优化激励机制完善国有商业银行治理结构

在商业银行管理机制建设中，激励机制是非常重要和关键的。本文通过引用关于激励机制的理论，探索我国国有商业银行建立有效的激励机制，从而推动国有商业银行完善公司治理结构，建立起现代企业制度。     

上市公司股票期权长期激励机制分析

股票期权制度是世界各国上市公司重要的激励模式,虽然存在一些现实的实施障碍,但股票期权制度必然成为我国上市公司长期激励机制的未来选择。文章围绕该论点,结合美国、中国香港等地股票期权制度,以及我国上市公司的实际情况,探讨适合我国上市公司的股票期权计划。     

国有商业银行建立长效激励机制初探

文章对国有商业银行如何建立长效激励机制进行了探讨。     

浅析国有商业银行理财经理激励机制

随着国有商业银行的改制成功，更加细化的管理经营模式，理财经理负责制逐步实行起来，然而国有商业银行建立理财经理激励机制还有很多问题，比如缺乏长期激励机制，单一化的激励方式，不透明的薪酬体系以及不合理的绩效考核体系等等。本文着重分析这些存在的问题及原因，提出完善的机制和改进措施。     

论我国国有商业银行的激励机制改革

中国即将加入WTO的现实 ,迫切要求我国国有商业银行改革的步子更快、路子更准。文章针对我国国有商业银行激励机制的现状作了一定程度的探讨 ,并就其改革方向提出了建议。     

我国国有商业银行激励机制研究

随着国内金融市场在不断往前发展,国有商业银行面临的竞争也越来越大。银行业是知识和技术含金量较高的行业,现代社会银行的竞争程度很大程度上取决于人才的竞争,现在的商业银行的激励机制还存在许多需要改进的地方。本文通过分析我国商业银行现行的激励机制,找出其不足之处,最后提出改进我国国有商业银行激励机制的建议。     

一种有效的长期激励机制：谈谈股票期权在企业中的应用方式

此文详细描述了股票期权制度在国外的实施条件及主要内容 ,并对我国企业在试行股票期权制度中的方式与国际通行作法进行了比较。建立有效的激励机制问题不仅涉及到企业的发展 ,而且与整个经济的活力紧密相关。目前我国部分国有企业正在进行股票期权的试行方案 ,但与国外的应用方式存在较大的差异 ,因此我们认为设计与推行较为规范的股票期权制度 ,才能使这种在国际上颇为有效的激励机制在中国的试点及应用中取得成功!     

论我国上市公司的股权激励机制

股权激励机制有助于降低企业管理成本、提高企业经济效益,是一种有效的长期激励手段,正在越来越多地被我国企业采用.股权激励在我国自上世纪末开始实施,目前,已经推行和实施的股权激励方式主要有期股激励和管理层收购(MBO).与发达国家相比,我国上市公司股权激励机制的发展严重滞后,股权激励制度还处于萌芽状态,上市公司中还没有非常规范的股票期权计划.完善股权激励机制的几点建议:制定和完善配套的法律法规;建立规范有效的股票市场;建立科学的考核业绩标准;完善公司治理结构和健全企业内部监督机制;制定严格的信息披露制度.     

国有企业经理人薪酬激励机制深化改革研究

随着国有企业混合所有制改革的不断深入,实行与社会主义市场经济相适应的企业经理人薪酬激励机制显得尤为必要.虽然我国国有企业经理人薪酬激励机制也随着整个国有企业收入分配制度的改革而不断深化,但是目前我国国有企业经理人的薪酬激励机制依然存在许多问题,导致了经理人经营行为的异化和人才的流失,对经济长期健康稳定发展产生了极为不利的影响.因此,如何构建有效的国有企业经理人薪酬激励机制是我国国有企业改革和发展中急需解决的重要问题.本文通过分析当前我国国有企业经理人薪酬激励机制现状,指出国有企业经理人薪酬激励机制存在业绩考核指标单一、缺乏长期激励和信息披露制度不健全等问题.最后,针对上述问题提出完善国有企业经理人薪酬激励机制的政策建议.     

