition, the evolution of the estimated coefficients over time shows an effect that is consistently positive but that oscillates over time. Interestingly, after a decrease in the 1990s, the estimated coefficients of the effect of aid on trade show a steady increase in the period between 2001 and 2005. The paper distinguishes among recipient countries and finds that the return on aid measured by German exports is higher for aid to countries considered 'strategic aid recipients' by the German government. We also find some evidence that aid given by other EU members reduces German exports.     

Need,Merit, or Self‐Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?

Previous studies of aid allocation have concluded that foreign aid is allocated not only according to development needs but also according to donor self‐interest. We revisit this topic and allow for donor‐ as well as recipient‐specific effects in our analysis. In addition to comments on the statistical significance of our results we assess the relative economic importance of recipient need, merit, and donor self‐interest. Our results indicate that all bilateral donors allocate aid according to their self‐interest and recipient need. However, most bilateral donors seem to place little importance on recipient merit. Less than 1% of the variance of aid is accounted for by merit, ceteris paribus. The UK and Japan are exceptions: they allocate more aid to countries with higher growth, higher democracy scores, and fewer human rights abuses.     

Company interests and foreign aid policy: Playing donors off against one another

The evidence on conditionality indicates that this instrument sometimes works, and sometimes does not work. We suggest that third parties to the donor-recipient relationship influence the aid disbursement. The halt in aid that should follow non-compliance could trigger the recipient to cancel contracts with companies from donor countries, which creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid disbursement. We use a multi-agent triadic model of the relationships between a recipient and two donors and two companies to illustrate that recipients may act strategically to make third parties (like companies and others) influence the disbursement decision. Failing to take account of third parties’ role yields the opposite result; conditionality becomes successful.     

Does development aid increase military expenditure?

Using a new instrumental variable strategy, we examine whether bilateral development aid increases military expenditure in recipient countries. The instrument is the interaction of donor government fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid. The dataset includes new data on military expenditure for 124 recipient countries over the 1975–2012 period. When accounting for outliers, our results do not suggest that development aid affects military expenditure in the full sample. However, the effect of aid on military expenditure varies across characteristics of recipient and donor countries, even after excluding outliers. First, aid increases military expenditure in countries that depend on aid and are prone to conflicts. Second, aid provided by coordinated market economies increases military expenditure.     

Measuring absorptive capacity constraints to foreign aid

To assist with progress towards the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in developing countries, the international community is scaling-up foreign aid to record levels. Concurrently, there are concerns that additional aid will not be used effectively due to a problem of absorptive capacity in recipient countries. Empirical studies lend support to these concerns with many finding that there are diminishing returns to foreign aid. This paper reviews the extensive aid effectiveness literature to identify the various dimensions of absorptive capacity. It proceeds by devising a composite index of absorptive capacity for individual recipient countries which can assist policymakers in guiding the allocation of their aid. The relevance of the index is confirmed through its employment in a standard empirical model of aid effectiveness. The paper highlights the developing countries that currently receive high levels of aid relative to their estimated level of absorptive capacity.     

Good governance and good aid allocation

We model the aid allocation process as a rent-seeking contest between two countries and investigate the effects of differing allocation rules on recipients' behavior in a simple framework. We investigate the aid allocation mechanism design that attempts to increase the governance quality of potential recipient countries: the potential recipients spend costly resources improving governance, while the donor country allocates the fund based on their governance quality. The paper compares two mechanisms: one uses a simple winner-takes-all tournament to award the entire available purse to the country with the best governance; while under the other aid is distributed among countries in proportion to their governance qualities. The paper shows the second mechanism outperforms the first only if competing countries are sufficiently asymmetric. Moreover, the recipient who is most effective in governance – and stands to benefit the most from development assistance – has interests opposite to those of the donor. In addition, the paper shows that if the donor country allocates the fund based on both governance and the levels of poverty, it may result in a poverty trap: the leaders of potential recipient countries deliberately allocate funds away from the poorest so as not to better their position in order to receive more aid.     

Aid effectiveness,governance and public investment

In this paper, we develop a growth model in which aid finances infrastructure investment and pro-poor spending in order to analyze ways through which aid can be made more effective. We assume that the recipient countries are aid-dependent in the early phase of development and that they ultimately become independent. In the model, donors can accelerate a recipient's independence from aid by investing in infrastructure. We demonstrate that even a small increase in aid can improve aid effectiveness and that aid effectiveness depends more on the growth rate than on the efficiency of the government.     

When is Foreign Aid Effective in Fighting Terrorism? Threshold Evidence

Building on the previous literature, we assess when foreign aid is effective in fighting terrorism using quantile regressions on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Bilateral, multilateral and total aid indicators are used whereas terrorism includes: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. We consistently establish that foreign aid (bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at fighting terrorism exclusively in countries where existing levels of transnational terrorism are highest. This finding is consistent with our theoretical underpinnings because donors have been documented to allocate more aid towards fighting transnational terrorist activities in recipient countries because they are more likely to target their interests. Moreover, the propensity of donor interest at stake is likely to increase with initial levels of transnational terrorism, such that the effect of foreign aid is most significant in recipient countries with the highest levels of transnational terrorism. Policy implications and future research directions are discussed.     

The determinants of hospital size: a survivor analysis

A common criticism of foreign aid is that it reduces domestic tax effort. Empirical research on the issue has been hampered by the failure to tackle endogeneity issues effectively. We use measures of geographical and cultural distance to donor countries as instrumental variables to uncover the causal effect of aid on tax revenue in a panel of 93 countries. The tax to GDP ratio is found to decrease following aid inflows. This reduction in tax effort is statistically and economically significant; a one SD increase in aid causes a 0.52 percentage point drop in the tax-to-GDP ratio. The results indicate that the effect is driven by unconditional grants, whereas aid given as loans induces recipient governments to improve their tax effort. Our results are robust to changes in the sample and the use of a nearest neighbour matching technique to account for nonrandom assignment of aid. Our identification strategy is sharpened by the use of a difference-in-difference estimation strategy that leverages a natural experiment in which aid flows exogenously increased for some countries following the Iranian Revolution in 1979.     

Do elites benefit from democracy and foreign aid in developing countries?

A popular argument for the absence of any beneficial effects of foreign aid is that it is skimmed by political elites in recipient countries. However, studies also suggest that aid may be more effective in relatively democratic developing countries. By exploring data on income quintiles derived from the World Income Inequality Database for 88 developing countries, a set of results indicate that foreign aid and democracy in conjunction are associated with a higher share of income held by the upper quintile. It thus appears that foreign aid, contrary to popular beliefs, leads to a more skewed income distribution in democratic developing countries while the effects are negligible in autocratic countries. The paper closes with a discussion of potential mechanisms generating this perverse effect.     

When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination

Foreign aid flows have increased considerably during the last decades, targeting, apart from development objectives, goals related to democracy. In this paper we investigate whether aid has affected the political regime of recipient countries. To this end, we use annual data on Net Official Development Assistance covering 64 aid-recipients. Because of data limitations, we cover the 1967-2002 period. We find that aid flows decreased the likelihood of observing a democratic regime in a recipient country. This effect is sensitive to economic and social conditions. The negative relation between aid and democracy is moderated when aid flows are preceded by economic liberalization. Aid from the U.S. has a non-significant effect on the political regime of recipients.     

Changing aid regimes? U.S. foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror

This paper explores how U.S. bilateral economic aid has changed over time, focusing on how the recent era-in which the War on Terror has played a prominent role in the Bush administration's aid policy-differs from previous eras. In particular, has the renewed geopolitical role of aid coincided with a reduction of aid to the poorest countries or less weight on need in U.S. aid allocation decisions? We start with an analysis of annual U.S. aid budgets from 1955 to 2006. Controlling for domestic political and economic conditions, we find that the War on Terror's effect on the aid budget is significantly larger than is immediately apparent. To explore how the emphasis on need may have changed over time, we use country-level panel data on aid allocations to 119 countries across the same time period. This shows that U.S. aid flows-for the poorest as well as other developing countries-increased with the War on Terror. However, after rising for 35 years, the emphasis placed on need has been falling steadily for core aid recipients during the War on Terror.     