关于完善企业员工激励机制的探讨

企业竞争归根到底是人才的竞争,建立合理的工作人员激励机制,激发企业人才的潜能,成为提升企业核心竞争力的有效途径。在实践中,虽然企业意识到激励机制是现代企业制度的核心内容之一,但是对员工的激励机制的建立还有待完善。通过阐述企业激励机制对员工的重要性,在分析我国企业员工激励机制现存问题的基础上,提出了完善我国企业员工激励机制的措施。     

银行规模与经理人激励——基于中国信息和不确定性环境的理论研究

本文基于委托代理激励理论,探讨不同规模银行中信息类别、不确定性信息与合同期限、政府行为等因素对经理人激励的影响.发现在中国这样的转型经济国家中,不确定性、非契约关系与政府行为使得银行规模与其竞争力和生存性的关系变得更加微妙.(1)相对大银行而言,小银行的发展面临更多的机会和风险;(2)长期合同下股权激励对于小银行经理人有着更为重要的意义;(3)客户经理的素质高低与一致性对于小银行激励效率的发挥至关重要;(4)我国小银行与地方政府天然密切的关系对其"软"信息获取作用很大,但同时也可能对其激励机制的长期有效性造成负面影响.     

On Hayek's denationalization of money,free banking and inflation targeting 1

Abstract

Recent central bank experience with inflation targeting is used to restate Hayek's reform proposal as a performance contract. This requires banks to first state an explicit inflation target and then promise to perform a set of actions whenever an independent forecast departs from target. Making such actions explicit and observable makes the promise of price stability offered by competing banks operational and enforceable. Competition among banks then leads to convergence on current best practice in the short term and to faster performance evolution as the incentive to innovate induces improvements over the long term.     

论我国国有商业银行的服务营销

我国商业银行服务营销主要存在着对服务营销认识不足、营销方式过于简单化、营销人才缺乏以及缺少与客户的沟通等方面问题。新时期我国商业银行服务营销的策略,包括建立激励机制、人才本地化、完善客户经理机制和差异化营销等。     

HORIZONTAL SOCIAL COMPARISONS AND VERTICAL RECIPROCITY IN A PRINCIPAL–MULTI‐AGENT EXPERIMENT

The aim of this note is to investigate whether the incentive mechanism based on reciprocity is still effective in the presence of several agents by exploring a principal–multi‐agent relationship in a gift‐exchange experiment. The results show that horizontal social comparisons between agents can undermine the vertical reciprocity‐driven incentive mechanism. When long‐term relationships or merit procedures are introduced in the experiment, reciprocity becomes effective again.     

山西票号与现代商业银行的治理机制比较研究

从产权制度、激励约束机制、组织架构三个方面对山西票号与现代商业银行的企业治理机制进行了比较,认为山西票号尊重股东、管理者、员工利益,以人为本,注重构建激励约束体系,强调总号对分号的控制力及各机构间的紧密联系和信息共享,对现代商业银行有一定借鉴意义。     

Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: the case of Turkish banking system

We investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. We construct a model, under reasonable assumptions, with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk –?moral hazard risk. Empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis. Our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system. We relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks. The research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk-taking.     

我国科技奖励体制发展的路径选择

回顾科技奖励制度及理论的产生与发展,并分析了发达国家科技奖励制度的特点。通过正视当前我国科技奖励在体制、机制、导向方面存在的问题,着眼于构建与市场经济体制相适应的有中国特色的科技奖励制度,促进其朝着有利于国家和社会的长期利益方向发展。     

ON THE WELFARE PROPERTIES OF FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING

Monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking, such as the ability to undertake more profitable (long‐term) investment opportunities, and the difficulties associated with it, such as the risk of insolvency for each bank and the associated losses to bank liability holders. I show that a specific banking arrangement (a joint‐liability scheme) provides an effective mechanism for ensuring the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks, so it is possible to select a socially efficient reserve ratio in the banking system that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a store of value and maximizes the rate of return paid to bank liability holders.     

后金融危机时代我国银行监管的博弈分析

2008年以来的全球金融危机暴露了美国等发达国家在金融监管上的不足,加强金融监管已成为国际社会的共识。在世界各国强有力的干预刺激下,全球经济开始缓慢复苏,新形势下加强银行监管势在必行。在我国,银行业在金融业中一直占主导地位,对商业银行进行合规性监管仍将是现实情况下我国银行监管的重要内容。本文针对我国银行监管现存的问题,建立监管的博弈模型,得出混合战略纳什均衡,并从完善监管的法律体系、规范商业银行信息披露制度、建立监管者的激励约束机制、加强监管的国内国际协调、完善国内银行资本监管制度等方面对我国现行银行监管制度提出了相应的政策建议。     

Bank ownership type and temporal evolution of long‐term bank funding in the period 2005–2017

This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.