DEMOCRATIC AID AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF RECIPIENTS

We investigate whether democratic aid flows, which are directed toward the democratization of recipients by covering democracy‐related programs and government and civil society activities, affect the future political regime of recipient countries. We introduce a multinomial multivariate logit model and we use 5‐yr averaged data covering the period 1972–2004 for 59 democracy aid‐recipient countries categorized into three broad classes according to the prevalent political regime. We find strong evidence that democratic aid flows are positively associated with the likelihood of observing a partly democratic or a fully democratic political regime in democratic aid‐recipient countries and that this result is robust to the potential endogeneity of democratic assistance.(JEL D70, F35, C25)     

Darlings and Orphans: Interactions across Donors in International Aid

We examine how the bilateral aid flows from an individual donor to a recipient depend on the aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral donors to that recipient. Thereby, we assess to what extent issues including donor coordination, free‐riding, selectivity, specialization, and common donor interests drive bilateral aid allocations. We find that others’ bilateral flows lead to a significant increase in aid flows from a particular donor, but primarily within a given year. The effects are particularly pronounced for large donors and so‐called “darling” recipients. Overall, the results suggest that herding is a dominant feature of aid inter‐relationships.     

Welfare effects of tied food aid

An important part of the overall U.S. aid program is Public Law 480 food aid. The design of the program seeks to satisfy numerous and often conflicting objectives. Several constraints have been placed on the use by recipient countries of that aid to insure that the intentions of the program are achieved. This paper examines the implications for recipient country welfare of both the traditional and the proposed restrictions on PL480 aid. It also seeks to clarify the interpretation of empirical work on the effects of this aid. It is shown that the net value of such commodity tied aid is simply the grant component of the subsidized sale and may easily be realized by substituting food aid imports for commercial imports. Restrictions which prevent aid recipients from doing so are costly to the recipient and could lead even to immuserization. Empirical evidence obtained by others is consistent with the notion that such restrictions are circumvented, where possible, by food aid recipients. The results presented indicate that a ‘Schultzian’ disincentive effect is characteristic of a closed economy. Typical interventions on the part of recipient country governments do not effectively reclose the economy. Hence, open economy models are more appropriate frameworks for evaluating the effects of PL480 aid.     

Competitively awarded government grants

The model of consumer behavior subject to a budget constraint, often applied to such programs as Federal grants to local governments, ignores the fact that the terms and size of the grant may be influenced by the potential recipient's own efforts. This is most clearly true for competitively awarded grants. In a simple case the marginal recipient of a competitively awarded grant receives no net private benefit and imposes a net loss on society for his effort. The issue is general and should be considered in adopting a grant program to achieve social goals.     

Donor–recipient ideological differences and economic aid

We explore the impact of donor–recipient ideological differences on US economic aid decisions. We find that the odds and the amount of aid to left-wing recipients are higher under left-wing US administrations. The opposite result is found for center-right recipients.     

Equal opportunity and poverty reduction: How should aid be allocated?

This paper analyzes a model of aid allocation equalizing the opportunity between recipient countries to reach a common poverty reduction goal. We propose a fair and efficient aid allocation based on a multicriteria principle. The model considers structural handicaps in recipient countries in terms of lack of human capital and economic vulnerability, their initial poverty, and the natural gap between the growth rate required to reach a development goal and the observed one. We show that our proposed aid allocation favors poor and vulnerable countries with our multicriteria principle. It substantially differs from the observed allocation. Analyses also shed light on the impact of the donors' aversion to the low natural growth gap in recipient countries on the optimal aid allocation and the marginal efficiency of aid.